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The recent revival of interest in Marxism has addressed the question of subjectivity in new ways. 
This thesis undertakes a critical investigation of the theme of subjectivity in key texts from the 
classical Marxist tradition in preparation for assessing its contribution to contemporary debates. My 
aim in this project has been to explore how one might construct a defensible version of the solution 
to the problem of subjectivity advanced by Marx and his successors. 
Examining Marx’s effort to develop the dialectical unity of subject and object in his Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, I propose the coexistence of two conceptions of subjectivity in 
these Manuscripts. A tension is created within the text that I argue pre-figures the development of 
his theory of commodity fetishism. This theory addresses the problem of the authentic or quasi-
subjectivity of capital. 
This theme is developed through an exploration of the obstacles confronting proletarian subjectivity 
in Marx’s Capital. Within this framework, I show how Marx elaborates concrete forms of working 
class self-activity, such as in his chapter on The Working Day. The relationship between human 
actors and social structures is studied, in particular the role of the knowing subject in the process of 
class struggle, such as with the case of the factory inspectors. I also critically examine the 
interpretation of Capital advanced by Moishe Postone in his work: Time, Labour and Social 
Domination. 
In the third chapter, Lukács’s theory of reification is examined, extending commodity fetishism to 
locate the commodity-form as the structuring principle fragmenting subjectivity in all spheres of 
social life. Following Marx’s discovery of the proletariat as the ‘universal’ class, Lukács poses the 
proletariat as the philosophical basis for overcoming these obstacles. I attempt to locate the 
questions that Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness allows us to ask and those it excludes. 
Whilst Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks do not directly address the theme of alienation and fetishism, in 
the final chapter, I argue that his distinctively concrete account of class subjectivity has a de-
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fetishising function related to the central role played by intellectuals in political leadership. I discuss 
the apparent autonomy of the State in Gramsci’s framework and examine whether this poses a 
problem for his conception of class subjectivity. In order to assess this challenge, I propose a new 
categorisation of two modes – holistic and constitutive – by which Gramsci analyses the State. 
Finally, I consider the possibility that Lukács and Gramsci’s heterogeneous frameworks might yield 
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1) The Return to Marx and Contemporary Debates in Subjectivity 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, there has been a widely acknowledged return to the ideas 
of Karl Marx arising from and resonating with new political movements. This attempt to use Marx’s 
ideas to make sense of the contemporary world has been in continuing dialogue with and against 
the dominant intellectual currents of the twentieth century. For a number of thinkers, such as the 
radical philosophers Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, their engagement with Marxism in the aftermath 
of post-modernism, post-structuralism and other schools of thought has taken the form of 
addressing the problem of subjectivity. 
Thus Žižek, in his book The Ticklish Subject, reworks the opening passages of Karl Marx and Frederick 
Engels’s Communist Manifesto.1 He replaces the spectre of communism hanging over bourgeois 
society in the nineteenth century with the threat of the subversive core of Cartesian subjectivity to 
the consensus of contemporary academic thought. It is the abandonment, he claims, of the 
Cartesian subject by the deconstructionism of the post-modernists or its replacement by some in 
critical theory with ‘discursive inter-subjectivity’ that undermines the possibility of a genuine 
emancipatory project.2 For Žižek, a defensible theory of subjectivity does not simply dissolve the 
subject into flows of meanings or desires, as do the post-structuralists. At the same time, neither 
does he believe that we can uncritically follow Descartes and Hegel in treating the subject as self-
constituting. 
Žižek’s investigation of subjectivity has been influenced by the work of Alain Badiou. Since the late 
1960s, in the context of the disintegration of the Marxist intellectual milieu in France, Badiou has 
attempted to identify an elusive and rare political subjectivity that is constituted by its fidelity to, 
                                                          
1 Žižek, S The Ticklish Subject: the Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999), p.1 
2
 Žižek The Ticklish Subject, p.1 
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what he calls, the Event.3 Through a rigorous investigation of this concept, Badiou seeks to explore 
the philosophical structure of the exceptional, that which breaks from the course of normality. 
Badiou’s notion of fidelity, as interpreted by Alex Callinicos, refers to “the stance or orientation that 
a subject takes up in order to sustain a particular truth through time”.4 
The approaches to the question of subjectivity adopted by Badiou and Žižek both reject the 
relativism of post-modernism and seek to offer a “politics of truth”.5 They make an apparent return 
to themes associated with classical Marxism, such as the class subjectivity of the proletariat. Whilst 
both thinkers accept a break with the orthodoxy of the classical Marxist tradition, Žižek argues that it 
is necessary to undertake the Leninist operation of re-inventing the revolutionary project. For Žižek, 
a return to the Marxist tradition is not simply a re-enaction, but a Kierkegaardian repetition of 
Marxist thought, aiming to “retrieve the same impulse in today's constellation”.6 These thinkers 
propose an emancipatory project that, in Žižek’s words, seeks to “re-formulate a leftist, anti-
capitalist political project in our era of global capitalism and its ideological supplement”.7 
For the classical Marxist tradition, proletarian self-emancipation is central to the anti-capitalist 
project. This certainly poses the question of a break with the normal functioning of capitalist society. 
In this respect we find a correlation between the themes of Badiou and Žižek and classical Marxism. 
There is also of course a conceptual gulf between them. However, a fruitful dialogue may be 
established in which these new approaches to the question of subjectivity can illuminate the 
relationship between the crisis of capitalist society and the conscious revolutionary intervention of 
the working class. I will return to the ideas of Badiou and Žižek in my conclusion. However, it is my 
basic contention that a significant preparatory work is necessary before advancing to clarify the 
relationship between these post-Marxist accounts of subjectivity and the classical Marxist tradition. 
                                                          
3
 Badiou, A Being and Event (London: Continuum, 2007), p.180, p.392 – For Badiou, an Event can take a 
political form, such as the French revolution, the Russian revolution of 1917, or the events of May 1968, but 
can potentially also take other forms, such as that of a sublime work of art. 
4
 Callinicos, A The Resources of Critique (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p.102 
5
 Žižek, S “A Plea for Leninist Intolerance” Critical Inquiry 28:2 (Winter 2002), p.547 
6
 Žižek “A Plea for Leninist Intolerance”, p.553 
7
 Žižek The Ticklish Subject, p.4 
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2) The Problem of Subjectivity and the Classical Marxist Tradition 
In this context, I propose to undertake an investigation of four key texts by Karl Marx, Georg Lukács 
and Antonio Gramsci in order to establish the ground-work from which the contribution of the 
classical Marxist tradition to renewed debates in subjectivity can be assessed. I examine the role of 
the problem of subjectivity in the foundation of Marxism and its elaboration by Marx’s successors. 
The former is achieved through an analysis of the development between Marx’s Early Writings and 
his mature thought. 
For the latter, I have chosen to study Georg Lukács and Antonio Gramsci as two key thinkers who 
sought to renew Marxism in opposition to the fatalistic reading advanced by the leading 
theoreticians of the Second International. Following the revolutionary struggles in the first decades 
of the twentieth century, these radical critics sought to reinstate subjectivity to a central location in 
the Marxist theory of history. It is perhaps not coincidental that contemporary thinkers such as 
Badiou and Žižek again regard this theme as central to the project of re-inventing Marxist thought. 
In the thesis, a substantive impression of each thinker’s notion of subjectivity emerges from their 
formulation of the obstacles facing the proletariat in becoming a subject. In order to address Marx’s 
conception of subjectivity, I will examine his theories of alienated labour and commodity fetishism. 
This theme of the obstacles confronting the proletariat is presented first through a close reading of 
his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, and subsequently through an analysis of his 
later thought in Capital. 
I will then draw out the conceptions of subjectivity advanced by Lukács and Gramsci in their works 
History and Class Consciousness (1923) and The Prison Notebooks (1929-35) respectively. Lukács 
extends Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism by analysing the relationship between the structuring 
forms of the economy and the creation of class consciousness, producing a distinctively polarised 
conception of subjectivity. This gives rise to radical insights but also to theoretical difficulties, as I 
seek to demonstrate. Although Gramsci conceptualises the processes that produce obstacles to 
13 
 
proletarian subjectivity very differently to Marx and Lukács, I will examine the connections between 
the theme of alienation, fetishism and reification, and Gramsci’s particular concerns. 
This thesis contends that tracing the theme of subjectivity through the writings of Lukács and 
Gramsci illuminates, with increasing definition, aspects of the problem that are embryonic in Marx’s 
thought. Lukács’s desire for the proletariat to become the “identical subject-object” of history and 
Gramsci’s aim to develop a proletarian hegemonic project each address the question of proletarian 
revolution posed by Marx.8 Both attempt to identify the revolutionary character of Marx’s dialectical 
method. This is reflected in their efforts to elaborate the essential core of Marxism as a philosophy 
of praxis. 
The aspects of Marx’s thought developed by Lukács, particularly the theory of reification, have 
become an important foundation for the subsequent critical theory of the Frankfurt school, and a 
key reference for the contemporary debates in subjectivity discussed above. Likewise a version of 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony has been mobilised by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in 
support of their post-Marxist approach.9 Parallels have been drawn between Gramsci’s writings on 
language, his critique of the empiricist notion of ‘objective reality’, and the relativistic approach of 
post-modernism.10 
However, each of these ‘developments’ requires the detachment of key aspects of these thinkers’ 
frameworks from its connection to class struggle and social revolution, and its corresponding 
economic basis. Whilst the development of the classical Marxist tradition in distinctive directions by 
Lukács and Gramsci might be considered a divisive tension within it, their work also motivates a 
clarification of our interpretation of this tradition. I will examine both the elements of division and 
compatibility in the frameworks of Lukács and Gramsci, and ask whether there can be a mutually 
reinforcing reading of their work. 
                                                          
8
 Lukács, G History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin, 1971), p.149 
9
 Laclau, E and Mouffe, C Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: 
Verso, 1985)  
10
 Ives, P Language and Hegemony in Gramsci (London: Pluto, 2004), p.135 
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a) The Modern Notion of the Self 
The problem of subjectivity inherited by Marx can be traced back through the traditions of classical 
German philosophy to the origins of the modern notion of the self. In turn, pre-figurations of this 
notion can be found in conceptions passed down by the ancient Greeks. Its development can be 
charted through medieval and Renaissance thought to the 17th century shift to what Charles Taylor 
calls the modern “self-defining subject”.11 Taylor argues that this process arrives at “two seemingly 
indispensable images of man”: a subject defined in relation to something external to it, and a subject 
that is self-defining.12 These two images appear to have “deep affinities”, and yet at the same time 
seem to be “utterly incompatible”.13 They both arise as reactions to or developments of the radical 
Enlightenment. 
The culmination of this process, in what Taylor calls Georg Hegel’s ‘expressivism’, forms an essential 
part of the background of Marx’s own thought. Hegel articulates the central expressivist aspiration 
to transcend what he argued was the dualism in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. He sought to unite 
moral freedom and communion with nature in a self-constituting, absolute subject. This project is a 
precursor to Marx’s effort to develop the idea of the dialectical unity of subject and object, notably 
in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. 
Marx, like Hegel before him, seeks, in Taylor’s words, to “escape from a predicament in which the 
subject is over against an objectified world”.14 Marx’s confrontation with these problems would give 
rise to a radically new outlook and the ‘discovery’ of a new subject: the proletariat. The 
development of Marx’s thought is entwined with the problem of subjectivity and the complex of 
theoretical threads through which modern notions of selfhood are constituted. 
                                                          
11
 Taylor, C Hegel (Cambridge: CUP, 1975), p.7 
12
 Taylor Hegel, p.3 
13
 Taylor Hegel, p.3 
14
 Taylor Hegel, p.29 
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b) Marx and Subjectivity 
As a Young Hegelian, Marx conceived the problem of subjectivity as the problem of universal human 
emancipation. In his Early Writings, this emancipation is realised primarily through philosophy. 
However, Marx develops the notion that human emancipation comes about through revolution, and 
recognises that a revolution needs a “material basis”, even if seen as a “passive element”.15 The 
passivity of this material basis is reflected in Marx’s analogy, adapted from Feuerbach,16 of 
philosophy as the head of emancipation, and the proletariat as its heart.17 
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, motivated by his study of the French Revolution and 
the writings of political economy, Marx moves towards identifying a material basis for the dynamic 
conception of human nature that he detects in modern society. The impulse of this development is 
an understanding of the subjectivity of labour and that of private property. The theory of estranged 
labour that he develops in the Manuscripts begins to lay the basis for a conception of the proletariat 
as a subject. I will argue that this shift in Marx’s conception of subjectivity demonstrates that he is 
on the threshold of a new project. 
Marx’s discussion of the problem of subjectivity will set the parameters within which my 
investigation of subjectivity is located. Thus I will mainly be concerned with the question of collective 
subjects and, for Marxism in particular, with the problem of the subjectivity of classes. Since Marx 
never formulated a definitive statement of his conception of class, it is necessary to infer this from 
his writings. It is also apposite to ask how classes are composed as subjects, how a class is capable of 
action, and what processes might inhibit its activity. These questions are linked to an understanding 
of the relationship between consciousness and collective action. It is further necessary to enquire 
whether a theory of the subjectivity of classes is compatible with notions of other collective subjects, 
such as society, or the State. 
                                                          
15
 Marx, K Early Writings (London: Penguin, 1992 [1975]), p.252 (emphasis in original unless otherwise stated) 
16
 Löwy, M The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx (Chicago: Haymarket, 2005), p.58 
17
 Marx Early Writings, p.257 
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Given the wealth of texts produced by Marx, and the even greater volume of subsequent Marxist 
theory, this thesis has been highly selective in its sources. In order to trace the development of the 
theme of subjectivity in Marx’s work, I have selected a close reading of key texts: his Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, and his later writings in Capital. This excludes other texts by 
Marx, such as his Grundrisse, or his political and historical writings (e.g. The 18th Brumaire, The Civil 
War in France) from a similar treatment. However, as indicated in my methodological comments 
below, I have demarcated the boundaries of this project, in order that the framework that it 
develops can be fruitfully tested and expanded in the future. 
3) The Obstacles Confronting the Proletariat 
In this thesis, I will focus on the political aspect of the problem of revolutionary subjectivity, in 
particular the potential for the proletariat to become a collective political agent. A theme that 
emerges across the texts is the attempt of each to characterise the obstacles confronting the 
proletariat in this task, or as David Harvey, another exemplar of the return to Marx, puts it, what the 
proletariat are “forced to cope with and defend against”.18 
Thus Marx, in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, formulates the theory of 
alienated labour, the way in which workers create an autonomous, alien power over and against 
themselves. In the Manuscripts, the centrality of labour, and the theory of its estrangement, comes 
into conflict with the framework associated with the concept of species-being. By investigating the 
presence of two conflicting subjectivities within this work, the subjectivity of private property and 
the subjectivity of labour, I seek to demonstrate how Marx initially formulates the problem of the 
authentic or quasi-subjectivity of private property. 
Examining the former, I trace the historical development of the concept of industry and its 
relationship to the internally dynamic nature of political economy, and its status as “modern 
                                                          
18
 Harvey, D Limits to Capital (London: Verso, 1999), p.113 
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industry as self”.19 The latter conception – the subjectivity of labour – underpins Marx’s first critique 
of political economy, and his project to rise above it. I ask whether this project can be identified with 
his theory of communism, rising above crude communism through various stages of transcendence 
in a Hegelian manner. 
I propose that the two conceptions of subjectivity, identified above, coexist in the Manuscripts, but 
are placed under tension by Marx’s project to reduce them to a single conception. This internal 
tension is a productive force that leads Marx towards the identification of the division of labour with 
the “perceptibly alienated expressions” of human activity and to the threshold of a new project.20 
Although Marx operates with a different analytical framework in the Manuscripts to that found in his 
later writings, the internal development of his thought presses towards the formulation of the 
theory of commodity fetishism. 
a) Between Alienation and Commodity Fetishism 
The close relationship between Marx’s conception of alienation and the development of his theory 
of commodity fetishism binds the interpretation of these two works together. The embryonic 
treatment of the relationship between capital and labour in his Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts arises from the tensions that I identify within this work. In Capital, the development of 
Marx’s critique of political economy leads to the articulation of a more richly determined framework 
of concepts with which he investigates the capitalist mode of production. 
In his later work, Marx re-formulates the problem of the authentic or quasi-subjectivity of private 
property. Whereas in the Manuscripts the movement of private property is the primary focus, in 
Capital private property as a juridical expression is subordinated to an investigation of the relations 
of production.21 The movement of capital is conceptualised as a process of self-valorization, of value 
generating itself, through which past labour confronts living labour and becomes authentically 
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transformed into capital. His theory of commodity fetishism explains the economic mechanism by 
which this personification of things and reification of persons take place. 
Although the subsequent historical debate regarding the role of the concept of alienation in his later 
work will not be rehearsed here,22 it should be noted that even in the latter stages of producing a 
draft of Capital, Marx continues to develop this notion. Thus in the chapter, published in 1933, 
entitled The Results of the Immediate Process of Production (Resultate), Marx argues that the rule of 
the capitalist over the worker is the “rule of things over man”, “the alienation [Entfremdung] of man 
from his own labour” [C, I, p.990].23 
Indeed in Volume I of Capital itself, Marx discusses how the worker “constantly produces objective 
wealth, in the form of capital, an alien power that dominates and exploits him” [C, I, p.716]. And in 
Volume III of Capital, Marx discusses the inversion of the relation between subject and object at 
length.24 Nevertheless, Michael Lebowitz claims that Capital does not treat the worker as a human 
being, but rather as an object within the labour process.25 For Lebowitz, Marx “does not explore the 
side of the capital/wage-labour relation which involves the creation of new social needs for 
workers”.26 In the chapter on Capital, I will investigate Lebowitz’s claim that this subjective aspect is 
not fully developed in Marx’s later writings. It is evident however, that the relationship between the 
theme of alienation and the subjectivity of the working class is not a straightforward one. 
In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx’s theory of communism is presented as the 
positive supersession of private property, the overcoming of the system of estranged labour. In my 
study of Marx’s Capital, I investigate whether Marx’s mature critique of political economy is capable 
of advancing a corresponding theory of the working class as a subject with the potential to 
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overcome commodity fetishism, a theory of proletarian revolution. I will ask whether his study of the 
laws of development of the capitalist system conflict with the notion that revolutions are the result 
of a process of class struggle, and whether he gives a concrete account of the nature of the 
communist activity proposed in his Early Writings. 
Moishe Postone’s interpretation of Capital, in his work Time, Labour and Social Domination, argues 
against the ‘traditional’ Marxist conception of the working class as the potential revolutionary 
subject in capitalist society.27 Postone claims that Marx’s mature theory is a critique of industrial 
labour, rather than a critique from the standpoint of labour, and that Capital gives rise to the non-
personal social domination of capital as a subject. Against Postone, I argue that Marx’s later writings 
take up, in Chris Arthur’s words, the “critically adopted standpoint of labour”.28 
From this perspective it is possible to read Capital as both a theory of determinate forms of social 
mediation and as a class-based analysis. Even if the possibility of proletarian self-emancipation is not 
present in the same manner as Marx’s earlier work proclaims the project of communism, I will 
demonstrate how he develops more concrete forms of working class self-activity in Capital. 
Furthermore, I will suggest that it is possible to find, as Karl Korsch contends, the latent 
“revolutionary will” of Marx’s earlier writings present throughout his later work.29 
b) From Commodity Fetishism to Reification 
Famously, Georg Lukács, without having access to Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, 
was able to re-construct many of the themes of Marx’s early exploration of the theme of alienation 
in his work History and Class Consciousness. At the same time, Lukács bases his writings on the 
theory of commodity fetishism developed by Marx in Capital. Marx’s solution to the problem of the 
quasi-subjectivity of capital is essentially a conception of the economic mechanism of fetishism, 
whereby social relations take on the natural properties of things. 
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In his Resultate, a draft chapter for Capital, Marx describes the process of material production as the 
“life-process in the realm of the social” [C, I, p.990]. Although Marx’s Resultate were also unavailable 
to Lukács, it is this wider interpretation of the economic sphere, in the sense of a life-process, which 
he takes as the basis for his investigations. Lukács extends Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism to 
explain its manifestation in all spheres of social life. 
Lukács’s theory of reification examines the connection between mediation and class structure to 
explain why the proletariat is the only class capable of generating the necessary mediations to 
penetrate “authentic” reality and thus to transform it.30 Lukács develops the subjective aspect of 
Marx’s thought, particularly his observation in the Resultate that the worker “stands on a higher 
plane than the capitalist”, since he “has his roots in the process of alienation” and “confronts it as a 
rebel” [C, I, p.990]. Lukács attempts to give the worker’s unique standpoint a philosophical basis.  
This conception of the proletariat as the solution to the antinomies of bourgeois thought has been 
criticised for its apparently teleological approach, in which the proletariat is seen as the realisation 
of the universal absolute. By postulating the proletariat as the ‘identical subject-object’ of history, 
Lukács appropriates Fichte’s solution to the schism between subject and object.31 It is not self-
evident whether his transposition of this solution into a Marxist framework is able to overcome the 
weaknesses that Lukács himself identifies in Fichte’s philosophy. Later I investigate the difficulties 
associated with giving a concrete account of this subject of revolutionary action, and its relationship 
to Marx’s notion of the proletariat as the ‘universal’ class. I will ask whether this philosophical 
conception of the proletariat is inevitably separated from the empirically-existing working class, and 
whether this gap can be overcome.  
In contrast to the central unifying role that the concept of labour plays in Marx’s Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts, Lukács’s discussion of the work process is structured around the 
relationship between workers’ social existence and the forms of their consciousness. I will assess 
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whether the absence of an explicit theorisation of labour in Lukács’s framework makes it difficult for 
him to formulate the distinction between objectification and alienation found in Marx’s Manuscripts. 
Lukács himself argues this point in his Preface to HCC from 1967.32 
Lukács’s conception of the philosophy of history is a very important element to the defensibility of 
his position. This theme unites Lukács and Gramsci in a common concern to understand the meaning 
of Engels’s pronouncement that the proletariat is the inheritor of classical German philosophy. I 
argue against the commonly-held conception that Lukács conceives modern philosophy as a linear 
development from Kant, through Fichte and Schelling, culminating in Hegel. Whilst Hegel represents 
the most profound attempt to overcome the antinomies of bourgeois thought, Lukács sees all the 
failed attempts to overcome these antinomies as vitally instructive aspects that must be 
incorporated into a many-sided understanding of the Marxist dialectic. 
Lukács makes a link between the category of totality and the revolutionary standpoint in order to 
oppose the apparent ‘scientism’ of the opportunist tendency; those who would artificially isolate the 
‘facts’ from the whole, or who conceive the subject that perceives these ‘facts’ as outside of the 
historical process.33 Although it is a somewhat abstract notion, Lukács sees a standpoint oriented on 
totality as necessary for generating the mediating links to overcome reification. I will attempt to 
show how the framework developed by Lukács allows direct questions to be posited about the 
creation of revolutionary subjectivity and the proletariat becoming a ‘class-for-itself’, but also raises 
difficulties. 
c) A Theory of Fetishism in Gramsci? 
Antonio Gramsci tends to construct the question of the obstacles confronting the revolutionary 
subjectivity of the proletariat in a very different way to the problematic of alienation, commodity 
fetishism and reification. In Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks I discover a distinctively concrete account of 
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class subjectivity in his generalised theory of class power. His hostility to speculative or metaphysical 
arguments makes him averse to a foundational account of the proletariat as a potential absolute. 
Nevertheless I will contend that there is a relationship between these conceptions and his rather 
different concerns. 
Following recent scholarship, I dispute the account of Gramsci’s anti-‘economism’ as demonstrating 
a lack of sophistication in political economy.34 In particular, I contend that the absence of an explicit 
focus on the economic mechanism of commodity fetishism in his writings, implies neither that he 
would reject such a mechanism, nor that his work fails to treat the manifestations of commodity 
fetishism at levels other than the economic. In a similar way to Lukács, Gramsci is motivated by 
Marx’s conception of the economy in the wider sense of the “life-process in the realm of the social” 
[C, I, p.990]. Gramsci’s distinctive characterisation of this mediated relationship between man and 
matter is that of the unity between the levels of the economy, philosophy and politics [SPN, p.402].35 
Indeed Gramsci analyses the tendency by which political organisations become fetishized, or 
“mummified” [SPN, p.211], over and against individual members, who no longer recognise their 
active role as an element of a collective will. Gramsci formulates the harmful passivity that arises 
amongst the lay membership, and the corresponding autonomy of the bureaucratic elements within 
it. Thus the political organism appears as a “phantasmagorical being … a kind of autonomous 
divinity”, which has neither a “concrete brain”, nor “specific human legs”, but nevertheless thinks 
and moves for itself [SPN, p.187 fn.83]. I argue that Gramsci’s conception of a revolutionary party, 
the Modern Prince, is intended to play a de-fetishising function in overcoming these organisational 
problems.  
This analysis is rooted in the economic structure of capitalism, since Gramsci is searching for the 
organisational forms that can support the practices through which the proletariat can develop its 
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own independent leadership of a historical bloc of the subaltern classes. Central to Gramsci’s 
analysis, is his conception of the contradictory consciousness of the working class [SPN, p.333]. 
Under capitalism, the consciousness of workers is composite, consisting of a conception of the world 
expressed in their “effective action” in struggle as an “organic totality” [SPN, p.327], and another 
that is more superficial, inherited and taken up from the dominant world-view of the hegemonic 
class. Gramsci’s conception of a revolutionary organisation is one that works on making coherent the 
world-view arising from the experience of working class self-activity, which requires overcoming the 
“mummified” conceptions of the world in popular culture [SPN, p.417]. In this sense, the Modern 
Prince again plays a de-fetishising function in Gramsci’s thought. 
Thus both Lukács and Gramsci are concerned with overcoming the obstacles to proletarian 
subjectivity and with the development of the revolutionary consciousness of the working class. For 
both, the consciousness of workers is conceived as a part of social reality, not simply a passive 
reflection, but as a critical practical activity [SPN, p.333].36 Gramsci’s framework emphasises the 
emergence of a new conception of the world through the criticism of ‘common sense’ and its 
renovation into a coherent world-view. Thus, in contrast to Lukács, he confronts the problem of 
superseding existing modes of thinking without the application of a transcendent principle.  
Whereas Marx frequently employs an analogy between the “inversion of subject into object” in 
religion at the ideological level with the phenomena of fetishism [C, I, p.990], Gramsci engages with 
the theme of religion as a way of analysing the strength of tradition as a force that organises the 
masses through “doctrinal unity” [SPN, p.328]. Whilst Gramsci might not reject the theoretical 
importance of penetrating fetishistic appearances, his primary focus is with the immanent 
development of new social forces. 
Gramsci’s concern with the development of ideas is concentrated on the process by which they 
acquire “fanatical granite compactness”, the way in which “popular beliefs” assume the energy of 
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“material forces” [SPN, p.377, p.404]. His emphasis on the practical efficacy of philosophy as a 
measure of its value tends to give the impression that ‘truth’ is something pragmatically relative. By 
contrast, Lukács’s identification of totality as the bearer of revolution in Marxist thought seeks to 
deliver an overarching principle for establishing the truth of a revolutionary position. The gulf 
separating these positions may not be unbridgeable however, when we consider that Gramsci’s 
criterion for establishing whether a philosophy is “historically true” is the extent to which it can 
become “concretely – i.e. historically and socially – universal” [SPN, p.348].  
Therefore Gramsci’s concern with the concrete does not exclude him from orienting on a totalising 
project. Whilst Gramsci never reaches towards a universal outlook without forging a concrete 
analysis at each level, there is a consistently revolutionary impulse embedded within the developing 
autonomy of the counter-hegemonic project of the subaltern classes. In particular, the distinctively 
concrete nature of Gramsci’s account of the construction of the hegemonic project of the dominant 
class, and the counter-hegemony of the subaltern classes, develops Marx’s concrete analysis of the 
effects of working class struggle on the functioning of capital in his chapter on The Working Day. 
For Gramsci there is “no organisation without intellectuals” [SPN, p.334], and he studies the 
particular role played by intellectuals in political leadership. I argue that one of the specificities of 
Gramsci’s framework is the central role played by the intellectual as a unit or building block in his 
understanding of political leadership. Where Marx’s observations on the relationship between the 
working class movement and the factory inspectors give particular insights into the role of the 
knowing subject in the process of class struggle, Gramsci develops a more comprehensive and 
explicit theory of the relationship between intellectuals and the class struggle, and the relationship 
between philosophy, political organisation and ideology. I consider Gramsci’s expansion of the term 
‘intellectual’, and will contend that the category of the “traditional intellectual”, despite its bearers’ 
claims to autonomy from a class framework, in fact constitutes a complexity, rather than an 
anomaly, in his conception of class subjectivity. 
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The universal moment of Gramsci’s thought discussed above is closely connected with the 
realisation of a hegemonic project and the formation of a State. This raises the question of whether 
Gramsci’s notion of the collective subject extends beyond the subjectivity of classes, or, in other 
words, whether Gramsci’s account in fact gives the State the status of a subject. I assess examples of 
the apparent autonomy of the State in Gramsci’s framework and ask whether they pose a challenge 
to his conception of class subjectivity. In order to theorise this problem, I propose a new 
categorisation of two modes by which Gramsci analyses the State: the holistic and the constitutive.  
The first, constitutive mode is found in Gramsci’s demonstration that the molecular processes by 
which the State bureaucracy is formed have their basis in a class framework. This mode brings the 
apparent autonomy of the State, for example in the case of Caesarism or Bonapartism, within the 
domain of his class analysis. By contrast, the second, holistic mode of analysis employed by Gramsci, 
considers the relations between State and class at a totalising, holistic level. This mode is 
exemplified in Gramsci’s analysis of the way that prestige is reflected by a State onto the dominant 
class. It is also found in his analysis of the conception of ‘State Spirit’. This holistic mode 
demonstrates the active role that the State plays in the formation of a class subject. The discussion 
will attempt to demonstrate that Gramsci’s analysis of the State requires the articulation of both of 
these modes, and suggest possible ways to explain their interrelationship. 
Although the particular framework adopted by each thinker reveals different approaches to the 
problem of subjectivity, I will try to demonstrate that there are certain common characteristics of 
the classical revolutionary Marxist conception. For example, examining Gramsci’s use of the concept 
‘catharsis’ to denote the “starting point for all the philosophy of praxis” [SPN, p.367],37 I will consider 
whether this can be compared with Lukács’s conception of the ‘leap’ from empirical to 
imputed/ascribed class consciousness. This possible complementarity in the Gramscian and 
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Lukácsian frameworks could provide a point of departure for developing an adequate Marxist 
conception of subjectivity. 
4) Methodology 
In this project, I adopt a method of close reading in order to establish the framework of concepts 
adopted by Marx, Lukács and Gramsci in their texts. I aim to elaborate the problem of subjectivity 
within the theoretical framework of each thinker before taking up the analysis from a critical 
perspective. The difficulties of attempting to rise from an immanent to a critical standpoint can be 
addressed through a comparative analysis of the different frameworks developed. 
I attempt to provide the necessary space for such comparative analyses of the various thinkers over 
the course of the thesis. This imposes the problem of translating the particular terminology that 
arises within each chapter. I seek to counter this tension by constructing a generalised set of 
concepts that can be deployed across the thesis, and by drawing out the common themes in each 
chapter.  
This method does not claim access to an authentic or an originating moment of reading these texts, 
rather it seeks to illuminate elements that may have remained dormant or undeveloped: the paths 
not taken. Thus I contend that a re-immersion in these texts will help to articulate a richer 
determination of the conceptions of Marx, Lukács and Gramsci, and to avoid particular one-sided 
interpretations. 
To a certain extent this process necessitates a stripping back of the partisan history of subsequent 
debates in so far as they constitute an obstruction to a live engagement with the texts. At the same 
time, I aim not to disregard the continuing relevance held by these controversies. This method will 
therefore limit to a certain extent the exposition of secondary literature in favour of a close 
engagement with the texts. The goal of this thesis is not to retrieve an ossified relic relevant only to 
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the historical conditions of each thinker, but to re-conceive the ‘authenticity’ of the work as the 
transfer of a living method that can contribute to contemporary debates. 
5) Further Investigations 
I have suggested that the timely nature of re-examining the theme of subjectivity within key texts of 
classical Marxism arises from contemporary debates on this topic. Whilst this provides a justification 
for adopting the concept of subjectivity as the organising theme, it is also important to note other 
potential focuses, such as the notions of consciousness or agency. Whilst these topics do not play a 
central role, it will become evident that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and appear as 
elements throughout the thesis. 
The breadth of possible discussions on the theme of subjectivity has necessitated the focus of this 
thesis on a particular aspect of this question. Thus it deals with the issue of political class subjectivity 
in selected works from the classical Marxist tradition. As I have indicated, any selection necessarily 
entails certain exclusions and the bracketing of the object of study. For example, Karl Korsch’s 
Marxism and Philosophy could have been studied as a different example of the trend identified here 
in Lukács and Gramsci. 
Similarly, an evaluation of the issues raised by Chris Arthur with respect to the structural relationship 
between Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic would require a close reading of Hegel’s later work. As has 
been suggested by Taylor, an interest in the young Hegel, particularly his Phenomenology of Spirit, 
can be found amongst those with affinities for Marx’s earlier writings, including the Manuscripts.38 In 
both cases, a detailed study of major works by Hegel has not been possible in this project. 
The attempt to bracket the focus of this thesis on the issue of class subjectivity is of course not 
always effective. This is demonstrated by the discussion of the individual subjectivity of the factory 
inspectors in Capital. Thus Jean-Paul Sartre’s valorisation of individual subjectivity could have 
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provided a sharp contrast to the subordinate position of the individual in Lukács’s framework, who 
intransigently declares: “No path leads from the individual to the totality”.39 Sartre’s Critique of 
Dialectical Reason (1960) and his attempts to examine the relationship between biography and 
history, between singularity and totalisation present another angle from which to address Marx’s 
conception of personalisation. His later project to fuse Marxism and psycho-analysis also provides a 
further link, albeit against the grain, with contemporary debates in subjectivity, in particular Slavoj 
Žižek’s presentation of Marxism in Lacanian terms. 
The thesis focuses on a close reading of selected texts in order to create an apparatus for 
subsequent critical readings of other texts and debates impossible to cover in the scope of the 
present study. The effectiveness of this method may be judged from its application in the critique of 
Moishe Postone’s Time, Labour and Social Domination. In turn this helps to highlight certain 
analytical points within the preceding interpretation of Capital. In the conclusion, I will elaborate the 
key themes and general characteristics of the classical Marxist conception of subjectivity developed 
in the different frameworks of Marx, Lukács and Gramsci.  
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a) One or Two Subjectivities in the Manuscripts? 
Karl Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts1 form a relatively brief work, or ensemble of 
texts,2 when placed in comparison alongside the three published volumes of Capital. They present 
the task of interpreting Marx’s commentary on various excerpts from the writings of classical 
political economy as well as dense, and often elliptical, philosophical passages. It is not easy to 
assess whether a plain and coherent overall narrative can be extracted from these exploratory 
writings. At the same time, reading the Manuscripts provides the experience of Marx’s first concrete 
attempt to produce an intellectual synthesis of political economy and philosophy. However 
problematic or incomplete this attempted synthesis might be, it has been described as the moment 
of birth of a new project for Marx,3 the understanding of which is crucial to the interpretation of his 
later work. 
The specific aspect of this question of synthesis with which this chapter is concerned is the problem 
of subjectivity. In particular, I will investigate whether it is possible to extract a defensible framework 
for an understanding of subjectivity from the Manuscripts. I will question whether the Manuscripts 
in fact present us with a single conception of subjectivity at all, or whether we can rather find within 
them two discordant and competing conceptions of subjectivity. I will seek to address this question 
by first considering the latter possibility, and then by asking whether Marx attempts to unify these 
                                                          
1
 Marx, K Early Writings (London: Penguin, 1992 [1975]) – Henceforth referenced in the text as [EW, p.page], 
i.e. [Early Writings, p.page] 
2
 The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts were not prepared or intended for publication by Marx. They 
are in a number of sections fragmentary. Their internal structure is documented in the Marx-Engels Gesamt-
Ausgabe (Marx, K and Engels, F Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) 1. Abteilung, Bd.2: Apparat (Berlin: Dietz, 1975)), and 
has also been the object of study for several writers (see Fay, M “The Influence of Adam Smith on Marx's 
Theory of Alienation” Science & Society Vol. XLVII No.2 (Summer 1983)). The significance of this structure for 
Marx’s thought cannot be studied in this project, but merits further investigation. 
3
 István Mészáros calls this project a work of “synthesis in statu nascendi” (Mészáros, I Marx's Theory of 
Alienation (Delhi: Aakar, 2006), p.15). Although Mészáros places a forceful emphasis on the aspects of 
continuity in Marx's writings, this formulation seems flexible enough to incorporate a continuing development 
and evolution of Marx's thought. 
31 
 
two, either in thought, in practice or both, and to what extent he is successful in formulating a 
project capable of achieving this. 
Initially, I will consider the case of two conceptions of subjectivity: the subjectivity of private 
property and the subjectivity of labour. In doing so, I will advance a further bifurcation by positing 
the possibility of isolating two different levels from which to consider these conceptions of 
subjectivity. Thus the Manuscripts can be examined at one level from the perspective of a critique of 
theory, or from another as the investigation of the actual subjects themselves. On the first level, I 
will argue that Marx's criticism of theory analyses the expression in consciousness of the “real energy 
and movement” of these subjects, whilst at the same time ascribing to theory an active and 
transformative role [EW, p.341].4 Applying this to the case of two discordant conceptions of 
subjectivity, I will propose that political economy and communism are two discordant theories of 
subjectivity.5 
Marx conceives political economy as “modern industry as self” [EW, p.341], an internally dynamic 
and contradictory theory that develops a “cosmopolitan, universal energy” [EW, p.342].  Political 
economy, as a theory, initially appears to recognise man, but becomes increasingly cynical of its own 
original (human) conception. Marx also considers the development of the consciousness of 
communism, from its crude form as the abolition of private property “as such” through successive 
stages to a communism apprehended as the positive transcendence of private property [EW, p.345]. 
These bodies of thought, whilst dynamic and interrelated, nevertheless suggest that these two 
different conceptions of subjectivity can be represented as two distinct theoretical entities. 
In the second reading, Marx is concerned with establishing the essential nature of the subjects 
themselves. The Manuscripts were Marx’s first close and systematic engagement with political 
economy, from which he extracted an understanding of the economic system. This investigation led 
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him to weigh seriously the way in which the movement of private property as modern industry 
develops as a real power, and thus, in the form of capital, attains independence as an authentic 
subject. Thus I will assess the evidence presented in the Manuscripts that Marx treats private 
property, and in particular private property as capital, as an authentic subject. 
At the same time, one of the defining features of the Manuscripts is the central and active role that 
Marx attributes to labour. He seizes firstly upon, what he sees as, the progressive core of 
“enlightened political economy” [EW, p.342]. This is its recognition of labour as the “sole essence of 
wealth”, the “subjective essence of wealth” [EW, p.343], as the means through which the worker 
appropriates nature. The increasing historical power of labour, its capacity to produce an ever-
growing wealth of products, both materially and intellectually, seems to indicate that here we have 
an, and in the future possibly the, authentic subject. I will further examine to what extent Marx 
poses this second conception of subjectivity, of the self-creation of man through human labour, as 
an authentic subject. 
Thus I find two opposing conceptions of subjectivity, of private property and labour, each of which I 
will attempt to consider on two distinctive levels. At this point initial concerns can be raised already 
about the feasibility of developing each conception of subjectivity in sharp isolation from the other. 
For example, it could be asked whether this separation constrains an investigation of labour as a 
potential power for transcending the current economic system. However, such a contrast of these 
two conceptions does provide a suitable vantage point from which to discuss a different, 
synthesising approach to subjectivity, and to assess its points of strength and weakness. At the 
same, time this approach might also help to investigate the pitfalls in expressing adequately the 
relationship between subjectivity and theorisation, to analyse Marx's conception of this in the 
Manuscripts, and to point towards a terrain explored and extended by later Marxist thinkers. 
In the second part, I will investigate whether these two conceptions of subjectivity can be unified in 
thought and/or practice. I will examine to what extent Marx has encountered an insuperable 
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boundary that prevents the synthesis of a unified theory of subjectivity in thought alone. I will 
question whether this limitation in theory leads Marx to grasp the correspondence of this boundary 
to a real set of contradictions.6 I will assess the viability of Marx's attempt to reveal an inner 
connection in the class struggle between these two apparently independent subjects rising from the 
first part of this investigation, and thus whether Marx can successfully demonstrate them to be 
aspects of a more fundamental relationship. I will then ask what lessons Marx draws from his 
engagement with the enduring tension implied by this framework. I will claim that the formulation 
of this problem pre-figures the development in Marx’s thought of a conception of fetishism and the 
creation of a new project to produce a differentiated unity of these two conceptions of subjectivity. I 
will now demonstrate more concretely how this argument is developed in the Manuscripts. 
b) Alienated Labour and Transcendence 
In demonstrating that the goal of the economic system is the distress of society and suffering for the 
majority of mankind [EW, p.286], Marx's analysis of the system of private property gives rise to the 
concept of estranged labour. In fact, Marx's argument turns on this pivotal notion. His analysis of the 
concept of estranged labour shows that “although private property appears as the basis and cause 
of alienated labour”, it is “in fact its consequence” [EW, p.332]. The system of private property is 
revealed as arising out of a system of estranged labour, or, as Marx argues, private property is the 
“material, summarized expression” of estranged labour [EW, p.334]. If we wish to assess the validity 
of Marx's assumption that private property as a subject can be expressed fully as the product of 
alienated labour, we must investigate the process of estrangement by which Marx conceives this 
transformation of the system of labour into the system of private property as taking place. 
Marx places human activity, as labour, at the centre of his theory of estranged labour. He seeks to 
show how the relationship of man, as worker, to labour and the product of his labour is fundamental 
to the creation of the de-humanised world of private property. Its contradictions, he argues, are 
                                                          
6
 For Marxists such as Georg Lukács, as I will argue in a later chapter, this problem of synthesis is bound up 
with the practical creation of a unified subject-object of history, the proletariat as class-for-itself. 
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driving it towards its limit, culmination and decline [EW, p.337]. This theory seems to place labour, 
the source of all value, as the potential subject in the transcendence of this economic system. It is 
however currently dis-empowered in its estranged form.  
The formation of labour as a subject requires the elaboration of a process of mediation through 
which estranged labour is transcended. The workers, initially defined by their passive suffering, are 
now, in the context of estranged labour, enabled to conceive even this suffering, in an active sense, 
as an enjoyment of self [EW, p.351]. Thus we find a pivot from which even, or especially, the most 
developed estrangement can present the potential for a transcendence of this estrangement. At the 
same time, whilst in present-day production man is produced as a human commodity, “a self-
conscious and self-acting commodity”, he is also produced as a “mentally and physically 
dehumanized being” [EW, p.336]. 
Since I argue that Marx's theory of estranged labour is founded on the negation of a positive 
conception of species-being and species-activity, it is necessary to inquire into the origins of this 
conception. I will later consider the importance of Marx's contention that political economy’s 
scientific examination of the division of labour is the expression of real species-activity within 
estrangement [EW, p.369]. I would suggest that these questions can be explored by examining the 
argument concerning the number of authentic independent subjects that we can identify in the 
Manuscripts. For this reason, I will consider the notion of a quasi-subject, an entity which takes on 
the characteristics of a subject but is not in fact an authentic subject. I will inquire how to interpret 
the inauthenticity of this quasi-subject, either as a false appearance, merely illusory or non-real, or 
as an appearance with an objective social reality. Since private property is the means through which 
labour is alienated, Marx argues that its alien character does appear to be something real [EW, 
p.335]. 
Let us consider the possibilities for subjectivity within the Manuscripts. If labour is considered the 
sole authentic subject in the Manuscripts, it must be determined whether the system of private 
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property can be fully expressed as a system of estranged labour. If this expression is found to be 
insufficient, then an alternative explanation is required. It is possible either that private property is 
the only authentic subject,7 that there are multiple authentic subjects, or that there is some other 
explanation for the relationship between labour and private property. If private property is assumed 
to be a quasi-subject, not an authentic subject, then only one authentic subject remains. Considering 
Marx's investigation of “private property in its active form” as pointing towards the notion of quasi-
subjectivity poses some difficult questions [EW, p.343]. Although Marx is only beginning to define 
“capital” in the Manuscripts, he identifies the process by which the increasingly conscious 
estrangement of the political economists makes private property in its active form into a subject 
[EW, p.343-344]. 
I will argue that Marx is searching for a position on the question of subjectivity in the Manuscripts. 
He appears to express two notions of subjectivity in the Manuscripts, whilst trying to synthesise 
them. In other words, the Manuscripts contain a superposition of both two authentic subjects and 
one authentic subject. It seems that Marx explores both aspects in the Manuscripts and attempts to 
construct a framework that is able to give a full expression to both. To express this satisfactorily 
however, I will argue that Marx requires a theory of fetishism. I will suggest that he makes some 
important pre-figurations of such a theory arising from his discussions of primogeniture and fetish-
worship. 
It could be suggested that Marx is asking two sets of questions in the Manuscripts. Firstly, he 
investigates why there is a hostile opposition between these two conceptions of subjectivity. And 
secondly, he asks how it might be possible to achieve a differentiated unity of these antagonistic 
visions, a unity of opposites. István Mészáros argues that both find their unifying thread in the 
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 We must then consider if capital is the authentic subject (as has been suggested of Capital, e.g. by Moishe 
Postone, who we will consider in the next chapter). This is difficult to defend consistently given the central 
position Marx ascribes to labour in the Manuscripts. Although in the Manuscripts, he describes money as “the 
existing and active concept of value” (Marx Early Writings, p.379) 
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synthesising idea of estranged, alienated labour.8 Marx's project is to show how it is possible to 
overcome the division between theory and practice not simply in an abstract form, but translated 
into a tangibly concrete project. 
I will argue that these issues are related to the development of Marx’s concept of abstraction. In the 
Manuscripts, Marx gives abstraction a predominantly negative connotation. It is primarily placed in 
opposition to the real, living, particular and personal. Similarly in Marx's writings prior to the 
Manuscripts, abstraction is often seen as a separation, as an estrangement.9 By contrast, in Capital 
and Marx’s later writings, abstraction is considered more as a power to be harnessed by man in 
order to break through the misleading, but sensuously objective, appearances that obscure the real 
functioning of the economic system. This raises the question of how to define the connection 
between abstraction as a tool of science, and real abstraction, not in the sense of a generalising 
operation of thinkers, but as “something occurring in the machinery of the social order, in reality”.10 
At stake for Marx in resolving this problem is the possibility of transcending the estranged, alienated 
labour on which he argues that the current economic system is based. As a consequence, it concerns 
the liberation of the whole of mankind from all forms of human servitude. In rigorously following the 
logic of both conceptions of subjectivity that I have identified in the Manuscripts, I will argue that 
Marx begins to develop a critique of capital and certain pre-figurations of his theory of fetishism. By 
considering the problem of subjectivity in this way, I will argue that Marx stands on the threshold of 
a new project in which the full complexity of these aspects can be investigated. I will make a close 
study of the Manuscripts that argues that their synthesising impulse initiates for Marx a project that 
finds expression in a more concretely determined form in his later writings. 
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 Mészáros Marx's Theory of Alienation, p.19 
9
 The developing usage of the notion of abstraction by Marx is discussed by Lucio Colletti in his Introduction to 
Marx's Early Writings (Colletti, L “Introduction” in Marx, K Early Writings (Penguin, 1992 [1975]), p.33, p.38-39) 
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 Colletti “Introduction” in Marx Early Writings, p.38 
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2) Two Subjectivities 
I will begin by considering the Manuscripts as containing two conceptions of subjectivity, and 
attempt to detail what is distinctive about each. For each conception of subjectivity I will seek to 
distinguish two separate aspects, a theory of subjectivity and the corresponding subject itself. I will 
assume for the moment that it is possible to outline an identifiable body of theory and place it in 
some form of association with a particular subject. I will posit that there is some connection for 
Marx, on the one hand, between political economy as a theory of subjectivity and private property in 
the form of modern industry or capital as a subject, and on the other, between communism as a 
theory of subjectivity and labour as a subject. Finally I will consider the limitations of trying to 
compare such differing, and perhaps incommensurate, entities and the possible implications of 
attempting to isolate two distinct subjectivities from each other. 
a) The Subjectivity of Private Property in the Form of Modern Industry or 
Capital 
i) Private Property (Modern Industry/Capital) as a Subject 
I will first consider whether private property appears as a subject in the Manuscripts. Marx theorises 
the development and antagonism of different forms of private property. He looks first at the conflict 
between landed property and industry, associated with the concepts of immovable and movable 
property respectively, and then theorises private property as a commodity, and the inevitable 
“triumph” of money over other forms of property [EW, p.340]. 
If the economic system has developed in such a way that even the masters of labour are subject to 
the laws which they impose, it might appear that the condition of misery endured by the majority in 
present-day society is produced by the “power of things” [EW, p.307].11 Despite our increasing 
productive capacities, humans are therefore not (or are no longer) the subjects of world history. 
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 Marx is here quoting from the French writer Eugène Buret (Buret, E De la misère des classes laborieuses en 
Angleterre et en France Vol. I (Paris, 1840), p.82 quoted in Marx Early Writings, p.307). 
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Marx seems to confirm this when he claims that private property in its ultimate form perfects “its 
rule over men” and becomes a “world historical power” [EW, p.345]. If so, we must examine what is 
distinctive about this particular form of private property and how it arises.  
I will propose that industry, specifically in its form as modern industry, is the form of private 
property that Marx has in mind in the Manuscripts when considering private property as a subject. I 
will attempt to justify this choice in the course of the argument, since it is more common, in view of 
Marx's later writings, to consider private property as capital as a subject. I will examine the origins 
and development of the concept of industry in the various sources quoted by Marx. I will assess 
whether Marx’s conception of modern industry as a subject comes under tension in the 
Manuscripts. I will argue that Marx identifies this tension as corresponding to a contradiction in 
reality, which he diagnoses as the “discordant reality of industry” [EW, p.343]. 
1.  What is Industry? 
The concept of industry has its origins in the French term industrie in the 14th century, having 
originated from the Latin industria, meaning the virtue of study and diligence.12 In English, the term 
accumulates an increasing breadth of meaning over the following centuries, from the application of 
cleverness and skill, to the notion of systematic and useful work, to indicating a “particular form or 
branch of productive labour”.13 During the industrial revolution the concept developed rapidly, in 
particular through debates about the doctrine of ‘industrialism’ at the beginning of the 19th 
century.14 In this chapter we can only touch summarily on this debate. 
Marx appropriates the concept of industry from a number of different sources. He quotes political 
economists such as Adam Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say, as well as those critical of political economy 
                                                          
12
 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition – s.v. “industry” 
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 For further discussion see Stedman-Jones, G “Saint Simon and the liberal origins of the socialist critique of 
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like Eugène Buret and Wilhelm Schulz. Whilst only briefly acknowledged in the Manuscripts, the 
thought of the utopian socialists Charles Fourier and Saint-Simon also forms the environment for 
Marx's use and development of the concept. In particular, Saint-Simon stresses the notion of the 
“industrial revolution”, laying an emphasis on the dynamic nature of industry.15 
In the passages that Marx quotes from Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, industry is primarily 
conceived as a value or virtue in opposition to idleness. Thus Marx quotes Smith’s argument that, 
“The proportion between capital and revenue [...] seems everywhere to regulate the proportion 
between industry and idleness. Wherever capital predominates, industry prevails: wherever 
revenue, idleness” [EW, p.301].16 These values correspond to the terms in which the advocates of 
industry, as movable property, conceive their struggle as taking place against the “idle, cruel and 
egotistical lords of yesterday”, the owners of landed property [EW, pp.338-339]. For Marx, as we 
shall see later, this distinction, in the context of the historical process of the industrial revolution, “is 
a historical distinction, a fixed moment in the formation and development of the opposition 
between capital and labour” [EW, p.337]. 
Marx also draws on Jean-Baptiste Say’s Traité d'économie politique, from which he extracts a 
number of quotes.17 Say builds on Smith by elaborating a theory of entrepreneurship. He formulates 
Smith's values in the shape of two distinct groups of persons, the “industrieux” and the “oisifs”. The 
“industrieux” are those associated with the process of production, those who engage in “industrie”, 
conceived by Say as agriculture, manufacture and commerce. Conversely the “oisifs” are the “non-
working land-owners and rentiers”, those who merely own stock as a “residue of conquest or 
occupation”.18 Say's intervention sought to sharpen Smith's broader definition of capital that 
included less entrepreneurial forms within industry. Interestingly Saint-Simon makes a similar 
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 See Kouvelakis, S Philosophy and Revolution (London: Verso, 2003), p.182 – Kouvelakis argues that liberal 
and radical English critics, unlike Saint-Simon, avoided the term “industrial revolution” for fear of jeopardizing 
the unity of their “front” with the aristocracy in that country. 
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 Marx quotes from Smith, A The Wealth of Nations Books I-III (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), p.437 
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distinction of the “industriels”, the socially useful, the competent and industrious bourgeois, as 
opposed to the “oisifs”, the socially useless, the parasitic and lazy aristocracy, clergy, etc.19 
Smith's notion of industry quoted above is associated with his concept of capital, but is not 
immediately manifested as a particular form of organisation of labour. Smith may have considered a 
relationship between his conception of industry and the particular form of manufacture of his time 
(e.g. the division of labour in manufacturing), but it would have been inconceivable for him to 
associate industry with the system of factory labour. Such a modern organised technical force only 
began to emerge in the 19th century. 
In the later sources drawn upon by Marx (e.g. Buret, Schulz, Constantin Pecqueur, etc.), industry 
does appear to be increasingly connected to this form of social organisation of labour (i.e. the 
factory system). Industry, says Marx, is associated with the introduction of “labour-saving machines” 
[EW, p.289]. The “factory system”, he argues, “is the perfected essence of industry” [EW, p.345]. In 
the Manuscripts, even when discussing Smith, Marx's usage tends to pick up on this sense of 
industry (e.g. “branch of industry” [EW, p.297]). Thus Marx suggests that “industrial labour is highly 
developed” where “all manual crafts have become factory labour” [EW, p.303]. 
I would argue that a process can be identified through which the concept of industry develops. 
Initially understood as a value, industry can be conceived increasingly as a collective human subject 
involved in a historical struggle with landed property. This first part of the process is manifested in 
consciousness by the classification of this struggle between industry and landed property as that 
between the “industriels” and the “oisifs”. In this process a second aspect can also be discerned, in 
which the concept of industry is increasingly associated with a particular form of the social 
organisation of labour and a specific type of private property, capital. In the second part of this 
process, industry appears as a non-human subject, with needs of its own. The possession of the form 
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of private property associated with this industry, capital, bestows upon capitalists the “power to 
command labour”, but in turn, this capital “is able to rule the capitalist himself” [EW, p.295]. It is this 
second aspect of industry that increasingly begins to mark out the specificity of modern industry, as I 
will argue in the next section. 
2. What is Specific about Modern Industry? 
In the Manuscripts, Marx considers the historical development of economic systems largely in terms 
of their corresponding economic theorisation. He considers the crude “metal-fetishism” of the 
Monetary system [EW, p.364], which evolves through Mercantilism, Physiocracy, and Political 
Economy (Smith). This in turn develops into a more “consciously estranged” or “cynical” Political 
Economy (from Say, to Ricardo and Mill) [EW, p.343]. This understanding is organised around a 
single unified theme, the logical unfolding of the forms of private property. The consequence of this, 
arguably teleological, theory is that history has arrived at the final form of private property, whose 
internal contradictions are driving it towards a resolution, the positive super-session of private 
property. 
This contradiction, in its limiting form, argues Marx, is “necessarily the limit, the culmination and the 
decline of the whole system of private property” [EW, p.337]. Once all wealth has become 
“industrial wealth, wealth of labour”, Marx argues, we have arrived at “the fully developed objective 
form of private property” [EW, p.345]. In this context, the working out of the inner nature of the 
relationship of private property appears as a progression of the conflict between immovable and 
movable private property, between landed property and industry, in which the latter is ultimately 
victorious. I will now elaborate this problem in more detail. 
In the Second Manuscript, Marx begins to employ the concept of industry for himself, and does so in 
the sense of both aspects described above: as industry’s struggle against landed property, and as 
modern industry’s appearance as an agent with non-human subjective properties. These two senses 
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appear to be under an internal tension with each other, and yet the first is seen as logically and 
historically impelled towards dissolution in the second. 
On the one hand, Marx sets up an opposition in which two forms of private property, movable and 
immovable, represented in the forms of industry and landed property, develop together in a 
symbiotic relationship. In this relationship, industry is associated with “town life”, and defined in its 
opposition to landed property, which is in turn associated with “aristocratic feudal life” [EW, p.337]. 
The “town life” aspect of industry is marked by its immaturity, since it still bears the “feudal 
characteristics of its opposite”, under which labour retains an “apparently social meaning, the 
meaning of genuine community” [EW, p.337]. 
On the other hand, Marx suggests that once labour reaches a stage of “indifference towards its 
content and of complete being-for-itself” [EW, p.337], a new aspect of industry arises from this 
necessary development of labour: industry constituted for itself as such, or “liberated industry” [EW, 
p.337]. Marx closely associates liberated industry with the notion of “liberated capital” [EW, p.337]. 
Marx determines the specificity of modern industry as being contained in this sense of “liberated 
industry” or “liberated capital”. But, if industry is liberated from that which it is defined in opposition 
to, two questions arise. First, what becomes of it opposite? And second, what is the positive 
foundation of this new liberated industry? 
In answer to the first question, landed property itself undergoes a transformation. Agriculture 
emerges as an industry through a process of internal transformation, as a manifestation of the 
power of industry over landed property, and the landowner becomes a “master of industry” [EW, 
p.338]. Marx identifies this process as taking place, first through the agency of the tenant farmer, 
who increasingly provides the landowner with his economic existence. Thus landed property, 
defined as distinct from capital, is in fact “private property, capital”, albeit “not yet entirely emerged 
from its involvement with the world and come into its own” [EW, p.340]. In contrast, liberated 
industry, fully-developed liberated capital, must for Marx, in the “course of its formation on a world 
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scale”, “attain its abstract, i.e. pure, expression” [EW, p.341]. In order to address the second 
question, Marx must investigate the extent to which liberated industry, as liberated capital, has 
become a subject for itself. This entails a closer engagement with the concept of industrial labour 
and its relationship with capital. 
3.  Modern Industry as a Subject 
The question I will try to address is whether the rise of industry in its modern form is associated in 
the Manuscripts with the subjectification of a specific form of private property. I will argue that 
Marx’s analysis of the system of private property overlaps with his first attempt to analyse the 
category of capital. By analysing the relationship of private property in the present-day economic 
system, Marx appears to be attempting to investigate both the general nature of production under 
private property and the specific form of commodity production. Marx declares that production 
creates the “self-conscious and self-acting commodity...the human commodity” [EW, p.336]. 
On the one hand, later political economists, like Ricardo and Mill, recognise that capital regards the 
“human productivity” of its investment as an irrelevance, even harmful to the real aim of 
production: interest and yearly savings [EW, p.336]. On the other hand, the recognition by classical 
political economy (Smith et al.) that industrial wealth is based on the wealth of labour implies that 
labour might play a role as a subject within industry. Later in this chapter we will consider the 
subjectivity of labour, but presently we are concerned with analysing whether modern industry as 
capital plays the role of a subject, or a quasi-subject, in the Manuscripts. 
Political economy, suggests Marx, regards labour, “abstractly as a thing”, as a commodity [EW, 
p.293]. Furthermore, as he points out, any commodity is forced to obey the laws of competition 
[EW, p.321]. The significance of making an analysis of a system determined by the conditions of 
competition is that it is no longer under conscious human control. Such a system, as Marx argues in 
the Manuscripts, emerges historically from the roots of private property in land, and, once 
developed, appears as the “naked rule of private property, of capital” [EW, p.319]. At this point the 
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relationship between property owner and worker “should be reduced to the economic relationship 
of exploiter and exploited” [EW, p.319].20 
Industry has become a war, and it requires increasingly large armies that can be summoned and 
destroyed at will [EW, p.294]. This “perpetual war”, says Marx quoting Eugène Buret, “in the view of 
science, is the only means of achieving peace; this war is called competition” [EW, p.294].21 
Analysing Smith's propositions on the accumulation of capitals and the competition amongst 
capitalists, Marx finds that, from the standpoint of political economy, the “sole defence [of the 
consuming public] against the capitalists is competition” [EW, p.300]. 
This competition is only possible if there are many capitals, “multiple capitals held by many different 
people” [EW, p.300]. This requires multilateral accumulation, “since capital in general stems from 
accumulation” [EW, p.300]. However, Marx argues that accumulation results in the “concentration 
of capital in few hands”, if capitals are allowed to follow their “natural course” [EW, p.300]. Further, 
he claims that: “It is only through competition that this natural proclivity of capital begins to take 
shape” [EW, p.300]. The apparent subjectivity or quasi-subjectivity of capital that Marx seeks to 
investigate arises through the process of competition. 
Does Marx consider capital to be the subject of this process? Although he seeks to reduce the 
system of private property to the system of alienated labour, the “alien character” of capital for the 
worker “inevitably appears as something real” [EW, p.335]. I contend that Marx begins to explore 
this contradiction through his conception of modern industry as industry liberating itself of the 
conflict between movable and immovable property. He explores the relationship between capital 
and industry. Whilst it is important that the two concepts are not identical, there is an intimate 
connection between them. Thus Marx argues that “the accumulation of capital increases the 
quantity of industry” [EW, p.286]. 
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 In contrast to Capital, Marx does not systematically employ a conception of exploitation in the Manuscripts, 
although here we can see that the concept is present in a less-determined form. 
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I would argue it is necessary to understand the development of the different conceptions of industry 
outlined. I will ask whether there is continuity between Marx’s conceptions of industry and modern 
industry, or whether there are problems in advancing from one to the other. By what means does 
Marx propose that modern industry has liberated itself, and can this process be considered at any 
point complete? Marx gives only an elliptical answer to these questions, when he suggests that 
industry “had to ruin itself both in the form of monopoly and in the form of competition before it 
could believe in man” [EW, p.322]. 
There are real human subjects associated, on the one hand with landed property, the landowners, 
and on the other hand with rising industry, the capitalists. But Marx also operates with a conception 
of liberated industry or capital, whose subject appears not to be a set of persons or class. It is a non-
human subject, private property as capital. The manner in which the human and non-human 
elements of subjectivity within industry relate to each other is a problem that seems to be 
unresolved in the Manuscripts, although, as we will argue later, its formulation pre-figures the 
development of Marx’s theory of fetishism. 
Marx has identified that in the bitter struggle between capitalist and landowner, “each side tells the 
truth about the other” [EW, p.338]. The capitalist regards the landowner as the “enemy of free 
industry and free capital” [EW, p.338]. Yet, the “feudal reminiscences” of the landowner critique the 
greedy profiteering of the capitalist. The capitalist trades away the community and breeds 
“competition and pauperism, crime and the dissolution of all social ties” [EW, p.338]. Marx claims 
that the “real course of development (to be inserted here) leads necessarily to the victory of the 
capitalist, i.e. of developed private property, over undeveloped, immature private property, the 
landowner” [EW, p.340]. But he also subjects to scrutiny the claims of movable property, which sees 
itself as a product of the “modern age” [EW, p.339]. 
The partial truth of these latter claims, he suggests, is manifest in the fact that the “civilized victory 
of movable capital has precisely been to reveal and create human labour as the source of wealth in 
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place of the dead thing” [EW, p.340]. Yet, the universalising claims of movable property also conceal 
a developing hostile opposition. Marx highlights a “foreboding of the danger” that some states bear 
towards the “full development of free industry” [EW, p.340].22 He suggests that their attempts to 
stop the capitalization of landed property through protectionist measures is a recognition of the 
danger to the system of private property as a whole of allowing these contradictions to develop. 
4. Discordant Reality of Industry 
J.C.L. Simonde de Sismondi, a liberal republican and student of Smith, gives an account of industry 
that emphasises its increasingly problematic nature.23 As Stedman-Jones explains, “The progress of 
industry meant the growth of inequality. There was no single industrial class. Rather, there were two 
classes - capitalists and proletarians - and the gulf between them was widening”.24 Furthermore, as 
Schulz recognises, the “frequent and sudden reductions in employment” associated with the 
“industrial war”, give “rise to feelings of bitterness among the class of wage-earners” [EW, p.304]. 
The increasing misery caused by industry in the ranks of the proletariat, argues Schulz, “inevitably 
increases the conflict between the propertied and the propertyless classes” [EW, p.309]. This is one 
aspect that leads Marx to argue that the “consequences of industry” appear “more developed and 
more contradictory” to the later political economists [EW, p.343]. 
The theoretical division between the “industriels”/”industrieux” and the “oisifs” is one appropriate 
to a class struggle between producers and idlers, a conception binding the productive workers to the 
entrepreneurial bourgeoisie as a revolutionary class. However, in his writings of 1843/1844, Marx 
increasingly argued that the “role of emancipator” [EW, p.255] in the search for human freedom had 
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albeit quoted by Marx only from Buret (Marx Early Writings, p.306, p.339). See Stedman-Jones for a more 
detailed account of Sismondi (Stedman-Jones “Saint Simon”, p.35). 
24
 Stedman-Jones “Saint Simon”, p.35 
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definitively passed from the bourgeois class in all countries, either by the result or the impossibility 
of partial emancipation, to a new class.25 
The concept of industry develops alongside the developing capitalist class: from being the battle-cry 
of the bourgeoisie against the old regime, it latterly universalises the value with which the 
bourgeoisie justifies its own rule over society. This requires the values of industry to be taken up not 
just by the industrious bourgeois, but in some sense by other sections of society, such as the 
productive workers. Thus the “industriels” could feasibly include both productive labourers and the 
masters of labour, and the “oisifs” could refer to the dependent poor as well as the parasitical rich.  
The concept of industry thus begins to obscure the relationship that Marx identifies as being latent 
within the relation of private property: “the relation of private property as labour, the relation of 
private property as capital and the connection of these two” [EW, p.336]. Marx suggests that the 
“reality of industry” is a discordant one [EW, p.343]. The principle of this discordance has been 
formulated by political economy, and it is only through a critique of political economy that the 
content of a theory of subjectivity can be developed further. 
ii) Political Economy as a Theory of Subjectivity 
Inspired by Engels’s Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy in the Deutsch-Französische 
Jahrbücher, Marx set himself the task of making an “exhaustive critical study” of political economy 
[EW, p.281].26 The Manuscripts represent Marx's first systematic engagement with the field. I am 
interested here in considering Marx’s conception of political economy at this time as a theory of 
subjectivity. I am looking to investigate what is distinctive about the conception of subjectivity that is 
                                                          
25
 Marx developed his ideas through his practical experiences as the editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, his 
critiques of Hegel and political economy, and his engagement with the revolutionary movement in France (See 
Nimtz Jr., A Marx and Engels Their Contribution to the democratic breakthrough (Albany, NY: SUNY, 2000), p.4-
8). Marx's understanding that the bourgeoisie could no longer play a leading role in the revolutionary 
movement was to be brutally confirmed in practice by the crushing of the revolutions of 1848 (See Nimtz Marx 
and Engels, p.89). 
26
 The bulk of material drawn upon in the Manuscripts is from Smith's Wealth of Nations, whereas David 
Ricardo, for example, appears through the work of other writers (e.g. Buret). In contrast, Marx has a prolonged 
engagement with Ricardo in Capital. Marx's description of an 'exhaustive critical study' might in fact be a more 
fitting description of his later works, Capital and the Theories of Surplus-Value. 
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portrayed by political economy, and the connection between it and private property as a subject. I 
will ask to what extent, in the Manuscripts, political economy itself can be considered as an active 
component, the consciousness aspect, of private property as a subject. 
1. Political Economy: Modern Industry as Self 
Marx argues that political economy, of the type which recognises labour as its principle, such as that 
practised by Adam Smith, is the “independent movement of private property become conscious for 
itself” [EW, p.341]. It is, he suggests, “modern industry as self” [EW, p.341]. We can see immediately 
from this definition that modern industry and political economy are closely linked for Marx. Political 
economy appears in the Manuscripts both as a subject, “modern industry as self”, and as a body of 
theory. It is both a “product of modern industry”, and a “factor which has accelerated and glorified 
the energy and development of this industry and transformed it into a power belonging to 
consciousness” [EW, p.341-342]. The active role of political economy, Marx seems to argue, is to 
excite greed and encourage competition: “the war of the avaricious” [EW, p.322]. But despite setting 
these wheels in motion, it does not fully control them. Political economy formulates “abstract 
formulae which it then takes as laws” which reflect the real material process through which private 
property passes [EW, p.322]. 
It could be argued that political economy is the expression of the consciousness of private property 
as a subject. This independent movement of private property includes a non-human element of 
subjectivity. If modern industry is intimately linked with capital, as we have argued in the previous 
section, this raises the question of the relationship between capital and this non-human subjectivity. 
At the same time however, political economy, as the theorisation and scientific existence of the 
interests of industry and its advocates, still requires the capitalists, as the masters of industry, to put 
it into practice. Political economy therefore seems also to express a human element of subjectivity. 
It seems therefore that these two elements are inextricably intertwined, and that Marx's dynamic 
understanding of political economy suggests that they are involved in a process of development. 
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2. Marx's Theory of the Development of Political Economy 
In the Manuscripts, we can discern a theory of the development of political economy. Far from being 
an internally static and fixed doctrine, Marx characterises political economy as an energetic body of 
thought that develops through its “cosmopolitan, universal energy” [EW, p.342]. There is a 
movement, argues Marx, from the political economy of Smith, through Say to Mill and Ricardo. This 
movement is one of increasing cynicism, and “inasmuch as the consequences of industry appeared 
more developed and more contradictory to the latter; the latter also become more estranged – 
consciously estranged – from man and their predecessors” [EW, p.343]. Political economy, he 
argues, is forced through its own consistent development to “cast off its hypocrisy and step forth in 
all its cynicism” [EW, p.342]. 
Thus Marx contrasts the “original conception” of the political economy of Smith from the “anti-
human” conclusions of the later proponents of political economy in the Ricardo school [EW, p.343]. 
There is however, for Marx, no fundamental break between the two, rather that the latter have 
merely developed the science of political economy “more logically and more truly” [EW, p.343]. By 
adopting the principle of labour, political economy had originally appeared to recognise man, and 
yet political economy, argues Marx, “is in fact nothing more than the denial of man carried through 
to its logical conclusion” [EW, p.342]. 
The crucial contribution of the political economists, Marx claims, was to bring man within the realm 
of private property. Marx quotes Engels’s declaration that Adam Smith was “the Luther of political 
economy”, in order to demonstrate the fact that wealth is no longer seen as something external to 
man, but rather that “man himself is recognised as its essence” [EW, p.342]. Thus political economy 
heralded the abolition of the appearance of private property as something external and independent 
of man, and made possible the abolition of its “mindless objectivity” [EW, p.342]. 
In contrast to Smith, it was the great advance of the Ricardo school, “to declare the existence of the 
human being [...] to be indifferent and even harmful” [EW, p.336]. Thus the production of humanity, 
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or the number of workers that a capital supports, is irrelevant, rather it is the expansion of wealth 
that is all important.27 Marx hails the contribution of this “recent English political economy” as 
having reduced the landowner to a “prosaic capitalist”, and thus for having “anticipated and 
prepared the[se] changes in reality”, and in their act of “simplifying the contradiction” between 
capitalists and workers, thus “bringing it to a head and hastening its resolution” [EW, p.337]. 
It is these political economists who make private property in its active form the subject, and man as 
a non-being the “tensed essence” of private property [EW, p.342-343]. Thus it appears when we 
arrive at the culmination of modern industry, the ‘liberated industry’ discussed in the previous 
section, the non-human element of subjectivity in political economy correspondingly reaches its 
apex, a situation in which, even for the capitalists, “an inhuman power rules over everything” [EW, 
p.366]. 
3. The Political Economist and the Layman 
I will now consider the human element of political economy as a theory of subjectivity. It can be 
seen that the potential exists for a gap between the actual consciousness of the capitalists, and the 
theorisation of their interests by the political economists.28 The political economist is a specialist 
who functions as a scientist of the empirical interests of the capitalist. However, at times in the 
Manuscripts, Marx employs the terms ‘capitalist’ and ‘political economist’ somewhat 
interchangeably. Marx considers the theoretician as an expression of the practitioner, and likewise 
the theoretician is inextricably entwined with real practice. This is highlighted when he reveals that 
by referring to political economists, he really means “empirical businessmen”, for political 
economists “are the scientific exposition and existence of the former” [EW, p.260].29 
                                                          
27
 If political economy takes as its principle the absence of needs, as Marx points out later in the Manuscripts, 
we might see even the existence of man as a pure luxury and the production of people as a public disaster 
(Marx Early Writings, p.363). 
28
 Although Marx traces the struggles of industrial and landed property, workers and capitalists in very 
suggestive ways in the Manuscripts, he does not formally theorise the consciousness of classes. 
29
 Contrast this with Marx's references in Capital to the political economist as the “ideologist” (Marx, K Capital 
Vol. I (Penguin, 1990 [1976]), p.718) of the capitalist, the separation of the “practical agents of capitalist 
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It might be useful to consider this in the light of the aforementioned analogy of Smith with Luther, 
who, according to Marx in the Manuscripts, “negated the idea of priests as something separate and 
apart from the layman by transferring the priest into the heart of the layman” [EW, p.342]. In terms 
of political economy, the implication is that Smith transferred the political economist into the heart 
of the empirical businessman. This line of argument indicates the importance of theorising the role 
of intellectuals in society.30 However, in the Manuscripts, Marx does not further develop a theory of 
ideology and the relationship between practical and ideological agents. 
Bourgeois ideology aims towards the universalization of its claims. While political economy “takes 
the interests of the capitalists as the basis of its analysis” [EW, p.323], its pretensions towards 
universality draw into its practice actors who reach beyond the purview of the capitalists. It is 
therefore not simply a theory of the interests of one specific and distinct sphere of society. In its 
inability to remain within the borders of its own compartmentalisation, through its internal 
contradictions, political economy as a theory of subjectivity seems inherently prone to 
destabilisation. A consequence of recognising this potential instability is Marx's statement that the 
revolutionary movement must “find both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the movement of 
private property or, to be more exact, of the economy” [EW, p.348]. It would therefore appear that 
economic theory has the potential to be transformed, through critique, into a tool for the working 
class movement. 
4. Critique of Political Economy and Critique of the Economic System 
I have been considering political economy as a theory of subjectivity. Marx refers throughout the 
Manuscripts to political economy rather than to the economic system as such. This might seem to 
indicate that political economy is itself the object of study.31 However, the terms are sometimes 
translated interchangeably and thus we are unsure whether to treat political economy simply as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
production” from their “ideological word-spinners” (Marx Capital, I, p.757), or the notion of political economy 
as an “ideology” (Marx Capital, I, p.931). 
30
 In a later chapter I will consider the relation between this advance of political economy and Antonio 
Gramsci’s theory of the organic intellectual. 
31
 In Capital, Marx refers to the “capitalist mode of production” (Marx Capital, I, p.90). 
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doctrine or also as denoting the actual economic system itself. There is potentially a stark difference 
between political economy as a doctrine, a body of ideas, and political economy as an economic 
system. Firstly, the proletariat only plays an active role in the latter. Secondly, if no rigid distinction is 
made between the two, then political economy as a theory might be considered to have a much 
stronger role in the (re-)creation of the economic system, and the political economist to have a level 
of agency that would extend beyond the role of an ideologist. 
In the Manuscripts, there is a sense in which Marx is both overly and insufficiently critical in his 
estimations of political economy. This observation, if well-founded, is at the core of the argument 
for there being two discordant subjectivities in the Manuscripts. Marx, as we shall see in the next 
section, seizes on the notion of labour as the truly creative power, and argues that the “essential 
relationship of labour” [EW, p.326] is revealed in the direct relationship between the worker and 
production. Marx’s first critique of political economy is based on its concealment of “the 
estrangement in the nature of labour” [EW, p.325]. 
In order to develop an account of the estrangement of labour, to determine the nature of this 
concealment, Marx must advance his critique of political economy itself concretely. It is only through 
a critique of political economy that one might gain access to this direct relationship. But, if we find 
that Marx has not fully substantiated his criticism of what he calls the “anti-human” conclusions of 
the doctrine, then he stands accused of being overly critical of political economy [EW, p.343]. On the 
other hand, to the extent that Marx uncritically absorbs or reproduces certain elements of political 
economy (the concepts of fixed and circulating capital, the iron law of wages, etc.), it can be argued 
that he is insufficiently critical of political economy.32 Marx's examination of money, in its mediating 
role, as “the truly creative power” [EW, p.378], and the seriousness with which he considers the 
political economists’ treatment of private property in its active form as the subject, suggests an 
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 The extent to which Marx reproduces the iron law of wages is most evident in Marx's description of the 
inevitable victory of the capitalist over the worker in the struggle over wages (Marx Early Writings, p.282). He 
later describes the raising of wages as “an anomalous situation that could only be prolonged by force” (Marx 
Early Writings, p.332). 
53 
 
opposed and antagonistic conception of subjectivity to that of labour as the source of all wealth. 
Thus I would claim that the development of Marx's theory of political economy bears a critical 
relationship to the development of his thought on the question of subjectivity. 
b) The Subjectivity of Labour 
i) Labour as a Subject 
The notion of labour is central to Marx's argument throughout the Manuscripts. By contrast, other 
concepts (e.g. communism, industry, and political economy) shift in and out of the frame of his 
discussion at various points in the text, depending on the particular focus of each section. Although 
labour is present as a concept at all points in the Manuscripts, we cannot assume that Marx's use of 
the concept is uniform in its meaning throughout. This is an important point given that Marx 
engages closely with various thinkers of significant but not necessarily coincident perspectives, most 
notably Smith and Hegel.33 In this section, I will attempt to identify the extent to which labour 
appears as a subject in the Manuscripts. The answer is not easily provided. But, if it is difficult to 
identify labour as a concrete subject in the Manuscripts, it could be possible to classify labour as a 
potential subject, one that has yet to be realized as a power belonging to consciousness. Later, I will 
also investigate the relationship between communism as a theory and the potential realization of 
labour as a subject. 
I will begin by examining, as Marx does, the relationship of political economy to labour. It is the 
progressive core of “enlightened political economy” [EW, p.342],34 to have identified labour as the 
sole essence of wealth from within the system of private property. And yet, Marx implies that none 
of the political economists point to or elaborate labour as a concrete subject. Labour appears, if at 
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 The Manuscripts represent an encounter between Smith’s and Hegel’s conceptions of labour. Note in this 
regard Marx's observation that “Hegel adopts the standpoint of political economy” (Marx Early Writings, 
p.386). In the concept of labour there is a point of traversal between Smith’s political economy and Hegel's 
philosophy that Marx attempts to mobilise for the mutual benefit of his attempted synthesis. Although this 
argument has a bearing on our analysis, its full elaboration lies beyond the remit of the current study. 
34
 i.e. Smith and later the political economists – those who have been lifted out of the backwards age of the 
fetishism of metal-money or land. 
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all, only as an abstract subject for political economy. Indeed, for Marx in the Manuscripts, those who 
labour, the workers, are characterised at all points by their lack of power, and, in the estrangement 
of labour, by the almost total destruction of their subjectivity. Marx is centrally concerned with the 
meaning of the “reduction of the greater part of mankind to abstract labour” [EW, p.289].35 
In the Manuscripts, Marx recognises that the historical rise of modern industry and capital has 
coincided with the reduction of the majority of mankind to abstract labour. He stops short however 
of developing a theory of the connection between abstract labour and capital. I would argue that the 
relationship between the element of non-human subjectivity that has been identified in the 
investigation of modern industry above, and that is formulated in the laws of political economy, 
poses unresolved question for Marx about the notion of abstract labour. It is only in his later writings 
however that abstract labour appears as a norm that is both imposed on producers by the process of 
competition, and that both results from and is reproduced by the active choices made about the 
distribution of production and productivity by the masters of industry. 
This process causes a further modification in the content of abstract labour.36 Abstract labour, being 
determined by external factors (competition and the ‘masters of industry’), is therefore not a subject 
in any conventional sense, but is rather better characterised as the absence of a subject. As an 
external constraint on the producer, abstract labour is the medium through which the social 
character of labour is transmitted, while at the same time it is not the product of any conscious 
regulation of production. 
For Marx in the Manuscripts, abstract labour is the means by which he defines the proletarian, as 
someone who lives only by “one-sided, abstract labour” [EW, p.288]. For political economy, the 
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 Marx associates this question with a more practical question, although the connection between the two is 
not self-evident. He asks what mistakes are made by those who seek to improve the situation of the working 
class by piecemeal reforms, or those who see these reforms as the goal of a social revolution (Marx Early 
Writings, p.289). Marx believes it is necessary to investigate both questions in order to illuminate in the 
problem of the subjectivity of labour, and we shall attempt to deal with the second in the section on 
communism. 
36
 The modification of the content of abstract labour must necessarily be a quantitative one, as abstract labour 
by its nature is labour abstracted from its qualitative content. 
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existence of the proletarian as a human being is not considered, and he or she is regarded as 
“nothing more than a worker” [EW, p.288]. The restriction of labour to the form of “wage-earning 
activity” [EW, p.289], is the denial of the life activity of the proletarian as a human being. Marx 
therefore seems to associate the denial of the living reality of the humanity of labour with 
abstraction. 
The pejorative aspect of abstraction is its connection with the idea of separation. It is the abstraction 
of genuine human functions, their separation from the other aspects of human activity, from the 
totality of this activity, and their transformation into “final and exclusive ends” that crystallises their 
de-humanisation [EW, p.327]. Indeed, Marx identifies one-sidedness and abstractness as key 
characteristics of present-day labour, and it is from the very essence of this present-day labour, he 
argues, that the misery of the workers, their decline and their impoverishment proceed.  
The notion of separation is what links the concept of abstract labour to that of external labour, but 
these two concepts belong to very different categories. Abstract labour relates to abstraction, the 
realm of intellect and thought, whereas external labour relates to the concrete, sensuous 
experience. Whilst abstract labour is only a category of theory, external labour denotes the real 
experience of the subject of labour. In particular, for Marx, external labour is what constitutes the 
alienation of labour, the experience of the labourer. 
External labour, as Marx characterises it, has become separable from the worker. External labour is 
external from the point of view of the subject, the labourer. Marx's theorisation of the experience of 
the worker through estrangement and the externalisation of labour is important because of the 
emphasis, following Feuerbach, that he places on sense perception as the “basis of all science” [EW, 
p.355].37 It could be argued that labour is only present in the Manuscripts as a concrete subject in so 
far as it is determined by the experience of a certain type of labour.  
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 This claim locates an original positive foundation for the transcendence of estrangement in sense 
experience. However, the problems with this conception have been well documented by Chris Arthur in his 
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I would argue that the division between the realms of experience and abstraction poses a significant 
problem for Marx's thought in the Manuscripts, especially given the strategic importance that the 
notion of abstract labour has for Marx's later theory, i.e. in Capital. Despite the pejorative 
connotation of abstraction in the Manuscripts, Marx's attention has been drawn to the importance 
of the notion of abstract labour for his work. If we deem the Manuscripts to contain two discordant 
subjectivities, this points towards Marx's inability to synthesise the necessary categories of 
abstraction developed by political economy and the experience of labour by the worker. We could 
argue that Marx is both too rooted in the particularity of experience, which we will later discuss as 
the suffering of the worker, and at the same time in the universality of abstraction without the 
necessary mediating concepts to make such a synthesis possible. As we will try to demonstrate 
however, by giving such a structure to this problem, Marx begins to develop a number of analytical 
tools that lead him in the direction of its solution. 
ii) Communism as a Theory of Subjectivity 
Marx's discussion of the notion of communism in the Manuscripts is at times both abstract and 
complex. Having sought to elaborate the relationship between private property and labour through 
the employment of his understanding of estranged labour, Marx then explores the relationship of 
private property and communism. He advances a summary critique of different attitudes towards 
private property, such as Proudhon, Fourier and Saint Simon [EW, p.345]. For Marx, the abolition of 
private property must be its positive supersession, not a crude levelling down. Marx traces out the 
stages of a Hegelian process of supersession, passing through what he terms ‘crude communism’ to 
reach higher levels [EW, p.346]. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Dialectics of Labour.  Marx posits Feuerbach's unity of man and nature in an un-problematised fashion. Firstly, 
it involves the assumption that “just because man is natural, nature can be humanized through the mediation 
of industry” (Arthur, C Dialectics of Labour (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p.133). Secondly in emphasising the 
“affirmative character of appropriation”, there is no real recognition of the “sheer recalcitrance of nature to 
human use” (Arthur Dialectics of Labour, p.133). Arthur points out that, for man, nature is a “continually 
surprising interlocutor” (Arthur Dialectics of Labour, p.135). He argues however that the centrality of labour in 
Marx's analysis has already begun in the Manuscripts to destabilise this insufficiently problematised notion of 
the unity of man and nature. 
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Since the term, for us, has been subsequently charged with historical meaning, it is appropriate to 
clarify what the notion of communism in the Manuscripts is not. Marx asserts that “communism is 
not as such the goal of human development – the form of human society” [EW, p.358].38 Interpreted 
literally, this appears to contradict the commonly held view of communism as the form of society 
which comes about as a process following the achievement of a socialist society. Communism, far 
from being the end of history, says Marx, is “a real phase, necessary for the next period of historical 
development, in the emancipation and recovery of mankind” [EW, p.358]. In this context, 
communism appears to be a point of transition to an ever higher stage of humanity. Communism, he 
says, is the “act of positing as the negation of the negation”, giving rise to the possibility of socialist 
man and socialism, as the “positive self-consciousness of man” [EW, p.357]. 
Is there a tension between the three notions of communism as a body of ideas, an act, and as a real 
phase of history? In his theory of communism, we might consider whether Marx has produced 
something analogous to the relationship between political economy as “modern industry as self” 
[EW, p.341]. Communism could be viewed as the expression of labour-as-self, a theorisation of the 
consciousness of labour, or as the theoretical expression of the proletariat. This is clearly a very 
problematic formulation, as it touches on questions of ascribed and empirical consciousness that we 
will deal with in later chapters.39 We might remark that political economy and communism, if 
considered as theories of subjectivity, are theories of subjectivity in very different ways. 
The structure of Marx's approach to discussing communism in the Manuscripts merits further 
examination. I would argue that the section on Private Property and Communism does not make a 
binary distinction between ‘crude communism’ and a ‘true’ or ‘real’ communism [EW, p.345].40 
Rather Marx elaborates five points which appear to be five stages or levels of the development or 
                                                          
38
 This statement is sometimes interpreted as referring to ‘crude communism’, however the meaning of the 
text at this point is somewhat ambiguous (Marx Early Writings, p.358) 
39
 i.e. in relation to Georg Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness  
40
 This is however what the editors of the Early Writings seem to suggest (Marx Early Writings, p.345 fn.2) – An 
analogy is also sometimes drawn between crude and higher levels of communism and the stages of 
communism identified in Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Programme. 
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coming-to-be of a communistic consciousness. This displays the structure of a phenomenological 
process, similar to Hegel's “alienations”.41 Marx therefore appears to be representing a process in 
thought or the construction of subjectivity.42 In this sense, communism as a theory of subjectivity 
represents the development of labour from its immediate perception to the self-consciousness of 
man. Arguably Marx is trying to emulate what he sees as Hegel's “positive achievement”: to have 
brought together “universal fixed thought-forms” and to have presented them as “moments in the 
process of abstraction” [EW, p.397]. 
But there are limitations to viewing Marx’s discussion of communism as an investigation of 
consciousness. As Marx makes clear within the section itself, the theoretical antitheses of the 
economic system can find a resolution only in a practical way, “through the practical energy of man” 
[EW, p.354]. Their resolution is “by no means only a problem of knowledge, but a real problem of 
life, a problem which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it treated it as a purely 
theoretical problem” [EW, p.354]. 
Let us therefore return to the notion of communism as a ‘real phase’ of history, as this is the main 
sense in which Marx discusses communism in the Manuscripts. Communism's focus on practice, the 
fact that it's “philanthropy” is “at once real and directly bent towards action”, sets it apart from 
political economy as a theory of subjectivity [EW, p.349]. The analogy between political economy 
and communism breaks down, and presents us with a new set of problems. Marx argues that 
although the idea of communism is sufficient to supersede the idea of private property, to 
supersede the real existence of private property requires something he calls “real communist 
activity” [EW, p.365]. But there is, at best, some ambiguity as to the content of this activity. 
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 David McLellan describes these 'alienations’ as the stages of man's own reason which he comes to recognise 
in the world. They are thus “creations of the human mind yet thought of as independent and superior to the 
human mind” (McLellan, D Marx before Marxism (London: Macmillan, 1980), p.18). 
42
 These stages, considered thematically, I would tentatively characterise as: 1) Crude, unthinking communism, 
2) Political/despotic communism, which has ‘grasped the concept, but not the essence of communism’, 3) 
Social communism, as the positive transcendence of private property, the ‘return of man as social being’, 4) 




Marx points towards the experience of communist workers, for whom, he argues, “the brotherhood 
of man is not a hollow phrase”, but a reality in their “work-worn figures” [EW, p.365]. Marx observes 
that the direct aim of the workers, to produce propaganda, has the unintended by-product of 
creating for the workers a new need, the “need for society”, as a goal in-itself [EW, p.365]. Marx 
contrasts this relationship between means and ends in the working class movement, the need for 
society and the existence of man, with the doctrine of political economy, money as the sole end and 
the ‘inhuman power’ that rules over everything [EW, p.366]. 
Marx, whilst giving several indications of his belief in an impending social revolution in the 
Manuscripts, does not elaborate a substantive theory of revolution. This is manifested most clearly 
in his dismissive attitude towards struggles for the reform of working class conditions. Marx argues 
that fighting for a rise in wages is “nothing more than better pay for slaves”, which results in no 
“increase in human significance or dignity for either the worker or the labour” [EW, p.332]. This view 
seems to arise on the one hand from an acceptance of the iron law of wages, that an “enforced rise 
in wages” is an “anomalous situation” prolonged only by force [EW, p.332], and on the other hand 
from the determination that a social revolution must achieve full human emancipation. Marx's 
earlier inquiries into the limitations of the piecemeal reformers are now framed by this conception. 
Wages and private property both arise, for Marx, as the immediate consequence of a certain type of 
labour. Thus Marx argues that the “emancipation of society from private property” is expressed in 
“the political form of the emancipation of the workers” [EW,p.332]. The emancipation of the 
workers, he claims, contains within it “universal human emancipation”, because the “whole of 
human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production”, and “all relations of 
servitude are nothing but modifications and consequences of this relation” [EW,p.332]. 
The importance of Marx's revolutionary critique in the Manuscripts lies in advocating a radical break 
with private property at the level of the system as a whole, and at the same time grounding the 
potential for the transcendence of these relations of servitude in the experience of workers. As we 
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have seen however, the content of this transcendence is perhaps necessarily ambiguous and 
indeterminate in the Manuscripts. Although Marx has identified the importance of political economy 
to his critique, his criticisms at this point are primarily directed at its philosophical presuppositions. I 
would argue that this is reflected in his failure to valorise the process by which concrete reforms of 




3) One Subjectivity 
The meaning that is ascribed to the Manuscripts is in part determined by the project that Marx was 
engaged in whilst writing them. Thus, if it is supposed that the meaning of the central concepts with 
which Marx was operating in the text undergo a transformation in the course of their elaboration, 
then Marx himself was likely to have been in a process of re-evaluating the nature of the project 
which he was pursuing.43 I have already provided some evidence for the configuration of these 
concepts, such as modern industry, labour, etc., when considered from the point of view of the 
Manuscripts containing two distinct conceptions of subjectivity. 
I will now consider whether Marx was in fact seeking to formulate a synthesising project in which 
these two conceptions of subjectivity could potentially be unified in thought and/or in practice. By 
doing so I will evaluate to what extent Marx has been successful in this endeavour and by extension 
whether such a goal is in fact possible. If Marx was not fully successful in this synthesis, I will ask 
whether the persistence of two theories of subjectivity, of more than one meaning, as an internal 
tension within the work, has interesting consequences for the development of Marx’s project. 
a) Estranged Labour and Private Property 
i) The System of Private Property Revealed as the System of Estranged Labour 
The concept of estranged labour is central to the Manuscripts and to the question of subjectivity 
within it. In particular, it is a key concept in the consideration of the Manuscripts as a work 
containing one conception of subjectivity, because it is a unifying concept that emerges at a 
crossroads between political economy and philosophy. The concept arises both from a concrete 
description of the economic facts, as described by political economy, and from a judgement of these 
facts that Marx roots in an historical and philosophical conception of man. 
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Marx attempts to reduce the system of private property to one that is based on and explained by 
the system of estranged labour. To make this claim, Marx must elaborate his conception of 
estranged labour. He does this by beginning from a “present-day economic fact” [EW, p.323]. Thus 
his analysis appears to have a foundation in objective fact, to be grounded in the descriptions of 
political economy. From this starting-point Marx unpacks four aspects of estrangement, elaborating 
a structured account of estranged labour. 
These four aspects of estrangement are, broadly: the worker’s estrangement from the product, the 
worker’s estrangement from the activity of production, the worker’s estrangement from species-
being, and the worker’s estrangement from other workers. Although this account of estranged 
labour refers to the experience of the worker, it is not simply constructed from it. On the other 
hand, I will argue that the interdependence of the different aspects of estranged labour makes the 
concept reliant on a defensible notion of species-being. 
The concept of species-being attempts to uncover the essential characteristics of what it means to 
be human. This entails both the subjective aspect of the experience of man, species-consciousness, 
and the objective recovery of man as a social being. Marx attempts to derive this third aspect of 
estranged labour, estrangement from species being, from the first two. To what extent Marx 
achieves a synthesis of a somewhat abstract account of species-being and a more concrete 
determination of the experience of the worker remains to be seen. I will attempt later to give an 
account of the usage and limitations of Marx’s account of species-being. 
The immediate consequence of the economic fact of estranged labour is that the product of this 
labour stands “opposed to it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer” [EW, 
p.324]. Marx then raises the question of the relationship between this product and the process of 
production, the activity itself. The relationship of the worker to the product is only one aspect of 
estrangement, he suggests, and this estrangement is only possible because the worker is “estranging 
himself from himself” in the “act of production, within the activity of production itself” [EW, p.326].  
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Marx argues that the product is simply the “résumé of the activity” [EW, p.326]. It seems therefore 
that he is arguing that private property is fully and exhaustibly explainable by estranged labour. By 
uncovering the particular form of activity at the heart of present-day production, Marx is arguing 
that the real content of private property is reducible to estranged labour. But how does Marx 
propose to perform this reduction? Can private property be sufficiently described as the “material, 
summarized expression” [EW, p.334] of estranged labour? Certainly a number of commentators 
have found this manoeuvre suggestive of some form of sleight of hand. 
In particular, Allen Wood criticises Marx’s “‘theory’ of alienation” precisely for its attempt to unify 
the diverse aspects of estrangement within a single system or whole, and to locate a “paradigm 
form” of estranged labour.44 Wood rightly suggests that the search for commensurability between 
such diverse phenomena relies on the conception of some sort of essence whose nature has been 
violated or set into disharmony. What status is accorded to such an essence, and how defensible it 
might be is then at issue for debate. Such criticism is not easily pushed aside, and it raises serious 
questions about the synthesising project of estranged labour, or perhaps the suitability of the 
concepts in which it is rooted (e.g. species-being) to perform the functions which are being asked of 
them in the Manuscripts. 
For Marx, private property derives entirely from “an analysis of the concept of alienated labour” 
[EW, p.332]. It can be seen how this treatment of private property simply as an expression of 
estranged labour would undermine its status as an authentic subject. The autonomy of private 
property as a power dominating human actors would stand revealed as a product of their own 
creation. On the other hand, we have also seen how, at times, Marx does appear to treat private 
property as an authentic subject, as indicated in the first part of this chapter. Is the concept of 
estranged labour capable of this synthesis, or is it one that does violence to reality? 
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I would argue that the answer is one that is perhaps necessarily indeterminate in the Manuscripts. 
The text itself opens up a rich seam of problems that stem from the attempt to formulate an 
adequate conception of estranged labour and its expression and presentation in reality [EW, p.330]. 
As we can see from Wood’s critique however, whilst Marx has identified the complex 
interconnection of the ills of present-day economic society and its determinate and historically-
rooted origins in the labour process, there appear to be serious limitations to the explanatory power 
of the set of concepts with which he is operating in the Manuscripts. 
ii) Objectification and Estrangement 
In the Manuscripts, Marx identifies a process of objectification in which the subject objectifies itself 
in the object. The product of labour is “the objectification of labour” [EW, p.324]. Under the system 
of private property, revealed as the system of estranged labour, he argues that objectification only 
appears as the loss of and bondage to the object. Correspondingly, the appropriation of the object 
appears only as estrangement [EW, p.324]. Whilst Marx makes a clear distinction between the 
processes of estrangement and objectification, within the system of estranged labour they also 
appear to be internally linked.45 
The process of estrangement is, for Marx, an inversion of the process of objectification in the sense 
that agency is transferred from the subject to the object. The object can then be described as 
displaying the properties of a subject, or it could be said, a quasi-subject. It seems therefore that, in 
“present-day” economic conditions as envisaged by Marx [EW, p.323], there is a process of 
estrangement that both preserves the kernel of objectification at the same time as having wholly 
inverted it. This theoretical framework, Marx claims, helps us to explain the inversion of activity and 
passivity that takes place under estranged labour. The activity of the worker appearing as passivity, 
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and the passivity of the non-worker appearing as activity can now be understood through the 
appropriation of the products of labour. 
Marx argues that political economy fails to comprehend this estrangement. It is concealed because 
political economy ignores the “direct relationship between the worker (labour) and production” 
[EW, p.325]. In his project to “rise above the level of political economy”, Marx attempts to unveil this 
concealment [EW, p.288]. But he also points to the real domination of the product, capital, over the 
worker and the fact that it actually confronts the worker as an “autonomous power” [EW, p.324]. 
This poses a set of problems which are at the same time both theoretical and practical. Is it possible 
for the product both to have an authentic “autonomous power” and to be a quasi-subject? How 
does Marx propose to gain access to the direct relationship between the worker and production, if 
not through political economy? Before attempting to answer these questions I must look further at 
the framework in which Marx is operating. 
Marx appears to have appropriated and developed a social ontology with which he seeks to explain 
both the general relationship of man and nature, the fundamental mediation of human productive 
activity, and the historically specific form of further mediation which arises in the present-day 
economic system, estranged labour. Commentators on the Manuscripts have sought to make a 
distinction between these first and second-order mediations in Marx’s social ontology. This 
categorisation is proposed by István Mészáros, and further discussed by Chris Arthur.46 
The first-order mediation expresses the relationship between man and nature at a level of 
abstraction that is able to discuss the concepts of objectification and appropriation in a non-
estranged form. The second-order mediation operates at a more specific historical determination 
and deals with the more concrete expressions of estranged labour and private property and with the 
concept of estrangement. Although it might seem possible to isolate these different orders of 
mediation analytically, Marx’s usage of estranged labour in the Manuscripts seems to suggest that 
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the second-order “mediation of the mediation”, as Mészáros calls it, is not so easily disentangled 
from its basis.47 
I have argued above that Marx treats objectification and estrangement as distinct processes but also 
as having an intimate internal connection. Marx’s critique of estranged labour is not a rejection of 
mediation altogether, but of this specific set of second-order mediations. Mészáros claims that Marx 
has developed “the first truly dialectical grasp of the complex relationship between mediation and 
immediacy”.48 Arthur is more measured in suggesting that it is the “conceptual inflection rather than 
the mutual exclusion of the categories of ‘objectification’ and ‘alienation’ that permits theoretical 
space for grasping the objective necessity of a historical supersession”.49 If Marx’s conception of 
communism is the vehicle for this historical supersession, both practically and theoretically, this 
‘complex relationship’ reflects the task of communism to rise from within the system of 
estrangement, whilst simultaneously creating a qualitatively new system. This requires reflection on 
the form of non-estranged labour or human activity on which this new system might be based. 
There is considerable debate over Marx’s use of the term labour in the Manuscripts in relation to 
estrangement. To what extent Marx conceives of labour as inextricably connected to estrangement, 
and as a term for human activity limited to the present-day economic system is a matter of 
contention. Certainly in his later writings, e.g. Capital, Marx examines labour as a process common 
to many different epochs of human production [Capital, I, p.283].50 It would be dangerous however 
to read this understanding into his earlier writings in a teleological manner. 
In the Manuscripts, there is a very strong association between labour and the process of 
estrangement, although Marx’s use of terminology in the Manuscripts is somewhat unhelpful in this 
regard. It is possible to extract quotations that seem to point to an interchangeable usage of labour 
and human activity, suggesting that Marx treats labour in the Manuscripts as at least partially trans-
                                                          
47
 Mészáros Marx's Theory of Alienation, p.79 
48
 Mészáros Marx's Theory of Alienation, p.79 
49
 Arthur Dialectics of Labour, p.12 
50
 Marx Capital, I, p.283  
67 
 
historical in its scope. On the other hand, Arthur argues that an examination of the full context of 
the Manuscripts, and not just of selected fragments, discredits this interpretation, and points 
towards Marx having a conception of labour that is inextricably connected to private property and 
estrangement.51 
At certain points, Marx explicitly suggests that “labour is only an expression of human activity within 
alienation” [EW, p.369]. The transcendence of private property, as a means of achieving some form 
of “truly human and social property” would thus require the creation of a qualitatively new form of 
free human activity [EW, p.333]. If Marx does not conceive of the possibility of a really-existing non-
estranged labour, then this has implications for the transcendence of estrangement. It seems that 
the possibility of such transcendence is predicated on the possibility of bridging this gap. Therefore 
the problems that Marx encounters in stepping between the language of human activity and human 
labour are perhaps not merely theoretical, but stem from the existence of a problem in reality. 
iii) Estrangement and Suffering 
Much like the concept of estranged labour, Marx’s conception of suffering can be said to play a 
bridging function between political economy and philosophy within the Manuscripts. In the First 
Manuscript, it can be argued that Marx engages in an immanent critique of Adam Smith’s political 
economy. In doing so Marx attempts to use Smith's own moral criterion to demonstrate that the 
goal of the present-day economic system is an unhappy society. Taking Smith's contention that a 
society in which the majority suffer is an unhappy one, Marx demonstrates that in every possible 
state of society, advancing, decreasing, and static prosperity, the result is suffering and misery for 
the vast majority. 
In the critical case of a society with advancing prosperity, Marx establishes the concept of estranged, 
alienated labour in order to demonstrate that misery is the product of “the very essence of present-
day labour” [EW, p.288]. Marx calls this suffering under conditions of advancing wealth a 
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“complicated misery” [EW, p.286], because it is both a concentration of the workers’ activity in the 
hands of another and a distortion of that activity, so that the worker is more uniformly dependent 
on an abstract and one-sided type of activity. Therefore the concepts of suffering and estranged 
labour are both products of this project and are required to underpin the nascent critique of political 
economy that Marx is advancing. 
Arthur argues that Marx’s “main critical category” changes within the First Manuscript from 
‘abstraction’ to ‘estrangement’.52 In the first sections it is the separation and abstraction of labour 
from capital and landed property that is purely negative and harmful, whereas in the later sections it 
is more specifically the estrangement of labour that is diagnosed. I would argue that the concept of 
suffering links these critical categories. I have suggested and will demonstrate below that Marx’s 
notion of estranged labour depends upon the concept of species-being, or human essence. Marx 
roots this conception of the appropriation of man’s essence in the concept of suffering. 
As I will show later, Marx argues that man, “appropriates his integral essence in an integral way, as a 
total man” [EW, p.351]. Even the most debased and inhuman estrangement, the worst condition of 
suffering, is, for Marx, a confirmation of human reality. He argues that, “suffering, humanly 
conceived, is an enjoyment of the self for man” [EW, p.351]. The one-sidedness of man has arisen in 
all the senses as a result of private property, and it reduces all these senses merely to the uniform 
sense of having [EW, p.352].53 Marx sees the reduction of human nature to this absolute poverty as a 
necessary stage in a process of human nature “giving birth to its inner wealth” [EW, p.352]. 
In this case suffering appears to represent the kernel of species-consciousness that remains for the 
estranged worker completely dominated by the autonomous power of private property. Recognition 
of this suffering as an expression of self, I would argue, preserves the potential for humanity to 
emerge from the system of estranged labour and become a self-conscious subject [EW, p.351]. In 
                                                          
52
 Arthur Dialectics of Labour, p.15 
53
 This is an understanding that Marx has derived from Moses Hess’s Einundzwanzig Bogen, as he 
acknowledges in the text (Marx Early Writings, p.352). 
69 
 
the transition from suffering to passion, “the sensuous outburst of my essential activity” [EW, 
p.356], the fulcrum can be located around which an inversion from passivity to activity takes place. 
Marx therefore begins his immanent critique of political economy in the First Manuscript by using 
Smith’s measure of suffering to demonstrate “society’s distress” on its own terms [EW, p.286]. But 
through the process of estranged labour, suffering is transformed by Marx into an ontologically 
important turning point. 
In the later Manuscripts, during Marx’s more ‘philosophical’ discussions, he connects suffering 
fundamentally to sensuousness. For a human being to be an objective sensuous being, he argues, it 
must also be a suffering being [EW, p.390]. Furthermore, because man “feels his suffering, he is a 
passionate being” [EW, p.390]. Passion, argues Marx, is “man’s essential power vigorously striving to 
attain its object” [EW, p.390]. In the section on the Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic and General 
Philosophy, Marx appears to be seeking to reinvigorate the framework of sensuousness that he has 
adopted from Feuerbach with the tools of estrangement that he has drawn from Hegel. In this way 
Marx attempts to address the problem, as he formulates it, that man is both a natural being and, at 
the same time, a human being. There is therefore a relationship between being and knowing, which 
raises a number of questions for the problem of subjectivity and the understanding of human 
consciousness. 
For Marx, the species-being of man is dependent on its confirmation and realization as a being-for-
itself in both being and thought. His notion of the transcendence of private property is here 
translated into the discourse of senses. Such transcendence would mean “the complete 
emancipation of all human senses and attributes” [EW, p.352]. In particular, to achieve this Marx 
argues that the senses must become “theoreticians in their immediate praxis” [EW, p.352]. In this 
way the theoretical antitheses between activity and passivity, or suffering, lose their antithetical 
character not simply in thought, but in the social condition. Therefore, Marx seems to be 
70 
 
approaching the conclusion that the problems of philosophy are not simply problems of knowledge, 
but those of real life. 
Although Marx’s discussion of the development of human senses and needs raises many interesting 
insights, it is not within the remit of the present study to explore these further. I have argued above 
that Marx’s notion of estranged labour is dependent on an adequate conception of species-being. 
On the one hand, Marx claims that the worker’s estrangement from species-being is derived from 
the first two aspects of estrangement (estrangement from the product of labour and estrangement 
from the activity of production). On the other hand, it seems that man’s estrangement from species-
being requires a positive concept of species-being and species-consciousness. I will now go on to 
examine the concept of species-being in more detail. 
b) Man as a Subject: Species and Species-Being 
I argued earlier that Marx’s notion of estranged labour in the Manuscripts is reliant upon a 
defensible notion of species-being or species-essence. The concept of species-being is crucial for 
how Marx is able to define a worthwhile, meaningful or human life, and therefore to identify the de-
humanised form it takes under the conditions of estranged labour. Further, it is through the concept 
of estranged labour that Marx is able to reveal the system of private property as being based on the 
system of estrangement. I would thus argue that the concept of species-being provides a key 
foundation for the project of unifying the two conceptions of subjectivity that I have elaborated in 
the earlier part of this chapter. 
I will now attempt to give an account of Marx’s usage of the term, its implications and possible 
limitations. It is difficult to pin down exactly Marx’s conception of species-being in the Manuscripts. 
At times it might seem that his conception points towards a fixed definition, at others towards 
something quite elastic. Quotations can be extracted that suggest a trans-historical conception, and 
others that suggest a minimal content outside of the historically specific. It is worth acknowledging 
from the outset Marx’s inheritance of the term from Hegel and subsequently Feuerbach, and 
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therefore the tradition from which it can be argued that he both borrowed and departed. I will begin 
with the aspect of continuity that Marx’s conception of species-being shares with his predecessors. 
The concept of a species, for Marx, is derived from Hegel. For both Marx and Hegel there is a 
relationship between the individual and the species in which the species is not simply an aggregate 
of the individual members. Following Feuerbach, this conception of a species seems to point to 
some species-being which is common to all individual members of that species. This may seem to 
contradict the first statement, but for Feuerbach and Marx, Wood argues, the source of the 
connection between each human individual lies in the fact that the essential qualities of the 
individual are connected to their relationship to the human species as a whole, as a single collective 
human entity.54 
In contrast to Hegel, Marx takes up the philosophical position of “consistent humanism and 
naturalism” [EW, p.389]. He enthusiastically adopts this Feuerbachian formulation on a number of 
occasions in the Manuscripts. Marx equates the full development of naturalism with a fully 
developed humanism [EW, p.348]. Such a position is distinct, he argues, from both idealism and 
materialism and constitutes “at the same time their unifying truth” [EW, p.389]. Marx associates this 
position with communism, understood as the positive transcendence of private property. It is, 
argues Marx, “the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. human, being” [EW, p.348]. 
I will discuss later the significance of this identification with communism. 
The restoration of man, the re-humanization of its species-being, poses the possibility of the 
overcoming of antagonisms between humanism and naturalism, between man and nature. I have 
already discussed the difficulties with such an un-problematised positing of the unity of man and 
nature.55 The recalcitrance of nature to human use is a problem for Marx in his appropriation of this 
Feuerbachian framework. There is however already some evidence of Marx going beyond 
Feuerbach. Marx recognises in the Manuscripts the importance of understanding the “process of 
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world history” and the vital role that naturalism plays in comprehending this [EW, p.389]. More 
important, although not unrelated, is the central role that Marx gives to labour in the Manuscripts. 
In the Manuscripts, Marx proposes a social ontology, as discussed above, in which the relationship 
between man and nature is mediated by labour.56 It is the introduction of labour into Marx’s analysis 
that destabilises the problematic positing of the unity of man with nature.57 Marx seems to be 
attempting to examine the complex connections between those relationships that exist at the level 
of the worker and the materials of labour with those at a more fundamental level between the 
species and nature. I would suggest that one source of difficulties for Marx’s use of species-being is 
the blurring of distinctions between species and society, since all humans are members of the same 
species, but not necessarily of the same society. It is clear historically that human societies have the 
capacity to vary greatly in character.58 
On the one hand, Marx employs Feuerbach’s conception of “consistent humanism and naturalism” 
[EW, p.389], and on the other has reframed this philosophical perspective and is re-shaping it by 
asserting the centrality of the labour process. In this context, Marx’s critique of Hegel is an attempt 
to creatively reinvent estrangement and to extract “all the elements of criticism [that] are concealed 
within it, and often prepared and worked out in a way that goes far beyond Hegel’s own point of 
view” [EW, p.385]. Hegel’s insights into the creation of man as a process, albeit abstractly in thought 
alone, allow him to grasp the nature of labour and “objective man – true, because real man – as the 
result of his own labour” [EW, p.386]. It is this aspect of Hegel that Marx seeks to synthesise with the 
framework of Feuerbach, and thus to create his own conception of species-being. 
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Although Marx never explicitly criticises Feuerbach in the Manuscripts,59 he goes beyond him, as 
Arthur formulates it, by “recognizing that Hegel’s dialectic of negativity, freed from its estranged 
form of expression within philosophy, can be given concrete content in the pattern of historical 
genesis”.60 Although still somewhat abstract, this important development will later be manifested 
explicitly in Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach. Wood recognises the speed of the development of Marx’s 
thought during this period.61 Within a year or so of writing the Manuscripts, in his Sixth Thesis on 
Feuerbach, Marx states that “the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. 
In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations” [EW, p.423]. 
There are similarities between the dilemma at the heart of Marx’s conception of species-being and 
the problem expressed by all those thinkers who, following Hegel, grappled with the inheritance of 
the radical Enlightenment. As Charles Taylor defines it, the problem is how to unite “two seemingly 
indispensable images of man”.62 The first image is of a subject defined in relation to something 
external to it, and the second is of a subject that is self-defining. These two images on one level have 
“deep affinities”, and yet at the same time seem “utterly incompatible”.63 These two elements are 
intertwined in Marx’s conception of species-being, and yet are not self-evidently free from 
incompatibility. I will now examine these elements more closely. 
Marx claims that man is a species-being for two reasons, which he argues are both different 
expressions of the “same thing” [EW, p.327]. Firstly, that man is a species-being, because “he 
practically and theoretically makes the species – both his own and those of other things – his object” 
[EW, p.327]. Secondly, it is because “he looks upon himself as a universal and therefore free being” 
[EW, p.327].64 Thus, for Marx, man as a subject is both self-defining and defined by ‘his’ relation to 
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‘his’ object. Both of these things are, for Marx, expressions of a single relationship between subject 
and object. Whilst he conceives of man as a social being, it is not simply sociality alone which defines 
humans as a species-being. It is also through their consciousness of themselves as a species that 
human beings achieve such a distinction. 
Animals, argues Marx, are “immediately one” with their life activity; they are that activity [EW, 
p.328]. The conscious life-activity of humans distinguishes them qualitatively from animal life-
activity. For man’s life activity is a mediation, it is “not a determination with which he directly 
merges” [EW, p.328]. Man makes life activity an “object of his will and consciousness” [EW, p.328]. 
Man's species-being, argues Marx, is at the root of the freedom that characterises human activity, 
and ‘his’ position as a conscious being. This relationship is reversed by estranged labour, which, since 
man is a conscious being, “makes his life activity, his being, a mere means for his existence” [EW, 
p.328].65 Since man “reproduces himself not only intellectually, in his consciousness, but actively and 
actually”, for Marx, man is capable of contemplating “himself in a world that he has created” [EW, 
p.329]. 
The manifestation of Marx’s positing of the Feuerbachian unity of man and nature can be seen again 
in his allusion to the “world that [man] has created”, and his statement that man “reproduces the 
whole of nature” [EW, p.329]. In contrast to Feuerbach however, it can also be seen that, for Marx, 
the alienation to be overcome is one which is objective, created by humans practically through a real 
historical process. Marx’s investigations in the Manuscripts trace the outlines of a new project that 
posits the possibility of examining the material content of this process. He begins to advance the role 
that political economy can play in this project. 
It is in this sense that Marx argues that the division of labour is “nothing more than the estranged, 
alienated positing of human activity as a real species-activity” [EW, p.369]. It is precisely because of 
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having grasped labour as the essence of private property, argues Marx, “that the development of 
the economy as such can be analysed in its real determinateness” [EW, p.369]. It stems from the fact 
that the division of labour is a “configuration of private property” that human life “needed private 
property for its realization and that it now needs the abolition of private property” [EW, p.374]. 
I have identified the limitations of Marx’s conception of species-being. Conceived from a merely 
philosophical perspective, it is incapable of solving the inherited riddle of history, the unification of 
two indispensable images of man. Marx’s emphasis on real practical activity precludes the idea that 
such a riddle could be conquered in thought alone. On the other hand, the internal tensions of 
Marx’s conception and the development of a new project lead him to some interesting pre-
figurations of his notion of commodity fetishism that we shall now investigate. 
c) Quasi-subjects and the Limits of the Manuscripts 
i) Primogeniture and Fetishism: Capital as a Quasi-Subject 
In the Manuscripts, I have argued that Marx presents us with a compelling expression of two 
different subjectivities. Through his identification of labour as the sole essence of wealth, Marx 
seems to address the potential of labour as a subject.66 On the other hand, in its developed form as 
modern industry or capital, private property displays the properties of a subject. Marx attempts to 
unify these two conceptions of subjectivity by revealing the system of private property as 
established on the basis of the system of estranged labour. The theory of estranged labour seeks to 
explain the creation of the quasi-subjectivity of the products of labour, private property taking on 
the properties of a subject. I have identified a number of limitations in this attempt at unification: 
the theory of estranged labour, and the notion of species-being on which it is based. Thus there 
remains an ambiguity as to whether the quasi-subjectivity of private property is reducible to the 
subjectivity of labour, or whether private property is in fact an authentic subject. 
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 Although, the form of labour that increasingly characterises the present-day economic system, abstract 
labour, appears to represent the absence of a subject. 
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I will now examine this ambiguity between private property as a quasi-subject and as an authentic 
subject. I will argue that the co-existence of two conceptions of subjectivity in tension with each 
other suggests that Marx recognises both as having a social reality in the present-day economic 
system. I will argue that both conceptions of subjectivity are explored in the Manuscripts, and that 
Marx seeks to construct a framework that is able to give a full expression to each. In one sense, it 
could be argued that this theory is necessarily incomplete. For Marx, the riddle is to be solved by 
communism and since his conception of communism is one that relies on the interaction between 
thought and practice, by definition it cannot be solved in thought alone [EW, p.348]. What I will now 
examine however, is whether the continued presence of two conceptions of subjectivity alongside 
this attempted unification presents Marx with any insights that begin to reconfigure his project. 
I will argue that in his exploration of the phenomenon of primogeniture in relation to the transition 
from feudal society to the present-day economic system, Marx identifies a theoretical apparatus 
that can begin to address the problem of private property as capital, as both a quasi-subject and an 
authentic subject. Although Marx employs the term fetishism in the Manuscripts, he does not yet 
have a conception of fetishism in relation to commodities.67 I will argue however that his discussion 
of primogeniture gives some intimations of his mature theory of fetishism and demonstrates that 
Marx is pressing towards a conception of fetishism in relation to commodities. 
In the feudal form, private property already appears as a quasi-subject, “the domination of the earth 
as of an alien power over men” [EW, p.318]. For Marx, feudal property is land that has already been 
sold off. It is, “land which has been estranged from man and now confronts him in the shape of a 
handful of great lords” [EW, p.318]. Both serf and lord belong to the land. The serf is an 
“appurtenance” to the land, and the lord himself is inherited by the land through primogeniture: “It 
inherits him” [EW, p.318]. The origins of the rule of private property, argues Marx, are to be found, 
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 Marx discusses the “fetishism of the old, external wealth” (Marx Early Writings, p.344). 
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and have their basis, in property in land. Marx equates both landed property and capital as different 
forms of private property. 
The specific difference of the feudal form of landownership is that, “the lord at least appears to be 
king of the land” [EW, p.318]. The relationship between owner and land appears to be “based on 
something more intimate than mere material wealth” [EW, p.318]. The land acquires both the status 
and the name of the lord. It is individualized and becomes a person: “It appears as the inorganic 
body of the lord” [EW, p.318]. There is a blurring between the nobility and landed property. In the 
same way, argues Marx, landed property “does not appear directly as the rule of mere capital” [EW, 
p.318]. Those dependent on the landed property relate to it like a “fatherland”, and it is, suggests 
Marx, like a “narrow nationality” [EW, p.318]. This relationship is “therefore directly political, and 
even has an agreeable aspect” [EW, p.318]. 
Once however, “it is only a man's purse, and not his character or individuality, which ties him to the 
land”, the appearance that I have been describing is abolished [EW, p.319]. It is inevitable, suggests 
Marx, that landed property, as the basis of private property, “should be drawn entirely into the orbit 
of private property and become a commodity” [EW, p.319]. The rule of the property owner then 
appears as “the naked rule of private property, of capital” [EW, p.319]. And furthermore the 
relationship between property owner and worker is “reduced to the economic relationship of 
exploiter and exploited” [EW, p.319]. Thus the root of landed property, self-interest, is able to 
manifest itself in its “cynical form” [EW, p.319]. 
Immovable monopoly, argues Marx, becomes mobile and “restless monopoly, competition” [EW, 
p.319].68 Landed property, under conditions of competition, and thus in the form of capital, now 
“manifests its domination both over the working class and over the property owners themselves, 
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 Marx discusses the division of landed property and the distinction between the existence and the essence of 
monopoly. He introduces the concept of the “industrial sphere” (Marx Early Writings, p.319). In considering 
the abolition of private property in land, Marx raises the notion of association as applied to the land, and 
argues that equality is a tendency inherent in the division of land. Marx posits the concept of an “authentic, 
personal property for man” (Marx Early Writings, p.320). This section culminates with Marx’s assertion of the 
necessity of crisis and revolution (Marx Early Writings, p.321-322). 
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inasmuch as the laws of the movement of capital are either ruining or raising them” [EW, p.319]. 
Marx summarizes this transition thus: from the medieval phrase, “nulle terre sans seigneur”, to the 
modern saying, “l'argent n’a pas de maître” [EW, p.319].69 The latter, Marx suggests “is an 
expression of the complete domination of dead matter over men” [EW, p.319]. 
Thus Marx traces the historical appearance of private property as a subject from the fetishism 
attached to feudal property to the boundary of something new, a fetishism of a modern form 
associated with private property as a commodity. Marx does not develop this insight further in the 
Manuscripts, and therefore it is important not to overstate this as a pre-figuration of Marx’s later 
theory. It is clear however that Marx has recognised the theoretical significance of fetishism, albeit 
here primarily in relation to the metal-money fetish.70 As Marx points out later in the Manuscripts, 
fetishism demonstrates the “extent to which the solution of theoretical problems is a function of 
practice and is mediated through practice” [EW, p.364]. It is by examining the importance of real 
practical activity that Marx will begin to formulate the implicit difference between his position and 
that of Feuerbach in the Manuscripts. And it is in this sense that Marx later asserts in the Theses that 
the purpose is not simply to interpret, but to change the world. 
In the Manuscripts, Marx formulates the impasse reached by philosophy. There is an “abstract 
hostility between sense and intellect” [EW, p.364], he says, and this hostility is inevitable for as long 
as “the human sense for nature, the human significance of nature and hence the natural sense of 
man, has not yet been produced by man’s own labour” [EW, p.364]. Thus the antinomies that are 
found in the system of estrangement, between idealism and materialism, humanism and naturalism, 
cannot be resolved without the transcendence that is being proposed by Marx. Present-day “popular 
consciousness”, he suggests, is incapable of comprehending the self-mediated being of nature and 
of man, since such a being contradicts “all the palpable evidence of practical life” [EW, p.356]. The 
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 This is perhaps not surprising as the concept of fetishism would have been a common currency in the 
intellectual milieu of the time (see Dimoulis, D and Milios, J “Commodity Fetishism vs. Capital Fetishism” 
Historical Materialism Vol. 12:3 (2004), p.3). 
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sense perception of this consciousness is predicated on a real sensuous existence that must be 
overcome. 
How does this sensuous reality relate to abstract thought in the system of estrangement? The 
answer, for Marx, is different depending on the relation of the person to production. The worker has 
a “real, practical attitude” towards production, and thus the world appears as an activity of 
estrangement [EW, p.334]. By contrast, the non-worker has a “theoretical attitude” and is 
confronted by a situation of estrangement [EW, p.334]. Marx had intended to investigate these 
relationships further in the Manuscripts, but the text breaks off at this point.71 In the latter part of 
the Manuscripts, Marx sees the transcendence of the system of estrangement as overcoming this 
schism between sense and intellect. As I have indicated above, Marx argues that, in the supersession 
of private property, the senses must become “theoreticians in their immediate praxis” [EW, p.352]. 
ii) Capital as a Social Relation and the Positive Supersession of Private Property 
The relation of private property, Marx argues, contains latently the relationship of labour to capital: 
“the relation of private property as labour, the relation of private property as capital and the 
connection of these two” [EW, p.336]. Marx suggests that there is a necessary “movement through 
which these parts have to pass”, in order for the relationship of private property to fully express 
itself [EW, p.341]. However whilst private property “appears as the basis and cause of alienated 
labour, it is in fact its consequence” [EW, p.332]. The relationship of the worker to production is for 
Marx the “essential relationship of labour”, whereas the relationship of the non-worker to the object 
of production is “only a consequence of this first relationship” [EW, p.336]. 
Marx analyses the historical development of industry and landed property out of the feudal relations 
that previously characterised society. In doing so he argues that both landed property and industry 
are historical moments of the more fundamental category of private property. Marx attempts to 
reveal the inner connections of this historical development in the “real energy and movement of 
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 Although Marx does examine and conceptualise the conflict between the abstractions capital and labour in 
the Second Manuscript, as I will discuss in the next section (Marx Early Writings, p.341). 
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private property” [EW, p.341]. It can be argued that by removing a sharp demarcation between 
feudal ownership and landed property, and between landed property and industry, Marx makes it 
difficult to discern the specificity of modern capitalist relations of production. This may however be 
placing demands upon the Manuscripts that it is not able, or does not intend, to provide. 
One conclusion that can be drawn from the irreducibility of the relation between private property as 
a subject and labour, to that of estranged labour with itself, is that this relationship is a social 
relation that requires the full exposition of both poles of the relationship, capital and labour. The 
structure of these poles is not homologous and therefore the inner relationship between them must 
be investigated. In the Manuscripts, Marx attempts to find the essential connections between the 
terms that make up the “system of estrangement” [EW, p.323]. In his later work, Marx research is 
ordered by the recognition of the fundamental priority of the relationship between capital and 
labour.72 Marx’s dedication to examining the connections between the “system of estrangement” 
and the “money system” marks his commitment to systematically examining what can be extracted 
from the critique of political economy [EW, p.323]. 
The Manuscripts give a sense of the progressive role of industry that Marx goes on to develop in his 
later writings. As indicated above, Marx attempts to theorise the relationship between capital and 
labour, to conceptualise their movement using the Hegelian forms of opposition and mediation. 
Whilst this “hostile reciprocal opposition” is developed only very schematically in the Manuscripts, 
these passages anticipate themes that will be developed in writings such as the Poverty of 
Philosophy, and then re-affirmed by Marx in the light of his later research in Capital [EW, p.341]. 
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 Marx is conscious of the historical formation of the opposition between capital and labour (Marx Early 
Writings, p.337). He also identifies the fundamental nature of the economic relationship of exploiter and 
exploited (Marx Early Writings, p.319). In the Manuscripts, Marx does not however identify the human essence 
as the ensemble of social relations, as he was to do in the Theses on Feuerbach, as this would presuppose a set 
of concepts that he has not yet developed. 
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iii) Rising above Political Economy = Communism? 
In the Manuscripts, Marx poses two different, but perhaps commensurable, projects: that of rising 
above political economy and that of communism understood as the positive transcendence of 
private property. I will ask whether these two projects can be understood as being equivalent to 
each other. In the former, there is a movement to develop an immanent critique based on political 
economy’s premises, language and its laws. The continuity of this method with Marx’s later writings, 
such as Capital, might be presumed from its subtitle: A Critique of Political Economy. 
Although political economy tends to legitimise the class rule of the bourgeoisie, Marx recognises 
that it has “formulated the laws of estranged labour” [EW, p.332]. In the Manuscripts, Marx is critical 
of political economy, but accepts much of its content. He directs his criticism primarily at its 
philosophical pre-suppositions: for reducing man to the individual, stripped of all determinateness, 
and classified as a capitalist or a worker [EW, p.369]. However Marx also recognises that it is only 
through engaging with the achievements of political economy that a scientific study of the division 
of labour can be mounted. It is necessary to discover therefore how the project of rising above 
political economy is related to communism, the latter project in this equation. 
For Marx, estranged labour, as human activity within alienation, cannot be transcended merely in 
thought alone. The practical and concrete supersession of estranged labour requires the raising to 
consciousness of the social nature of labour. This social nature is expressed economically as the 
division of labour. Although raising the social nature of labour to consciousness is not an act of 
supersession in itself, it is a positive advance to have attained this consciousness, and a necessary 
part of the overall process of supersession [EW, p.365]. 
Marx’s critique of crude communism follows the form of a Hegelian dialectical process. It can be 
seen, argues Marx, “how the history of industry and the objective existence of industry as it has 
developed is the open book of the essential powers of man” [EW, p.355]. Through this open book it 
becomes possible to conceive of a materialist conception of the history of production. Thus Marx 
82 
 
claims that, “Industry is the real historical relationship of nature, and hence of natural science, to 
man” [EW, p.355]. In contending that man's essential powers have an “exoteric revelation”, I would 
argue that Marx is driving beyond the limits of his Feuerbachian influences to embark upon a new 
and distinctive project [EW, p.355]. 
Marx states that, “The consideration of the division of labour and exchange is of the highest interest, 
because they are the perceptibly alienated expressions of human activity and essential powers as 
species-activity and species-powers” [EW, p.374]. Marx has posed the unresolved problem of 
examining these ‘perceptibly alienated expressions’. Whilst remaining conscious of the limitations of 
the conception of species-being that he inherits in the Manuscripts, I would argue that this can be 
considered an anticipation of Marx’s later investigation of the social relations of production. 
Thus Marx develops an, albeit somewhat abstract, understanding of communism in the Manuscripts, 
as the positive transcendence of private property. Communism, as the act of its own creation and of 
its thinking consciousness, is a step beyond Feuerbach’s unity of man and nature inasmuch as it 
engages with Marx’s new conception of estranged labour and presents a strategy for its positive 
transcendence. It declares that the “genuine resolution” of the conflict between man and nature 
cannot take place in thought alone [EW, p.348]. Communism, Marx declares famously, is “the 
solution to the riddle of history and knows itself to be the solution” [EW, p.348]. 
Although in the early stages of his engagement with political economy, I would argue that this 
investigation of the Manuscripts demonstrates that Marx was moving towards a new project. This 
project sought to synthesise communism as a real movement with a critique of political economy. 
The task of communism is to practically abolish the present-day system by organising the forces that 
are emerging within it. In this historical movement to supersede private property, Marx makes the 
proposal for “real communist activity” [EW, p.365]. Whilst his suggestion simply that “history will 
give rise to such activity”, is clearly insufficient, it is nevertheless true that Marx has made a “real 
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advance” in having gained “at the outset an awareness of the limits as well as the goal of this 




4) Conclusion: The Initiation of a New Project 
Marx opens the Manuscripts with a Preface in which he excoriates the “critical theologians”, such as 
Bruno Bauer, who rebel against Hegelian philosophy in a negative and “cowardly” manner and 
systematically fail to go “to the root of the matter” [EW, p.282].73 It is my contention that the 
Manuscripts represent Marx’s first systematic exploration of a path leading beyond this “negative 
dissolution of philosophy, i.e. its process of decay” [EW, p.282].74 
Whilst the Manuscripts themselves have no conclusion, in this chapter I have tried to consider the 
development of Marx’s project internal to them. I structured my approach to the problem by 
addressing the question of how many conceptions of subjectivity can be found in the Manuscripts. In 
order to investigate this I proposed and analysed two conceptions: the subjectivity of private 
property and the subjectivity of labour. 
Although I concluded that there were indeed two distinct conceptions of subjectivity within the 
Manuscripts, I also examined the synthesising aspect of Marx’s project. I argued that his incomplete 
attempt to reduce these two conceptions to a single unified conception through the theory of 
estranged labour raises the possibility of private property as a quasi-subject. Assessing the evidence 
that private property exists as both an authentic and a quasi-subject in the Manuscripts, I examined 
Marx’s attempts to trace the historical appearance of private property as a subject, and to identify a 
modern form of fetishism associated with private property as a commodity. I have argued that this 
terrain of investigation pre-figures his later theorisation of the problem of commodity fetishism. 
In expressing the problem in the form of a unity of two differentiated conceptions of subjectivity, 
Marx initiates a project in which the challenge of investigating the full complexity of these two 
aspects and their interrelationship is posed. The difficulties involved in this project are manifested in 
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the tension between Marx’s use of a theoretical framework associated with the concept of species-
being and the elevation of labour to a central position within his system. 
I argue that this tension is a productive one in Marx’s investigations, and gives rise to further 
developments in his critique of political economy. Following Arthur, I have examined the relationship 
between his critical concepts of ‘abstraction’ and ‘estrangement’, in which the notion of suffering 
plays an important mediating role. I claim that the Manuscripts contain the anticipation of several 
arguments that are developed in Marx’s later writings, e.g. the historically progressive aspect of 
capitalism, and the relationship between capital and labour. Whilst not yet having critically 
addressed the question of value in the Manuscripts, Marx’s identification of “one-sided, abstract 
labour” with the proletariat, the degradation of work and the reduction of the worker to a machine 
are insights that are later integrated into the, albeit very different, analytical space of writings such 
as Capital [EW, p.288]. 
The duality of the structure my argument has also raised questions about the ambiguous 
relationship between subjects and theories in the Manuscripts. I investigated the dynamic nature of 
political economy and its relationship to the human and non-human aspects of the subjectivity of 
private property, or its status as “modern industry as self” [EW, p.341]. I have argued that Marx 
recognises the necessity of the revolutionary movement finding its empirical and theoretical basis in 
the “movement of private property”, the economy [EW, p.348]. At this stage in his development 
however, Marx has not formulated a positive critique of much of the content of political economy. 
Whilst Marx refers to the class struggle in the Manuscripts, notably in the opening passages, he 
tends to conceive the conflict theoretically as a clash between two abstractions, capital and labour. 
This raises the question of what framework is required for the elaboration of concrete class subjects, 
such as the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The latter concept is noticeably absent in the 
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Manuscripts.75 In the Manuscripts, Marx identifies the political economist as the “scientific 
exposition and existence” of empirical businessmen [EW, p.360]. This identification of theorist and 
practitioner opens a discussion about the role of the intellectual that I will examine further in a later 
chapter on the work of Antonio Gramsci. 
The Manuscripts are also the site of Marx’s first substantive reflections on his conception of 
communism. Marx structures his exposition of communism as a Hegelian critique of crude 
communism that rises through successive levels. I argue that Marx proposes synthesising the 
conception of rising above political economy with the project of self-emancipation that is contained 
in his conception of communism. I have argued that there is a crucial link between the continuing 
development of his critique of political economy, analysing the economy in its “real 
determinateness” [EW, p.369], and his desire for the concrete elaboration of a “real communist 
activity” [EW, p.365]. 
It is in this sense that I argue for the significance of Marx’s announcement that the history of 
industry is the “open book” of man’s essential powers [EW, p.354]. Despite the unchanged form of 
Marx’s conceptual framework of species-being, I have argued that the task of studying of the 
“perceptibly alienated expressions” of human activity places him at the threshold of a new content: 
conceptualising the necessity of analysing the social relations of production [EW, p.374].  
The problem of two subjectivities thus initiates a theme that extends from Marx’s Manuscripts 
through to his later writings, involving the closely related notions of alienation and commodity 
fetishism. The problem is expressed in the Manuscripts through the conceptual framework of 
alienated labour. Here Marx attempts to transform the movements of private property into the 
relationship of alienated labour with human development. I have argued that Marx’s initial 
investigations of political economy lead him into the dilemma of regarding the subjectivity of private 
property as a superposition of quasi-subjectivity and authentic subjectivity. This begins to test the 
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limits of the conceptual apparatus of alienated labour in the Manuscripts and presses in the 
direction of a new project. 
This problem is reformulated and developed in a more determinate form by Marx in Capital. On the 
one hand, by elaborating a coherent labour theory of value, Marx is able to advance a critique of 
political economy that does not uncritically accept its concepts, such as the iron law of wages. On 
the other hand, this critique does not reject them solely on the basis of an overarching philosophical 
principle, the alienation of human nature, alone. This advance is expressed in Marx’s Theses on 
Feuerbach (1845), where he conceives of human essence as “the ensemble of the social relations” 
[EW, p.423]. Marx’s later writings in Capital undertake a root-and-branch investigation of the 
concepts of political economy, their immanent critique. 
Nevertheless, in the next chapter I will seek to demonstrate that the issue of the authentic or quasi-
subjectivity of private property as capital is a theme which continues to underlie his later writings. As 
we will see, the framework of fetishism leads some to suggest that Marx treats capital as the subject 
of Capital. Against this however, others continue to assert that the standpoint of labour, critically 
understood, continues to be the vantage point from which Marx’s critique in Capital is mounted. 
I have sought to demonstrate in this chapter that the pre-condition of this later work was the 
formulation of a problem in which Marx recognised that it was necessary for the subjectivity of 
private property and the subjectivity of labour to be given full expression. This produced an internal 
tension in his theory of alienated labour, as it attempted to straddle the apparently authentic 
subjectivity of private property and to reveal its basis in the subjectivity of labour. In Capital, as I will 
demonstrate, Marx addresses this question by exploring the mysterious phenomenon that he calls 
the fetishism of the commodity.  
The_Problem_of_Subjectivity_in 
Marx’s_Capital 
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a) Capital and the Theory of Revolution 
In Capital, Marx notes that the “learned dispute” between industrial capitalists and wealth 
landowners falls silent “in the face of the July Revolution”.1 He describes how the urban proletariat 
sound the “tocsin of revolution at Lyons”, and how the rural proletariat begin to set fire to 
“farmyards and hayricks in England” [C, I, p.743].2 For Marx, the revolutions of 1848 meant that the 
claims of the proletariat were “no longer to be ignored” [C, I, p.98]. However the presence of 
revolution in Capital does not necessarily imply that there is an explicitly developed theory of 
revolution in Capital.  
Although Marx considers the “peculiar advantages” of the “French revolutionary method” in his 
chapter on The Working Day, the absence of the character of the working class revolutionary is 
noticeable in the text [C, I, p.414]. As I will show, the heroic figures of the class struggle depicted in 
Capital are more often the factory inspectors, who appear as a ‘knowing subject’, attempting to 
effect social change. At the same time however, Marx envisages the passing of the factory laws as 
the first staging post in the intervention of the working class movement, and the “preliminary 
condition” of its further emancipation [C, I, p.415]. 
Thus Marx is very much committed to a concrete analysis of the effects of working class struggle on 
the functioning of capitalism. In this chapter, I will attempt to investigate whether Capital allows an 
understanding of the means by which the proletariat – as victims of capital integrated into its 
monstrous machinery – might take control of this organism and overthrow it. Karl Korsch argues that 
“the revolutionary will is latent, yet present, in every sentence of Marx’s work”.3 Yet, at the same 
time, it could be argued that the defeat of the revolutions of 1848 left a lasting imprint on the 
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 Marx, K Capital Vol. I (London, Penguin, 1990 [1976]), p.743 – Henceforth referenced in the text as [C, I, 
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development of Marx’s theory. It could therefore be asked whether there are problems relating to 
the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism that cannot be discussed fully on the terrain of a critique 
of political economy. 
b) Class Struggle and Subjectivity 
In this chapter, I will investigate the possible tension between Marx’s aim to study the laws of 
development of the capitalist system of production and the notion that “revolutions are not made 
by laws” but are the result of a process of class struggle [C, I, p.915]. I will begin by asking questions 
about Marx’s methodology in Capital and the relationship it presents between individuals, classes 
and social structures. In particular this will lead me to interrogate Marx’s conception of 
personification, and to examine whether Louis Althusser’s interpretation of this concept excludes 
important dimensions, such as the moment of lived experience. 
By constructing a typology of subjectivity in Capital, I will argue that it contains the elements of a 
sophisticated understanding of the agency of different types of actors within capitalist society. My 
discussion of Marx’s chapter on the working day examines his understanding of the relationship 
between class struggle and the functioning of capitalism, and highlights the interaction between the 
working class movement and the factory inspectors in creating the “first conscious and methodical 
reaction of society” against the outrages of the capitalist production process [C, I, p.610]. This will 
lead me to explore the connections between knowledge, the ‘knowing subject’, and the process of 
class struggle. Finally, I will evaluate the argument that capital is the subject of Capital developed by 
Moishe Postone in his work Time, Labour and Social Domination.4 Against Postone’s critique and 
abandonment of the standpoint of labour, I will defend a position that retains this standpoint, but 
adopts it critically. I will argue that it is possible to read Capital as both a theory of determinate 
forms of social mediation and as a class-based analysis. 
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c) Alienation and the Fetishism of Commodities 
Marx’s Capital deploys a conception of commodity fetishism, which addresses the theme of 
subjectivity in relation to capital and the commodity-form. In the previous chapter, I argued that this 
conception is pre-figured in and emerges from the internal tensions of his Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. The Manuscripts appear to be suspended by a dilemma in which 
private property is seen as both a quasi-subject and an authentic subject. 
In Capital, Marx has made a crucial advance in addressing this problem by developing a coherent 
conception of the labour theory of value, and in particular of the dual nature of labour contained in 
commodities. Marx considers the movement of capital as that in which value is the subject, the 
“independently acting agent” [C, I, p.255 fn.*]. In those products of labour that take on a 
commodity-form, this value arises as the socially objective form of the equality of labour. The 
“mysterious character” of the commodity-form consists in the fact that “the social characteristics of 
men’s own labour” is reflected by the commodity as its “socio-natural properties” [C, I, p.164-5].   
Marx’s formulation of the fetishism of the commodity and its secret is central to his resolution of the 
apparently intractable dilemma that we find in the Manuscripts. Marx confronts the fact that the 
“semblance of objectivity possessed by the social characteristics of labour” is not simply an illusion, 
but has a social reality [C, I, p.163]. Although the intellectual discovery of the mechanism of 
commodity fetishism may raise the question of overcoming it, this discovery alone is not sufficient to 
overcome its effects. In fact, Marx argues that the more “predominant” the commodity-form 
becomes in production, the more difficult it becomes to penetrate its fetish character [C, I, p.176]. 
Whilst an understanding of commodity fetishism represents an advance beyond the conceptual 
framework of alienation in the Manuscripts, a conception of alienation continues to be present 
throughout Capital. Thus, Marx argues in Volume I that “the worker himself constantly produces 
objective wealth, in the form of capital, an alien power that dominates and exploits him” [C, I, 
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p.716].5 Some thinkers, such as István Mészáros, hold that an understanding of alienation lays down 
the “foundation of the Marxian system”.6 Others such as Allen Wood contend that in Capital 
alienation no longer plays an explanatory function, but merely a “descriptive or diagnostic one”.7 
It is certainly true that Marx addresses different types of questions in his earlier writings. In the 
Manuscripts, he contends that the forms of alienation in the particular spheres of life (religion, law, 
morality, etc.) are particular modes of its general form in production.8  In Capital, Marx’s discussion 
of the fetishism of commodities is quite closely delimited to its functioning as an economic 
mechanism. Of course, this does not exclude one from arguing that its effects are manifested more 
generally in different spheres of social life (law, ethics, politics, etc.). It would be necessary however, 
to give an account of this. In the next chapter we will see how Georg Lukács develops the logic of 
commodity fetishism into all spheres of capitalist society with his theory of reification. 
It is possible to argue that Marx would have developed a more significant role for the theme of 
alienation in his 6-volume plan for Capital, which included a proposed book on wage-labour that was 
never written. Michael Lebowitz suggests that the subjective side of labour in the capital relation is 
not fully explored in the published volumes of Capital.9 For Lebowitz, Capital contains a critical 
silence that “permits the appearance that, for the scientist, the only subject (if there is one at all) is 
capital”.10 
On this basis, Lebowitz argues that a full theory of wage-labour pre-supposes a dynamic 
understanding of the development of human needs. In this chapter I will investigate Lebowitz’s 
arguments alongside my own assertion that, in Capital, the subjectivity of the proletariat is given a 
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more determinate form through his investigation of the concrete forms of working class self-activity 
in his chapter on The Working Day. 
At the same time, Marx attempts to mediate between the abstraction of capital and the more 
determinate level of classes and individual persons. Thus, Marx denotes the capitalist as the 
conscious bearer of the movement of capital [C, I, p.254]. In this chapter, I will also examine how we 
might interpret this process of personification. We will see that the concrete elaboration of Marx’s 
notion of class becomes possible only once the overall process of capitalist production is developed, 
in which questions are raised about the competition between capitals, and about other collective 
actors such as the state.  
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2) Real Human Actors, Social Roles and Social Structures 
This section will analyse Marx’s project and method in Capital, making the claim that an adequate 
account of his work shows it to transcend the well-worn opposition between structure and agency. 
Marx's Capital is a work that investigates the dynamics of the structural forms of the capitalist mode 
of production in meticulous detail. His presentation proceeds from the simple commodity to 
determine an increasingly rich body of concepts that “tend towards the concrete as they are 
articulated in the totality”.11 The structural aspect of Marx's analysis, I would argue, is inseparable 
from his theory of classes, within which it is possible to determine certain social roles, such as the 
capitalist and the worker. At the same time, for Marx, definite human beings are both the premise 
and the result of his investigations. 
The voices of real human actors appear in Capital. They are drawn from all segments of the capitalist 
class and their representatives, from landowners, parliamentarians, and factory inspectors, and even 
from the workers who appear in parliamentary reports; the Blue Books from which Marx often 
quotes. They consist of complaints by capitalists about a threat to their profits, or the interventions 
of the factory inspectors over transgressions of the factory laws by mill owners, or indeed 
statements by workers about the conditions in which they are forced to live: 
 J. Murray, 12 years of age says: “I turn jigger and run moulds. I come at 6. Sometimes I 
 come at 4. I worked all night last night, till six o'clock this morning. I have not been to bed 
 since the night before last [...] I get 3 shillings and sixpence. I do not get any more for 
 working at night.” [C, I, p.354] 
In constructing his analysis of the capitalist mode of production, Marx presents evidence in the form 
of the words and the actions of the human actors who populate it (or, it might be said, of which it is 
constituted). Marx sees it as necessary to relate both the details of these actors’ deeds and present 
indications of their consciousness through their words. For Marx, the reflexive nature of human 
                                                          
11
 Bensaïd, D Marx for our Times (London: Verso, 2002), p.97 
95 
 
activity is its distinctive feature. He argues that the first element of the human labour process is 
“purposeful activity” [C, I, p.284]. This presents its own problematic in terms of interpreting the 
intentions of actors and analysing their actual effects. An added level of analysis is required in order 
to contrast the reality of social existence and human consciousness of it. 
Political economy can be seen as an expression of the consciousness of the bourgeoisie. Capital is 
explicitly a critique of political economy, and it therefore has a very clear immanent aspect. In 
defining his own position, Marx is very concerned with both reconstructing the historical 
achievements and transcending the limits of classical political economy. He uses the statements of 
its greater (and lesser) proponents to illustrate the internal logic of their points of view. Although 
Marx understood that there were certain ideas appropriate to the standpoint of the bourgeoisie, he 
ascribes a real significance to the differences between vulgar and classical political economy. 
For Marx, the vulgar economist “does nothing more than translate the peculiar notions of the 
competition-enslaved capitalist into an ostensibly more theoretical and generalized language”.12 He 
essentially trades only in the phenomena and the surface appearances of capitalism. The classical 
political economists, such as Smith and Ricardo (from whom Marx quotes extensively), had the 
advantage of theorising from general principles, by which they sought to understand value and the 
‘laws of motion’ of society. However, in the last instance, even the classical political economists 
proved incapable of adequately explaining the phenomena they observed, such as the tendency of 
the rate of profit to fall and the origin of crises. 
Whether Marx aimed at and achieved a move beyond political economy in Capital has been a matter 
of some debate. E.P. Thompson derided political economy for lacking the essential terms for 
comprehending societies and histories. He located Marx's problems in his move from political 
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economy to a theory of capitalism, “that is, the whole society, conceived of as an ‘organic system’”.13 
For Thompson, this “whole society comprises many activities and relations (of power, of 
consciousness, sexual, cultural, normative) which are not the concern of Political Economy, which 
have been defined out of Political Economy, and for which it has no terms.”14 
It seems that, for Thompson, Capital contains an inherent tension between its structural aspect and 
the instances of ‘history’ “inscribed within it.”15 I will inquire whether this opposition is really a point 
of irreconcilability, or is in fact a false dichotomy, and investigate the extent to which Marx is 
successful in transcending this apparent contradiction. In his book, Marxism and Ideology, Jorge 
Larrain suggests that the polarisation of the problem along this opposition does not do justice to or 
exhaust its richness.16 However, it is certainly one of the fault-lines along which debate was waged 
amongst the different strands of Western Marxism in the latter part of the 20th Century, with 
Thompson and Louis Althusser at its poles. 
a) Marx’s Project and Methodology 
Defining Marx's project in Capital can be approached only summarily in this study, if it is to focus on 
the central theme of subjectivity. However, it could be argued that, in Capital, Marx attempts to 
transcend the political, economic and sociological ‘facts’ that he has gleaned (many from the 
parliamentary Blue Books) to achieve a knowledge of the overall historical tendencies that shape 
society under capitalism and to create a theory capable of explaining the experiences of those who 
live within it. On the one hand, Leszek Kolakowski has suggested that Capital is the “culmination of a 
series of works in which Marx applied his basic theory of de-humanization to the phenomena of 
economic production and exchange”.17 On the other hand, Althusser’s critique of “theoretical 
humanism” accuses this type of interpretation of projecting the “shadow” of the mature Marx onto 
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the young Marx, and of “constructing a pseudo-theory of the history of philosophy in the ‘future 
anterior’”.18 For Althusser, such an “analytico-teleological method” is “constantly judging”, but 
“cannot make the slightest judgement of any totality unlike itself”.19 
Althusser thus questions notions of agency that are based on a conception of a human essence as 
the origin of a process in which this essence is exteriorised and lost. Althusser’s critique of 
‘theoretical humanism’ is one that Kolakowski and others need to address. However, I will discuss 
later whether his proposed ‘theoretical anti-humanism’ is an adequate tool to address the 
dimension of lived experience in the development of the Marxist project. 
Defining the methodology pursued by Marx in Capital is a matter of quite some contention. 
Famously, Georg Lukács claimed that, in Marxism, “orthodoxy refers exclusively to method”.20 As 
Colin Barker points out, Marx’s method “has a political significance”.21 Marx states in the Preface to 
the First Edition of Capital that his tool of investigation in the analysis of economic forms is not the 
“microscope” or “chemical reagents”, but the power of abstraction [C, I, p.90]. For Marx, a scientific 
method is necessary because the inner connections of the capitalist mode of production are not 
immediately visible in its outward appearance. Thus Marx attempts to delve beneath capitalism's 
objective appearance to “reveal the economic laws of motion of modern society”, and from this 
conceptual apparatus to reconstruct the complex appearances that confront its inhabitants [C, I, 
p.92].  
Marx thus distinguishes his method of presentation from the form of his inquiry: 
The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of 
development and to track down their inner connection. Only after this work has been done 
can the real movement be appropriately presented. If this is done successfully, if the life of 
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the subject-matter is now reflected back in the ideas, then it may appear as if we have before 
us an a priori construction. [C, I, p.102] 
Marx is explicit in stating that his method is dialectical, but that “in its foundations, [it is] not only 
different from the Hegelian [dialectic], but exactly opposite to it” [C, I, p.102]. Despite indicating an 
intention to write a summary of this method, Marx unfortunately never gave a succinct statement of 
the specificity of the ‘inversion’ that the Hegelian dialectic undergoes in his hands. One of the 
strengths of Capital, but also one of the difficulties of interpreting it, is that, for the most part, we 
are left to infer Marx's method implicitly from the text. This goes some way towards explaining the 
profusion and diversity of interpretations that have followed in its wake.22 
Much debate on the understanding of Marx’s method has revolved around the development of 
Marx's project from his earliest economic writings, much influenced by Ricardo and Smith, to the 
Manuscripts of 1857/8, the 'first draft' of Capital, known as the Grundrisse, to the final form of 
Capital as we have it in its published editions. One pole of this debate centres on whether the 
marked influence of Hegel's thought in the Grundrisse, in particular his Logic, continues to be 
present in Marx's later drafts and indeed in the final published edition(s) of Capital. Thus Roberto 
Fineschi argues that “Marx’s concept of ‘capital’ is linked to Hegel’s concept of ‘concept’, or with 
that of ‘spirit’”.23 Likewise, Enrique Dussel tries to show that it is from a certain Hegelian 
‘philosophical paradigm’ that “the ‘rational nucleus’ of Hegel is inverted (but used nonetheless in its 
entirety) … [and] from which Marx began to develop the economic concept of capital”.24 
Kolakowski argues that, from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 through 
successive ‘critiques’ up to Capital, Marx is developing more and more elaborate versions of a single 
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project.25 In contrast, Althusser famously argues that there is an “unequivocal ‘epistemological 
break’” between the ‘pre-scientific’ philosophical concerns of the young Marx, prior to 1845, and his 
mature ‘scientific’ work.26 Althusser’s argument thus posits a period of transition, in which Marx’s 
mature ‘philosophy’ had been formed, but was not yet manifested in his works in a “positive and 
consummated form”.27 However, the theory of an ‘epistemological break’ encounters a problem of 
periodization in the fact that Marx’s Grundrisse was written after this transitional period. More 
recent Capital scholarship, such as Dussel’s, attempts to make use of texts such as the Grundrisse to 
establish the development of Marx’s relationship to Hegel. 
We can investigate the reasons why this relationship is such a point of contention between differing 
interpretations of Marx's Capital. We might note that those thinkers who highlight the influence of 
Hegel often argue for a conception of subjectivity in Capital that allows for and emphasises the self-
emancipatory potential of the working class. This is perhaps not true in all cases, as we shall see 
later. Others, such as Althusser, see the development of the ‘scientific’ principles of Marxism as 
essential for understanding the predicament of the working class under capitalism. In response, it 
could be suggested that there is a necessary tension between an activist conception of Marxism, the 
development of a theory of praxis, and the development of Marxism as a ‘science’. 
In his famous study, The Making of Marx's Capital, Roman Rosdolsky argues that there is a 
methodological continuity between the Grundrisse and Capital, in particular in Marx’s conception of 
‘capital in general’. For Michael Heinrich, this concept is not simply a presentational device. He 
argues that distinguishing between ‘capital in general’ and ‘competition between many capitals’ 
constitutes a “methodological approach reflecting a particular view of the structure of bourgeois 
society”.28 According to Fineschi, Rosdolsky’s argument presents ‘capital in general’ as a kind of 
“methodological ladder”; useful for establishing a conceptual framework to demonstrate “the 
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central role of industrial capital”, but unnecessary once “the real exposition developed to the more 
concrete levels of competition and credit”.29 
Heinrich argues that Marx's breakthrough in understanding “that the laws of the inner nature of 
capital are merely realised in the actual movement of individual capitals”, meant that the distinction 
between ‘capital in general’ and ‘many capitals’ was no longer sufficient.30 The development of 
Capital through its various drafts then became an attempt to find the appropriate categories and 
structure to conceptualise this realisation. We might ask whether this implies that the influence of 
Hegel's dialectical thought in the Grundrisse was diminished in Capital itself. On the contrary, 
Fineschi argues that, if Marx had initially attempted to “apply Hegel’s scheme to a given matter to 
put it [in] order”, he found later that the “theory of capital could be worked out only following its 
own inner logic”.31 For this reason, Fineschi argues that the final structure of Capital is “more 
dialectic[al] and consistent than the original one”.32  
We cannot here make a comprehensive investigation of this apparently new dialectical method 
developed in Capital. One understanding of this dialectic stems from Lukács's claim that the 
‘category of totality’ is the “essence of the method which Marx appropriated from Hegel”.33 Dussel 
attempts to refine this formulation by suggesting that Marx was a Hegelian in the “use of the 
ontological dialectic of ‘Totality’”, but, that he “infused in that ‘Totality’ a ‘novelty’ that always 
comes to capital ‘from outside’ from the creative transcendentality of ‘living labor’”.34 We should 
therefore be sensitive to the implications of relative emphases on categories such as ‘totality’ and 
‘exteriority’, as disputes over conceptions of methodology and their differences are also proxies, or 
the basis, for debates at a more concrete level. 
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b) Individuals, Classes and Structures 
Although individuals may present themselves in an atomised way under capitalism, for Marx, it is not 
sufficient to investigate them in this manner. Whilst human actors make history, they are the 
products of that history as well. Individuals can only be understood if that knowledge is also 
connected to an understanding of society as a whole. For Marx, society is not a ‘solid crystal’, but an 
“organism capable of change, and constantly engaged in the process of change” [C, I, p.93]. In this 
conception, we might see human actors as part of a connected, organic system, and, by virtue of 
their relations, simultaneously acquiring capacities and being constrained. 
At the same time, the activities of these human actors create social structures with dynamic 
properties. Paul Blackledge quotes Alasdair MacIntyre’s argument that “while [Karl] Popper ‘is right 
to stress that there is no history and no society which is not the history or society of concrete 
individuals’, it is equally true that ‘there are no individuals who exist apart from their history or apart 
from their society’”.35 Blackledge prefers MacIntyre’s insistence that the “characterisation of 
individuals and classes has to go together. Essentially these are not two separate tasks”.36 Thus we 
are asking whether, in Capital, Marx has constructed an analysis capable of mediating between the 
level of class analysis and that of the individual. 
It can be argued that the analytical structure of Capital is its most important aspect. Rather than 
being concerned with conscious human activities, we might then look behind these for their 
unstated presuppositions. Steven Smith contends that the school of structuralism is defined by its 
“concern with unconscious structures”, which “silently [condition] intentional human thinking”.37 For 
Althusser, this leads to a conception of history as ‘a process without a subject’, or, put in another 
way, to the idea that the “true ‘subjects’ of history are no longer individual human actors who form 
themselves into classes, but the social relations of production which determine the places and 
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functions that they occupy”.38 For Althusser, ‘social relations’ are the raw materials of a scientific 
Marxist political practice tasked with transforming them into new social relations.39 Althusser 
defines as Hegelian, and therefore idealist, any method that conceives of a “development of itself 
within itself”.40 Yet this would seem to negate the possibility of the self-emancipation of the working 
class. Trapped by ideology as a ‘lived relation’, the proletariat’s only salvation would seem to lie in 
an external intervention by practitioners of a Marxist ‘theoretical practice’. 
Althusser’s methodology of ‘symptomatic reading’ derives its understanding of Capital on the basis 
of what is contained in the text. Therefore, we should inquire whether there are in fact lacunae in 
Capital for those who would place an emphasis on the role of conscious human choice, value and 
action in history. Michael Lebowitz argues that Capital “does not explore the side of the 
capital/wage-labour relation which involves the creation of new social needs for workers”.41 He 
claims that Marx’s failure to “set out the side of wage-labour in a logical and analytical manner”, as 
he does for capital, means that there is “a certain one-sidedness to the entire project”.42 Lebowitz 
thus contends that Capital is missing a ‘Book on Wage-Labour’ that was once part of Marx's plan for 
the project as a whole.43 
In Capital, in order to investigate productivity in relation to the value of labour-power, Marx makes 
the assumption that, for capital, the level of workers' means of subsistence is a given factor, or 
datum, at a particular place and moment in time [C, I, p.275]. At this level of abstraction, the worker 
is not considered as a human being, but only as a ‘factor of production’. Lebowitz argues that this 
leads to a shortcoming, because “the reproduction of capital depends on the production of labour-
power, through a process of production distinct from that of the former, though, of course, 
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subordinated to it”.44 Barker points to Lenin’s famous claim in his Philosophical Notebooks that it is 
only possible to understand Capital if one has read and understood the entirety of Hegel's Logic, and 
he suggests: “Lebowitz goes further: we cannot understand Capital unless we make the effort to 
complete it!”45 
Thus Lebowitz argues that, in Capital, Marx does not develop the workers as “subjects acting for 
themselves against capital”.46 Taken to its logical conclusion, this could imply that the only subjective 
imperative in Capital comes from the valorization process itself.47 In other words, we must 
investigate whether we can “reconcile the notion of capital as an alienated form of social mediation 
with the notion of class struggle”.48 According to Lebowitz, these problems originate in the 
unfinished nature of Capital, although Pablo Ghigliani contends that “they cannot be reduced to 
it”.49  
For Barker, Lebowitz establishes “that wage-labour needs to be incorporated in a direct and active 
sense into the whole argument of Marx’s Capital, and that filling this gap is a vital antidote to all 
mechanical and deterministic understandings of Marxism and its political project.”50 However, 
Lebowitz's interpretation of Capital is one dominated, says Barker, by the ‘vertical’ relations 
between wage-labour and capital, and overlooks the ‘horizontal’ relations between commodity 
producers and capitals.51 He argues that both capitalism's dynamism and its tendency towards crisis 
are inexplicable if we understand capital as a monolithic block. Lebowitz, argues Barker, understates 
the importance of competition in capitalism. We shall examine this issue in more detail later. 
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c) Personifications, Typologies and Social Roles 
In Marxist theory, there has often been a false dichotomy presented between the historical and the 
structural; between the conception of subjects simply as either ‘free agents’ or as Träger – bearers 
or supports for the relations of production. Marx states clearly in his Preface to the first edition of 
Capital that “individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications of 
economic categories, the bearers [Träger] of particular class-relations and interests” [C, I, p.92]. 
Althusser regards this as proof of his ‘anti-humanistic’ interpretation of Capital. Marx uses the 
formulation of human actors as ‘personifications’ of economic categories to abstract from their 
individual perspectives, although, I would argue, not necessarily to negate the capacity of human 
actors to influence the course of history. 
The categories of the ‘person’ and the process of ‘personification’ are used throughout Capital, and 
are very important for Marx. They have particular associations with Hegel’s notion of the ‘legal 
personality’, derived from Roman law, as the formal bearer of legal rights and obligations. Marx 
suggests that the full existence of individuals may consist in more than that which is “dealt with 
here”, raising the question of whether a full conception of personification necessarily goes beyond 
the legal moment [C, I, p.92]. We might ask whether a full process of personification is a richer 
determination of the bearer of social relations as the living incarnation of those relations, i.e. 
including the dimension of lived experience. 
I would argue that, by embarking on this process of abstraction, Marx is implicitly involved in the 
creation of a typology of subjectivity. Although it could be argued that Marx does not explicitly 
theorise the problem of subjectivity in Capital, his fundamental use of certain social roles, such as 
the capitalist and the worker, raises important questions for anyone attempting such a task. What is 
more, the processes by which all actors within bourgeois society objectively appear as legal ‘persons’ 
with certain equal rights obscures this deeper typology based on class within which, I would argue, 
lies the potential for the emergence of a self-conscious revolutionary subject. 
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Marx poses the social roles of capitalist and worker neither as trans-historical ideal types, nor as 
generic concepts embracing all the common characteristics of a group of actors. In his book Making 
History, Alex Callinicos argues that social relations should be understood as being both a constraint 
and a capacity.52 Callinicos points to Marx's formulation of the problem of structure and agency in 
The Eighteenth Brumaire, where Marx states that “men make their own history, but they do not 
make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but 
under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past”.53 This seems to 
invoke more heavily the negative and constraining aspect of ‘circumstances’, of the structure as 
something “essentially negative”.54 
On the other hand, in Capital, Marx understands that ‘circumstances’ create both the potentiality of 
what is possible for human actors as well as what is not. In particular, we could cite how Marx's 
analysis of the ‘collective worker’ begins to show that, since the capital relation structurally tends to 
produce a working class driven into increasingly socialised forms of organisation in the labour 
process, it increasingly creates the potentiality for collective struggle [C, I, p.468, p.544]. Similarly, as 
we shall see later, the structuring of competition internal to the bourgeois class inhibits such 
solidarity among capitalist society's rulers. Yet there is still a need to explain the reasons for the 
undermining of decisive attempts at world-historic collective action by the working class, and the 
continuing capacity of the bourgeoisie to maintain their class rule. 
In his paper, “Re-inventing the subject: Marx and Ethics”, Caleb Basnett argues that “capital needs a 
subject”, and “continually and actively forges them to suit its requirements”.55 In the development 
of the process of production through the stages of co-operation, manufacture and large-scale 
industry, we see a corresponding development in the physiognomy of the worker. At first, in the 
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period of co-operation, the worker is simply a person deprived of all property except for his or her 
labour-power. Later, the worker becomes increasingly fragmented by the development of 
manufacture, specialisation and the division of labour. At the culmination of this process, claims 
Basnett, “[l]arge-scale industry demands that its subject treat its body not simply as property, but as 
an investment, one that demands planning, diligence, and the alignment of one's own will with the 
will of the capitalist in order to produce an ever-greater surplus”.56 
In Capital, Marx attempts to develop a scientific methodology with which to investigate the 
ensemble of social relations that are both determined by and constitutive of the bearers of these 
relations. Understanding the relationship between social relations, the process of personification 
and concrete individuals requires, for Marx, an answer to the question: “What makes a class?” [C, III, 
p.1025]. Unfortunately for us, the manuscript of Capital ends precipitously before Marx advances a 
reply. 
Daniel Bensaïd argues that the “notion of class [is] reducible neither to an attribute to which the 
individual units comprising it are the bearers, nor to the sum of these units”.57 For him, it is a 
relational totality, and not a mere aggregate. Thus, atomised individuals only possess properties on 
the strength of being part of a totality. They do not possess these properties in isolation. The pure 
worker or indeed capitalist cannot exist as concrete persons without the full determination of their 
existence within the ensemble of social relations. It would be nonsense to try and imagine the 
individual worker or capitalist in isolation, although Marx notes the characteristic attempts of the 
political economists to imagine such a figure in the shape of Robinson Crusoe [C, I, p.169]. For Marx, 
social relations are in essence between classes and not individuals, and yet must in some sense be 
realised at the level of each individual. Whether such an analysis is feasible without some reduction 
of individuals to a collective typology, and whether this leads Marx to an adequate treatment of 
subjectivity as a whole remain unresolved questions. 
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This approach to subjectivity in Marxist thought might therefore entail asking whether adherence to 
a perspective or consciousness is appropriate to certain social roles, and therefore whether there is 
an opposition between ethical individualism and social determinism in Marx’s thought. While Marx's 
conception attributes to individuals the capacity to ‘subjectively raise’ themselves, there is a 
tendency under ‘normal conditions’ for these roles to dominate. For Marx:  
My standpoint, from which the development of the economic formation of society is viewed 
as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for 
relations whose creature he remains, socially speaking, however much he may subjectively 
raise himself above them. [C, I, p.92] 
Later, we will discuss the influence that ‘knowledge’ might have in this conflict and the possibility 
that a knowing subject could transform social roles, or change the basis of the circumstances that 
condition them. In other words, we must consider the connection between understanding and 
action. 
It seems that by categorizing different types of social roles, e.g. capitalist and worker, Marx has 
implicitly embarked to some degree on theorising a typology of subjectivity. In a society where the 
capitalist mode of production prevails, all human actors appear at the most immediate level as 
individual market actors; as buyers or sellers of commodities. But, for Marx, there is a more 
fundamental relation in the capitalist mode of production – between the bourgeoisie and proletariat 
– that determines the specific and unique properties of the system. Furthermore, real capitalists and 
real workers exist, and their abstract categorization allows Marx to illuminate the significance of the 
objective appearance of autonomy acquired by the driving forces that motivate these individual 
actors, and to expose the particular historical roles these types play in society, as socially determined 
by their position in the productive process. 
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d) Class Subjects and Mythical Subjects 
Collective subjects can take many forms. A collectivity can range from simply a shared identity, to an 
organisation, to a class-subject.58 Although there is a tendency to conceive of collective subjects as 
an aggregate of individuals, a class subject, as Bensaïd argues above, must be something 
qualitatively beyond this. In Capital, Marx’s critique does not simply extend a conception of liberal 
individualism to the collective.59 Having said this, Marx's moral language in Capital (‘capital's 
monstrous outrages’, its ‘werewolf-like hunger’ [C, I, p.353]) and the importance that he attaches at 
times to the actions of individuals (e.g. certain factory inspectors) as well as class subjects cut against 
any reading that would remove the active role of consciousness from his analysis. 
Although Marx's fundamental concern in Capital is on the consequences of actions (certainly for the 
capitalist good or bad intentions are often irrelevant),60 intentions still have some importance. Only 
human actors are subject to moral judgement, and only individuals can be morally evaluated, and 
only then by considering their intentions. However, as we have already seen, for Marx, human 
activity can only be fully explained within the framework of a class-based theory. For class is not only 
a collection of individuals but a social ‘entity’ – according to Leszek Kolakowski, it is a “body that 
behaves in such a way that reactions of human elements which compose it are governed by the class 
as a whole and not vice-versa”.61 
Bensaïd asks whether posing class as a “higher reality” than the individuals that comprise it 
succumbs to the “fetishistic illusions that transform society, history or class into so many mythical 
subjects”.62 Let us take Marx's investigation of the social role of the capitalist. Here we have the 
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insight that, despite being a human actor, the capitalist is constrained and indeed appears as a 
‘personified category’ [C, I, p.265] motivated by a process, whose real subject is value:63 
In truth, however, value is here the subject (i.e. the independently acting agent) of a process 
in which, while constantly assuming the form in turn of money and commodities, it changes 
its own magnitude, throws off surplus-value from itself considered as original value, and thus 
valorizes itself independently. [C, I, p.255] 
We might ask whether this implies that the subjective experience of the capitalist is merely a 
construction subordinated to the objective necessity of the logic of capital unfolding itself. Equally, 
we might ask what implications such a conception of value-as-subject would have with regards to 
the agency of the proletariat. 
Samuel Knafo contrasts two polar conceptions of subjects and structures. From a purely economic 
perspective, an abstract logic is played out in history. And from a historicist perspective, subjectivity 
projects itself, creating objective forms. In the former, the role of structures consists in ‘producing 
certain effects’, whereas, in the latter, structures are “seen as mediating forms in social relations 
(which make agency appear in specific ways)”.64 Knafo reframes this polarity between subject and 
object. He argues that in Marx, as in Hegel, there is a dialectical structure of necessity. According to 
Knafo, social relations are not “the ‘infrastructure’ reflected in consciousness, but rather constitute 
the mediating relations through which consciousness emerges”.65 
There exists, in Knafo's opinion, a twin danger, either of adopting a deterministic view of capitalism, 
or of conceiving agency as an act of voluntarism, as an escape from historical structures or as 
external to them. Subjectivity would then be defined as something that ‘escapes the grasp of 
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theory’. For Knafo, Marx's analysis of the law of value in Capital cannot be reconciled with his 
“historicist pre-occupations if the issue of the subject is not directly addressed”.66 
Knafo claims that the romantic notion of the subject is close to Marx's notion of labour, which 
“represents an open, creative and subjective force”.67 From Knafo's perspective, in Capital, 
commodities are the basic objects that mediate capitalist social relations. Thus, he argues that “the 
commodity represents the category that grounds the way in which people rationalize their 
experience in capitalism”.68 Since, he says, meaning is invested by the way in which we value 
commodities, the origin of necessity under capitalism lies in the process of valuation. Value is thus 
an expression of our subjectivity – not subjectivity itself. Conceived in this way, Marx's theory of 
commodity fetishism in Capital allows him to reintroduce the class struggle as a determinant of 
valuation. 
Capital, argues Knafo, should therefore be seen as an attempt to uncover the process of the 
objectification of subjectivity, not the logic of the motion of objects. He claims that, “Capital is 
fundamentally about the nature of agency in capitalism, the specific form that subjectivity takes in 
capitalism, which in turn conditions the nature of social interaction, and thus class struggle”.69 
Ultimately, any evaluation of Knafo's arguments would require a deeper investigation into the 
relationship between Hegel and Marx outside the remit of this study. Nevertheless, Knafo's 
arguments convincingly suggest that the problem of subjectivity is central to reconciling Marx's 
elaboration of the labour theory of value to his historical analysis. A premise of the Hegelian 
dialectic, which Knafo claims is maintained in Marx, is that “[o]ne cannot understand objects without 
problematizing the subject that relates to them”.70 
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3) A Typology of Subjectivity in Capital  
a) The Individual and the Collective: Individuals in the Market Place 
In elaborating the conception of an ideal capitalist marketplace, Marx constructs the ‘equal’ terrain 
on which all ‘free’ individuals operate in capitalist society. This is the arena in which all human actors 
are characterised as market actors; as buyers and sellers of commodities. Basnett calls this character 
‘the subject of circulation’ or “the legal ‘person’ of bourgeois society”.71 The commodity mediates 
the relations between these individuals. In Capital, human actors first appear as “guardians, who are 
the possessors of commodities” [C, I, p.178]. They are buyers and sellers of commodities who enter 
into relations via this exchange since commodities “cannot themselves go to market and perform 
exchanges in their own right” [C, I, p.178]. 
Marx introduces these ‘guardians’ of commodities in the second chapter of Capital, where he states 
the common sense position: “Commodities are things, and therefore lack the power to resist man” 
[C, I, p.178]. In the first chapter of Capital, Marx has already begun to lay out a conception of why 
the opposite appears to be case under capitalism; his notion of the fetishism of commodities. Marx 
tries to explain how mankind finds itself enslaved by the commodities that it has created. The 
development of an understanding of Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism is one of the central 
terrains on which the interpretation of the question of subjectivity in Capital is carried out. 
For commodities to enter into relations between each other, Marx reasons, their guardians must 
likewise enter into a relation. Necessary for this relation is a common respect for the private 
property of the other, which enables the parties to enter into a contract, formal or otherwise. It is, 
Marx says, “a relation between two wills that mirrors the economic relation” [C, I, p.178]. Already it 
can be seen that the most elementary form of the process of exchange of commodities implies 
certain presuppositions about the form of relations between the social actors in that society.  
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Proceeding further with his investigation, Marx argues that “the characters who appear on the 
economic stage are merely personifications of economic relations […] it is as the bearers of these 
economic relations that they come into contact with each other” [C, I, p.179]. For Basnett, what 
Marx is considering here are the subjects that are required by capital: “bodies performing certain 
operations”.72 Basnett suggests that, for Marx, as for the political economists, the “detailed account 
of the ‘inner life’ of a subject is here bracketed from consideration”.73 It might seem that presenting 
the characters that inhabit capitalist society in this way in fact produces passive carriers of “the 
cunning of reason” [C, I, p.285 fn.]. 
It could be asked, therefore, whether human actors are bound to play out a role economically 
determined for them by their position in the ensemble of capitalist social relations. Certainly, it does 
seem that Marx is suggesting that the situation appears this way on an individual basis:  
Men are henceforth related to each other in their social process of production in a purely 
atomistic way. Their own relations of production therefore assume a material shape which is 
independent of their control and their conscious individual action. [C, I, p.187] 
This leaves open the question of whether there are other forms of conscious action qualitatively 
different to and beyond that of the individual. Nevertheless, at this point in the presentation of his 
argument in Capital, Marx has not yet set out the abstract categories in which groups of actors may 
take part in other forms of action. 
Marx constructs a framework in which the bourgeois ideals of “Freedom, Equality, Property and 
Bentham” – the “innate rights of man” – exist between the buyer and seller of commodities in the 
realm of circulation [C, I, p.280]. These ideals can be revealed as having their basis in the relations of 
exploitation in production between the capitalist and worker [C, I, p.280]. The process of 
transforming money into capital must necessarily be mediated by circulation through the purchase 
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of labour-power that takes place on the market, but this in itself is only one moment in the total 
process of valorization, which has its fundamental determination within the sphere of production. 
Thus, Marx argues that the “capital relation arises only in the production process because it exists 
implicitly in the act of circulation, in the basically different economic conditions in which buyer and 
seller confront one another, in their class relation” [C, II, p.115].74 
The capitalist mode of production therefore presupposes the class relationship between capitalist 
and worker. There exists a fundamental antagonism in the relation between capital and labour. 
However, capitalism systematically mystifies this relation. Marx understands this process of 
commodity fetishism not simply as a distorting veil, but in the sense that relations between people 
actually take the form of relations between things. Thus, we can ask whether fetishism is responsible 
for reducing the actors in this process to bearers of the logic of capital. In one sense, this hypothesis 
can be confirmed, because commodity fetishism explains the capacity of the logic of the capitalist 
system to shape the way in which the world is perceived. 
With the expansion of capitalist relations to all parts of human life, the creation of an objective 
appearance increasingly appears to foreclose any alternatives to capitalism. On the other hand, it 
could be argued that the distinction Marx introduces between essence and appearance, and the 
possibility of penetrating this appearance, reasserts the capacity of human agency at a world-
historical level. From this perspective, an account can be sought in Capital of how critical 
consciousness might be able to overcome this systematic mystification. This might lead some to 
conclude that social change could result merely from a change in consciousness; a process of critical 
reflection taking place in the heads of individuals. 
In contrast, I would argue that Marx conceives a practical-political process as necessary both to 
penetrate the veil created by commodity fetishism and to effect social change. In transforming wider 
reality, such a process would effect an overthrow of its own conditions of existence. In the German 
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Ideology and other writings, Marx explicitly formulates a notion of the practical revolutionary 
transformation that he envisages.75 It must be determined whether this understanding is also dealt 
with explicitly in Capital, and what can be inferred from this. 
b) Class, Competition and Private Property 
For Marx, although a commodity's value is the basis of a rational understanding of money, its simple 
circulation and the social intertwining of its metamorphoses, the framework for “money’s transition 
into its function as means of circulation and for the altered form it assumes as a result [...] is 
immaterial as far as the transaction between individual buyers and sellers is considered” [C, III, 
p.295]: 
When we consider supply and demand, on the other hand, the supply is equal to the sum of 
commodities provided by all the sellers or producers of a particular kind of commodity, and 
the demand is equal to the sum of all buyers or consumers (individual or productive) of that 
same kind of commodity. These totals, moreover, act on one another as unities, as aggregate 
forces. Here the individual has an effect only as part of a social power, as an atom in the 
mass, and it is in this form that competition brings into play the social character of 
production and consumption. [C, III, p.295] 
For Heinrich, Marx's qualitative breakthrough from his earlier market-oriented analyses of the 1840s 
was the conception “that the laws of the inner nature of capital are merely realised in the actual 
movement of individual capitals”.76 For the political economists, competition was an assumption on 
which to study the laws of capital, whereas Marx now saw competition as a form of the appearance 
of these laws. He thereby posed a challenge to the foundational notion of bourgeois moral and 
political theory that the pursuit of individual private interests would produce the ‘general interest’. 
                                                          
75
 Marx and Engels argue that the “practical movement” of a revolution is necessary “not only because the 
ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a 
revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew” (Marx, K 
and Engels, F The German Ideology (Amherst: Prometheus, 1998), p.60). 
76
 Heinrich “Capital in General”, p.65 
115 
 
For Marx, private interests are already social, and the bourgeois general interest is already present in 
the act of this pursuit as far as it determines them. In the development of such an analysis, Marx 
attempts to explain the process through which, in competition, everything appears upside down: 
The finished configuration of economic relations, as these are visible on the surface, in their 
actual existence, and therefore also in the notions with which the bearers and agents of 
these relations seek to gain an understanding of them, is very different from the 
configuration of their inner core, which is essential but concealed, and the concept 
corresponding to it. [C, III, p.311] 
The individual capitalist experiences competition as an external pressure. It is a race to accumulate 
from which they cannot withdraw. The dynamic of competition acts to produce a “practical 
freemasonry” amongst the capitalist class for as a long as business is good [C, III, p.361]. However, 
Marx adds the caveat that each is concerned with the “common interest [only] as long as he obtains 
more with it than he would against it” [C, III, p.295]. Unity amongst capitalists begins to fragment 
when this condition is not met, and each individual tries to extract what they can. 
Whilst associations of capitalists band do together to regulate production in certain periods, Marx 
says that, “[a]ll ideas of a common, all-embracing and far-sighted control over the production of raw 
materials [...] give way to the belief that supply and demand will mutually regulate one another” [C, 
III, p.215]. Conscious control of production is in fact “incompatible, by and large, with the laws of 
capitalist production, and hence remains forever a pious wish, or is at most confined to exceptional 
common steps” [C, III, p.215]. The structure of capitalist society produces a mutual conditioning 
between the authority which prevails within the domain of each capitalist's autocracy and the 
general anarchy of the social division of labour as a whole. 
When discussing the dynamics of competition, it is necessary to distinguish between different levels 
of exposition in Marx’s analysis. Whilst he considers class relations to be constituted within the 
process of production, the concrete elaboration of his notion of class becomes possible only at the 
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stage at which he has developed the overall process of capitalist production. Once his presentation 
reaches the level at which there are notions of the individual agency of capitalists, or other agents, in 
the competition between capitals, this immediately raises questions about collective actors such as 
classes and the state. One of the difficulties of assessing claims that capital behaves as a subject in 
Capital is Marx’s conception of the process of competition. 
Whilst competition amongst capitalists may be a “practical freemasonry” in high times, i.e. when the 
profit rate is settled, Marx famously observes that it becomes a “struggle of enemy brothers” when 
there are losses to be made [C, III, p.362]. Individual capitalists are interested in maximising their 
share of the surplus-value, but also in minimising their losses. They may act in such a way as to 
undermine the future accumulation of capital for the class as a whole. In conditions of declining 
profitability and crisis, individual capitalists may indeed be fighting for their very survival as 
capitalists. Ernest Mandel argues that the relations of inter-capitalist competition are very different 
to the segmentations within the proletariat. In his Introduction to Volume III of Capital, he claims: 
In spite of all the inherent segmentations of the working class – all the constantly recurring 
phenomena of division along craft, national, sex, generational, etc. lines – there are no 
inbuilt structural obstacles to the overall class solidarity of workers under capitalism.77 
Let us now examine this difference between the classes in the relationship of each to private 
property. The working class, as a class of wage-earners, can be defined objectively by the fact that it 
exists in a state of dispossession of the means of production. Since private property is 
overwhelmingly in the hands of the capitalist class, the working class experiences their relationship 
to this property as a manifestation of their powerlessness.78 On the other hand, for the capitalist 
class it is the embodiment of their social power; “The capitalist himself wields power only inasmuch 
as he is the personification of capital” [C, I, pp.1053-4]. 
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The ideal for the capitalist-as-individual is the role of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur seeks to 
derive a super-profit above and beyond his fellow capitalists through technical innovation. Thus 
Marx is able to explain capital's drive to continually revolutionise the technical basis of production. 
The gains are, however, more or less short-lived for the entrepreneur, as the other capitalists seek to 
close the gap; often at a reduced cost of investment. Mandel claims that private property and 
competition are built into “the very nature of the capitalist class”, whereas competition between 
wage-earners is “imposed upon them from outside, not structurally inherent in the very nature of 
the class”.79 On the contrary, he argues, “wage-earners normally and instinctively strive towards 
collective cooperation and solidarity”.80 
Under capitalist relations of production, the benefits of a co-operative work process accruing from 
the creativeness, invention and skill of the workforce appear as properties of capital. Marx argues 
that this is because the collective work process itself appears as an instantiation of capital: 
Though the workshop is to a degree a product of the workers' combination, its entire 
intelligence and will seem to be incorporated in the capitalist or his understrappers, and the 
workers find themselves confronted by the functions of the capital that lives in the capitalist. 
[C, I, p.1054] 
However, Marx adds that, as the social productivity of the labour process develops, the private 
ownership of the means of production increasingly acts as a fetter on this creativity and squanders 
it. Mandel, in his Introduction to Volume III of Capital, says that the laws of capitalist accumulation 
“operate independently from and in spite of, conscious decisions by individual capitalist firms”, and 
they “can be said to be the objective and unforeseen effects of conscious decisions by these firms.”81 
At the level of the system as a whole, the social division of labour in the capitalist mode of 
production is anarchic and unplanned. In Volume III of Capital, Marx analyses the structural 
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tendency of the rate of profit to fall. A competitive process of accumulation means that neither 
individual capitalists nor the capitalist class are truly in control of the development of the process as 
a whole. Accumulation drives the development of the social productivity of labour and leads overall 
to a tendency of the general rate of profit to decline, albeit conditioned by important ‘counteracting 
influences’ [C, III, p.339]. The rate of profit is constituted by the relationship between the surplus-
value and the total capital advanced. Surplus-value is created in the capitalist production process. In 
Marx’s analysis, this process is characterised by class relations and the process of exploitation of 
wage-labour that lies at its heart.  
Given that the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall involves competition between 
capitalists, we could ask whether it is problematic to understand this tendency in terms of a class 
analysis. I would argue that this objection requires that we overlook the structuring of class into the 
process of competition. For Marx, the processes of demand and supply “imply the transformation of 
value into market value”, and, “on further analysis, imply the existence of various different classes 
and segments of classes which distribute the total social revenue among themselves and consume it 
as such” [C, III, p.296]. Thus, he argues that, “it is also necessary to understand the overall 
configuration of the capitalist production process if one is to comprehend the demand and supply 
generated among the producers as such” [C, III, p.296]. 
c) The Capitalist: Bearer of Capital, Agent of Competition, Consumer of 
Luxuries? 
Marx introduces the capitalist as a human actor who, through the combination of the roles of buyer 
and seller, becomes “the conscious bearer of this movement” of capital [C, I, p.254]. The subjective 
purpose of the capitalist is thus the process of valorisation; the “objective content of the circulation 
we have been discussing” [C, I, p.254]. To the extent that someone behaves in such a way as to be 
motivated by the “appropriation of ever more wealth in the abstract”, that person functions as a 
capitalist; “as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will” [C, I, p.254]. Unlike the 
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miser, who hoards money, the capitalist must constantly seek to place money into the process of 
circulation in order to augment its value. Whereas, in the former hoarding is an eccentric individual 
behaviour, for the latter accumulation is driven by a social mechanism beyond the individual’s 
control [C, I, p.254].82 
In Capital, Marx is mainly concerned with the capitalist as the personification of capital. Whilst he 
gives a brief account of the capitalist as a consumer in Volume II, he does not assume that the desire 
to accumulate is the capitalist's sole motivation. This sets his thought apart from political economy, 
for which the capitalist is as much a machine for transforming surplus-value into surplus-capital as 
the worker is for producing surplus-value [C, II, pp.479-80]. For Marx's capitalist, “[t]wo souls, alas, 
do dwell within his breast”, and there develops in him a “Faustian conflict between the passion for 
accumulation and the desire for enjoyment” [C, I, p.741]. Although the capitalist’s expenditure on 
luxury does grow with accumulation, this division must be maintained by an act of will. If a capitalist 
wishes to prosper, pleasure-taking must be subordinated to accumulation [C, I, p.741]. 
From Marx’s statement that the capitalist has no historical value except as capital personified, we 
might infer that, at the historical level, while the capitalist as an individual who acquires and enjoys 
use-values is of little importance, it is the acquisition and augmentation of exchange-values marks 
the capitalist’s historical ‘purpose’ [C, I, p.739]. For Marx, the real historical importance of capitalists 
is their effect on the development of society's productive forces; such that they might “form the real 
basis of a higher form of society, a society in which the full and free development of every individual 
forms the ruling principle” [C, I, p.739]. 
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d) Workers as Wage-labourers and Human Beings: Human Needs and the 
Value of Labour-power 
Since the advent of capitalism, the potential for labour as an ‘open, creative force’ has historically 
become increasingly confined within the form of wage-labour. However, at the same time, the ever 
more socialised form of the labour-process means that workers increasingly become part of a 
‘collective worker’ with a combined labour potential. For Marx, it is both a historical and conceptual 
pre-condition of capitalist production that a large number of workers work together in the same 
field of labour to produce a certain type of commodity under the command of the same capitalist. 
Historically, a quantitative difference in the numbers of workers working together begins to manifest 
itself as a qualitative one, and it becomes possible to discern the conception of a collective working 
day amongst individual labourers. 
When numerous workers work together “side by side in accordance with a plan”, Marx calls this 
form of labour “co-operation”. It not only increases the “productive power of the individual”, but 
also creates “a new productive power, which is intrinsically a collective one” [C, I, p.443]. In both 
simple and complex common labour processes, when the worker co-operates with others in a 
planned way, “he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his 
species” [C, I, p.447]. Under capitalism, workers are brought together only under the “despotic” 
command of the capitalist. In its current capitalist form the “interconnection” between their labours 
“confronts them, in the realm of ideas, as a plan drawn up by the capitalist, and, in practice, as his 
authority, as the powerful will of a being outside them, who subjects their activity to his purpose” [C, 
I, p.450]. 
For Marx, the value of the labour-power commodity is determined, like that of all others, “by the 
labour-time necessary for its production” [C, I, p.274], but distinctively its determination “contains a 
historical and moral element” [C, I, p.275]. Marx demonstrates that the means of subsistence of the 
individual labourer can only be understood by reference to the processes required to make possible 
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the reproduction of the whole class of wage-labourers. This includes not just simple physical 
reproduction, but also education and training. In the process of circulation, these social processes 
are resolved into a definite quantity of means of subsistence. Thus, Marx states that this value is, for 
a given country at a given time, a ‘known datum’ [C, I, p.275]. The effects of the class struggle on the 
functioning of capitalism, although discussed explicitly by Marx in the chapter on The Working Day, 
appear here, in Marx's terms, ‘post festum’83 as a determinant of this datum. 
Lebowitz argues that the worker cannot be fully described as simply a wage-labourer; “it is because 
workers are not merely wage-labourers but are human beings that there is a tendency to drive 
beyond wage-labour”.84 He argues that it is not sufficient to consider the contradiction between 
capital and labour; we must also consider the contradiction between wage-labour and the human 
being. Quoting from Marx’s Grundrisse, Lebowitz says that “the worker ‘strives not to remain 
something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of his becoming’”.85 The worker, claims 
Lebowitz, is driven by the contradiction between his ‘human nature’ and his conditions of existence 
under capitalism.86 Through the class struggle, workers play a role in consciously reshaping the ruling 
class accepts their needs to be. This process in turn further develops the basis on which their needs 
are produced. 
In her book, On Human Needs, Kate Soper considers the means by which human needs are both 
defined and created. Whilst rejecting essentialist theories of ‘human nature’, she tries to 
demonstrate that a theory of human needs underwrites “every actual or possible form of social 
organisation”.87 Furthermore, Soper argues that political economy and liberal theories of man 
“operate complicitly to effect a closure upon the question of needs”.88 Needs, she says, “are pre-
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given to the consumer as an essentially natural rather than socially acquired possession”.89 On this 
reading, liberal theory provides a moral basis for the positivistic account of needs found in political 
economy.  
Soper argues that Marx’s critique of political economy challenges the de-politicisation and 
neutralisation of the question of needs by advocating an alternative system; one based on the 
expansion of need without limit and distribution in accordance with need.90 In his Critique of the 
Gotha Programme, Marx registers that a “higher phase of communist society” would give rise to 
labour not simply as a means of life but as “life’s prime want”.91 In the Grundrisse, Marx recognises 
the constant expansion and creation of new needs characteristic of capitalist society, but, regarding 
the “system of needs” within his project, he asks: “at what point is this to be dealt with?”92 Soper 
contends that Marx’s recognition of the shifting benchmark of social standards implies an 
unresolved problem about the issue of absolute or ‘true’ needs.93 Marx’s silence on this issue in 
Capital, she suggests, leaves unanswered questions for the project to supersede capitalism with a 
socialist-communist society. 
For Marx in Capital, mankind is “distinguished from all other animals by the limitless and flexible 
nature of his needs” [C, I, pp.1068-9]. Under capitalism, workers are encouraged to carry out their 
acts of consumption as individuals, and, under normal conditions, to reproduce their labour-power 
as individual consumers. However, in their acts of resistance against the capitalist at the point of 
production, workers necessarily tend to organise themselves collectively due to their combination as 
a workforce; as a ‘collective worker’. In the forms that this resistance gives rise to, workers also 
begin to organise collectively to meet their needs at the point of consumption. I would suggest that 
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such resistance would also require the potential to transform the process of production itself. We 
should inquire, however, as to why these examples of resistance which challenge the very 
foundations of the capitalist system – in other words, the formation of a revolutionary subjectivity – 
do not appear to be an explicit focal point of Marx’s argument in Capital. 
The agency of the workers, when seen as individual market actors, is limited to selling their own 
labour-power as a commodity. However, as a collective actor they have significantly greater 
bargaining power and capacity to make demands. Further still, the working class ultimately has the 
power to overthrow the autocratic rule of the capitalist through the expropriation of his private 
property and transformation of the mode of production. As Callinicos points out, “The most 
important instance of structural capacity is that possessed by the world working class to replace 
capitalism with communism”.94 
For Barker, the path to turning this capacity into an actuality is suggestive of a possible lacuna in 
Capital. He argues that the “conception of collective self-production”, one in which the “exploited 
class of capitalist society, make themselves into the founders of a new, more directly need-based 
system of social production”, is the final element that we must assume was intended for Marx’s 
“‘Missing Book on Wage-Labour’”.95 Barker argues that the resolution of the ‘final’ contradiction of 
capitalism between the “worker as wage-labourer and the producer as human being, with rich and 
multiple needs” can ultimately be found only in “what Marx termed ‘revolutionary practice’, and 
that requires a struggle to transform the totality.”96 
e) The Collective Worker and the Role of Trade Unions 
Whilst we have seen that mankind is distinctive in the limitless nature of its needs, Marx also argues 
that it is “able to restrict his needs to the same unbelievable degree and to reduce the conditions of 
his life to the absolute minimum” [C, I, p.1068]. We have also seen that the value of labour-power 
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can be determined in a given state of society, while the analysis of the variations in the “level of the 
necessaries of life”, as Marx argues, belongs to “the theory of wages” [C, I, p.1069]. In Capital, Marx 
analyses the foundation of the trade unions and their conscious role in attempting to “prevent the 
price of labour-power from falling below its value” [C, I, p.1069]. Whilst, trade unions can appreciate 
that market prices fluctuate with the movement of supply and demand, as organisations, they seek 
to resist the misuse of this phenomenon by capitalists as a pretence on which to keep a 
disproportionate share of revenues for themselves. 
Furthermore, in the negotiation of contracts between capitalists and workers, the organisation of 
trade unions effects a shift in the balance of forces. Marx quotes T.J. Dunning, who claims that there 
is a great difference between “the level produced by the fair operation of exchange that exists when 
buyer and seller negotiate on equal terms” and the “level of wages which the seller, the labourer, 
must put up with when the capitalist negotiates with each man singly” [C, I, p.1069].97 Thus, Dunning 
argues that the logical basis of the trade unions is for workers to “combine in order to achieve 
equality of a sort with the capitalist in their contract concerning the sale of their labour” [C, I, 
p.1070].98 
From this analysis, we can deduce a dual aspect in the logical basis of the trade unions. On the one 
hand, trade unions spontaneously fight on the terrain of the wage-form. On the other, they begin to 
challenge the underlying class inequality in the negotiation of the contract between capitalist and 
labourer. This dual structure presents the potential for the proletariat to act as a class in order to 
challenge and expose this class relation. However, Marx’s account of the class struggle in The 
Working Day demonstrates that this process is mediated by many factors and is certainly not 
automatic. Marx exhibits his keen historical understanding of these mediations in his analysis of the 
history of anti-union legislation in Britain, and the ban on the combination of workers during the 
French Revolution [C, I, p.903]. 
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The continuing hold of reformist ideas over the working class is testament to the deep and enduring 
power of capitalist ideology. But, as Mandel points out, the “greatest theoretical weakness of 
reformism”, is to fail to understand that, whether “wages are high or low [...] they cannot upset the 
basic class relations and class inequality on which the capitalist mode of production is founded”.99 
Elsewhere Marx makes a similar point in Wages, Price and Profit: “Instead of the conservative motto: 
“A fair day's wage for a fair day's work!” they ought to inscribe on their banner the revolutionary 
watchword: “Abolition of the wages system!'”100 
Lebowitz argues that the conception of class struggle should not be reduced simply to the role of the 
trade unions bargaining with capital over the sale of labour-power by the worker. He claims that this 
narrow conception, concerned only with “the need for legislation to govern the labour market and 
sphere of production”, removes the wider political demands that arise from the struggle of the 
working class to lead full human lives as socially-developed beings.101 These wider political demands 
are certainly not the focus of Marx’s work in Capital, but, as we will see in the next section, Marx’s 
investigation of the development of working class movements in different countries does 
demonstrate an understanding of internationalism and oppression that presents opportunities for 
synthesis with his investigation of exploitation and the functioning of the capitalist system.  
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4) Class Struggle, the Knowing Subject and the Factory Inspectors 
a) Is the Class Struggle an Automatic Process for Marx? Or is a Knowing 
Subject Required? 
In Marx’s chapter on The Working Day, the ‘voice of the worker’ arises for the first time in Capital [C, 
I, p.342]. The workers make an apparently spontaneous claim, within the terms of political economy, 
as a commodity demanding its proper value. Marx quotes historical evidence from the manifesto of 
striking London building workers (1859-60). He also describes the working-class movement as having 
“grown instinctively out of the relations of production themselves” [C, I, p.415]. This implies a 
certain automatism to the process of class struggle. 
The individual workers who appear in the chapter on The Working Day are almost all victims, whose 
nightmarish conditions of existence are presented by Marx in great detail. If anything, the active 
protagonists might seem to be the factory inspectors, like Leonard Horner, who speak truth to 
power in their reports. But Marx also talks of the workers' resistance when faced with these 
conditions; their petitions, their ‘threatening meetings’, and their political organisations, such as the 
Chartists [C, I, p.405]. 
Class solidarity gives the proletariat strength as a class which runs counter to their powerlessness as 
individuals. Marx demonstrates the powerlessness of individual workers to resist the pressures 
exerted on them by capitalist relations to act according to ‘Bentham’; i.e. in their own immediately 
apparent personal interests; even to the extent of devastating their own families by sending out 
their children to work in wretched conditions. Marx argues that “the isolated worker […] succumbs 
without resistance once capitalist production has reached a certain stage of maturity” [C, I, p.412]. 
Marx demonstrates how the collective action of workers can reshape this ‘voluntary’ contract in a 
juridical fashion. He thus argues that the workers must “put their heads together and, as a class, 
compel the passing of a law” that would be “an all-powerful social barrier by which they can be 
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prevented from selling themselves and their families into slavery and death by voluntary contract 
with capital” [C, I, p.416]. The class demands articulated by the proletariat thus begin to challenge 
the norms of political economy; “In place of the pompous catalogue of the ‘inalienable rights of man’ 
there steps the modest Magna Carta of the legally limited working day” [C, I, p.416]. Of course this 
reform is only a partial victory, but Marx seems to indicate that new principles are being born that 
begin to challenge the ideology of capitalist social relations. 
We will now briefly mention the features that Marx identifies in the development of working class 
movements in different countries. Whilst Marx recognises the implicit internationalism of the 
working class movement, he is at the same time keenly attuned to its different national 
manifestations. Thus he expresses a certain appreciation for the French ‘revolutionary method’ over 
the piecemeal way in which the victories of the English workers were achieved (and often reversed). 
Secondly, Marx recognizes the weakening of class solidarity caused by divisions of race; “[l]abour in a 
white skin cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin” [C, I, p.414]. Thirdly, Marx 
argues that the process of achieving immediate demands should be a necessary staging post on the 
path to full emancipation for the working class. Marx enunciates this in the statement he drafted for 
the London Council of the International Working Men's Association; “[w]e declare that the limitation 
of the working day is a preliminary condition without which all further attempts at improvement and 
emancipation must prove abortive” [C, I, p.415]. 
b) How does a ‘Knowing Subject’ influence Society? Factory Inspectors and 
Class Struggle 
There is a certain group of actors who appear in Capital that merit study because they do not easily 
fit into the category of capitalist or worker; the factory inspectors. Although they are drawn by and 
large from a privileged section of society, Marx often pours praise on their actions. He singles out 
the actions of inspector Leonard Horner in particular, saying; “His services to the English working 
class will never be forgotten” [C, I, p.334 fn.10]. The factory inspectors acted as guardians of the 
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factory laws, which functioned to “curb capital's drive towards a limitless draining away of labour-
power by forcibly limiting the working day on the authority of the state, but a state ruled by 
capitalist and landlord” [C, I, p.348]. On the authority of the Home Secretary, the factory inspectors 
published reports every six months revealing the “voracious appetites of the capitalists for surplus 
labour” [C, I, p.349]. Horner himself, according to Marx, carried out a “life-long contest, not only 
with embittered manufacturers, but also with the Cabinet” [C, I, p.334 fn.10]. 
We can make several observations about this. Firstly, the inspectors were not themselves workers 
and it is not self-evident that they should act in solidarity with workers. We might speculate that it 
was their first-hand knowledge of the living conditions of the workers that motivated their actions. 
They were perhaps better aware than most of “capital's monstrous outrages” and it's “were-wolf 
like hunger” [C, I, p.353]. Secondly, the inspectors were not all alike in their behaviour. In Capital, 
Marx demonstrates that their position as employees of the government meant that pressure was 
applied on them in two directions. Sometimes the pressure of industrialists’ lobbying was passed 
down by the Home Secretary to force them to refrain from making prosecutions. At other times, as 
in the case of Leonard Horner, the factory inspectors rebelled and rerouted the pressure upwards, 
warning the government against showing undue lenience to the industrialists. 
In order to achieve their aims, the inspectors were capable of doing several things. They could put 
pressure directly on industrialists to comply with the factory laws by collecting evidence from 
workers and bringing cases of misconduct before magistrates. (During later struggles over the 
Factory Acts, they were also called upon to de-bunk the counter-petitions extorted out of workers by 
the industrialists). Secondly, they were able to help mobilise public anger by bringing to public 
attention the conditions in the factories and the workers’ neighbourhoods and homes. Here we find 
an interaction between the actions of the inspectors and the working class movement itself; the 
“voice of workers” raised with its “threatening meetings” and petitions to Parliament. 
129 
 
In the decade following the introduction of the Factory Acts, says Marx, the reports of the factory 
inspectors “teem with complaints about the impossibility of enforcing it” [C, I, p.392]. He quotes 
examples where manufacturers in effect sat in judgement on themselves as the magistrates 
enforcing the laws. Marx describes both the political demands for suffrage made by the working 
class through the Chartist movement and their economic counterpart in the Ten Hours Bill. 
Manufacturers denounced the factory inspectors as being a type of “revolutionary commissioner 
reminiscent of the Convention” and decried their “mania for improving the world” [C, I, p.395]. 
Eventually, Marx says, the individual manufacturer was forced to rein in his “lust for gain” by the 
“spokesmen and leaders of the capitalist class” to preserve their class interests as a whole. 
Marx presents the process giving rise to the factory laws in three different modes. Firstly, he says 
that the factory laws were “dictated by the same necessity as forced the manuring of English fields 
with guano” [C, I, p.348]. He suggests that the necessity of the factory laws “developed gradually out 
of circumstances as natural laws of the modern mode of production” [C, I, p.394]. Yet whilst he sees 
a law-like element to the creation of these acts, he also argues that their “formulation, official 
recognition and proclamation by the state were the result of a long class struggle” [C, I, p.394]. This 
second mode introduces the aspect of struggle, suggesting that human beings acting as class 
subjects have agency in this process. Marx also notes that, “the working class's power of attack grew 
with the number of its allies in those social layers not directly interested in the question” [C, I, 
p.409]. Thus, Marx expresses the working class's ability to build alliances to achieve its immediate 
aims. 
Finally, in the third mode, Marx describes the factory legislation as, “that first conscious and 
methodical reaction of society against the spontaneously developed form of its production process” 
[C, I, p.610]. Marx thus suggests that conscious human intervention can alter the ‘spontaneous’ 
development of the production process. Yet the subject of that intervention, ‘society’, echoes his 
130 
 
use of the term ‘public anger’ earlier in this section.102 Therefore, we might ask to what extent the 
‘spontaneous development’ of the production process sets the parameters of that human 
intervention. The importance of identifying these different modes in Marx's understanding of agency 
and structure is to establish whether they are in tension with each moment, or perhaps different 
moments, in his presentation of the process of historical development. 
If the intention of the factory legislation was simply to protect the “working class both in mind and 
body” [C, I, p.635], then it also produced consequences unintended by the factory inspectors and 
others. Marx determines that its effect was to accelerate “the concentration of capital and the 
exclusive predominance of the factory system” [C, I, p.635]. This result is highly significant, because 
the destruction of previous forms that obscure the direct domination of capital has the potential 
consequence of generalizing the class struggle between capital and labour. The actions of the factory 
inspectors can be seen as beginning to change the conditions that form the basis of the class 
struggle to the extent that they help uncover the antagonisms in the relations of capital’s 
domination. 
c) Knowledge and Class 
If we agree with Daniel Bensaïd’s proposition that “knowledge is not a simple collection of facts”, 
then we should attempt to advance an alternative conception.103 According to G M Tamás, 
knowledge is “a social institution, possible only in certain situations of high complexity, sometimes 
called ‘civilization’, which would allow the betterment of that knowledge”.104 For Althusser, 
knowledge is the product of a ‘theoretical practice’,105 and conversely every ideology is a ‘non-
knowledge’.106 
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It can be argued that understanding knowledge as production emphasises a certain autonomous 
character of theory. Thus, Smith claims that this understanding of knowledge is “not verified either 
empirically by reference to ‘fact’ or ‘brute data’ or pragmatically as an expression of certain social 
needs or interests”.107 Rather, he argues that it is said to contain “its own canons and protocols of 
validation that are strictly ‘internal’ to itself alone”.108 This conception is intended to undercut what 
Althusser might see as a twin deviation in theories of knowledge; of empiricism and historicism. It 
could then be argued that science is continually tested and put under tension by the changing basis 
of reality. 
Tamás considers the relationship between class and knowledge. He asks whether there are 
differences between “acting and knowing subjects” that might suggest “irreconcilable discrepancies 
between people's positions” that make a “unified and rational knowledge” impossible.109 As a 
consequence of this, he identifies two distinct “visions of the social subject in need of liberation”, 
inherited from Rousseau and Marx.110 He claims that many who have intended to follow in the 
footsteps of Marx, such as E. P. Thompson, have in fact been Rousseau-ian socialists. Tamás 
therefore posits a contrast between the position of the revolutionary subject for the Rousseau-ians, 
by whom it is “extolled” for its inherent excellence, and for Marx, for whom it is its current state of 
“wretchedness, its total alienation, that makes it see that it has ‘nothing to lose buts its chains’”.111 
  
                                                          
107
 Smith Reading Althusser, p.108 
108
 Smith Reading Althusser, p.108 
109
 Tamás “Telling the truth about class”, p.228 
110
 Tamás “Telling the truth about class”, p.228 
111
 Tamás “Telling the truth about class”, p.229 
132 
 
5) What is Missing in Capital? 
a) The Proletariat as Subject? 
Marx has been accused of treating workers within the labour process as objects dominated by and 
subordinate to the will of capital. For David Harvey, “The charge that Marx treats the worker as an 
‘object’ is in one sense true”.112 This is because, for Marx, a ‘direct subjective experience’ of the 
world alone is not sufficient to understand it. Put another way, in Capital, Marx develops an 
understanding of what it is that workers are being “forced to cope with and defend against” – to 
construct by scientific investigation “a materialist theory of the capitalist mode of production”.113 In 
this context we may want to heed Terry Eagleton’s advice that it is important “to see that, in the 
critique of ideology, only those interventions will work which make sense to the mystified subject 
itself”.114 Eagleton argues that critique is a form of discourse that “seeks to inhabit the experience of 
the subject from the inside” and in this way is able to elicit the “‘valid’ features of that experience 
which point beyond the subject's present condition”.115 
Whilst, in Capital, Marx seeks to explain the processes that give rise to the consciousness of the 
capitalists and the “illusion created by competition” in their minds [C, III, p.992], evidence from both 
Capital and his enduring commitment to revolutionary politics demonstrates that he regarded the 
working class as the subject of revolutionary social change. Indeed, in a letter to his French 
publisher, he famously points out that the accessibility of Capital to the working class is the 
“consideration which to me outweighs everything else” [C, I, p.104]. The aim of raising working class 
consciousness and its fulfilment are, however, two different things.116 The problem of political 
consciousness remains a fundamental issue for contemporary Marxist theory. It has generated 
theoretical interventions from many of those who have followed Marx; from Lukács, to Gramsci, to 
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the Frankfurt School. Like Harvey, we might therefore surmise that “the duality of the worker as an 
‘object for capital’ and a ‘living creative subject’ has never been adequately resolved in Marxist 
theory”.117 
That Marx's Capital is in some sense an uncompleted work is a widely accepted notion. How his 
plans for the project developed and how their final form and content took shape continue to be a 
matter of much debate and research (notably in the MEGA project). As Lebowitz argues, I believe 
rightly, an ‘accommodation’ or explaining away of the possible deficiencies or lacunae of Capital 
should be resisted. Lebowitz makes useful attempts to reconstitute those aspects that he deems 
missing. In particular, he pursues an exploration of the variable nature of human needs and what he 
argues is “a critical silence” in Capital that “permits the appearance that, for the scientist, the only 
subject (if there is one at all) is capital”.118 The implied jettisoning of the proletariat as the agent of 
revolutionary social change consequent on this argument makes it a key point of contention. We will 
now investigate one of the most developed accounts of this conception of capital-as-subject in 
Moishe Postone’s work Time, Labour and Social Domination.119 
b) Moishe Postone and Capital-as-Subject 
Moishe Postone seeks to carry out a “fundamental reinterpretation of Marx’s mature critical theory” 
[TLSD, p.3]. He proposes to undertake this by questioning the central assumptions of the analysis of 
what he terms, “traditional Marxist theories” [TLSD, p.3]. His claim is that, by developing new 
understandings of concepts relating to the essential character and development of modern society, 
a renewed critical theory can overcome the antinomies between structure and action, and between 
meaning and material life. 
Postone is motivated by what he sees as the deficiencies of “traditional Marxism” and its failure to 
advance an adequate critique of “actually existing socialism” [TLSD, p.3]. He tries to isolate the core 
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of the capitalist system conceptually, as an impersonal form of social domination generated by 
labour itself and not by the mechanisms of the market or private property [TLSD, p.3]. From this 
conception, Postone deduces that proletarian labour and the industrial process of production are 
simply expressions of domination and not means of human emancipation, thus calling into question 
the “political and social role traditionally accorded the proletariat in the possible historical 
overcoming of capitalism” [TLSD, p.7]. 
Postone distinguishes two modes of critical analysis; the first is a critique of capitalism from the 
standpoint of labour, and the second is a critique of labour in capitalism [TLSD, p.5]. The first mode, 
based on a transhistorical understanding of labour, is characteristic of ‘traditional Marxism’, whereas 
the second corresponds to Postone’s own attempts to initiate a critical theory adequate to modern 
society. We will now carry out a critical analysis of issues in Postone’s Time, Labour and Social 
Domination relevant to our investigation of subjectivity in Marx’s Capital. 
The strength of Postone’s project lies in his sustained engagement with Capital, and his attempt to 
reconcile his interpretation with detailed readings of Marx’s Grundrisse. Postone rejects the 
“pessimistic turn” of Frankfurt school critical theory [TLSD, p.85]. His detailed analysis of the 
question and category of subjectivity in Capital is an important contribution to clarifying our 
understanding of value, labour, social mediation, alienation and fetishism. His attempt to examine 
the ‘essential core’ of Marx’s understanding of capitalist society, and, with the benefit of 
subsequently available texts and historiography, to re-engage with Capital is also welcome, however 
problematic its results. 
As Postone acknowledges, his interpretation of Capital is indebted to the type of reading initiated by 
Georg Lukács in his work History and Class Consciousness [TLSD, pp.72-74]. Postone affirms Lukács’s 
historical analysis of the process of reification associated with the commodity form. However, I 
would argue that, by dismissing the proletariat as a potential revolutionary subject and adopting 
capital as the subject of Capital, Postone actually inverts and zombifies Lukács’s conception. Postone 
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preserves the theoretical strength of reification – its theorisation of a historically specific, abstract, 
impersonal form of social domination peculiar to capitalism – but removes the potential for 
proletarian self-emancipation which is the animating impulse of Lukács’s Marxism. While Postone’s 
work shares the polarised quality present in History and Class Consciousness, in Lukács a result of 
vertiginous class struggle, his claims to escape the pessimism of Frankfurt school theory would 
appear to be predicated on a utopian impulse. 
Our exposition earlier in this chapter has demonstrated the intimate relation Marx saw between the 
capital relation and the class relation (e.g. [C, II, p.115]). This relationship poses significant problems 
for Postone’s interpretation of Capital. He argues correctly that capitalism’s fundamental 
contradictions “should not be identified immediately” with “concrete social relations […] such as 
those of class struggle” [TLSD, p.34]. However, this should not imply that class struggle has no 
mediated relation to this fundamental contradiction. Postone maintains a marked silence on the 
effects of working class struggle on the functioning of capitalism in Marx’s chapter on The Working 
Day. I would argue that Postone’s antipathy towards ‘traditional’ Marxism tends to obscure a serious 
examination of the potential connection between an immanent critique, which he advocates, and a 
class-based analysis. 
Postone’s re-interpretation of Marx’s theory as a “critical and self-reflexive analysis” [TLSD, p.84] of 
life in capitalism is predicated on a critique of the proletariat as a potential revolutionary subject; “as 
a social agent that both constitutes history and realises itself in socialism” [TLSD, p.37]. Whilst we 
might agree with Postone that there is “no linear continuum” between the “demands and 
conceptions of the working class”, and the “needs, demands, and conceptions that point beyond 
capitalism”, this does not logically imply that there is no connection whatsoever [TLSD, p.37]. 
The idea of the disappearance of the proletariat as a potential revolutionary subject in Postone’s 
work is connected to his conception of modern society as “post-liberal capitalism”, defined in 
contrast to its nineteenth-century forms [TLSD, p.84-87]. Postone argues that Marx attempts to 
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move beyond conceiving capitalist society “in terms of the opposition between the state and civil 
society” [TLSD, p.57]. He suggests that Marx’s analysis of the “directionally dynamic character” of 
capitalism requires another dimension of society; the sphere of production [TLSD, p.57].  It is 
through an analysis of the “specificity of labour in capitalism”, he claims, that Marx attempts to 
explain the “historical dynamic of capitalist society” [TLSD, p.57]. 
Drawing on Marx’s explicit formulations that “self-valorizing value” is the “automatic subject” [C, I, 
p.255], and that capital “presents itself as a self-moving substance” [C, I, p.256], Postone advances a 
particular interpretation of this “self-moving substance which is Subject” [TLSD, p.75]. He contends 
that Marx is able to analyse the nature of capitalist social relations in terms of the attributes that 
Hegel associated with Geist, or the absolute subject [TLSD, p.75]. For Postone, capital is transformed 
into a self-reflexive relation. The opposition between capital and labour becomes an opposition 
between alienated labour and the possibility of emancipated labour. Postone appears to ascribe to 
the inner logic of the categories of capital a degree of control over historical development that is 
greatly overemphasised. In this respect, we must distinguish between the setting out of an abstract 
development of the core “category of capital” and the historical development of capitalism or 
capitalist society [TLSD, p.76]. 
A degree of ambiguity is introduced into Postone’s argument by his frequent use of the prefix ‘quasi’ 
in his formulations. This is often employed to refer to the ‘quasi-independence’ of the structures of 
social relations that dominate human beings under capitalism [TLSD, p.126].120 This would suggest 
that Postone is attempting to straddle the conception of capital as a subject in the strong Hegelian 
sense and the apparent subjectivity of capital as a form of fetishism. The appearance of this polarity 
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is perhaps a legacy of the Lukácsian framework, but it raises the question of whether capital can be 
simultaneously regarded as both a subject and a fetish.121 
Although Postone opposes ‘traditional’ Marxism on the basis of its “transhistorical conception of 
labour”, his own apparently historically specific critique of labour would appear unable to escape the 
problem of transhistorical abstractions. Postone’s argument relies on notions such as ‘use-value’ and 
‘material wealth’ which appear to transgress the boundaries of capitalism. Furthermore, if Capital is 
to be considered an internal critique of capitalism, are we not here making a transhistorical claim? If 
Postone is to successfully deny the methodological validity of transhistorical categories, then it 
would appear to be necessary to address issues within his own framework. 
Postone argues that the standpoint of Capital is immanent to its object of investigation, although he 
does not indicate where in capitalist society this standpoint is located [TLSD, p.21]. Postone’s 
ambiguity on the standpoint of this auto-critique may spring from the high level of abstraction in his 
analysis, but we might also suggest that his abandonment of the standpoint of labour leaves him ill-
equipped to advance any solutions to this persistent problem. Postone thus adopts a level of 
detachment characteristic of critical theory; the root cause of reification, he believes, lies with 
industrial labour. His rejection of the standpoint of labour gives us cause to examine the nature of 
his own critique. 
Postone’s rejection of ‘traditional’ Marxism is central to his argument, although he never explores or 
sufficiently explains the origins of this phenomenon. His definition refers not to any “specific 
historical tendency”, but denotes all forms of Marxism that have at their core a “transhistorical 
conception of labour” [TLSD, p.7]. Postone criticises the “productivist paradigm” that “affirms 
proletarian labour, industrial production, and unfettered industrial ‘growth’” [TLSD, p.17]. 
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I would argue that Postone’s critique of ‘traditional’ Marxism omits the resources to address many 
of the problems that he seeks to identify with this category. The conspicuous absence of 
revolutionaries such as Engels, Luxemburg, Lenin, Trotsky, and Gramsci from his analysis suggests 
that the representatives of Postone’s ‘traditional’ Marxism are those appropriate to his purposes. In 
light of this fact, it is not so surprising that the resultant picture fails to address the issues of ‘actually 
existing socialism’ and the “failure of revolution in the West” [TLSD, p.85]. 
Despite the weakness of Postone’s constructed target, he helpfully brings the reflexive aspects122 of 
Marxism under scrutiny with the text of Capital. Postone is correct to draw our attention to one of 
two features that Marx identified in a letter to Engels after completing Volume I as fundamental to 
understanding Capital: the ‘two-fold character’ of labour [TLSD, p.55].123 However, Postone tends to 
underplay the second side of this observation in which Marx gives equal significance to his treatment 
of surplus-value abstracted from its particular forms. Whilst Postone’s book is very useful in 
attempting to establish the essential difference between the treatment of labour by Marx and by 
political economy, Postone tends to emphasise Marx’s account of David Ricardo from his 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and underplay Marx’s more detailed, but no less 
critical, engagement with Ricardo in Capital. I would argue that the significance of Postone’s neglect 
of the category of surplus-value and exploitation is connected to his failure to engage with the 
concrete interrelationship of the class struggle and the functioning of capitalism. 
Although Postone’s detailed argumentation highlights many key aspects of the core categories in 
Marx’s analysis, the antagonism that he constructs between his approach to the categories of 
Capital and a class-based analysis is unnecessary. I would suggest therefore that an adequate 
reading of Capital must overcome this artificial opposition between the critique of labour and the 
standpoint of labour in order to formulate both a theory of the determinate forms of social 
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mediation and a theory in which class, exploitation, private property and the market are central 
features. 
Following Chris Arthur, we might suggest that it is possible to characterise Marx’s position in Capital 
as the “critically adopted standpoint of labour”.124 We have the evidence of Marx’s own explanation 
in his Postface to the Second Edition of Capital, that his critique of political economy aims to 
represent “the class whose historical task is the overthrow of the capitalist mode of production and 
the final abolition of all classes – the proletariat” [C, I, p.98]. Such a perspective helps to explain that 
Marx’s concern for the “meagre concession rung from capital” in the form of the Factory Acts is in 
fact a prelude to his desire for the “conquest of political power by the working class” [C, I, p.619]. It 
is to the “revolt of the working class” that Marx looks for the death “knell of capitalist private 
property” and the potential expropriation of the expropriators [C, I, p.929]. 
That Marx saw the emergence of the working class as a class subject as of fundamental significance 
is further evidenced by his Letter to Bolte of 23 November 1871.125 Here, Marx distinguishes 
between an economic movement, such as the struggle within a particular factory for a shortening of 
the working day, and a political movement; the attempt to pass a general law limiting the working 
day. Marx argues that a political movement grows out of the separate economic movements of the 
proletariat as “a movement of the class, with the object of achieving its interests in a general form, 
in a form possessing a general social force of compulsion.”126 While Postone is correct to draw our 
attention to the critique of labour in Capital, I would argue that, in Marx’s conception, the 
proletariat is capable of forming a subject both inside capitalism and against it. The difficulty for the 
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working class is that, in generalising from its experience of class struggle over the working day, it 
must, in the words of Lebowitz, “negate its negation”.127 
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It is fair to state that Marx's ambitious aim in Capital for an exposition of the capitalist economy in 
its totality is missing critical elements. This is most obvious in the absence of a comprehensive 
theory of the state, international trade, and the world market.128 Lebowitz has some justification in 
arguing that a fuller exploration of the worker as a subject is required. Yet we could argue that it is 
not possible to produce a comprehensive analysis of capitalist society at the economic level without 
also producing an explicit theory of political consciousness and subjectivity. The possible 
construction of such a theory is a controversial topic, but elements that we might suggest include 
theories of language, of knowledge, of consciousness, of ideology, and, crucially, of the philosophy 
of praxis. 
In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate the complexity of Marx’s notion of the person as a 
living incarnation of social relations; a complexity that is not exhausted by a reading that omits the 
dimension of lived experience. In formulating the relationship between class struggle and the 
functioning of the laws of capitalism I have raised the issue of the working class movement and 
other actors, such as the factory inspectors, who compelled the passing of legislation of behalf of 
‘society’. Marx’s aside that the power of the state is “the concentrated and organized force of 
society” [C, I, p.915], suggests questions that will be addressed later in this thesis. 
Against Moishe Postone’s critique of the standpoint of labour, I argued that an adequate reading of 
Capital must retain and critically adopt this standpoint. Whilst there may be no ‘royal road’ to 
revolution elaborated in Capital, Marx conceives of his method, the dialectic, as “in its very essence 
critical and revolutionary” [C, I, p.104, p.103]. I have argued that the core of Marx’s project is 
predicated on the notion of proletarian self-emancipation. It is exactly this notion that is at stake 
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when we consider whether to reject Postone’s proposed antithesis between the overcoming of 
capital and the self-assertion of the working class [TLSD, p.371]. 
These issues, it seems to me, are particular aspects of a broader tension within Marx's methodology. 
On the one hand, Marx says that the “particular course taken by our analysis forces this tearing 
apart of the object under investigation” [C, I, p.443], and he argues that this fragmentation 
corresponds to “the spirit of capitalist production” [C, I, p.443]. On the other hand, Marx condemns 
any type of “abstract materialism” that excludes the historical process. We have investigated the 
ways in which a critique might both reproduce the concrete appearances of capitalist society and 
use abstraction to formulate a rigorous analysis of its internal functioning. This project is perhaps by 
necessity, until completed through practice, an open-ended one. In other words, a revolutionary 
critique of capitalist society cannot be formulated in theory alone. 
Harvey argues that a full comprehension of the concepts in Marx's theoretical apparatus is only 
possible in a relational and open-ended way.129 I have argued above that these concepts reveal a 
progressively richer content as Marx’s investigation unfolds. I would further argue that his 
‘investigations’ should not be seen as a passive process, but, like the Theses on Feuerbach, as 
proceeding with the purpose of changing the world. Capital can be conceived as both the theoretical 
expression of a turning point in history and as a project in need of completion. I would argue that 
Marx bequeaths to us both crucial insights and a methodology, the development of which indicate 
the potential for an adequate Marxist theory of subjectivity. 
To summarise; I have conceded Lebowitz’ suggestion that Marx does not offer us a complete theory 
of the working class as a subject in Capital. Yet, against Postone’s reading of Capital, I have argued 
that Marx does conceive the proletariat as having the potential to be the revolutionary subject in 
capitalist society. To examine the development of Marx’s thought at the hands of other ‘great 
investigators’, we now turn to the work of Georg Lukács and Antonio Gramsci.  
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In a short period from 1919 to the mid-1920s Georg Lukács produced a series of works in the 
revolutionary Marxist tradition: Tactics and Ethics, History and Class Consciousness, and Lenin: A 
Study in the Unity of his Thought.1 In this chapter I re-construct the key concepts of History and Class 
Consciousness (HCC) in order to illuminate Lukács’s distinctive approach to the problem of 
subjectivity. I will analyse the particular questions which Lukács’s conceptual framework allows us to 
ask, and subsequently those questions which it precludes. This will allow me to reflect on the 
relationship between Lukács’s conception and those of Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci. 
a) The Importance of History and Class Consciousness 
In HCC, Lukács creatively reinvents Marx’s method, the materialist dialectic. His conception of 
subjectivity is distinctive as the origin of a trend of thought known as ‘Western Marxism’.2 Lukács’s 
synthesis of a particular historical moment and his influence on subsequent Marxist thought makes 
HCC a prime candidate for close study. Michael Löwy argues that the central essay of the book, 
Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, despite its high level of abstraction, is 
concerned with Lukács’s central theme, the “proletarian revolution against capitalist reification”.3    
The polarised quality that I argue characterises Lukács’s HCC can be understood within the context 
of the wave of mass revolutionary upheavals in which he was a participant [HCC, p.xli].4 I will argue 
that HCC remains one of the most prolonged attempts to give a theoretical and philosophical basis 
to the notion of the self-emancipation of the proletariat. By examining his theory of reification and 
the special prominence he gives to the working class in society, I hope to grasp the potential 
difficulties that he faces. 
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b) The Problem of Subjectivity and Lukács’s Path to Marxism 
Lukács’s theory of reification is influenced by his engagement with the neo-Kantian ideas of the 
sociologist Max Weber and the Heidelberg school, of which Lukács was formerly a member. In 
Lukács’s own account of his intellectual development, from his 1967 Preface, he “hovered between 
the acquisition of Marxism and political activism on the one hand, and the constant intensification of 
[his] purely idealistic ethical preoccupations on the other” [HCC, p.x]. This twin development is 
reflected in his exposition of the problem of subjectivity. 
Lukács’s Marxism was stimulated by the works of Rosa Luxemburg and his opposition to 
opportunism, those who he called “vulgar Marxists” [HCC, p.9]. In reaction to this tendency, Löwy 
argues that Lukács’s active engagement in politics up to 1919 was characterised by a type of ultra-
leftism. During the course of writing the essays in HCC, Löwy argues that Lukács’s Marxism develops 
into a position that he calls “revolutionary realism”.5 This position is an attempt to move beyond 
both ‘leftist’ utopianism and ‘right’ opportunism. 
c) Alienation, Commodity Fetishism and Reification 
Lukács’s conception of subjectivity, centred on his theory of reification, is both an extension of 
Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism in Capital and a return to themes associated with the 
theory of alienation developed by Marx in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Lukács 
extends the theory of commodity fetishism by explaining its effects in all spheres of human life: not 
simply in the economy, but also in the juridical sphere, in politics, and in the structure of 
consciousness in capitalist society. 
Lukács poses questions similar to those arising from our discussion of subjectivity in Marx’s Capital: 
How is a world governed by the apparently law-like rules of the economy also the site of 
revolutionary class struggles? Lukács’s theory of reification explains the creation of “non-human 
objective laws of society” [HCC, p.87], a ‘second nature’ that seems to exile human subjectivity, 
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against which he counter-poses the potential role of working class consciousness in shaping history. 
Lukács, like Antonio Gramsci, is concerned to explain how theory can become an effective force that 
grips the masses. However, Lukács is distinctive in seeking to isolate the specificity of how dialectical 
theory is able motivate genuinely revolutionary activity. The key to this he believes is to comprehend 
the universality of the commodity as a category, its “undistorted essence” [HCC, p.86]. 
The conception of subjectivity that emerges is characterised by strong polarisation. Lukács’s 
understanding of reification paints an image of individuals trapped within the immediacy of social 
appearances. In thrall to an alienated social world in which even the mental faculties of individual 
workers are set against their total personality, it might appear that only a messianic feat is capable 
of overcoming the fragmentation of human subjectivity. 
Lukács attempts to recast themes associated with Max Weber within a Marxist framework, such as 
his notion of an ‘iron cage’ of rationalisation encompassing modern society. For Lukács, the 
formalism of capitalist rationalisation is self-limiting. This is an expression of the potential for crisis 
latent within the normal functioning of capitalist society. However, for Lukács, the potential for a 
rupture which overcomes the reified existence of bourgeois society can only be realised by the 
proletariat emerging as the “identical subject-object” of history [HCC, p.149].  
Lukács’s emphasis on the processes of social mediation is taken up by later thinkers in the Frankfurt 
school. As we have seen, Moishe Postone reads Capital as a theory of social mediation, as against a 
class-based analysis of capitalist society. Like other Frankfurt school thinkers, Postone abandon 
Lukács’s conception of the proletariat as the ‘identical subject-object’ of history. In this formulation, 
reification really does appear to be an inescapable ‘iron cage’, or assailable only by Postone’s 
ambiguous conception of auto-critique. In the absence of a proletariat capable of penetrating 
reification, the reified world of the commodity-form thus becomes the ideological counter-part to 
Postone’s notion of capital as the subject of Capital. We will therefore examine Lukács’s contention, 
despite its difficulties, that the proletariat can emerge as the subject of history.  
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2) An Exposition of the Key Aspects of History and Class Consciousness 
Whilst History and Class Consciousness is a series of essays, the book’s central essay Reification and 
the Standpoint of the Proletariat develops Lukács’s key concepts of reification, the antinomies of 
bourgeois thought, and the proletariat as the “identical subject-object” of history in greatest depth 
[HCC, p.149]. I would argue that these concepts, in conjunction with the prominence of the category 
of totality in Lukács’s dialectical method and his conception of class consciousness, reveal the 
framework of his understanding of subjectivity. For this reason, I will embark on a close study of 
these key aspects, primarily from this central essay, in order that I may use this as a basis for later 
analysis and criticism.6 
a) Lukács’s Theory of Reification 
The ideological problems of capitalism cannot be penetrated, Lukács claims, without understanding 
the fundamental structure of capitalist society. For this reason, Lukács’s studies are based on Marx’s 
economic analyses. Lukács’s examination of the phenomenon of reification, as with Marx’s Capital, 
takes the commodity relation as its starting point. The mysterious nature of the commodity is rooted 
in the process by which social relations between people take on the character of a thing [HCC, p.83]. 
Lukács extends Marx’s analysis of the fetish character of commodities, the riddle of the commodity-
structure, to explain all the phenomena of capitalist society, the totality of social life, in all its 
aspects. The theory of reification that Lukács constructs on this basis is a complex and multi-faceted 
conception which plays a pivotal role in his framework and understanding of subjectivity. Thus I will 
begin by examining his exposition of the phenomenon. 
i) The Phenomenon of Reification and the Fragmentation of the Subject 
Lukács explains the historical process by which commodity exchange achieves a qualitative 
dominance permeating “the total outer and inner life of society” [HCC, p.83]. Relations between 
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people acquire a “‘phantom objectivity’” that seems “so strictly rational and all-embracing as to 
conceal every trace of its fundamental nature” [HCC, p.83].7 Within this historical perspective, 
commodity fetishism stands as a specific problem of the modern capitalist age. This does not deny 
the “episodic appearance” of commodity exchange in societies prior to capitalism or the existence of 
associated subjective and objective commodity relations [HCC, p.84]. There is, Lukács argues, 
however a “qualitative difference between the commodity as one form among many regulating the 
metabolism of human society and the commodity as the universal structuring principle” [HCC, p.85].8 
Under capitalism, commodity exchange increasingly penetrates all aspects and expressions of life 
and reshapes them in a reified manner. 
Lukács notes the correlation between the commodity’s rise as the dominant social form and the 
emergence of a mystifying “veil of reification” [HCC, p.86]. Whereas feudal economic relations were 
once predominantly naked and personal, those under capitalism assume the appearance of, in 
Marx’s words, “the fantastic form of a relation between things” [HCC, p.86].9 This process is both a 
pre-requisite and a product of the commodity as a universal category.10 Consequently this category 
has the potential of being comprehended in its “undistorted essence” [HCC, p.86]. The reification 
produced by capitalism assumes “decisive importance both for the objective evolution of society and 
for the stance adopted by men towards it” [HCC, p.86]. It is crucial both for the “subjugation of 
men’s consciousness to the forms in which this reification finds expression” and to their attempts at 
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rebellion and liberation from “servitude to the ‘second nature’ so created” [HCC, p.86].11 Mankind 
finds this “‘second nature’” already existing in the “non-human objectivity of the natural laws of 
society” [HCC, p.86-87]. 
The process by which mankind’s activity becomes “objective and independent” of man and is itself 
dominated “by virtue of an autonomy alien to man” contains an objective and a subjective aspect 
[HCC, p.87]. The objective aspect is manifested in the existence of the “world of objects and 
relations between things”12 that appear to control society as natural forces [HCC, p.87]. Upon 
examining these forces, the individual can discern prudent courses of action for personal gain, but is, 
as an individual, incapable of altering them. The subjective aspect is expressed in abstract human 
labour, to whose formal equality commodities are not only reduced, but are also produced in 
accordance with this “real principle” [HCC, p.87]. 
The “isolated ‘free’ labourer” is both pre-condition and product of modern capitalism [HCC, p.87]. 
This mode of production, as it develops from “handicrafts via co-operation and manufacture to 
machine industry”, displays “a continuous trend towards greater rationalisation, the progressive 
elimination of the qualitative, human and individual attributes of the worker” [HCC, p.88]. It is 
beyond Lukács’s scope to describe the growth of the “modern process of labour” [HCC, p.87].13 He 
seeks to draw out the underlying “principle at work”, the “principle of rationalisation” [HCC, p.88].14  
Rationalisation is the impetus towards a more precise calculation of every outcome of the process of 
production. It causes a fragmentation of both the object and the subject of production. First, the 
fragmentation of the object of production is the destruction of the “organic, irrational and 
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qualitatively determined unity of the product” [HCC, p.88]. Along with this rationalisation, 
necessarily comes a process of specialisation. The work process’s special operations exhibit a 
technical autonomy increasingly manifested also as an economic autonomy [HCC, p.89]. 
Second, the subject of production undergoes a process of fragmentation. Under capitalist relations 
of production man no longer appears as the “authentic master of the process” of work, “[n]either 
objectively nor in his relation to his work” [HCC, p.89]. Mankind displays an increasing “lack of will”, 
and mankind’s activity becomes “more and more contemplative” [HCC, p.89]. This fundamentally 
“transforms the categories of man’s immediate attitude to the world” [HCC, p.89]. 
The subject of labour is also rationally fragmented. The “reality” of daily life is defined by the 
“objectification of their labour-power into something opposed to their total personality” [HCC, p.90]. 
This “personality” becomes a helpless observer, “reduced to an isolated particle and fed into an alien 
system” [HCC, p.90]. All ties, previously binding individuals to a community, are “mediated to an 
increasing extent exclusively by the abstract laws of the mechanism which imprisons them” [HCC, 
p.90]. 
The principle of rationalisation must, Lukács claims, “embrace every aspect of life” [HCC, p.91]. It 
turns all consumer articles into “abstract members of a species” identical with their cohort, whilst 
simultaneously making them into “isolated objects” [HCC, p.91]. This isolation and fragmentation is 
“only apparent”, since for the first time in history “the whole of society is subjected, or tends to be 
subjected, to a unified economic process” [HCC, p.92]. Despite being illusory, this process is also, for 
Lukács, a necessary one. 
Lukács argues that the “internal organisation of a factory” contains within it “in concentrated form 
the whole structure of capitalist society” [HCC, p.90]. For this reason, “the fate of the worker 
becomes the fate of society as a whole” [HCC, p.91].15 Lukács gives special prominence to the 
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 This can be compared with Marx’s comment in A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. 
Introduction that the proletariat forms “a sphere of society…which cannot emancipate itself without 
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worker’s specific situation, “typical of society as whole”, that “self-objectification, this 
transformation of a human function into a commodity reveals in all its starkness the dehumanised 
and dehumanising function of the commodity relation” [HCC, p.92]. 
Lukács has elaborated the basic phenomenon of reification, its integral connection with the principle 
of rationalisation, specialisation and the consequent fragmentation of both subject and object. This 
phenomenon transforms the whole of capitalist society, and yet the labourer plays a specific role 
within it. Lukács’s concern with the specific position of the worker takes him beyond a general 
Weberian conception of ‘rationalisation’. Lukács continues by analysing bourgeois attempts to 
comprehend the legal and state forms created in harmony with this structure. 
ii) The Process of Rational Calculation, Bureaucracy and Crisis 
Lukács quotes Marx from The German Ideology (1846) to show that “[p]rivate property alienates not 
only the individuality of men, but also of things” [HCC, p.92]. The process of “rational objectification” 
destroys the “authentic substantiality” of use-values under capitalism. The individual object assumes 
a “new substantiality” as it confronts man directly [HCC, p.92]. It is “distorted in its objectivity by its 
commodity character” [HCC, p.93]. This process intensifies as “the relations which man establishes 
with objects as objects of the life process are mediated in the course of his social activity” [HCC, 
p.93]. 
Modern capitalism subsumes previously isolated primitive forms of capitalism into its increasingly 
unified and radical process of the extraction of surplus value. It is these previous forms that 
represent the paradigmatic form of capital for the reified consciousness. It is not the extraction of 
surplus value, actually functioning capital, which is immediately presented to this consciousness, but 
rather a fetishistic form of capital-in-itself.16 The “potentiation of reification” is expressed most 
clearly in vulgar political economy, which portrays capital as an independent source of value [HCC, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
emancipating itself from – and thereby emancipating – all the other spheres of society” (in Marx, K Early 
Writings (London: Penguin, 1992 [1975]), p.256). 
16
 Or in Marx’s words: an “automatic fetish, self-expanding value, money generating money” (quoted in Lukács 
History and Class Consciousness, p.93) 
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p.93]. With the production and reproduction of capitalism at ever-higher economic levels, the 
“structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully and more definitively into 
the consciousness of man” [HCC, p.93]. 
While some bourgeois thinkers recognise the “humanly destructive consequences” of reification, 
their accounts remain in thrall to its surface forms and they are incapable of penetrating the basic 
phenomenon of reification itself [HCC, p.94].17 The separation of the manifestations of reification 
from an analysis of their economic bases “is facilitated by the fact that the [capitalist] process of 
transformation must embrace every manifestation of the life of society if the preconditions for the 
complete self-realisation of capitalist production are to be fulfilled” [HCC, p.95]. 
Reification thus influences and shapes in its own image the structural form of every institution in 
modern capitalist society: the state, its systems of justice and its administration. This distinguishes 
modern capitalism from “age-old capitalist forms of acquisition” [HCC, p.96]. Lukács associates this 
closely with Max Weber’s account of the organisation of institutions on the basis of rational 
calculation. The modern bureaucratic state, impossible in previous “irrationally constituted political 
systems”, is a vital pre-condition for modern business interests [HCC, p.96]. Only with the advent of 
“purely systematic categories” in modern society did the emergence of a “universally applicable” 
judicial system become possible to satisfy business’s concern for “exact calculation” [HCC, p.97].18 
This judicial system must necessarily give the appearance of a permanent edifice; however the 
unceasingly dynamic system of capitalist production results in inevitable conflicts, as new forces 
strain at the constraints of the law. Although this process produces new formulations of law, its 
essential structure is unchanged. Lukács explains the situation as a matter of perspective seen, from 
the historian’s view outside the process, in the continuous revolutionising of capitalist society, and 
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 Thus even “critical” bourgeois thinkers are unable to give a coherent explanation for Marx’s “topsy-turvy 
world, in which Monsieur Le Capital and Madame La Terre do their ghost-walking as social characters and at 
the same time as mere things” (quoted in Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.95). 
18
 i.e. a judicial system where “the judge is more or less an automatic statute-dispensing machine” whose 
“behaviour is on the whole predictable” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.96) 
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from within the process, in the direct experience of the “immobile face” it presents “towards the 
individual producer” [HCC, p.97]. 
This juridical manifestation of the conflict between “traditional and empirical craftsmanship and the 
scientific and rational factory” demonstrates man’s “contemplative nature” under capitalism and the 
limitation of man’s activity to the passive calculation of causation [HCC, p.97]. This is the “structural 
analogue”, says Lukács, of the behaviour of the operator of the machine [HCC, p.98].19 With 
capitalism, the existence of a unified economic structure generates a “formally” unified structure of 
consciousness [HCC, p.100]. This is manifested both in the project to formalise laws of isolated 
aspects of society, and the division and commodification of workers’ mental faculties for work 
against their total personality. 
As the division of labour advances, this phenomenon intensifies and extends itself into all spheres of 
life, including ethics. Man’s “qualities and abilities” are things to “‘own’ or ‘dispose of’” [HCC, p.100]. 
Even “subjectivity itself”, “knowledge, temperament and powers of expression” are “reduced to an 
abstract mechanism functioning autonomously”, separated from the personality of its “‘owner’”, 
and “from the material and concrete nature of the subject matter in hand” [HCC, p.100].20 These 
problems of consciousness appear in proletariat and bourgeoisie alike, although for the latter in a 
“refined and spiritualised, but, for that very reason, more intensified form” [HCC, p.100]. 
Whilst the “rationalisation of the world appears to be complete”, having penetrated both “man’s 
physical and psychic nature”, it is, argues Lukács, limited “by its own formalism” [HCC, p.101]. The 
aggregate of the partial systems of capitalist society appears to constitute a “unified system of 
general ‘laws’” [HCC, p.101]. But the authority of these laws is predicated on their disregard for the 
“concrete aspects” of their “subject matter” [HCC, p.101]. This displays itself in the “incoherence of 
                                                          
19
 In fact Lukács claims the activity of the entrepreneur and the machine operator display no “qualitative 
difference in the structure of consciousness”; rather “bureaucracy implies the adjustment of one’s way of life, 
mode of work and hence of consciousness, to the general socio-economic premises of the capitalist economy” 
(Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.98). 
20
 Lukács points to the reified faculties of the journalist and the “prostitution of his experiences and beliefs” as 
the very apogee of this process (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.100). 
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the system in fact”, manifested most dramatically in periods of crisis. During a crisis, says Lukács, 
“the immediate continuity between two partial systems is disrupted and their independence from 
and adventitious connection with each other is suddenly forced into the consciousness of everyone” 
[HCC, p.101]. 
The structure of a crisis is not qualitatively different than the “daily life of bourgeois society”, claims 
Lukács, but is simply the pinnacle of its intensity [HCC, p.101]. The “sudden dislocation” during a 
crisis is possible because “the bonds uniting its various elements” are a “chance affair even at their 
most normal” [HCC, p.101]. Society’s regulation by “‘eternal, iron’ laws which branch off into the 
different special laws” is “a pretence” [HCC, p.101]. The “true structure of society” appears in the 
partial laws that can only be formally systematised, while their concrete realities “can only establish 
fortuitous connections” [HCC p.101]. In the economic sphere, this is seen in the structure of 
capitalist production, which “rests on the interaction between a necessity subject to strict laws in all 
isolated phenomena and the relative irrationality of the total process” [HCC, p.102]. 
With capitalist rationalisation based on “private economic calculation” all aspects of life display an 
interaction between details “subject to laws and a totality ruled by chance” [HCC, p.102]. The total 
process may be law-like, but the character of this “’law’” is to be an “‘unconscious’ product of the 
activity of the different commodity owners acting independently of one another” [HCC, p.102]. The 
capitalist division of labour fragments every organic social process and makes these “partial 
functions autonomous”, so they develop “in accordance with their own special laws independently 
of the other partial functions of society” [HCC, p.103]. Actors with increasingly tangible claims to 
status become the “living embodiments of such tendencies” [HCC, p.103].21 
Lukács traces the consequences of the basic phenomenon of reification into every sphere of the life 
of society. The structure of society which the process of rationalisation presupposes is “produced 
and reproduced” by this same process [HCC, p.102]. Lukács examines its tendency towards 
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 e.g. lawyers, military officials, civil servants, and academics 
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bureaucratisation, its relation to formalism, and the consequent divergence of form and content. By 
highlighting the specificity of the worker’s situation, Lukács seeks to transform Weber’s conception 
of ‘rationalisation’ and place it within a Marxist framework. Thus the fragmentation between subject 
and object, identified in the basic process, is now linked by Lukács to a structural propensity towards 
crisis, not only in the economic sphere, but in all aspects of society. 
iii) The Destruction of the Whole, the Problem of Formalism, and the Limits of Philosophy 
The “specialisation of skills” under capitalism increasingly destroys “every image of the whole”, but 
not the aspiration towards it [HCC, p.103]. Lukács investigates the basis of this fragmentation of 
consciousness in life and the relationship between them. If a hypothetical vantage point could be 
posited outside of reified consciousness, he suggests, it would become capable of comprehending 
the “activity of modern science” [HCC, p.104].22 This external standpoint could register the attempt 
of a particular science to eliminate the “ontological problems of its own sphere of influence” from 
the “realm where it has achieved some insight” [HCC, p.104]. This process intensifies, the more 
scientifically it becomes “a formally closed system of partial laws”, such that “its own concrete 
underlying reality lies, methodologically and in principle, beyond its grasp” [HCC, p.104]. 
The problem of formalism is manifested in political economy’s exclusion of “use-value” from its 
“sphere of investigation” [HCC, p.104].23 The problem can potentially be offset by analytical 
devices,24 but this only renders a “derivative” problem without negating the method’s formalism or 
the initial elimination of its underlying concrete material [HCC, p.104]. It is precisely the “formal 
abstraction of these ‘laws’” that “transforms economics into a closed partial system” [HCC, p.105]. 
Consequently bourgeois economics is incapable of penetrating “its own material substratum”, and 
thereby arriving at an “understanding of society in its totality” [HCC, p.105]. 
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 The fact that Lukács regards science as an activity seems to be closely linked with his understanding of 
knowledge as “practical critical activity” (Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p.262). 
23
 As Marx notes in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy – (quoted in Lukács, as above, p.104) 
24
 Such as the “‘Theory of Marginal Utility’”, which takes “‘subjective’ behaviour on the market” as its starting 
point (Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p.104) 
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From the attempt to characterise a class’s social character “together with its laws and needs” arises 
a close interaction between that “class and the scientific method” [HCC, p.105]. The “ultimate 
barrier” to bourgeois economic thought is the problem of crisis [HCC, p.105].25 Lukács identifies a 
material transformation underlying this “methodological barrier” to the bourgeois comprehension of 
crisis [HCC, p.105]. Rationalisation of the economy, its transformation “into an abstract and 
mathematically oriented system of formal ‘laws’”, gives rise to this barrier [HCC, p.105]. As a result, 
in moments of crisis, the qualitative existence of “neglected things-in-themselves, as use-values”, 
ordinarily leading “lives beyond the purview of economics”, assume decisive importance [HCC, 
p.105]. 
The bourgeoisie’s class situation and interests and their methodological approach to economics are, 
for Lukács, “merely aspects of the same dialectical unity” [HCC, p.105]. Despite attempts by 
bourgeois theory to understand the history of crises, there is a methodological inevitability to their 
“failure to comprehend use-value and real consumption”, and to explain “the true movement of 
economic activity in toto” [HCC, p.106].26 These failures cannot be ascribed to individuals, argues 
Lukács [HCC, p.107]. In The Accumulation of Capital (1913), Luxemburg identifies a historical 
tendency in political economy for the “synoptic view of economic life”, first expressed by François 
Quesnay,27 to progressively disappear as the “process of conceptualisation” develops more precisely 
in the hands of Adam Smith and then David Ricardo [HCC, p.107]. 
An equivalent tendency arises in jurisprudence, although with a “more conscious” reification [HCC, 
p.107]. Rather than a “rivalry between two principles within the same sphere”,28 there is in law from 
                                                          
25
 Lukács draws a distinction between “vulgar economics” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.30) and 
“classical economics” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.105), as sub-categories of “bourgeois 
economics in toto” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.105). He is here addressing the last of these, 
bourgeois economics as a whole. 
26
 Lukács cites the example of the economist Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky – (Tugan-Baranovsky, M I Studien zur 
Theorie und Geschichte der Handelskrisen in England (Jena: Fischer, 1901)) 
27
 Lukács refers to Quesnay’s Physiocratic system as “great if also often primitive, faulty and inexact” (Lukács 
History and Class Consciousness, p.107). Marx describes it as “the first systematic conception of capitalist 
production” – Marx, K Capital Vol. II (London: Penguin, 1992 [1978]), p.436. 
28
 i.e. between use-value and exchange value in economics 
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the outset a direct conflict of form and content, between its qualitative content and its rational 
grounding [HCC, p.107]. During the bourgeoisie’s revolutionary period it was assumed that the 
formal equality of the law was capable of generating its own content. After its partial victory, the 
bourgeoisie begins to form a “‘critical’” view of law whose content is “something purely factual” 
[HCC, p.108]. 
This extends the possibility of a “real advance in knowledge”, but as capitalism develops, the 
attempt to ground law in reason is systematically abandoned in favour of a “formal calculus” to 
judge the “legal consequences of particular actions” [HCC, p.108-109]. The origin of laws and their 
politico-economic content are withdrawn from view. Thus the real basis for the development of law, 
“a change in the power relations between the classes”, is obscured and disappears “into the sciences 
that study it” [HCC, p.109]. These sciences generate the same problems of “transcending their 
material substratum” as law and economics [HCC, p.109]. 
The ideal of a “comprehensive discipline” capable of gaining an “overall knowledge” by transcending 
the material substratum of special disciplines is hoped for in philosophy [HCC, p.109]. This universal 
project exposes the limits of bourgeois thought, debarred by its structure from revealing the 
reification underlying the problem of formalism. The results of the special sciences are given and 
necessary for philosophy, just as the special sciences find empirical reality as given. Modern 
bourgeois thought’s structure delimits itself from access to the “real essence and substratum”, in 
which the growth and decay of these forms can be understood [HCC, p.110]. 
The reified world is presented as “the only conceptually accessible, comprehensible world” [HCC, 
p.110]. Bourgeois philosophy is incapable of penetrating the material substratum at the basis of 
these fragmented disciplines. A radical philosophy cannot “concentrate on the concrete material 
totality” without presupposing an awareness of “the genesis and the necessity of this formalism” 
[HCC, p.109]. Neither would this philosophy be automatically transmitted to the fragmented 
disciplines, requiring an organic transformation that, unlike the contemplative mode of thought, is 
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inescapably tied to the transformation of the world in fact. Philosophy’s “episodic trends” to 
challenge the “mechanical existence hostile to life” and the “scientific formalism alien to it” are, 
argues Lukács, “to one side of the main philosophical tradition” [HCC, p.110].29  
In summary, Lukács analyses the destruction of every image of the whole in modern forms of 
bourgeois thought. He searches for this fragmentation’s basis in life, and its expression in the 
spheres of economics and law.30 Lukács’s insight into the revolutionary period of the bourgeoisie 
demonstrates his sensitivity to the configuration of bourgeois projects oriented towards synthesis. In 
philosophy, the most universal form of bourgeois thought, we find a sphere in which numerous 
totalising projects are mounted, but Lukács concludes that “a radical change in outlook is not 
feasible on the soil of bourgeois society” [HCC, p.109-10]. There are however, Lukács would argue, 
important methodological insights into the problem of subjectivity to be gained from these failed 
attempts at synthesis by bourgeois thinkers, as I will examine in the following section. 
b) The Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought 
Lukács warns of the inevitable failure of bourgeois thought to overcome reification. Nevertheless he 
examines the most illuminating attempts of the bourgeoisie to do just that. This serves a dual 
purpose. Firstly it demonstrates the fundamental incapacity of the bourgeoisie to grasp the 
“antinomies of bourgeois thought” [HCC, p.110]. Secondly it allows Lukács to trace the development 
of the dialectical method, in the hands of the bourgeoisie, albeit in a negative and opaque form. 
The history of bourgeois philosophy is a trove of attempts by the bourgeoisie to take “the 
antinomies of its life-basis” and drive them towards their “highest possible intellectual expression” 
[HCC, p.148].31 Lukács is concerned in particular with two problems: the problem of totality and the 
problem of formalism. The former questions the capacity of man to know reality as a whole, 
                                                          
29
 e.g. the revolt of irrationalist philosophy does nothing to “modify the situation as it is in fact” (Lukács History 
and Class Consciousness, p.110). 
30
 The phenomenon of reification is manifested in a more conscious form in the sphere of law in which the 
problem of formalism is present from the start. 
31
 e.g. the schisms between subject and object, form and content, freedom and determinism, universal and 
particular, abstract and concrete, etc. 
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whereas the latter is concerned with whether content can be deduced from form, or whether 
content is given to form externally. 
Classical philosophy, according to Lukács, poses itself the task of locating a philosophy that would 
spell the “end of bourgeois society” [HCC, p.148]. Its failure, he argues, is a process that creates “a 
complete intellectual copy…of bourgeois society” [HCC, p.148]. However the “manner of this 
deduction”, the dialectical method, points beyond bourgeois society [HCC, p.148]. To understand the 
negative process by which Lukács’s attempts to isolate an authentic dialectical method and its 
importance for his own conception of subjectivity, I will examine his reconstruction of bourgeois 
attempts to overcome the antinomies of their thought.  
i) Kant and the ‘Copernican Revolution’: the Cognitive Subject 
Lukács seeks to demonstrate that the distinction between modern critical philosophy and previous 
philosophies has its historical “basis in existence” in the reified structure of consciousness [HCC, 
p.112]. Modern philosophy finds it self-evident that human reason should conceive of formal 
systems as “constitutive of its own essence” [HCC, p.112]. This results in a conflation of formal 
rational knowledge with knowledge in general [HCC, p.112]. Immanuel Kant’s radical contribution to 
bourgeois thought was his formulation of the knowing subject that conceives “rational knowledge as 
the product of mind” [HCC, p.111]. This project to construct a universal rational system, and attain 
rational knowledge, gives rise to the problem of irrationality. Kant proposed the concept of the 
thing-in-itself to theorise this fundamental barrier to human knowledge. Despite the “disparate 
functions” it is contended to play in Kant’s philosophy, Lukács argues there is a unified explanation 
for its various effects [HCC, p.114]. 
The thing-in-itself unites two “two great, seemingly unconnected and even opposed complexes” 
[HCC, p.115]. The first relates to the content of forms by which we know the world “because we 
have created it ourselves” [HCC, p.115]. The second is the problematic of the “‘ultimate’ objects of 
knowledge” needed to transform a partial system into a complete totality [HCC, p.115]. In the 
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Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that the second group of problems are non-scientific questions 
“falsely put”, which cannot be solved [HCC, p.115]. Kant therefore distinguishes between 
“phenomena” and “noumena”, and rejects efforts by “‘our’” reason to comprehend the latter [HCC, 
p.115]. 
Despite Kant’s efforts, the thing-in-itself recurs in many forms in bourgeois thought as “mythological 
expressions to denote the unified subject” or “the unified object of the totality of the objects of 
knowledge” [HCC, p.115]. These two complexes of problems, the problem of content and the 
problem of comprehending the totality, are presented as if disconnected. For Kant, pure reason 
cannot synthesise or define an object, so “its principles cannot be deduced ‘directly from concepts 
but only indirectly by relating these concepts to something wholly contingent, namely possible 
experience’” [HCC, p.116]. Thus, for Lukács, the thing-in-itself’s “distinct delimiting functions” are 
two aspects of a single problem [HCC, p. 116]. 
Once the question of producing the system as a whole is “consciously posed, it is seen that such a 
demand is incapable of fulfilment” [HCC, p.117]. A system based on the principles of rationalism 
must necessarily be a “co-ordination, or rather a supra- and subordination of the various partial 
systems of forms” [HCC, p.117]. Relations between these partial systems appear to arise from the 
logic constructing their constituent forms. Contents that could not be derived from this vision of 
systematisation present a problem. Lukács contrasts the Spinozist approach, which “dismisses every 
donné as non-existent”, with classical German philosophy which stoically retained the “irrational 
character of the actual contents” whilst attempting to transcend this philosophical impasse and 
construct a rational system [HCC, p117].  
Impossible as their aspirations proved, the classical philosophers laid “the foundations of the 
dialectical method” by driving their systems in the “direction of a dynamic relativisation of these 
antitheses” [HCC, p.118]. They attempted to habilitate the “given” irrational content into their 
systems, by resolving every “actuality” into a “necessity” [HCC, p.118]. For Lukács, this method 
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presupposes the irrational in its concept, and by extension the possibility of this resolution. Johann 
Fichte formulated this gap between the “creation” of content in “the material basis of existence” 
and the “constructed world” as the dark void between the projection and the thing projected [HCC, 
p.119]. 
For Lukács, the recognition of this problem represents the end of “the age in which the bourgeois 
class naïvely equated its own forms of thought … with reality and with existence as such” [HCC, 
p.119]. Conscious of this impasse, bourgeois philosophy increasingly abandons the attempt to 
understand systems as a totality and consequently penetrate their material basis, in preference of 
demarcating the limits of specialised partial system with a methodically pure world of rational 
categories. This contemplative philosophy which investigates the “formal presuppositions” of 
autonomous special sciences is unable to pose the problematic on which it stands [HCC, p.120]. 
With the bourgeoisie’s increasing control over the specifics of social existence, its ability to 
comprehend society as a totality diminishes. Classical German philosophy raises this “double 
tendency” of bourgeois society to consciousness, but is limited to doing so at the level of philosophy 
[HCC, p.121]. This, Lukács argues, prevents a concrete analysis of the problems necessary in order to 
present a concrete solution. However, it allows the “paradoxes” of this “historical stage in mankind’s 
development” to be seen as a problem in need of solution [HCC, p.121]. 
ii) Fichte and the Primacy of Practical Reason 
Classical philosophy’s attack on the dogmatism of the feudal worldview, claims Lukács, was equally 
dogmatic in its own premises: “the rational and formalistic mode of cognition” [HCC, p.121]. 
Confronted by the problem of the thing-in-itself, the classical philosophers turned “inwards” in 
search of a subject untroubled by a “hiatus irrationalis” [HCC, p.122]. This dogmatism blocked the 
only element capable of transcending the limitations of contemplative thought, “the practical” [HCC, 
p.122]. But, I would argue that tools can be found in these philosophical experiments that are later 
taken up and transformed by Lukács in the construction of his own theory of subjectivity. 
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Although Kant recognised the potential of practical solutions to the barriers of contemplative 
thought, it was Fichte who developed this idea most radically. Fichte’s project takes “the subject of 
knowledge, the ego-principle” as its starting point [HCC, p.122]. It proposes “activity” as the unity of 
an “identical subject-object”, from which the totality of content can be generated and a “positing of 
the objects” achieved [HCC, pp.122-123]. But the concrete exposition of the subject of this “action”, 
argues Lukács, simply recreates the problems of classical German philosophy “on a philosophically 
higher plane” [HCC, p.123]. 
Kant’s ethics “becomes purely formal and lacking in content”, but must appropriate the contingency 
of the “world of phenomena” in order to become concrete [HCC, p.124-125]. It negatively attempts 
to create concrete content, by means of the principle of non-contradiction.32 But it is impossible, as 
Hegel notes, to root out the self-contradictions of an immediate form without involving other 
necessary facts. Thus Kant’s attempt to use the realm of practical reason to rehabilitate concepts 
“destroyed by the transcendental dialectic” returns to the problem of the thing-in-itself by another 
route [HCC, p.125].33 
To resolve the problem of the thing-in-itself, suggests Lukács, would require the development of a 
principle of praxis that can annul the “indifference of form towards content” by relating to the 
concrete material substratum of action [HCC, p.126]. This praxis, qualitatively distinct from the 
“theoretical, contemplative and intuitive attitude”, allows the resolution of “the antinomies of 
contemplation” and their connection to praxis within a new framework [HCC, p.126]. 
Kant shows the “limits of abstract contemplation”, and in a “negative and distorted form” the path 
towards the true structure of praxis by raising “the dialectics of concept in movement as the only 
alternative to his own theory of the structure of concepts” [HCC, p.127]. Hegel’s critique of Kant 
demonstrates a methodological path beyond purely formal thought that incorporates gradations of 
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 This is the principle that “every action contravening ethical norms contains a self-contradiction” (Lukács 
History and Class Consciousness, p.125). 
33
 This argues Lukács, is the same “methodological problem of the thing-in-itself” as found in the “objective 
and contemplative analysis in the Critique of Pure Reason” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.125). 
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reality. It is Marx however who bases this conception in “historical reality and concrete praxis”, by 
developing a method that operates with “concepts of existence graduated according to the various 
levels of praxis” [HCC, p.127-128]. 
As the formal attitude is progressively raised to consciousness, the formal set of laws it develops 
operates with ever less recourse to its passive subject. The attempt by contemplative thought to 
expunge “every subjective and irrational element and every anthropomorphic tendency” appears to 
contradict the notion of contemplation concerned with the knowledge “of what ‘we’ have created” 
[HCC, p.128]. This contradiction, which Marx formulates in the fetish character of commodities,34 
reflects the antagonisms prevailing in modern society. Whilst modern society destroys “‘natural’” 
and irrational forms of relations, a “second nature” is continually renewed with a similar sense of 
“inexorable necessity” that pervaded previous epochs [HCC, p.128]. Lukács traces the consequences 
of this conception for the problem of knowledge. 
First, there is a qualitative difference between the irrational limitations confronting man in previous 
epochs and the limitations of an aggregate of specialised systems. In this rational structure, argues 
Lukács, the stark contradictions of modern society are expressed:  what is understood by “‘control’” 
becomes increasingly passive [HCC, p.129]. Creating space for the “free” action of the subject 
transforms that subject further into a “receptive organ” that adopts a vantage point appropriate to 
its own “best interests” [HCC, p.129-130]. 
Second, Lukács analyses the “assimilation of all human relations to the level of natural laws so 
conceived” [HCC, p.130]. The immediate presentation of the ideological forms of modern society 
makes this outlook appear as a natural consequence of the methodology of the natural sciences. It is 
in fact, argues Lukács, specifically bourgeois in character. By assuming the laws of nature as an 
“abstract substrata”, human relations are reduced to objective forms and the modern subject 
“assumes increasingly the attitude of the pure observer of these” [HCC, p.131].  
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Third, Kant and subsequently Fichte’s turn to the practical is thwarted by the “empty freedom” of 
the subject created, which is unable to penetrate its material substratum, and the consequent re-
emergence of the problem of irrationality [HCC, p.133]. These attempts merely fix bourgeois 
antinomies as “unalterable foundations of human existence” [HCC, p.134]. Their methodological 
advance however is to have “indicated the point where the real synthesis should begin”, and 
therefore to have clarified the relationship between contemplation and the practical such that its 
contradictions are held and extended in thought [HCC, p.134]. It is now possible to explore the turn 
taken by bourgeois philosophy towards the aesthetic and the creation of a concrete totality in 
search of a method of real, concrete synthesis. 
iii) Schiller and Aesthetic Totality 
Bourgeois materialism is faced with the antinomy that “man appears as the product of his social 
milieu”, and yet this “social milieu” is produced by man [HCC, p.134]. The “true basis” of this 
antinomy, says Lukács, is understood more clearly in its naïve formulation, “closer to its social 
background” [HCC, p.134]. First, he argues that with the development of bourgeois society, social 
problems “cease to transcend man and appear as the products of human activity” [HCC, p.135]. 
Second, Lukács claims that the man created from this bourgeois society is the “individual, egoistic 
bourgeois isolated artificially” [HCC, p.135]. And thirdly, that this results in a “social action” which is 
stripped of its “character as action” [HCC, p.135]. The intricate “problem-complexes”35 that arise 
from this situation are decisive for “the way in which bourgeois man understands himself in his 
relation to the world” [HCC, p.136].  
Lukács studies the historical development of the meaning of the term “‘nature’” [HCC, p.136]. In its 
initial form deriving from “Kepler and Galileo”, but expressed at its highest level in Kant, nature is 
conceived as the “aggregate of systems of the laws” regulating reality, in accord with the “economic 
structures of capitalist society” [HCC, p.136]. Lukács argues that the “revolutionary struggle of the 
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bourgeoisie” plays a significant role in making bourgeois society appear “natural” in comparison to 
“the artifice, the caprice and the disorder of feudalism and absolutism” [HCC, p.136]. 
A different “value concept” of nature develops alongside this meaning [HCC, p.136]. Nature, in 
contrast to the “artificial structures of human civilisation”, becomes something specifically not 
created by man [HCC, p136]. This can be found in Rousseau’s conception of social institutions which 
“strip man of his human essence” [HCC, p.136]. The result is that “the more culture and civilisation 
(i.e. capitalism and reification) take possession of him, the less able he is to be a human being” [HCC, 
p.136]. In this understanding is a “repository of all these inner tendencies opposing the growth of 
mechanisation, dehumanisation and reification” [HCC, p.136].  
Nature as “that not created by man”, claims Lukács, provides the basis of a third meaning, a 
negation of the original definition [HCC, p.136]. For Friedrich Schiller, there is an “aspect of human 
inwardness” which has remained natural, or with the desire to return to a natural state [HCC, p.136]. 
This meaning of nature is that as “authentic humanity”, as an “ideal” and a “tendency” to transcend 
reification and to reclaim “the true essence of man” [HCC, p.136]. 
This “attitude” to the impasse of bourgeois thought, suggests Lukács, possesses “a very real and 
concrete field of activity”, “namely art” [HCC, p.137]. Here, artistic achievement is the struggle to 
conceive the genesis of a concrete totality, whose form takes its orientation from the content of its 
material substratum. The historical connection of the principle of art with conceptions of nature 
made it appear suited to resolve both the antinomies of “contemplative theory and ethical practice” 
[HCC, p.138]. This principle is not able however, of its own accord, to overcome the antinomies of 
bourgeois thought. 
Artistic achievement offers the possibility of “anchoring” the transcendental postulate in the human 
consciousness [HCC, p.138]. This principle, in conjunction with the task of locating the “subject of 
‘action’”, results in the problem of “intuitive understanding”, whose content is “created” rather than 
given [HCC, p.138]. Such an understanding might, in the view of Kant, “indicate the point from which 
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it would be possible to complete and perfect the system” [HCC, p.138]. In those who followed Kant, 
this became a dogmatic foundation of their systematic philosophy. 
Schiller’s elevation of his aesthetic principle, that man is “fully human only when he plays”, to a 
position of universality, attempts to make the “socially destroyed” man “whole again in thought” 
[HCC, p.139]. Whilst this project necessarily fails within the given framework, Lukács argues that its 
achievement lies in the fact that “the problematic nature of social life for capitalist man becomes 
fully conscious” [HCC, p.139]. The aesthetic mode gives many “valuable insights into the question of 
reification”, but only at the cost of the aestheticisation of the whole world. 
The philosophical “discovery of art”, argues Lukács, makes it possible “either to provide yet another 
domain for the fragmented subject”, or to “tackle the problem of ‘creation’ from the side of the 
subject” [HCC, p.140]. Philosophy is no longer charged with creating a Spinozan “objective system on 
the model of geometry” [HCC, p.140]. Its task is to deduce the unity of this disintegrating creation 
and, in the “final analysis”, to “create the subject of the ‘creator’” [HCC, p.140]. 
iv) Hegel and History 
By moving beyond “pure epistemology”, philosophy’s project is no longer to investigate the 
“‘possible conditions’” of given forms of thought and action, but an expression of the desire to 
transcend the reified fragmentation of the subject and its correspondingly rigid and impenetrable 
objects [HCC, p.140]. The formulation of this aspiration, expressed by Goethe, for words and deeds 
to overcome the isolation and the fragmentation of humanity necessarily exposes, says Lukács, the 
“different meanings assumed by the subjective ‘we’” [HCC, p.141]. 
In order to reconstitute the “unity of the subject”, claims Lukács, the “intellectual restoration of 
man” must necessarily take a path through “the realm of fragmentation and disintegration” [HCC, 
p.141]. Lukács describes the different forms of fragmentation as “necessary phases” on this path 
[HCC, p.141]. The historical development of these antitheses with the advancement of culture, in the 
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words of Hegel, leads to the expression of their most general form between “absolute subjectivity 
and absolute objectivity” [HCC, p.141]. 
Hegel contention that the most intense totality is “only possible as a new synthesis out of the most 
absolute separation” focuses these issues on the question of dialectical method [HCC, p.141]. His 
method calls “objectively and scientifically” for an intuitive understanding to advance beyond the 
limits of the rationalistic principle of knowledge. This is the only means by which to address the 
problem of the irrationality of the thing-in-itself, and the problem of genesis, “the creation of the 
creator of knowledge” [HCC, p.141]. 
Prior to Hegel, users of the dialectic failed to link the dissolution of rigid concepts concretely to the 
logic of content, to the problem of irrationality [HCC, p.142]. It was Hegel, who first consciously 
reworked each problem of logic in the “the qualitative material nature” of its content, in its 
underlying matter in the “logical and philosophical sense” [HCC, p.142]. Hence he was able, albeit 
problematically, to establish “a completely new logic of the concrete concept, the logic of totality” 
[HCC, p.142]. Hegel’s dialectical process is not simply the objective relativisation of concepts or the 
subjective manipulation of “mental possibilities” [HCC, p.142]. It engulfs both subject and object 
such that the subject is both “producer and product” of the process on which the world imposes 
itself with “full objectivity” [HCC, p.142]. 
In Spinoza, the basis of a relationship of identity between the order in the “realm of ideas” and in 
the “realm of things”, is located in the object, the substance [HCC, p.143]. Every subjectivity 
disappears before the “rigid purity and unity of this substance” [HCC, p.143]. However with Hegel, 
“objectivity tends in every respect in the opposite direction” [HCC, p.143]. Hegel identifies the 
substance, in which the “underlying order” of reality and the “connections between things” can be 
found, as history [HCC, p.143]. It is only in the process of history, argues Lukács, in the 
“uninterrupted outpouring” of the qualitatively new that a “paradigmatic order can be found in the 
realm of things” [HCC, p.144]. 
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The orientation of the historical process towards content and the qualitatively unique in the 
concrete totality, Lukács claims, reveals the potential for genuine knowledge.  It allows the “two 
main strands” of transcendence, the problem of the irrationality of the thing-in-itself and the 
problem of the concreteness of the individual content and of totality, to “appear as a unity” [HCC, 
p.145]. Reality can be seen as a historical process created by us, as our “action”, by overcoming the 
dogmatism of the formal, rational system [HCC, p.145]. However, to comprehend the unity of 
subject and object through which this position may be achieved the problem of exhibiting the “‘we 
which is the subject of history” re-emerges in a more concrete form [HCC, p.145]. 
Hegel, most advanced amongst the classical philosophers, proposed the World Spirit as this subject 
[HCC, p.146]. He tried to explain the nature of history by means of “the ruse of reason” [HCC, p.146]. 
But in going beyond history to a point where reason discovers itself in the totality of the “‘absolute 
spirit’”, the identical subject-object is diverted into mythology [HCC, p.147]. For Lukács, since history 
is the “uniquely possible life-element of the dialectical method”, it is the “living body of the total 
system”, and not simply an aspect of that totality [HCC, p.147]. History either permeates all parts of 
Hegel’s system, or is denied the essence ascribed to it in his method. 
First, if the relation between reason and history is contingent, an “irrational dependence on the 
‘given’” re-emerges, and the problem of the thing-in-itself [HCC, p.147]. Second, Hegel’s contention 
that “history has an end” in his own system of philosophy, seems to contradict his own historical 
method, and arises from the ambiguous relationship between history and absolute spirit in his 
system [HCC, p.147]. And thirdly, the supra-historical process of genesis that Hegel has been forced 
to create, due to the limitations of classical philosophy, is confronted by the “historicity of all 
categories and their movements” and, given the objective unity of dialectical genesis and history, 
itself becomes historical at all points [HCC, p.147-148]. Thus if Hegel’s method degenerates and does 
“violence to history”, then “history will gain its revenge” by fragmenting the method [HCC, p.148]. 
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Marx recognised the contradictions in Hegel’s system and criticised the “demiurgic role of the ‘spirit’ 
and the ‘idea’” [HCC, p.148]. Whilst Lukács claims that this demiurge only appears to make history in 
Hegel’s philosophy, even this appearance is enough to “dissipate wholly the attempt to break out of 
the limits imposed on formal and rationalistic (bourgeois, reified) thought” [HCC, p.148]. For despite 
giving the antinomies of its “life-basis” the “highest possible intellectual expression”, classical 
philosophy is unable “to find a philosophy that would mean the end of bourgeois society” [HCC, 
p.148]. Classical philosophy, according to Lukács, points beyond its own limits to the dialectical 
method [HCC, p.148]. This method can only be developed by a class that is able “on the basis of its 
life-experience” to become the “identical subject-object, the subject of action; the ‘we’ of the 
genesis”, namely the proletariat [HCC, p.149]. 
c) The Consciousness of the Proletariat  
Lukács argues that Hegel’s philosophy does not live up to its own aspirations. The limitation of the 
dialectical method on the plane of classical philosophy, from the bourgeois standpoint, results in a 
bifurcation of history and genesis. From the standpoint of the proletariat, the dialectical method 
undergoes a metamorphosis. For Lukács, the proletariat is not only the solution to a philosophical 
problem, but also the empirical class with the potential life-experience to penetrate reification. I will 
examine later the consequences of this structural separation for Lukács’s argument.36 In the 
following section he examines the standpoint of the proletariat, and lays out his conception of the 
philosophy of praxis: the relation between mediation and immediacy, the notion of universal history 
and structural forms, myths of the individual and the absolute, the historical development of 
humanism, and how the proletariat can gain true historical knowledge. 
In the Introduction to his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx announces the “special 
position” that he attributes to the “proletariat in society and in history” [HCC, p.149].37 It is from this 
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standpoint, says Lukács, that the proletariat can “function as the identical subject-object of the 
social and historical processes of evolution” [HCC, p.149]. According to Lukács, proletarian self-
understanding coincides with the objective understanding of the nature of society. Through its 
“conscious intervention” to achieve its own class aims, the proletariat realises the objective aims of 
society, which otherwise remain “abstract possibilities and objective frontiers” [HCC, p.149]. 
But, Lukács asks whether adopting this standpoint causes any change since the forms of existence in 
which the proletariat appears are “repositories of reification” in its “acutest and direst form”, and 
result in “the most extreme dehumanisation” [HCC, p.149]. Lukács argues, following Marx, that all 
classes “represent the same human self-alienation” in capitalist society, although the process is 
different for each [HCC, p.149].38 The bourgeoisie are confirmed in their “self-alienation” and it gives 
a “semblance of human existence” to their reified lives [HCC, p.149]. On the other hand, the 
proletariat experiences its own powerlessness in the process of “alienation” and the “reality of an 
inhuman existence” [HCC, p.149]. 
i) Universal History, Mediation and Structural Forms 
Although there is a “grain of truth” in the insight that bourgeoisie and proletariat access the same 
immediate “objective reality of social existence”, for Lukács, this immediate existence only becomes 
an “authentically objective reality” through a process of social mediation that is fundamentally 
different for each class [HCC, p.150]. The “specific categories of mediation” that raise immediacy to 
the “level of consciousness” are different due to the position of each class in the “‘same’ economic 
process” [HCC, p.150]. The consequence of the view that holds mediation to be a merely subjective 
evaluation of reality is a standpoint in which “objective reality has the character of a thing-in-itself” 
[HCC, p.150]. 
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This view, expressed by the Neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert, uses the concept of “cultural 
values” to isolate the subjectivity of the historian in order to create “a mode of historical narrative 
that is valid for all” [HCC, p.151]. Cultural values become the benchmark of objectivity, but their 
class-nature may not be questioned within the given framework. This process transfers subjectivity 
to these “cultural values”, which represent a new, impenetrable thing-in-itself [HCC, p.151]. 
The pursuit of a theory of value in the philosophy of history reveals the problem of the relation 
between form and content, as well as the question of totality. Rickert contends that a universal 
history is possible only within a value-based system, whilst objective knowledge of individual 
historical events is available on a “purely empirical” basis [HCC, p.151]. Lukács argues that 
attempting to explain the ‘facts’ of history in isolation from a universal history eventually makes 
even the comprehension of individual historical events impossible [HCC, p.151]. 
Universal history can be understood neither as a “mechanical aggregate” of events nor as a 
“transcendental heuristic principle” opposed to these events [HCC, p.152]. The “totality of history”, 
says Lukács, is a “real historical power” yet to become conscious, and which is inseparable from the 
historical facts of which it is the “ultimate ground” [HCC, p.152]. From this perspective individual 
facts maintain their validity only in relation to the totality of history, and yet this power cannot 
“annul” their “factual existence” [HCC, p.152]. To treat the phenomena of history in isolation is to 
disfigure their actual content.39 
According to Lukács, the essence of history lies in changing “structural forms”, which are the “focal 
points” between man and environment [HCC, p.153].40 These forms can be comprehended only 
when the “the uniqueness of an epoch” is grounded in and exhibited through them [HCC, p.153]. 
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The immediate standpoint cannot grasp these forms and it must be transcended in an increasingly 
concrete manner in order to comprehend the totality of the historical process. 
The formal mode of thought is methodologically limited from progressing permanently beyond the 
contingent collection of factual material. Its knowledge is haphazardly connected to the underlying 
historical reality and is unable to transcend its state of immediacy, even if it becomes aware of this 
fact. In Lukács’s Marxism, the immediate is placed in a dialectical relation to the mediations 
necessary for the exhibition of the object. The forms of mediation, he argues, “can be shown to be 
the structural principles and the real tendencies of the objects themselves” [HCC, p.155].41 
Thus, intellectual genesis and historical genesis must be “identical in principle” [HCC, p.155]. Their 
fragmentation in the development of bourgeois thought is produced by an equally fragmented 
reality whereby content-less formal laws are set against the irrational contingency of given facts. 
This fragmented form is a prerequisite for the “critical” appreciation of its structure, but alone the 
latter fails to facilitate a true genesis of the object, “the thinking subject”, and inevitably returns to a 
state of immediacy [HCC, p.155]. 
Lukács argues that a dialectical relationship between immediacy and mediation is necessary in order 
to ground bourgeois thought in its basis in socio-historical reality. In Capital, Marx demonstrates 
bourgeois thought’s “systematic avoidance of the categories of mediation” in the realm of 
economics [HCC, p.156]. The antinomies of bourgeois thought demonstrate, in the final analysis, the 
unmediated character of its relationship with reality. 
The permanent division of the “material content of life” from, what Georg Simmel calls, “the non-
reifiable remnant” takes on the appearance of an immutable set of laws or values [HCC, p.157]. 
Bourgeois thought abandons the understanding of the present “as a historical problem” [HCC, 
p.157]. Even in historical form, it cannot traverse the rift between the subject and object of 
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knowledge. This “pernicious chasm” can only be transcended by adopting a truly historical method 
that comprehends the qualitatively new in the present. 
ii) The Historical Knowledge of the Proletariat: Self-Knowledge and Genesis 
For Lukács, the historical knowledge of the proletariat originates in its recognition of its own position 
within society, of its genesis and necessity. History and genesis are different aspects of the dialectical 
process, but their unity requires the fulfilment of two conditions. First, the categories of human 
existence must be determinants of that existence and not simply descriptive. Second, the internal 
structure of these categories must be seen as an organic part of the historical process, neither a 
collection of contingent forms nor an isolated and abstract logic. 
As Marx notes in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, the logical succession of these 
categories appears to be an inversion of their historical development [HCC, p.159]. In order to 
understand the objectivity of this social creation, the question of the economic structure of society 
must be confronted.42 A “real, profane history of men” neither accepts empirical reality as given, nor 
rejects it subjectively. A utopian “‘ought’” presupposes a reality rigidly separate in its objectivity. To 
escape this contradiction, bourgeois thought assumes the device of an infinite progression, which 
Hegel critiques as two united but antithetical relative determinants each staking their independence 
[HCC, p.161]. 
The dichotomy of ‘ought’ and ‘is’, a new form of the problem of the thing-in-itself, places two 
qualitatively incommensurable aspects in a quantitative relationship. The “authentic theme of 
history”, growth and decay, becomes incomprehensible in bourgeois thought [HCC, p.162]. 
Qualitative change is masked and reduced to a gradual quantitative transition, meaning that history 
can only be comprehended as a series of catastrophic interruptions. 
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In transcending the rationalist reflections of empirical reality there is a danger of abandoning 
immanent reality altogether [HCC, p.162]. The empirical existence of the objects of reality only 
appears unmediated through their artificial isolation. The proletariat’s transcendence of this 
unmediated viewpoint does not require a “tabula rasa”, but takes “bourgeois society together with 
its intellectual and artistic productions” as its “point of departure” for a qualitatively new method 
capable of comprehensively transforming the whole of society [HCC, p.163].43 
The methodological function of the categories of mediation is to make the “immanent meanings” of 
the objects of bourgeois society “objectively effective” and capable of being made conscious by the 
proletariat [HCC, p.163]. Bourgeois and proletarian methodologies are distinguished, not simply 
theoretically, but as an expression of their different class existence. The unmediated nature of 
bourgeois thought reflects the immediate form in which it is presented with the objects of reality. 
Thus, Lukács claims that knowledge “yielded by the standpoint of the proletariat stands on a higher 
scientific plane objectively” [HCC, p.163]. 
The proletarian method makes possible an “adequate historical analysis of capitalism” [HCC, p.164]. 
However, the ‘one-sidedness’ of the bourgeois view of history is a necessary part of the 
development of knowledge about society [HCC, p.164]. The problem of immediacy is an outward 
barrier for the bourgeoisie, but it confronts the proletariat inwardly. Since the dialectical method 
reproduces “its own essential aspects”, the proletariat is repeatedly confronted by the problem of its 
“point of departure” [HCC, p.164].44 The proletariat’s potential resolution of the problem does not 
alter immediate reality for either class, but it is driven beyond immediacy by the “motor of class 
interests” [HCC, p.164]. 
The bourgeoisie’s “abstract categories of reflection”, Lukács argues, “conceal the dialectical 
structure of the historical process in daily life”, but occasionally confront them with “unmediated 
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catastrophes” [HCC, p.164-165]. The bourgeoisie give a “double form” to the subject and object of 
the historical process [HCC, p.165]. The individual is conceived as a perceiving subject set against a 
system of objective necessities, whereas the “conscious activity of the individual” lies on the “object-
side of the process” [HCC, p.165]. The consciousness of the collective subject, the class, is disrupted, 
and its activity beyond the consciousness of the “apparent” individual subject [HCC, p.165]. This 
method’s rigidity is broken at moments of crisis, but is quickly replaced by another equally rigid 
form. 
Social reality does not exist in in this “double form” for the proletariat since it is made aware of its 
existence as the “pure object of societal events” [HCC, p.165].  Every worker is confronted with the 
knowledge that fulfilling their basic needs is merely an aspect in the process of reproducing capital. 
The process of abstraction in the worker’s life separates them from their commodified labour-
power. Its sale must be integrated into a rationalised and mechanical process. The capitalist’s 
personality is fragmented and reified, but appears as the subject of an activity which masks this. The 
worker is “denied the scope for such illusory activity” [HCC, p.166]. The quantitative determinants of 
the capitalist’s calculations appear transformed into the qualitative categories of the worker’s life 
making the penetration of these contemplative “categories of reflection” possible [HCC, p.166]. 
The quantification of labour-time, claims Lukács, is a “reified and reifying cloak” that obscures the 
“true essence” of the object [HCC, p.166]. For the worker, labour-time is not only the objective form 
of the commodity sold, “labour-power”, but also the “determining form” of the worker’s existence 
“as subject, as human being” [HCC, p.167]. The worker’s social existence forces it “wholly on the side 
of the object”; it divides their commodified labour-power from their personality [HCC, p.167]. If the 
object is raised above a relation of pure immediacy, the situation may be raised to consciousness 
through this separation between subjectivity and objectivity. Whereas the organic character of work 
historically prevented slaves and serfs achieving clarity of their social position, under capitalist 
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production work becomes “social by assuming the form of its immediate antithesis, the form of 
abstract universality” [HCC, p.168]. 
As the product of a “multiplicity of mediations”, a dialectical relationship is created between the 
social existence of the worker and the forms of their consciousness [HCC, p.168]. The creation of 
worker’s self-consciousness is the “self-consciousness of the commodity”; it modifies the relationship 
between consciousness and the object [HCC, p.168]. This is distinguished from a “‘thinking’ slave”, 
who is methodologically unable to become conscious of its own social situation [HCC, p.169]. The 
worker’s self-knowledge is practical; its forces “an objective structural change in the object of 
knowledge” [HCC, p.169]. 
Through this self-consciousness, the “qualitative living core” of use-value, the “special objective 
character of labour as a commodity”, is revealed from beneath the “cloak of the thing” [HCC, p.169]. 
Consciousness of the “commodity character of labour power” can reveal the fetish character of 
every commodity [HCC, p.169]. Prior to this consciousness “the special nature of labour” acts as the 
“unacknowledged driving wheel in the economic process” [HCC, p.169]. 
The dialectical method aims at, but does not immediately provide, the knowledge of society as a 
historical totality. It is distinguished from bourgeois thought and the categories of reflection by the 
fact that the whole can be comprehended within a correct grasp of each part [HCC, p.170]. Lukács 
holds that Marx’s chapter in Capital on the fetish character of commodities contains the whole of 
historical materialism.45 The aspect must be seen as “a point of transition to the totality”, in order 
that each new aspect should not ossify in a new immediacy [HCC, p.170]. For Lukács, the dialectical 
process is identical with the course of history.46   
The bourgeoisie and proletariat find the same immediately given situation, but the bourgeoisie, due 
to its class position, is trapped in this immediacy. The proletariat is forced beyond it “by the specific 
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dialectics of its class situation” [HCC, p.171]. Commodification subsumes and distorts the form of 
“every aspect of life” [HCC, p.171]. Whilst the bourgeoisie attempts to quantify qualitative 
developments within its rational calculations, for the proletariat they represent the potential to 
make the “social character of labour” increasingly conscious and concrete [HCC, p.171]. 
Whilst the “basic structure of reification” can be seen in all the “social forms of modern capitalism 
(e.g. bureaucracy)”, this structure can only be made “fully conscious in the work-situation of the 
proletarian” [HCC, p.171-172]. The proletariat experiences the “naked and abstract form of the 
commodity” in its work, whereas “other forms of work” disguise the commodity form “behind the 
façade of ‘mental labour’, of ‘responsibility’” [HCC, p.172]. These forms of work are mystified in 
proportion to the penetration of reification into “the soul of the man” [HCC, p.172]. 
Resistance against reification becomes increasingly difficult for those whose work commodifies their 
very deepest faculties. Class-consciousness is obscured by the “status-consciousness” and 
exaggerated belief in social mobility encouraged amongst intermediate groups [HCC, p.172]. The 
“most typical manifestation of reification”, the “constitutive type of capitalist socialisation”, argues 
Lukács, is “pure abstract negativity in the life of the worker” [HCC, p.172]. But this is also the focal 
point at which the structure of capitalist society can be subjectively made conscious and penetrated 
in practice. 
iii) A Standpoint beyond Immediacy: Proletarian Consciousness, Force and the Deed 
The emergence of proletarian consciousness is not the inevitable result of the development of 
capitalism. Although the “indispensable” preconditions for this process are the concentration of 
workers, the mechanisation of work, and the levelling down of living standards, this is only one side 
of the picture [HCC, p.173]. Whilst it is an unmediated fact that the labourer is a commodity, the 
potential for labourers to become aware of themselves as commodities does not solve the problem. 
The “unmediated consciousness” of the commodity is simply “an awareness of abstract isolation”, of 
an “abstract relationship – external to consciousness” [HCC, p.173]. Lukács argues that attributing 
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“an immediate form of existence to class-consciousness” results, even within a Hegelian framework, 
in a mythological species-consciousness rendering the relations between this encompassing power 
and the individual consciousness incomprehensible [HCC, p.173]. This leads to a mechanistic 
psychology and “finally a demiurge governing historical movement” [HCC, p.173]. 
Class consciousness “brought about through a common situation and common interests” is not 
unique to the working class [HCC, p.173-174]. Lukács contends that proletarian class consciousness is 
distinguished by its transcendence of immediacy, representing “an aspiration towards society in its 
totality” [HCC, p.174]. The “logic” of this consciousness is to elevate itself repeatedly and without 
pause beyond each new immediacy that arises from the previous transcendence. Marx recognises 
the “conscious and theoretical character” of the Silesian weavers’ revolt in their opposition to 
private property and attacks on their hidden enemy, the banker [HCC, p.174]. For Lukács, this aspect 
of their class consciousness throws “sharply into relief” the differences between the bourgeois and 
proletarian standpoints [HCC, p.174]. The unmediated character of the bourgeois standpoint is 
manifested in the “‘natural laws’ of society” [HCC, p.174]. The original representation of these laws, 
as the “principle of the overthrow of (feudal) reality”, is transformed over time (whilst maintaining 
the same structure) into the principle for “conserving (bourgeois) reality” [HCC, p.175]. 
For the proletariat, there is a practical interaction between the “awakening consciousness” and the 
object of this consciousness [HCC, p.175]. The objects are seen as “aspects of the development of 
society”, becoming part of the dialectical totality [HCC, p.175]. Since the “innermost kernel” of this 
movement is praxis, whose point of departure is action, the “immediate objects of action” undergo a 
“total, structural transformation” [HCC, p.175]. The category of totality ensures that actions limited 
to particular objects are “directed objectively towards a transformation of totality” [HCC, p.175]. 
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Lukács’s “essentially dialectical” conception of history means that the “way reality changes” can be 
observed in “every decisive moment” [HCC, p.175].47 
Capitalism’s historical specificity resides in its “abolition of all ‘natural barriers’” and transformation 
of relations between human beings into “purely social relations” [HCC, p.176]. The “abstract, rational 
categories of reflection” are the “objectively immediate expression” of this socialisation [HCC, 
p.176]. For the bourgeoisie, this socialisation takes an eternal appearance, as all human relations are 
reified under the categories of its thought.48 For the proletariat, the “transformation of labour into a 
commodity” results in the de-humanisation of its immediate existence and the destruction of every 
“organic” element of society [HCC, p.176]. In this “objectification”, Lukács says, “in the 
rationalisation and reification of all social forms”, it is possible to see “how society is constructed 
from the relations of men with each other” [HCC, p.176].49 The proletariat’s unique position at the 
“focal point” of this socialising process gives it the potential to glimpse these relations [HCC, p.176]. 
Human relations are mediated by “objective laws of the process of production” [HCC, p.177]. Several 
things follow from this. First, it is necessary to begin from reified relations and laws as they are 
immediately manifested in order to discover the human beings at their “core” [HCC, p.177]. Second, 
the social reality of these forms necessitates the practical abolition of the “actual forms of social life” 
[HCC, p.177]. A critique that fails the test of action will regress towards the reified forms of 
immediacy. Third, praxis must become conscious of the process “immanent in these forms” and the 
logic of its transcendence [HCC, p.177]. 
For Lukács, dialectics is not inserted artificially into history, rather it is “derived from history made 
conscious as its logical manifestation at this particular point in its development” [HCC, p.177]. 
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 It has therefore sometimes been possible, as with Shakespeare and Aeschylus, to trace the contours of 
changes in society through art long before it was possible, with the advent of historical materialism, to 
consciously “grasp their essence…and their place in the whole process” (Lukács History and Class 
Consciousness, p.176). 
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 Thus claims Lukács, “such thought trails behind objective developments” (Lukács History and Class 
Consciousness, p.176). 
49
 Here is an example, as I will discuss later, of Lukács’s conflation of the terms objectification and reification. 
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Fourth, the historical dialectic, as the contradictions of history become consciousness, finds its 
expression “‘in practice’” in the proletariat [HCC, p.178]. This dialectical necessity requires that 
proletarian consciousness becomes “deed” [HCC, p.178]. The act of becoming conscious, the self-
consciousness of an object, is inextricably intertwined with the objective transformation of the form 
of that object; it is a practical transition. 
The “eruption” of the irrational gap between the bourgeoisie’s specialised rational systems 
potentially dissolves its eternal “laws” into a dialectical form, but the outcome of this is ultimately 
decided through class struggle and the “conscious action of men” [HCC, p.178]. The “basic issue” of 
class struggle, says Lukács, is “the problem of force” [HCC, p.178]. The breach of immediacy has 
different implications for the contending classes. For the bourgeoisie it is “the continuation of its 
daily reality” [HCC, p.179]. The proletariat’s ability to exert force is dependent on the degree to 
which it has transcended the immediate standpoint. 
For Lukács, the revolutionary feature of the materialist dialectic is the dissolution of the immutability 
of individual objects into a process found concretely in the simple reproduction of capital. Seen as a 
continuous process, every capital is transformed into an accumulated capitalised surplus-value. This 
dissolution does not deny the significance of relations in their fetishised appearance. For bourgeois 
thought, relations appear as things torn from their basis. The proletariat has the potential to 
penetrate these appearances and comprehend the commodity relationship, and to emerge as the 
“subject of this process”, the self-consciousness of society [HCC, p.181]. 
iv) The Problem of Reality: Fact and Tendency 
Lukács ascribes a “higher reality” to “the developing tendencies of history” than to “empirical ‘facts’” 
[HCC, p.181]. There is an “antagonistic process” in capitalist society guided not by consciousness but 
by an immanent dynamic [HCC, p.181]. This process is immediately manifested in the rule of the past 
over the present, capital’s domination over labour. The bourgeoisie, he argues, is incapable of seeing 
beyond this reified reality, without announcing its own dissolution as a class. Only from the 
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standpoint of the proletariat can these reified forms be dissolved into processes “of which man is 
the driving force”, and the tendencies inherent in capitalism be made conscious [HCC, p.181]. 
The ‘laws’ of capitalism are implemented “over the heads” of those who appear as their “active 
embodiments and agents” [HCC, p.181]. The real class-nature of their calculated interests remains 
concealed to them. The strength of this “dialectical antagonism controlling the phenomena of 
capitalist society” is demonstrated by the fact that this process is not a “unique event, a 
catastrophe” [HCC, p.182]. Rather the reified structure of thought is produced and reproduced in the 
continuous movement of the relations of capitalist society. 
Lukács notes that the “conversion of social-democratic ideas into bourgeois ones” is marked by the 
abandonment of the dialectical method [HCC, p.182].50 The reduction of social tendencies to “ethical 
imperatives” and a reliance on the “facts” represents a failure to understand the real motor of 
history [HCC, p.182]. Dialectical trends advance not by an infinite series of quantitative changes, but 
are “expressed in terms of an unbroken qualitative revolution in the structure of society” [HCC, 
p.182]. The bourgeoisie’s increased control over “matters of detail” also increases the potency of 
tendencies beyond its control [HCC, p.183]. 
Lukács argues that the “basic thought” underlying Marx’s Capital is “the retranslation of economic 
objects from things back into processes, into the changing relations between men” [HCC, p.183]. The 
importance for theory of particular economic forms is determined, says Lukács, by their relative 
centrality to this process of “retranslation” [HCC, p.183]. In this way certain forms of capital assume 
primacy over other derivative forms.51 The historical role of derivative forms is limited to a “negative 
function” of dissolving the “original forms of production”, the ultimate development of which is 
rather determined by the constitution of the old mode itself [HCC, p.183]. 
                                                          
50
 Here Lukács has in mind the ideas of the “opportunists” in the Second International, as theorised by Eduard 
Bernstein (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.182). 
51
 e.g. industrial capital over merchant or finance capital 
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At the same time, from a theoretical perspective, the only “empirical laws” that appear to govern 
these forms are not “the expression of any universal social trend”, but those “enforced by 
competition” [HCC, p.183]. The true character of the “facts” and “empirical laws” can be exhibited in 
a “authentic, concrete and scientific” manner, if they are investigated in the context of the prevailing 
tendencies in society, as dependent on the “concrete totality to which they belong and in which they 
become ‘real’” [HCC, p.183-184]. 
Capitalist society simultaneously develops man’s capacity to control nature, whilst creating an 
intellectual division between “facts” and processes [HCC, p.184]. ‘Facts’ represent the purest form of 
the ossification characterising capitalist development, more than “empirical laws”, which maintain a 
semblance of “false subjectivity” [HCC, p.184]. The tendencies of history appear as subjectively-
constructed values in relation to ‘facts’, which form the basis of bourgeois thought [HCC, p.184]. The 
theoretical dominance of this outlook can only be broken if the true nature of the ‘facts’, as aspects 
artificially torn from the “authentic, higher reality” of a dialectical process, is revealed, [HCC, 
p.184].52 
Bourgeois thought is unable to solve the contingent and incomprehensible existence of immediate 
reality. At its “ultimate extreme” reification “no longer points dialectically to anything beyond itself” 
[HCC, p.184]. The forms that bourgeois thought takes as fundamental expose only its inability to 
penetrate its own “social foundations”, and invert the “true categorical structure of capitalism” 
[HCC, p.184]. Only the proletariat, starting with the immediate relation of capital to labour, is able to 
completely penetrate its reification and subsequently comprehend forms more remote to the 
production process in the dialectical totality. 
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 The “total process”, says Lukács, is “uncontaminated by any trace of reification”, and its “process-like 
essence” prevails “in all its purity” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.184). I will return to the notion of 
“purity” in the analysis. 
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v) Man and the Absolute: Marx, Feuerbach and Hegel 
With the benefit of the “conceptual and historical foundation” of the “methodological problems of 
economics”, Lukács claims that “man has become the measure of all (societal) things” [HCC, p.185]. 
It is now possible, he says, concretely to reconstruct fetishistic objects as processes and objectified 
relations between men, fetishistic forms from their “primary” human forms [HCC, p.185]. From this 
standpoint, the dynamic character of social relations and, in particular, the class struggle can be 
seen. The problem of history is the problem of transient definitions that are exposed as such “in the 
unceasing overthrow of forms that shape the life of man” [HCC, p.186]. 
History as such a universal discipline is thus concerned with both the problem of methodological 
form and the problem of the content of our knowledge of the present, because it unites them 
dialectically. All history, from this perspective, is related in the final analysis to the relations between 
men. Lukács credits Ludwig Feuerbach for this insight, but criticises him for marginalising history and 
the dialectic by conceiving of man as a “fixed objectivity” [HCC, p.186]. Feuerbach’s removal of the 
dogmatism of transcendental forces failed to extend this rigour to man. The danger inherent in 
humanism is the replacement of a “dogmatic metaphysics” with “an equally dogmatic relativism” 
[HCC, p.187]. 
Lukács draws a distinction between the relativisation of truth in this sense, and the exposition of the 
meaning of “various ‘truths’” as aspects of a concrete historical process [HCC, p.187]. In the former 
case, the concept of the “absolute” that relativism initially jettisons re-emerges methodologically at 
the point in the system where its apparent dissolution of fixed reality into movement cannot reach 
[HCC, p.187]. Without a dialectical understanding provided by the latter, the ossification of the 
“absolute” re-conquers the territory that relativism falsely removed from it [HCC, p.187]. Although 
relativism is symptomatic of the developing contradictions in capitalist society, says Lukács, its 
contradictions can only be transcended through a dialectical understanding of history in which all its 
forms of existence are comprehended as processes and displayed in their concrete historical shape. 
185 
 
History, for Lukács, is thus a concrete and unique process of struggle in which this dialectical 
movement is played out. For Hegel, each dialectical advance contains within it the truth of the 
previous stage. In this sense “truth” takes on a more developed meaning [HCC, p.188]. For Marx, it is 
the development of the objective forms of man’s entire social existence, “inner” and outer, that 
constitutes the process of history [HCC, p.188]. In a society based on contending classes, truth can 
only have a meaning with regard to the perspective of a particular class, and its material 
circumstances. The proletarian standpoint opens the possibility of a transformation of the reality 
that gives rise to the notions of the “absolute” and its relativistic counterpart [HCC, p.189]. 
According to Lukács, Marx developed the logic of Feuerbach’s “materialist anthropology” by arguing 
that Hegel was mistaken to predicate man on self-consciousness rather than self-consciousness on 
man [HCC, p.189]. Marx avoids Feuerbach’s severance of man from the real world and sets out to 
exhibit the concrete totality of real man embedded in the world, not man from an abstract 
perspective. Man is therefore both the foundation of the dialectical and historical method and 
subject to its process. In Hegel’s term, the situation of man under capitalism is one in which the 
“negation of his being becomes concretised … in the understanding of bourgeois society” [HCC, 
p.190]. Thus man’s true nature stands contrasted to the contradictory categories of bourgeois 
thought. 
For Marx capitalist structures of thought force men to go through a process of abstraction instead of 
existing as real, concrete men. In this context, Lukács says, Marx describes capitalism as the last 
stage of the “pre-history of human society” [HCC, p.190]. Many bourgeois writers have expressed 
the contradiction that being human under capitalism is not possible, whilst existing man is 
confronted immediately by this inhumanity. For Marx, the transcendence of these two aspects is 
rooted in the concrete historical process and the standpoint of real man. This standpoint must be 
capable of explaining the economic structure of capitalist society along with its political, ideological 
and cultural forms. 
186 
 
The limitations of humanism lead back to the antinomies of bourgeois thought. The philosophical 
duality of much Christian ideology makes man’s spiritual transcendence a counterpart to an inability 
to effect change on the objective world. Lukács sees two utopian aspects attached to this outlook. 
First the capacity of God to control objective reality, and second the sanctification of man’s inner self 
over and against the external world. In all cases reality creates a crisis for this humanism by forcing it 
to reproduce the class divisions of capitalism in thought and on a more reified level. Through its 
progressive corruption and accommodation to empirical reality, humanism’s utopian aspirations 
have in many historical instances been harnessed by the ruling class. In the revolutionary religious 
sects that contributed to the ideology of early capitalism, Lukács identifies the “hiatus irrationalis” of 
the bourgeois philosophers in a mythological form, preventing the conscious dialectical interaction 
of theory and practice [HCC, p.192]. 
“The individual can never become the measure of all things”, says Lukács [HCC, p.193]. For the 
individual, immediate reality consists of immutable objects, to which it can subjectively react but not 
influence. Through a penetration of reified immediacy, which is only possible on a class basis, the 
underlying nature of reality as a process can be unveiled. The dialectical understanding required for 
this process cannot be achieved by the individual, whose ego is cleft into intelligible and empirical 
factions. The former is a transcendental notion that is by definition unable to interact dialectically 
with the latter, which is determined by external empirical “laws” [HCC, p.193]. Consequently the 
bourgeois dilemma between “is” and “ought” is reproduced in this realm and leads to the adoption 
of a mythology [HCC, p.194]. Mythology performs the function of obfuscating the bourgeoisie’s 
inability to produce mediated relations. It recreates the structure of the problem of immediacy on a 
more reified plane. Equally argues Lukács, the irrationality of indeterminism gives rise only to its own 
dogma of intuition [HCC, p.195].  
Here Lukács counter-poses the revolutionary perspective to that of reformism, such as that of the 
Second International. The fragmentation of life under capitalism is manifest in the political formation 
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of social democracy, which retreats from every hard-won mediation and leaves the proletariat only 
in its immediate predicament, either in fatalistic submission to the “laws” of bourgeois society or by 
being drawn into affirming the “state as an ideal” [HCC, p.196]. On this terrain, the bourgeoisie has 
superior resources in “knowledge, culture and routine” and the proletariat renounces, of “its own 
free will”, its “decisive weapon”, the “ability to see the social totality as a concrete history totality” 
[HCC, p.197]. 
vi) Transcendence and the Proletariat 
Every member of capitalist society is confronted by an immediate reified reality. To disrupt this 
reified structure is possible, says Lukács, only by “concretely relating to the concretely manifested 
contradictions of the total development, by becoming conscious of the immanent meaning of these 
contradictions for the total development” [HCC, p.197]. The proletariat must raise these immanent 
tendencies into their own collective consciousness, in order that their praxis can change reality. 
Through such praxis, Lukács claims, the proletariat can become the “identical subject-object of 
history” [HCC, p.197]. The failure to accomplish this historically necessary task results in the 
reproduction of these contradictions in a different and more intense form. At each stage of this 
unbroken process, the consciousness of the proletariat interacts dialectically with these developing 
tendencies. The key to the proletariat’s success, he argues, is maintaining an “aspiration towards 
totality” [HCC, p.198]. 
To concretise the claim that the proletariat can become the identical subject-object of history 
requires the formation of the proletariat into a class and the forging of a “practically-won” class 
consciousness [HCC, p.199]. This process is not a single act, but “the unbroken alternation of 
ossification, contradiction and movement” [HCC, p.199]. It is the dissolution of the objects of reality 
into their underlying tendencies and their exposition as part of a deeper reality. Only in this 
recurrent moment can the dilemma between thought and existence, formulated in Kant’s thing-in-
itself, be transcended and reification definitively banished from consciousness. Lukács argues that 
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there is an ambiguity between Engels’s formulation53 of concepts as the “reflections of real things” 
and his understanding of the world as “a complex of processes” [HCC, p.199-200]. The former, he 
argues, reproduces the bourgeois duality of thought and existence, which bourgeois philosophy is 
incapable of resolving. Kant’s attempt to remove this duality “by logic”, results in its reappearance in 
the duality of the “phenomenon and the thing-in-itself” [HCC, p.200].  
Another, non-Kantian, approach to this problem attempts to connect thought with objects in both 
the world of ideas and the material world54. It attempts to establish an “ultimate essence” to 
reconcile the two qualitatively different types of object [HCC, p.201]. This project relies however on 
metaphysical justification and the mediation of mythology to explain empirical reality. The attempt 
to deduce thought from its immediate empirical reality is equally unsatisfactory. Neither is capable 
of giving a satisfactory analysis of the “specific problems” of the ossified opposition of thought and 
existence [HCC, p.202]. And yet it is only in the domain of reflection that the “criterion of correct 
thought” can be apprehended [HCC, p.202]. In this situation man can only relate immediately to 
both his thought and the empirical objects. They must be accepted as a given, and a bridge sought 
between them, whilst leaving their rigid nature unaltered. 
In contrast, Marx’s solution is to “transform philosophy into praxis” [HCC, p.202]. Thought is directed 
towards reality in a practical manner, and in turn receives its validation on demonstrating its efficacy 
in action. Reality is no longer understood as mere empirical existence, but as a “process of 
becoming” in which the real character of objects is unveiled and that “provides a concrete solution 
to all the concrete problems created by the paradoxes of existent objects” [HCC, p.203]. In this sense 
the schism between philosophical methodology and factual knowledge must be overcome in order 
to transcend the duality of thought and existence. 
For this praxis, the present is a mediation between past and future, in which a process of genesis 
takes place. The contemplative attitude to past and future leads to each being alien to man. The 
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 In his Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy 
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 The Platonic theory of ideas is the most extreme example of this. 
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“concrete truth” of the present is established by comprehending the immanent tendencies of the 
process of becoming [HCC, p.204]. Thus the question of reflection of thought and existence loses its 
vitality. Positive reality, in a sense “‘reflected’” in proletarian consciousness, equally could not have 
come about without being made practical and becoming part of that consciousness [HCC, p.204]. 
This reality is a product of the total process, a dialectical inevitability in which “abstract possibility” 
becomes “concrete reality” [HCC, p.204]. 
Lukács emphasises that only the “practical class consciousness of the proletariat” is capable of 
transforming reality [HCC, p.205]. The same conceptual structure transferred to another 
contemplative stance would inevitably result in a retreat into mythology and a new immediacy. Only 
in the “practical character” of proletarian thought can the living contradictions of reality be held and 
renewed in their development [HCC, p.205]. The formation of proletarian consciousness in itself is a 
dialectical process. More than just a “self-criticism of bourgeois society”, it aims to understand 
“which stage of the genuinely practicable is objectively possible and how much of what is possible 
has been made real” [HCC, p.205]. 
To grasp the fiction of society’s rigid reification does not “annul the ‘reality’ of this fiction” in 
practice [HCC, p.205]. Proletarian thought’s “theory of praxis” is the first step towards a “practical 
theory that overturns the real world” [HCC, p.205]. Only through this self-transformation can the 
claim “that the proletariat is the identical subject-object of the history of society” cannot become 
truly concrete [HCC, p.206]. The elimination of reification is not a “single act”, and neither is there a 
single path by which sets of phenomena become “dialecticised”, as we can see by the sensitivity of 
works of art to dialectical changes [HCC, p.206]. 
The complexly mediated nature of social reality means that the inner antagonisms of certain social 
phenomena reveal their inner contradiction only when mediated by the contradictions of more 
primary phenomena. Once these primary elements are comprehended, as dictated by the structure 
of capitalist relations, a dialectical hierarchy or sequence of categories is revealed. The danger of 
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rigidity returning to this method, says Lukács, necessitates the distinction of positive and negative 
dialectics [HCC, p.207].55 The qualitative distinctions between the social dialectic and the dialectic of 
nature must be elaborated in concrete fashion. Marx’s economic works provide material for an 
analysis of structures, Lukács argues, but a typology of these dialectical forms is beyond his project. 
For Lukács, seizing power and reorganising the economy on socialist lines are only stages in the 
achievement of the “ultimate objectives” of the proletariat [HCC, p.208]. The “decisive crisis-period” 
of capitalism is characterised by the simultaneous intensification of reification and the collapse of its 
fetishistic categories [HCC, p.208]. The “objective economic evolution” of capitalism gives the 
proletariat the “opportunity and the necessity to change society”, but this can only come about 
through “the–free–action of the proletariat itself” [HCC, p.208-209].  
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 “By positive dialectics [Hegel] understands the growth of a particular content, the elucidation of a concrete 
totality” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.207). 
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3) What questions does Lukács’s framework allow us to ask? 
In this section, I will argue that the conceptual framework constructed by Lukács in HCC foregrounds 
the question of revolutionary subjectivity in his argument. This is made possible by his attempt to 
synthesise three aspects: an analysis of capitalist reification, an account of the historical failure of 
bourgeois thought to resolve its antinomies, and a philosophical justification of the potential for the 
proletariat to become a class-for-itself. Lukács posits an integral connection between his discussion 
of method, the category of totality and this project for the construction of a revolutionary 
subjectivity. He offers these investigations as the beginning of a debate about the vulgarisation of 
Marx’s method that he believes has taken place at the hands of the leading theorists of the Second 
International.56 I will examine whether Lukács gives an adequate account of the subject on which 
this revolutionary subjectivity is based, whether the kind of subjectivity produced is characterised by 
a certain unity, or a type of purity, and subsequently I will expose some of the problems that 
Lukács’s framework might encounter. 
a) Method and System 
Lukács contends that the “true aim” of HCC is “to make the problem of dialectical method the focus 
of discussion as an urgent living problem” [HCC, p. xlvi].57 He seeks to distil the “essence of Marx’s 
method and to apply it correctly” [HCC, p. xlii]. I will argue that in focusing on the issue of method, as 
opposed to that of the system, Lukács creates a framework within which it is possible to ask a 
certain set of questions, in particular those centred on the problem of revolutionary subjectivity. In 
the following section, I will investigate the nature of these questions before asking whether such a 
framework equally precludes the positing of other types of questions. 
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 Lukács distinguishes his own theory from those who represent this tradition, such as Eduard Bernstein, or 
with more qualifications, Karl Kautsky and Georgi Plekhanov. 
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 In his Preface to HCC of 1922 – HCC is in fact a series of essays written over an extended period of time 
(1919-22), albeit one in which, according to Michael Löwy, the earlier pieces were “thoroughly reworked in 
1922” (Löwy From Romanticism to Bolshevism, p.173). 
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This radical return to method is historically motivated by Lukács’s concern to rescue Marxism from 
the deterministic and opportunistic tendencies that he saw as characteristic of, although perhaps 
not exclusive to, the Second International strand of ‘orthodoxy’.58 It also represents the product of 
an extended engagement with Marx’s Capital, and those he saw as actively developing and applying 
Marx’s method critically and in practice, namely Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. 
It should be noted from the outset that the counter-position of method and system is in itself 
potentially problematic. In other words, it is questionable to what extent Marx’s method can be 
extracted from his system, without in the process necessitating the reproduction of the system 
itself.59 This issue is posed most controversially at the outset of HCC60 when Lukács asserts 
polemically that “orthodoxy refers exclusively to method” [HCC, p.1]. Certainly it does not seem 
feasible to defend the overstated claim that all the results of Marx’s investigations “in toto” could be 
rejected without drawing into question to some extent the method by which such an analysis was 
generated [HCC, p.1].61 
However, the intention of this shock treatment seems to be to jolt the reader into a reassessment 
and recognition of the foundational texts of Marxism as open works – texts which are to be 
developed or even challenged on certain points, without necessitating the abandonment of 
orthodoxy towards Marx’s method: “the scientific conviction that historical materialism is the road 
to truth” [HCC, p.1]. Lukács may have had in mind the works of Rosa Luxemburg, who challenged 
Marx on substantive issues in which she thought him in error, but equally sought to develop his 
method from the standpoint of an adherent.62 
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 Particularly in his essay on Class Consciousness, Lukács rails against what he calls “vulgar Marxism”: a 
viewpoint which overlooks the “unique function of consciousness in the class struggle of the proletariat” and 
thereby reduces itself to the standpoint of the bourgeoisie (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.68). 
59
 Lukács himself highlights his discussion of the “methodological aspect” and its premises and implications in 
his Preface of 1922 (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p. xli–xlii). 
60
 In the essay What is Orthodox Marxism? 
61
 Emphasis in original unless otherwise stated. 
62
 Lukács himself stands in a similar relationship to Luxemburg, and her works played a significant role in the 
development of his Marxism. In HCC, he both praises her (at a time when her legacy was coming under 
increasing sectarian attack in the communist movement), but also, in a later essay, critiques her analysis of the 
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Lukács locates the source of Marx’s method in his book The Poverty of Philosophy (1847).63 He 
regards it as Marx’s first “mature, complete and conclusive work”, albeit one in which the solution to 
a problem is only “sketched in broad outline” [HCC, p.33]. Lukács advances the argument that there 
is an “essential similarity” of method between all of Marx’s works from this point onwards.64 He 
argues that Marx’s explicitly historical approach in The Poverty of Philosophy may not be 
immediately visible in his “principal theoretical works”, Capital and Theories of Surplus Value, due to 
the “scope and wealth of the individual problems” treated in these texts [HCC, p.33]. However, he 
suggests that the “internal structure” of these works points towards the more concrete 
development of a solution to the same problem [HCC, p.33]. 
Therefore, whilst it seems that Lukács does not discount the developments that take place in Marx’s 
thought, particularly with reference to the ‘internal structuring’ of the problem, he affirms the 
essential unity of Marx’s method post-The Poverty of Philosophy. There is however an obvious 
difference between The Poverty of Philosophy and Capital which pertains to our investigation of the 
problem of subjectivity. In The Poverty of Philosophy, it is possible to find an explicit discussion of the 
revolutionary subjectivity of the proletariat. Marx discusses, in the section on Strikes and 
Combinations of Workers, the development of the organisation of the proletariat as a class and the 
conditions for its emancipation.65 By contrast, in Capital it is much more difficult to find such an 
explicit discussion of revolutionary subjectivity.66 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Russian Revolution. Lukács is uncritical generally of Luxemburg in the earlier essay in which he discusses The 
Accumulation of Capital, and does not return to critique her economic work in his later essay. Further 
investigation of the reasons for this might be worthwhile pursuing. 
63
 We cannot directly discern whether Lukács’s would have cast a similar or different judgement on Marx’s 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts as Lukács was unaware of their existence at the time of writing HCC. 
64
 It is perhaps in reaction to this claim that Louis Althusser much later formulated his notion of an 
epistemological break between the young and the mature Marx. Certainly The Poverty of Philosophy is an 
important reference point for the later Marx, who cites it frequently in Capital. This would suggest that Marx 
would accept the notion of a substantive continuity between the two works, whilst at the same time it seems 
clear that Capital is on all levels a work much richer in determinations. 
65
 Marx, K The Poverty of Philosophy (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1956), p.196-197 
66
 As discussed in the previous chapter. 
194 
 
It might be countered that in The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx’s proposal in the finale of total 
revolution, the emancipation of the oppressed class and the creation of a new society, is all too brief 
and lacking in content.67 On the contrary, the substance of the work, Marx’s more serious 
conceptual innovations, rather stems from his engagement with Ricardo and Hegel and, crucially for 
Lukács, the development of his historical method. The question that Lukács’s declaration of 
methodological unity between Marx’s works post-The Poverty of Philosophy seems to pose is the 
following: starting from the basis of Marx’s mature economic analyses (i.e. Capital), but maintaining 
Marx’s historical method, are we now able to advance a more concrete and substantial theory of 
revolutionary subjectivity? I would argue that the great strength of Lukács’s project, to “obtain a 
clear insight into the ideological problems of capitalism and its downfall” [HCC, p.84], is that it seeks 
to fit exactly into these criteria. 
b) Revolutionary Subjectivity 
It seems therefore that there is an intimate connection between Lukács’s discussion of Marx’s 
method, his insistence on discovering its essence and true spirit, and the question of the constitution 
of the proletariat as a revolutionary subject. Although Lukács rejects from the outset the idea that 
HCC presents “even the sketchiest outline of a system of dialectics” [HCC, p. xlv-xlvi], he clearly seeks 
to re-invigorate a debate amongst, in Lenin’s words, “the materialist friends of the Hegelian 
dialectic” [HCC, p. xlv]. The dialectic, he contends, is the “life nerve” [HCC, p. xliii] of Marx’s method. 
For Lukács, in the spirit of this dialectic, the discovery of the fundamental nature of capitalist society 
is also integrally connected with the analysis of it as a totality, as I will discuss further in the next 
section. But first I will investigate the premises and implications of the central role that the question 
of revolutionary subjectivity assumes in HCC. 
I have identified the explicit and central discussion of revolutionary subjectivity by Lukács in HCC. 
This is a distinctive feature of HCC in comparison to Marx’s Capital, yet in HCC Lukács claims to be 
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 In this sense The Poverty of Philosophy is reminiscent of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. 
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faithfully re-creating the method of Capital. To what extent therefore are these two claims in 
tension? Lukács bases his work on Marx’s economic analyses in Capital, and proceeds to a discussion 
of the “problems growing out of the fetish character of commodities” [HCC, p.84]. He describes 
Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism as “a specific problem of our age, the age of modern 
capitalism” [HCC, p.84]. In doing so, Lukács deploys a particular characterisation of the fetish 
character of commodities, of the “mysterious” nature of commodities, as the phenomenon of 
reification [HCC, p.86]. Lukács describes the effects of the processes of capitalist rationalisation on 
the ideological forms of consciousness of human actors in capitalist society, as I have discussed in my 
earlier exposition of the phenomenon of reification.68 
The problem of commodity fetishism in Capital has its roots in Marx’s theory of alienation in his 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, and it can be contended that there is continuity between 
these two sets of problems.69 Therefore I will formulate a comparison between the themes that 
Lukács raises in HCC and Marx’s Manuscripts, another work that is arguably focused on the question 
of revolutionary subjectivity. As noted previously, Lukács was necessarily unaware of the 
Manuscripts, which were unpublished at the time of writing the essays of HCC. On the other hand, 
Lukács was familiar with and, in HCC, quotes from a number of Marx’s other early writings, in 
particular his “first critique of Hegel” [HCC, p.2].70 Although it would be unwise to equate Lukács’s 
HCC and Marx’s Manuscripts without justification, some parallels can be seen between them. In his 
Manuscripts, Marx attempts to formulate the notion of alienated labour and the possibility of its 
transcendence. In HCC, Lukács is committed to addressing the problem of the working class 
overcoming capitalist reification. 
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 I have analysed the relationship between Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism and the phenomenon of 
reification through Lukács’s appropriation of concepts from Max Weber such as ‘rationalisation’, but also 
‘objective possibility’ and ‘social types’. I have argued that Lukács seeks to transform Weberian categories by 
placing them within a framework in which the proletariat occupies a special position in capitalist society. 
69
 The pre-figurations of Marx’s understanding of fetishism in the Manuscripts are explored in the first chapter 
of this thesis. 
70
 e.g. Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Correspondence of 1843, The Holy Family. 
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In HCC, Lukács places an emphasis on revealing the fundamental nature of commodity relations as 
relations between people. In the Manuscripts, Marx attempts to reveal the essence of private 
property in the relation of estranged labour to itself, founded on the conception of a human 
essence. Although each is operating with a different set of concepts, there is a common theme of 
dialectical transcendence that is rooted in each thinker’s engagement with Hegel. Although it cannot 
be assumed that both thinkers have a similar relationship to Hegel, Lukács seems to be moving in a 
parallel direction to Marx in the Manuscripts, albeit from a very different starting point.71 
Lukács is able to place the self-emancipation of the proletariat at the centre of his analysis because 
of his discussion of the transcendence of capitalist reification. Lukács argues that Marx’s Capital 
contains such a wealth of “individual problems” [HCC, p.33] that it overwhelms and obscures the 
true form of Marx’s historical method. In order to examine more explicitly what he sees as its 
revolutionary essence, Lukács seeks to restate this method. This raises a number of questions. Does 
this apparent return to the “pristine and unsullied” [HCC, p. 33] method of Marx (the same method, 
Lukács claims, that is present in both The Poverty of Philosophy and Capital) carry any dangers with 
it? By identifying the obscuring role of the “individual problems” [HCC, p.33] of Capital, does Lukács 
pose too sharp a distinction between form and content? Is it not precisely through Marx’s treatment 
of the individual problems in Capital that it is possible to understand his method?  Does Lukács’s 
resulting discussion of revolutionary subjectivity therefore lack in some important content? 
I would argue that there is a tension within Lukács’s conception of totality. Whilst bourgeois thought 
may be able to formulate “abstract, special laws” [HCC, p.28] in particular specialist disciplines, to be 
“authentically totalising” it is not enough for bourgeois thought to deal with “‘all problems’ in a 
substantive manner (which is, of course, an impossibility)”, if at the same time it remains 
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 It is important to address the much-contested relation of Lukács’s conception of objectification and the 
phenomenon of reification to that of Marx’s theory of alienation, which I will attempt to do in the following 
section on the limitations of HCC. Lukács addresses the notions of alienation and objectification in his 1967 
Introduction (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p. xxiii). Furthermore I will go on to investigate to what 
extent Lukács’s concept of labour is underdeveloped in HCC, and limited to the concept of the ‘division of 
labour’. Interestingly, Lukács argues that the division of labour is “alien to the nature of man” (Lukács History 
and Class Consciousness, p.335). 
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“contemplative” [HCC, p.221 fn. 61]. The only “authentically totalising” method is the one which is 
orientated on practice [HCC, p.221 fn. 61]. For Lukács, therefore, Marx’s treatment of the “individual 
problems” [HCC, p.33] of Capital is authentically totalising, not as a complete aggregation of 
individual problems, but because of the historical method which he employs, which for Lukács 
implies an orientation on practice. 
On the other hand, Lukács warns against the dangers of the “fossilised ‘idealisation’ of the dialectical 
method” [HCC, p.34]. It seems therefore that there is a necessary connection between an 
engagement with the “individual problems” [HCC, p.33] of Capital and Lukács’s stipulation that the 
dialectical method must not be divorced from the “living stuff of history” [HCC, p.34]. Furthermore, 
Lukács would argue that a danger does exist of creating a new vulgar economics “with the plus and 
minus signs reversed” [HCC, p. 29]. He claims that this is a trap into which a number of Marx’s 
epigones have fallen. For Lukács, this “dogmatic materialism” signifies a qualitative methodological 
break from Capital [HCC, p.34]. Economic formulae by means of which economic reality is 
understood, such as those found in Capital, are a necessary abstraction. For Lukács, they represent a 
“clarification” and a “springboard for an assault on the real problem” [HCC, p.31]. 
The result of Lukács’s foregrounding of the problem of subjectivity is the specific emphasis which 
HCC gives to the problem of the “spiritual strength” of capitalist society which must be overcome by 
knowledge [HCC, p.262]. Thus Lukács remarks that the simultaneously strong and weak point of the 
state is “the way in which it is reflected in the consciousness of the people” [HCC, p.261]. Lukács’s 
conception of knowledge however is a particular one: “It must be knowledge that has become flesh 
of one’s flesh and blood of one’s blood; to use Marx’s phrase, it must be ‘practical critical activity’” 
[HCC, p.262]. The real problem that is Lukács’s central concern is the intimate connection, or unity, 
between the acquisition of self-knowledge by the proletariat and the practical carrying through of a 




HCC thus attempts to provide both a philosophical justification for proletarian revolution and a 
discussion of the methodological problems of its organisation, while traversing all the ideological 
problems of capitalist reification. Lukács seeks to demonstrate that Marx’s dialectical method is 
capable of providing a unified understanding that begins with the analysis of the commodity and 
ends with the practical questions of revolutionary organisation. The difficulty of adequately fulfilling 
the necessary mediations between these two poles in this project is already apparent. Lukács, in his 
1967 Introduction, formulates the problem with the question, “Can a genuinely identical subject-
object be created by self-knowledge, however adequate, and however truly based on an adequate 
knowledge of society” [HCC, p. xxiii]? I will investigate later to what extent this polar framework 
influences Lukács’s conception of class-consciousness. Before going on to discuss Lukács’s distinctive 
exposition of class-consciousness, I will first examine more closely the centrality of the notion of 
totality for his method. 
c) The Centrality of Totality 
Lukács places an emphasis on the dialectical connection between the category of totality and the 
discovery of the fundamental nature of capitalist society. Whilst HCC may focus on clarifying Marx’s 
method, it is also an attempt to put this method into practice, to generate the content of a Marxist 
analysis of class consciousness. Lukács makes a link between the self-knowledge of society and the 
process of proletarian revolution. Totality is, for Lukács, “a problem of category and in particular a 
problem of revolutionary action” [HCC, p.221 fn. 61]. Thus, he claims in the early essay on The 
Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg that: “The primacy of the category of totality is the bearer of the 
principle of revolution in science” [HCC, p.27]. 
This explicit link between the category of totality and the revolutionary standpoint allows Lukács to 
oppose the apparent “scientism” of the opportunist tendency, those who would artificially isolate 
the “facts” from the whole. Lukács is attempting to demonstrate that revolution is a process and not 
an “isolated act”, and that there are not “revolutionary aspects” of Marx’s thought, relics of a 
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“primitive period of the workers’ movement”, that can be separated off from the rest of his thought 
[HCC, p.29]. Rather, states Lukács, central to Marxism is “the principle that revolution is the product 
of a point of view in which the category of totality is dominant” [HCC, p.29]. 
Lukács’s conception of knowledge as “practical critical activity” [HCC, p.262],72 in conjunction with 
his close association of the category of totality and the revolutionary standpoint, seems to give a 
new perspective on and concrete content to the notion of revolutionary activity.73 Lukács’s emphasis 
on the centrality of the category of totality in his understanding of the dialectic does not, he claims, 
negate the role of abstraction. He contends that “the process of abstraction and hence the isolation 
of the elements and concepts in the special disciplines and whole areas of study is of the very 
essence of science” [HCC, p.28].74 The specificity of historical materialism for the proletariat is that it 
“permits us to view the present historically and hence scientifically so that we can penetrate 
beneath the surface and perceive the profounder historical forces which in reality control events” 
[HCC, p.224]. The centrality of the category of totality raises questions about whether other aspects 
are pushed to the margins. Later I will discuss what questions Lukács’s framework prevents us from 
asking, in particular with reference to the notion of totality and economics. First I will examine the 
way in which Lukács addresses the notion of class consciousness in HCC. 
d) Understanding Class Consciousness 
For Lukács, the fact that Marx’s Capital breaks off without a satisfactory definition of class is a 
significant limitation and source of dispute for later Marxists. The question of how to understand 
class consciousness is one which has a number of different aspects for Lukács.75 Lukács quotes 
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 I will later draw comparisons between Lukács and Gramsci’s conceptions of ‘practical critical activity’. 
73
 Lukács’s conception of revolutionary activity can be compared with Marx’s notion of “real communist 
activity” in the Manuscripts (Marx Early Writings, p.365), the content of which, as I argued in the first chapter 
(section 2.b.ii), is underdeveloped. This pre-figures issues that I will address later in this chapter, as it requires 
a comparison of Marx and Lukács’s conceptions of activity, labour, and therefore alienated labour. 
74
 Despite Lukács’s critique of bourgeois ‘science’, this passage seems to demonstrate his commitment to what 
he later calls “true science” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.224): one in which “the process of 
isolation is a means towards understanding the whole” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.28). 
75
 He categorises these in four different ways: how to understand class consciousness in theory, how to 
understand the practical function of class consciousness, whether class consciousness is a general 
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Engels to the effect that “nothing happens without a conscious purpose or an intended aim” [HCC, 
p.46]. However, the result of the process of history is often very different to the intended aims of its 
agents. For Lukács the “essence of scientific Marxism consists … in the realisation that the real motor 
forces of history are independent of man’s (psychological) consciousness of them” [HCC, p.47].  
What Marx does, according to Lukács, by enunciating a “historical critique of economics” is to 
resolve “the totality of the reified objectivities of social and economic life into relations between 
men” [HCC, p.49]. This reduces the objectivity of “the social institutions so hostile to man” and 
reveals them as in fact relations between human beings [HCC, p.49]. Lukács defines these social 
institutions as “capital” and “every form in which the national economy objectifies itself” [HCC, 
p.49]. His innovation lies in explicitly seeking to ‘resolve’ their reified form in order to reveal the 
social mediations in relation to capital that this form obscures.76 This might be interpreted as a form 
of ultra-subjectivism; however, Lukács argues that there is “a restoration of objectivity to their 
underlying basis, to the relations between men” [HCC, p.49]. 
The result of this analysis is Lukács’s much discussed notion of ascribed or imputed consciousness, 
and the corresponding notion of “false consciousness”.77 Lukács argues for the need to investigate 
“false consciousness” not as an “inflexible confrontation of true and false” [HCC, p.50], but rather to 
investigate it “concretely as an aspect of the historical totality and as a stage in the historical 
process” [HCC, p.50]. Although Lukács does not deny the empirical validity of the “material of 
genuine historical analysis” [HCC, p.51], he suggests that a transcendence of “pure description” 
yields the “category of objective possibility” [HCC, p.51].78 There are difficulties with Lukács’s 
conception of “false consciousness” that I will investigate later, but first I will comment on the 
polarised conception of consciousness indicated by his framework. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“sociological” problem or one that is differentiated by class, and whether there exist gradations of class 
consciousness (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.46). 
76
 The final chapter will show how Gramsci offers a much more concrete analysis than Lukács of these social 
institutions.  
77
 Lukács appears to have taken the notion of ‘false’ consciousness from a letter sent by Engels to Mehring 
(Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.50). 
78
 This is another example of Lukács’s appropriation of Weberian concepts as previously discussed. 
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I will argue that Lukács’s conception of class consciousness is characterised by its polarised nature 
and that this can be partially explained by the momentous nature of the events from which he was 
theorising: his lived experience of the Russian, Hungarian and German revolutions. This experience 
gives Lukács an acute insight into the peaks of a process in which the norms of non-revolutionary 
periods are cast aside. This can be seen particularly sharply in his conception of “the leap”, which he 
defines as “a turning in the direction of something qualitatively new” [HCC, p.250]. The leap’s 
“home”, Lukács claims, “is the realm of freedom” [HCC, p.250]. In periods in which the prospect of 
the working class seizing power is imminent, or in a state of transition, Lukács argues that the 
normal relationship between economy and violence moves into a state of flux. It is under these 
conditions that violence is “put to the service of man and the flowering of man” [HCC, p.251]. 
I have focused up to this point on Lukács’s explicit discussion of revolutionary subjectivity. But what 
about other kinds of subjectivity that are not revolutionary? Does the acknowledgement that Lukács 
speaks much more clearly to periods in which the class struggle has reached the heights of the 
revolutionary process conversely suggest that he is incapable of discussing the complexities of class 
consciousness in periods when class struggle is at a lower ebb? Or for that matter, is he capable of 
theorising forms of class consciousness that persist despite the rising tide of class struggle in 
revolutionary periods?79 Is Lukács’s framework of analysis capable of addressing these instances? 
Lukács’s initial reaction might be to say that “[h]owever little the final goal of the proletariat is able, 
even in theory, to influence the initial stages of the process directly, it is a principle, a synthesising 
factor and so can never be completely absent from any aspect of that process” [HCC, p.313]. At the 
same time, Lukács recognises that the “overdevelopment of individual consciousness”, brought on 
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 He recognises the persistence of these forms: “[e]ven in the very midst of the death throes of capitalism 
broad sections of the proletarian masses still feel that the state, the laws and the economy of the bourgeoisie 
are the only possible environment for them to exist in” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.262). 
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by the capitalist process of reification results in a “brutal egoism greedy for fame and possessions” 
[HCC, p.355].80 
Lukács’s framework gives a strong theorisation of the relationship between the individual and the 
class. Lukács does discuss gradations of class consciousness, but does not address the concrete 
content of the specific influence of different groups and cross-influences within society that make up 
its complex totality (e.g. religious organisation, the role of education, etc.). Lukács does however 
address the issue of trade unions and their bureaucracy in a novel way. Developing Lenin’s 
conception of the labour aristocracy, Lukács points towards the specific weight and influence which 
this layer of the working class gains within the movement derived from their particular access to 
bourgeois forms of consciousness. He argues that the “bourgeoisification of the proletariat becomes 
institutionalised in the Menshevik workers’ parties and in the trade unions they control” [HCC, 
p.310].81 
Lukács states clearly in his essay on the problems of organisation that “the class consciousness of the 
proletariat does not develop uniformly throughout the whole proletariat” [HCC, p.304], and he 
derives organisational conclusions from this. Although, as Marx and Engels identified, this 
unevenness can be partially explained by the privileged position that some workers arrive at due to 
the “entry of capitalism into its imperialist phase” [HCC, p.305], Lukács suggests that additional 
explanation is required to account for the inertia in the “subjective development of the proletariat” 
[HCC, p.350]. For Lukács, organisation is the “form of mediation between theory and practice” [HCC, 
p.299]. 
Lukács theorises the role of reformism in the “Menshevik parties” [HCC, p.310], but he also argues 
that the Communist party must become the “conscious approach to this leap and hence the first 
conscious step towards the realm of freedom” [HCC, p.314]. It is not the case, nor has it been 
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 This intensifies with the development of capitalism and is not overcome at the gates of the revolutionary 
party. 
81
 Lukács’s notion of “bourgeoisification” and its influence on the whole proletariat, not simply the trade union 
aristocracy, deserves further critique and investigation (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.310). 
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claimed, says Lukács, that the Communist Party is able “to reform the inner nature of its members 
by means of a miracle” [HCC, p.335]. The consequence of this is that Lukács recognises, somewhat 
ominously and presciently, the dangers of “ossification, bureaucratisation and corruption” [HCC, 
p.355]. These tendencies persist even within revolutionary organisations, although, unlike Weber, 
Lukács does not see these as inevitable. It is the critical relationship of the party to the proletariat as 
a class that provides the possibility of confronting these challenges. I will now examine some of the 
limitations of the framework of HCC and the questions which it precludes us from asking.  
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4) What are the limitations of Lukács’s framework? What questions 
does it preclude? 
a) The Proletariat as the ‘Identical Subject-Object of History’ 
“Materialist dialectic is a revolutionary dialectic”, asserts Lukács at the outset of HCC [HCC, p.2]. I 
have argued that Lukács defends the idea that the project for the construction of a revolutionary 
subjectivity can be developed from Marx’s method, as found in Capital.82 As I examined in the 
previous section, there is a strong link, for Lukács, between his exploration of the phenomenon of 
reification and the framework of concepts through which he questions the nature of revolutionary 
subjectivity. These concepts include the category of totality, the revolutionary standpoint, and 
knowledge conceived as “practical critical activity” [HCC, p.262]. This theoretical construction is only 
activated however, by the positing of a subject that is potentially capable of uniting these elements. 
In HCC, reification is the “immediate reality of every person living in capitalist society” [HCC, p.197], 
however this does not imply that all actors are capable of comprehending this phenomenon. On the 
contrary, Lukács claims that “[n]o path leads from the individual to the totality” [HCC, p.28]. In 
modern society, only classes are capable of advancing a “total point of view” [HCC, p.28]. Although 
the “basic structure of reification” is to be found in “all the social forms of modern capitalism (e.g. 
bureaucracy.)”, it is only in the “work-situation of the proletarian” that this structure can be made 
fully conscious [HCC, p.171-172].83 The proletariat is the only class capable of becoming “the 
identical subject-object of history whose praxis will change reality” [HCC, p.197].84 Lukács borrows 
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 Or indeed, as Lukács would claim, from its origins in The Poverty of Philosophy. 
83
 Lukács cites Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right as the source of this account of the “special 
position of the proletariat in society and in history” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.149). 
84
 In Lukács’s analysis of the phenomenon of reification, in the first section of his chapter “Reification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat”, the workers’ situation is explored in the abstract, but the notions of class 
and of the proletariat appear infrequently. The proletariat is discussed extensively only separately in the third 
section of this chapter, “The Standpoint of the Proletariat”. 
205 
 
the notion of the “identical subject-object” from German classical philosophy, and in particular from 
Johann Fichte [HCC, p. 123].85 
Modern critical philosophy arises from the reified structure of consciousness, argues Lukács, and its 
problems are distinguished from those of previous epochs by their roots in this structure [HCC, 
p.110-111]. Whilst classical philosophy took “the antinomies of its life-basis to the furthest extreme 
it was capable of in thought”, it bequeathed these antinomies unresolved to “succeeding (bourgeois) 
generations” [HCC, p.148]. At the same time, Lukács indicates that, in one aspect bourgeois 
philosophy “points beyond bourgeois society” [HCC, p.148], in that it gives rise, in an opaque form, 
to the dialectical method. 
Although many modern thinkers elaborate the problem of subjectivity, Lukács has a particular 
engagement with the ideas of Immanuel Kant. Kant, after Marx and Hegel, is one of the central 
points of reference in HCC. By formulating the problem of the thing-in-itself, Kant was the first to set 
out clearly the limits of bourgeois knowledge.86 Nevertheless, Lukács suggests that it was Fichte who 
gave “the most satisfactory formulation” to the problem of the schism between subject and object 
[HCC, p.119].87 Fichte’s solution was to place the practical, action and activity, “at the centre of his 
philosophical system” [HCC, p.123]. By starting at the point where the subjective and objective meet, 
Fichte sought to overcome the gap between subject and object. Lukács identifies the weaknesses of 
Fichte’s solution in his inability to give a concrete account of the subject of this action, and thus he 
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 Lukács makes a detailed study of the attempts to resolve the schism between subject and object in German 
classical philosophy in the section of the “Reification” chapter “The Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought” (Lukács 
History and Class Consciousness, p.110). 
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 It could be argued that by setting limits to bourgeois thought, Kant posits in a negative fashion, the only 
possible remaining route, the dialectical method developed by Hegel and later taken up and transformed by 
Marx. 
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 Fichte’s philosophy presses “forward to a conception of the subject which can be thought of as the creator 
of the totality of content” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.122-123). This marks the end, for Lukács, 
of “the age in which the bourgeois class naïvely equated its own forms of thought […] with reality and with 
existence as such” (Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.119). 
206 
 
suggests that Fichte has simply reproduced the problems of German philosophy on a “higher plane” 
[HCC, p.123].88 
In appropriating the notion of the “identical subject-object” [HCC, p.149] and applying it to the 
proletariat Lukács adopts the structure of Fichte’s solution but attempts to synthesise this with 
Engels’ insight that the working class is the inheritor of German classical philosophy. The question 
that must be asked is whether the weakness of Fichte’s solution is not simply transposed to Lukács’s 
own conception of the proletariat as the ‘identical subject-object of history’. Does Lukács similarly 
fail to give a concrete account of the subject of action, in this case the proletariat? 
In The Standpoint of the Proletariat, Lukács sets out his case for the proletariat as the potential 
‘identical subject-object’. His discussion of the vantage point of the proletariat highlights his 
approach to the problem of subjectivity. Lukács draws a distinction between objective reality “in its 
immediacy”, and “authentically objective reality” that is passed through the “specific categories of 
mediation” appropriate to the different position of each class in the economic process [HCC, p.150]. 
For Lukács, the authenticity of objective reality cannot be separated from the subject that 
understands it. Lukács argues that “the belief that the impact of the category of mediation upon the 
picture of the world is merely ‘subjective’ […] is as much as to say that objective reality has the 
character of a thing-in-itself” [HCC, p.150].89 
Critics such as Gareth Stedman-Jones would argue that this represents an “irruption of the romantic 
anti-scientific tradition of bourgeois thought into Marxist theory”.90 In contrast to Marx’s focused 
engagement with Hegel in the Manuscripts, Lukács’s concern with the Kantian tradition is striking. 
Lukács’s philosophical discussions are formulated with reference to a much wider historical frame, 
from Descartes through Kant and Fichte to critical thinkers contemporary to Lukács (e.g. Rickert, 
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Weber, Simmel). Whereas Marx develops a philosophical position in the Manuscripts from the 
starting point of a complex mixture of Feuerbachian and Hegelian perspectives, Lukács sets out in 
HCC from a position steeped in the tragic antinomy of subject and object characteristic of the neo-
Kantian tradition. Lukács might argue that this reflects the bourgeoisie’s growing awareness of its 
impotence to solve its own dilemmas in the intervening period between Marx and Lukács. 
Lukács would perhaps also argue that what validates his emphasis on the overcoming of the 
bourgeois antinomies of thought is his distinctively Marxist concern with the development of the 
class consciousness of the proletariat as a specific socially and historically located orientation on 
practice. It is in this context that Lukács takes issue with Ernst Bloch’s suggestion that historical 
materialism is “’merely economic’” [HCC, p.193] in its outlook. For Lukács, perhaps also criticising his 
younger self, economics cannot be seen as a concern with “objective things” to which a discussion of 
“soul and inwardness” can be counter-posed. Rather historical materialism, in setting about the 
“restructuring of the real and concrete life of man”, must approach economics as the “system of 
forms objectively defining this real life” [HCC, p.193]. In order to investigate this question I will 
therefore return to the starting point of Lukács’s investigation of the phenomenon of reification. 
b) Subjective and Objective aspects of The Phenomenon of Reification 
Lukács’s investigation of the phenomenon of reification begins with a historical analysis of the rise of 
the commodity as the universal structuring principle of society.91 Lukács then conceptually analyses 
the notion of reification itself. He quotes extensively from the section of Marx’s Capital entitled The 
Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret.92 He emphasises a theme, similar to Marx’s earlier 
conception of alienated labour, that “because of his situation a man’s own activity, his own labour 
becomes something objective and independent of him, something that controls him by virtue of an 
autonomy alien to man” [HCC, p.87]. 
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Lukács’s exposition of reification is distinctive in its radical separation of the “objective side” and the 
“subjective side” of this phenomenon [HCC, p.87]. Lukács thus on the one hand points to the 
objective aspect, the “world of objects and relations between things” that springs into being, the 
“forces that generate their own power”, which individuals are unable to modify by their activity, 
whilst on the other hand he also elaborates a subjective aspect in which a “man’s activity becomes 
estranged from himself”, is commodified and must “go its own way independently of man” [HCC, 
p.87]. 
The specification of subjective and objective aspects of the phenomenon of reification is of vital 
importance for holding in tension a dual function of reification. Whilst the phenomenon of 
reification plays one role of exposing how the relations between people take on the “character of a 
thing” and thus acquire a “’phantom objectivity’” [HCC, p.83], whose essence is to be revealed in the 
relations between people, it also plays another. The second function of reification is to show how 
the “world of objects and relations between things”, and the laws governing it, actually does spring 
“into being” [HCC, p.87]. Both essence and appearance have a social reality in the estranged activity 
of man on which the system is founded. This activity gives rise to non-human “invisible forces” that 
generate their own power [HCC, p.87]. This is reminiscent of the problem identified in the first 
chapter of whether we are able to identify two or one conceptions of subjectivity in Marx’s 
Manuscripts. It is also closely tied to the development of the conception of essence and appearance 
suggested by Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism in Capital. I will examine these statements more 
closely. 
The objective aspect of the phenomenon of reification corresponds to the “second nature” [HCC, 
p.86] of the apparent laws that govern capitalism, the appearance that is granted a social reality in 
both Capital and HCC. At the same time, the positing of the subjective aspect of reification as man’s 
activity estranged from himself, simultaneously suggests that man’s activity is the underlying 
foundation of this “second nature” [HCC, p.86]. The transcendence of this “second nature” is 
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therefore dependent on the overcoming of the estrangement of man’s activity that Lukács identifies 
[HCC, p.86]. I would argue that the tension that exists in Marx’s Manuscripts, examined in the first 
chapter, between two and one conceptions of subjectivity, seems to be reproduced within Lukács’s 
conception of the dual aspects of the phenomenon of reification.  
Whilst operating with very different conceptual frameworks, I would argue that there is an analogy 
between the forms of argument used in each work. In the first chapter, I argued that there is a 
tension in Marx’s Manuscripts between two and one conceptions of subjectivity, which pre-figures 
the development of Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism. Lukács takes the theory of commodity 
fetishism as his starting point, but reproduces this ambiguous relationship within the theory. 
Concretely this means that “second nature”, a human world that appears deprived of subjectivity, is 
simultaneously irreducible to and yet founded on human activity. The “forces which generate their 
own power” in Lukács’s analysis are either a pseudo-subject (one subjectivity) or a real subject (two 
subjectivities) similar to the role played by “modern Industry as self” in Marx’s Manuscripts.93 
Lukács’s exposition of the phenomenon of reification powerfully extends the contradictions of the 
problem, but the ticklish problem of the subject capable of transcending this reification remains. 
Marx’s distinction, in the Manuscripts, between alienation and objectification was unavailable to 
Lukács when writing HCC. This makes it somewhat teleological to ask whether Lukács would have 
been able to formulate such a distinction. It can be shown however, that a distinction between 
alienation and objectification and between essence and appearance is necessary for a defensible 
conception of a Marxist perspective. Therefore a valid question would be to ask to what extent 
Lukács’s framework precludes these distinctions, or makes it hard for him to formulate them. 
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c) Reification and the Proletariat 
In Lukács’s essay, Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, the notion of the proletariat is 
only discussed at length, and arguably mainly in a philosophical sense, in the third section called The 
Standpoint of the Proletariat. The concept is noticeable by its absence from his investigation of 
reification in the first section of the essay. I would argue that the separation of these two concepts, 
reification and the proletariat, is significant for Lukács. On the surface, the proletariat might simply 
appear as the answer to the philosophical problems posed by the antinomies of bourgeois thought. 
If Lukács’s conception of the proletariat were not rooted in his theory of reification, it would close 
off the possibility of a theory of proletarian transcendence of reification from within capitalist 
society. An adequate account of this central essay in HCC must explain the interconnections 
between its three sections. 
I will begin by questioning whether Lukács in fact only discusses the proletariat in a philosophical 
sense. On the one hand, Lukács points towards Marx’s concrete analysis of the consciousness of the 
Silesian weavers [HCC, p.174]. However there does appear to be a separation between the 
discussion of the proletariat as a potential revolutionary subject and the forms of reified 
consciousness experienced by the working class under capitalism. This separation would have to be 
overcome in order to enunciate an adequate theory of transcendence of reification from within 
capitalism. 
This raises the question posed by Lukács about the possibility of attaining knowledge under 
capitalism. On the one hand, for Lukács, true knowledge is only possible for the proletariat under 
capitalism because it is capable of becoming the identical subject/object of history. And yet, in HCC, 
Lukács emphasises that whilst the Kantian limit of the thing-in-itself presents a real horizon to 
bourgeois thought, it does not prevent the real expansion of knowledge under capitalism. Lukács 
poses the question later in HCC, with reference to class-consciousness, namely: “how far is it in fact 
possible to discern the whole economy of a society from inside it?” [HCC, p.52] 
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It is “the purely abstract negativity in the life of the worker”, which represents “objectively the most 
typical manifestation of reification” [HCC, p.172]. For this reason, for Lukács, it is “subjectively the 
point at which this structure is raised to consciousness and where it can be breached in practice” 
[HCC, p.172]. I will return therefore to the question of the proletariat and how Lukács understands 
the process of labour as giving content to the relationship between man and nature. 
d) Labour and the Proletariat 
In The Phenomenon of Reification, the first section of his essay on Reification and the Consciousness 
of the Proletariat, Lukács’s discussion of labour focuses on the notion of the division of labour. As in 
the earlier essay The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg, Lukács’s primary concern is the “division of the 
process of labour into parts at the cost of the individual humanity of the worker”, and its effect on 
the “thought, the science and the philosophy of capitalism” [HCC, p.27]. It is characteristic of Lukács 
that he approaches the question of labour from the context of a discussion of the process of the 
creation of consciousness. 
The capitalist division of labour underlies, for Lukács, the concern in bourgeois thought with objects 
that arise from the “process of studying phenomena in isolation” [HCC, p.28]. In his attempt to 
dissolve the fetishistic forms of the commodity system, Lukács diagnoses the estrangement of man’s 
activity as the “abstraction of the human labour incorporated into commodities” [HCC, p.87]. Lukács 
repeats this theme in his later chapter on organisational problems, when he argues that the division 
of labour is “alien to the nature of man, makes men ossify in their activity”, and that “it makes 
automata of them in their jobs and turns them into the slaves of routine” [HCC, p.335]. 
It is, Lukács argues, the universality of the commodity form that is responsible for this. The “modern 
process of labour” has developed, for Lukács, through a complex historical process to the point of 
being a “category of society influencing decisively the objective form of things and people in the 
society thus emerging, their relation to nature and the possible relations of men to each other” 
[HCC, p.88]. In the third section of the Reification essay, The Standpoint of the Proletariat, Lukács 
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investigates the dialectic between the “social existence of the worker” and the “forms of his 
consciousness” [HCC, p.168]. Lukács analyses the possibility of the workers breaking with the “pure 
immediacy” of their existence in society and becoming conscious of themselves as commodities, and 
thus beginning to discover their “own relations with capital” [HCC, p.168]. 
This new element of “adding self-consciousness to the commodity structure” [HCC, p.168], he 
argues, is different to the “rigid epistemological doubling of subject and object” that takes place in 
previous epochs, e.g. with slavery [HCC, p.169]. The workers who recognise themselves as 
commodities have a form of knowledge which is practical, knowledge which “brings about an 
objective structural change in the object of knowledge” [HCC, p.169]. 
Lukács discusses the “special nature of labour as a commodity” [HCC, p.169], which for as long as the 
workers are unconscious of themselves as commodities plays the role of an “unacknowledged 
driving wheel in the economic process”, but upon coming to consciousness “now objectifies itself by 
means of this consciousness” [HCC, p.169]. It could be asked therefore what the subject is that 
undertakes this simultaneous objectifying of itself and coming to consciousness? Is the proletariat 
identical with this self-knowledge of the commodity? Lukács thinks that Marx’s theory of commodity 
fetishism contains the “self-knowledge of the proletariat”, when conceived as the “knowledge of 
capitalist society (and of the societies that preceded it)” [HCC, p.170]. 
Lukács argues that this is contained “implicitly in the dialectical antithesis of quantity and quality as 
we meet it in the question of labour-time” [HCC, p.169]. The extent to which the theory of 
commodity fetishism is a universal key for Lukács can be seen by his claim that the recognition of the 
commodity character of labour power makes it possible to “recognise the fetish character of every 
commodity” [HCC, p.169]. He argues however that this does not to make the “teeming abundance” 
of history superfluous [HCC, p.170]. For this reason, it is necessary for the dialectical method to 
constant renew itself, if it is not to freeze into a “new rigidity and a new immediacy” [HCC, p.170]. 
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The proletariat is unique because it stands at the “focal point” of the capitalist socialising process 
[HCC, p.176]. Despite capitalism’s tendency to transform “relations between human beings into 
purely social relations”, bourgeois thought remains “enmeshed in fetishistic categories” [HCC, 
p.176]. On the one hand, every “human element” is removed from the “immediate existence” of the 
proletariat, whilst on the other hand, every ‘direct’ link with nature is eliminated so that “socialised 
man can stand revealed in an objectivity remote from or even opposed to humanity” [HCC, p.176]. It 
is in this “objectification”, in this “rationalisation and reification of all social forms” that Lukács 
argues we can “see clearly for the first time how society is constructed from the relations of men 
with each other” [HCC, p.176].94 
e) Labour beyond Capitalism and the Realm of Freedom 
In the section on The Standpoint of the Proletariat, Lukács claims to have sketched out a “Marxist 
analysis of labour under capitalism” [HCC, p.170].95 This is distinguished, Lukács would argue, by the 
antithesis between the “isolated individual” and the “abstract generality within which he finds 
mediated the relation between his work and society” [HCC, p.170]. The fact that Lukács develops a 
discussion of labour “under capitalism” [HCC, p.170], suggests that, following Marx in Capital, he 
discusses labour as a process common to more than one epoch of human history, or mode of 
production. This, it could be argued, leaves open the possibility of a form of labour that points 
beyond the limits of capitalism. 
Lukács’s use of the oft-quoted passage in Capital concerning the “realm of freedom” suggests that 
he operates with an implicit notion of the “realm of necessity” [HCC, p.312-313].96 In this passage 
Marx makes clear that both “savage and civilized” man must “wrestle with nature to satisfy his 
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 Lukács’s use of Marx’s conceptual apparatus and terminology from Capital is extensive in HCC. For example, 
Lukács employs a conception of the metabolic interchange between man and nature. It may be questioned, 
however to what extent Lukács has taken up both the form of language and the content of Marx’s concepts. 
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needs […] in all forms of society and under all possible modes of production”.97 In other words, does 
Lukács, like Marx in this passage, conceive of a trans-historical element of human labour? The 
question can perhaps also be whether Lukács recognises in labour an element that is simultaneously 
necessary and also potentially free. It would be a one-sided use of this passage if Lukács was to make 
repeated use of the notion of the “realm of freedom” without acknowledging the implications that 
the “realm of necessity” has for the enduring recalcitrance of nature and its role as a ‘continually 
surprising interlocutor’ with man.98 
In the chapter of HCC entitled Class Consciousness, Lukács associates the “‘realm of freedom’” with 
“the end of the ‘pre-history of mankind’” [HCC, p.69]. He argues that it “means precisely that the 
power of the objectified, reified relations between men begins to revert to man” [HCC, p.69]. Lukács 
makes little discussion of Marx’s corresponding term of the “realm of necessity”.99 Does the “realm 
of necessity” remain the basis of the “realm of freedom” for Lukács or is it in some way 
transcended? Lukács’s suggestion that the “moment of transition to the ‘realm of freedom’” is 
dependent on the “conscious will of the proletariat”, and the corresponding cataclysmic notion of a 
“final economic crisis of capitalism”, could be interpreted as suggesting that the revolution itself is a 
transition that leaves behind the realm of necessity altogether [HCC, p.70]. This interpretation seems 
unlikely in the context of Lukács’s overall framework. 
Perhaps the issue is that Lukács is not quoting directly from Marx at all, but rather has in mind 
Engels’ discussion in Anti-Dühring of the “transition accomplished by mankind after the revolution” 
[HCC, p.312]. Lukács draws particular attention to Engels’ notion of “the leap from the realm of 
necessity into the realm of freedom” [quoted in HCC, p.312]. Lukács points out that, for a dialectical 
materialist, this transition is both a leap and a process. Lukács recognises that the great difficulty 
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Writings (Arthur, C Dialectics of Labour (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p.135). 
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with this conception of the dialectical transition between the realm of necessity and that of freedom 
“is to determine the starting-point of the process” [HCC, p.312].  
Lukács argues that separating the “’realm of freedom’ sharply from the process which is destined to 
call it into being”, precluding all “dialectical transitions” is to lapse into a “utopian outlook” [HCC, 
p.313]. In this sense even the first appearance of the proletariat on the stage of history indicates an 
aspiration towards the realm of freedom, “albeit in an unconscious way” [HCC, p.313]. Lukács lays 
great emphasis earlier in HCC on the notion that “knowledge of the present” and of its necessity, its 
“genesis and history”, represents the starting point for the proletariat’s historical knowledge [HCC, 
p.159]. The role of class consciousness looms large for Lukács, as it plays the decisive role in 
determining the course of the revolution, and therefore whether such a leap is taken. And yet he 
recognises that the approach of the realm of freedom does not negate the objective necessities of 
the economic process. 
Lukács’s interpretation of Engels’ ‘leap’, as both event and process, seems to preserve the ability to 
conceive of the continuation of the realm of necessity after the revolution, where necessity is not 
conceived as something opposed to freedom, but as its basis. Thus, for Lukács, labour appears to 
have a trans-historical element. It is a process that has certain common features across different 
epochs of human history. Lukács also appreciates that the “realm of freedom” does not negate the 
laws of nature altogether, but that it merely necessitates the transcendence of the “second nature” 
created by man in order for humanity to realise the potential of this sphere. In the epoch of 
capitalist production however, individual freedom is progressively annihilated by the processes of 
capitalist reification. 
f) Transcendence and the ‘Purity’ of the Proletariat 
As a collection of essays written over an extended period of time, HCC might be expected to 
demonstrate a certain development or progression. In reference to the absence of a comparative 
element in Lukács’s analysis, it could be asked whether a tension exists between the apparent 
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‘purity’ of the conception of subjectivity present in the chapters on Class Consciousness and 
Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat in comparison with the later essays on the 
methodology of organisation and tactics. 
I have enquired as to whether Lukács’s resolution of the antinomies of bourgeois thought through 
the proletariat as the identical subject-object of history, in his essay on Reification and the 
Standpoint of the Proletariat, can be considered a form of ultra-subjectivity. Is there a connection 
between the possible resolution of this antinomy with a super-subject, and the ‘purity’ of the subject 
thus conceived? Methodological statements such as, “The totality of an object can only be posited if 
the positing subject is itself a totality” [HCC, p.28], seem to frame the analysis in such ‘pure’ terms. 
The ‘impurity’ that we might conceive is necessitated by the problem that the starting point of the 
transcending subject must emerge from within capitalist society itself. 
I will now consider the later essays of HCC, concerning his critique of Rosa Luxemburg and his 
examination of the organisational problems of the revolutionary party. In these essays, Lukács 
develops the relationship between proletarian and non-proletarian elements in the revolutionary 
process, and the influence of non-proletarian elements on proletarian class consciousness. Lukács 
also raises questions, common in the Third International at this time, regarding the notion of 
hegemony. It could be asked whether the same conception of subjectivity can be found in the 
chapters on Class Consciousness and Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, as is found 
in these later discussions, or whether another conception of subjectivity is identifiable. 
Lukács’s critique of Luxemburg in the essay Critical Observations on Rosa Luxemburg’s “Critique of 
the Russian Revolution” is explicitly based on her overestimation of the “purely proletarian 
character” [HCC, p.274] of the Russian Revolution. Lukács draws our attention to both the “non-
proletarian elements outside” the proletariat, as well as the influence of non-proletarian ideologies 
“within the proletariat” [HCC, p.275]. Given the absence of any criticism of Luxemburg in the earlier 
chapter on The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg, does this represent an implicit self-critique by Lukács 
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after reading Lenin’s Left-Wing Communism, or does his theorisation go even beyond this? At no 
point does Lukács explicitly claim to have a pure conception of the proletariat, but his later critique 
of Luxemburg might lead us to infer this in the earlier essays of HCC. 
The continuing influence of Luxemburg on Lukács is clear despite his criticisms. In fact he argues, in 
the Critical Observations essay, that Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital contains “the socio-
economic theory that suggests what the revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks ought to be vis-à-vis 
the non-proletarian strata of workers” [HCC, p.289]. Is there perhaps a link between Lukács’s 
discussion of hegemony and the question of the purity of his conception of subjectivity? Does 
Lukács’s discussion of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie imply that an understanding of the means by 
which a proletarian hegemony could be constructed? Can such an understanding be located in 
Lukács discussion of the relationship between workers’ movement and the revolutionary party, the 
problems of leadership and ‘spontaneous’ action? 
By what means does this ‘impurity’ arrive in Lukács’s analysis? It could arguably be established 
through the conception of knowledge as “practical critical activity” [HCC, p.262], which allows for the 
continual transformation of the basis of the relationship between empirical and imputed class 
consciousness. Bound up with this mechanism is Lukács’s notion, borrowed from Weber, of 
“objective possibility” [HCC, p.51], which seeks to integrate a concrete analysis of class forces into 
Lukács’s framework. But to what extent has this notion been organically integrated into his 
conception of a Marxist analysis?100 I have identified a number of limitations of Lukács’s analysis in 
HCC, but also some indication of a progression in Lukács’s essays in HCC that might be developed. I 
contend that the tensions in Lukács’s later essays on revolutionary strategy and organisation begin 
to modify his understanding, working backwards from a more concrete analysis to a higher level of 
abstraction. This will be of particular interest in the later discussion of Antonio Gramsci whose 
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218 
 
comparative analysis of class forces, power and institutions demonstrates a Marxist conception 




a) Lukács’s Conception of Subjectivity and the Philosophy of Praxis 
The detailed engagement of this chapter with the arguments of the central Reification essay of HCC 
was necessary in order to establish its conceptual framework. It forms the central pivot of Lukács’s 
attempt to synthesise three elements: the fusion of Weber’s concept of rationalisation within a 
Marxist theory of commodity fetishism, the immanent critique of bourgeois philosophy, and the 
elaboration of a philosophy of praxis as the basis for proletarian revolution. This gives rise to a set of 
categories that reveal a distinctive conception of subjectivity.  
In the analysis, I have argued that Lukács’s framework allows direct questions to be asked about the 
creation of the proletariat as a revolutionary subject. Lukács’s focus on the formation of class 
consciousness and the historical development of the complexities of bourgeois thought could appear 
as traits of a straightforwardly Hegelian approach.101 It is however the deployment of a set of 
distinctions (the categories of social mediation within a class-based analysis) developed from his 
transposition of the theory of commodity fetishism and the specificities of capitalist society into this 
investigation that seems to constitute a distinctively Marxist substance in his conception of the 
historical process. 
There are, however, obvious differences between the frameworks deployed by Marx and Lukács. 
The concept of labour in Lukács’s framework seems to play a much less unifying role than the one 
studied in the first chapter on Marx’s Manuscripts. The status of the concept of labour in HCC is 
disputed. It is difficult to isolate Lukács’s precise usage of the term labour in its various formulations 
as the division of labour, the problem of labour-time, the special nature of labour as a commodity, 
and labour-power. The reason for this may be that Lukács is most interested in illuminating the 
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Class Consciousness, p.136). 
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dialectic between the workers’ social existence and the forms of their consciousness [HCC, p.168]. 
His discussion of the work process is structured around this relationship.102  
Lukács depicts the development of revolutionary consciousness, not as the construction of a passive 
knowledge, but of knowledge as “practical critical activity” [HCC, p.262]. He tries to show the way in 
which the proletariat’s capacity of grasping the totality results in the “total, structural 
transformation” of the “immediate objects of action” [HCC, p.175]. What prevents the gap between 
the empirical consciousness of the proletariat and its imputed consciousness from becoming a 
‘messianic leap’ is that the interaction between consciousness and its objects continually changes 
the basis of the relationship between empirical and imputed consciousness. 
This picture is, however, predicated on the positing of its point of departure, the subject of action, 
the proletariat as the “identical subject-object” of history [HCC, p.149]. We have discussed the 
problematic nature of the notion of the proletariat as the ‘identical subject-object’ of history, the 
subject of Lukács’s philosophy of praxis. In Lukács’s framework this subjective aspect of the dialectic 
of the absolute subject-object requires the objective aspect of the dialectic between mediation and 
immediacy.103 A unique aspect of Lukács’s theory of subjectivity is his equation of class relations with 
mediation. The division between class standpoints is mapped in the realm of consciousness onto the 
capacity or incapacity to penetrate immediate reality, to generate the necessary mediations to 
construct what Lukács terms “authentic objective reality” [HCC, p.150]. The identification of 
mediation with class relations means that the bourgeoisie is incapable, in the final analysis,104 of 
going beyond the immediate standpoint. 
                                                          
102
 We might ask however whether Lukács would benefit from the conception of “living labour” which plays a 
central role for Marx in the development of Capital. 
103
 Arato, A and Breines, P The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism (New York: Seabury, 1979), 
p.131 
104
 An important point to note is the space left by Lukács for the bourgeoisie to temporarily raise mediations to 
consciousness, to develop real insights. This is has a significance for class consciousness. It is concretely 
manifested, for example, in the distinction between vulgar and classical political economy. 
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This raises the question of why the capacity or incapacity to penetrate immediacy need necessarily 
be tied to class. For Lukács, this seems to point to an intimate connection between mediation and 
the structure of capitalist society as he attempts to outline in the Reification essay. The danger in 
this conceptualisation is perhaps that mediation is transposed too crudely from this construction. It 
is apparent that certain bourgeois thinkers have been able in a partial and obfuscated way to 
provide insights and tools with which to penetrate immediacy. It is of course precisely this 
recognition that makes Lukács’s analysis of the antinomies of bourgeois thought so informative. We 
might question however whether Lukács is able to traverse his discussion of subjectivity at this level 
of abstraction to a discussion of the question of class subjectivity.105 Or to pose the question more 
concretely, whether such a traversal requires an analysis of the various forms in which human beings 
interact with each other in definite social contexts. 
b) Between Lukács and Gramsci 
I will shortly be turning to an investigation of subjectivity in Antonio Gramsci. I will therefore venture 
a few comparative observations based on the study of Lukács’s HCC. It seems that there is an 
interesting point of similarity in both thinkers’ emphasis on the methodological importance of the 
idea of tendencies.106 For Lukács, tendencies represent an authentic reality, placed on a higher level 
than the “facts” which must be exhibited through them [HCC, p.183-184]. Whilst Gramsci does not 
enunciate a similar critique of immediate facts, this does not mean that such an analysis is 
incompatible with his conception. For Gramsci, the intellectual tradition in Italy was predominantly a 
sophisticated anti-empiricist form of idealism, epitomised by Benedetto Croce. In this context, he 
was able to assume a critique of empiricism as given. By contrast, the various forms of mainstream 
bourgeois empiricism that Lukács had to confront are central targets for his attack in HCC. 
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 Arato and Breines The Young Lukács, p.139 – Arato and Breines theorise such a criticism through the 
absence of a notion of intersubjectivity in Lukács’s HCC. It would be fruitful to interrogate Arato and Breines 
further to find out whether their notion of intersubjectivity is necessary, or an abstraction that can more 
adequately be handled by a concrete analysis of the type put forward by Gramsci. 
106
 For Gramsci, Ricardo’s great achievement is to introduce the idea of law as tendency. Gramsci understands 
the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as an interaction between tendency and counter-tendency. 
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Lukács’s early intellectual association with the tragic worldview of a doomed bourgeois culture is in 
marked distinction from the more positive assessment by Gramsci of the bourgeoisie’s ability to 
construct an adequate conception of the world. It would be interesting to assess in what way this 
influences each thinker’s ability to give an account of how classes are formed into subjects. Another 
point of difference is Gramsci’s very sympathetic position towards pragmatism in comparison to 
Lukács’s more hostile attitude, perhaps here influenced by the Kantian urge to expunge the 
contingent from philosophy.  
Gramsci emphasises a conception of all human beings as philosophers, whose experience must be 
made critical. In one sense, the emphasis that Lukács places on an immanent critique of bourgeois 
philosophy, whose obscure product is the dialectical method, is in tension with its grounding in the 
lived experience of the proletariat. Gramsci’s consideration of all aspects of life, including 
philosophy, in the context of the development of hegemonic projects, could therefore be said to 
give a more concrete and comparative analysis from the outset. Gramsci’s focus on the content of 
the political level is in marked contrast to Lukács’s more formal discussion of political leadership. 
However, I would also argue that Lukács’s sensitivity to the Kantian tradition gives rise to his 
particular capacity to critique and theorise the limitation of power, as well as the notion of the 
overthrow and seizure of power. Here is a point of possible convergence with Gramsci’s interest in 
the new institutions of a counter-hegemonic (or proletarian hegemonic) power. The next chapter’s 
investigation of the development of Gramsci’s conception of class subjectivity and its relation to his 
understanding of philosophy seeks to deepen the basis of these summary comparisons. 
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a) The Prison Notebooks in Context 
The experience of class struggles in Italy during the Biennio Rosso (1919-20), the troubled birth of 
the Italian Communist Party, and the rise of fascism in Italy all profoundly shaped the subsequent 
political and philosophical writings of Antonio Gramsci. Over the course of his political and 
intellectual life post-1917, both at large and during incarceration, Gramsci attempted to synthesise 
the lessons of these experiences with the traditions of Leninism. The result was the development of 
a distinctive account of class subjectivity motivated initially by his enthusiasm for the Russian 
Revolution. The evolution of Gramsci’s conception of proletarian subjectivity within a field of class 
forces was in many ways a development of the practical working hypotheses that Gramsci was, 
through his leadership of the Italian Communist Party in the early 1920s, in the process of testing 
against reality. 
This practice was beginning to demand a conceptual apparatus capable of theorising the problems 
associated with this strategy. Thus if the proletariat could not be conceived of as forming a subject 
on its own, a theory would have to be formulated by which the hegemony of the bourgeois regime 
could be dissipated, destroyed and ultimately replaced by an alliance of anti-capitalist forces under 
the hegemony of a proletarian leadership. Gramsci’s imprisonment produced the seminal 
intellectual expression of this new conception in his Prison Notebooks.1 
b) What Kind of Theory of Subjectivity do we Find in Gramsci? 
Gramsci’s studies of various moments in Italian, European and world history in the Prison Notebooks, 
from the Sicilian Vespers through the Medieval Communes to the English and French Revolutions 
and the Risorgimento, to contemporary analyses of Fascism and Fordism can be characterised by 
                                                          
1
 Gramsci, A Selections from the Prison Notebooks ed. and trans. Hoare, Q and Nowell-Smith, G (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1971) – Henceforth referenced in the text as [SPN, p.page], i.e. [Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks, p.page]. 
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their comparative nature. This comparative method establishes the common features and the 
specificities of each. Through an analysis of the contending class forces and of the various moments 
of the hegemonic project of the dominant class in each situation, Gramsci attempts to construct the 
conceptual apparatus for a general theory of class power. In doing so he establishes a distinctively 
concrete account of the class subjects that take part in these events. 
For Gramsci the history of the ruling classes is “essentially the history of States”, and his account of 
the State traces the course of its historical development, its expansion, and changing function in 
society [SPN, p.52]. However it may also be useful to recall the direct context of Gramsci’s writings 
on the State. He is forced to come to terms with an Italian State in the hands of a fascist regime.2 It is 
an on-going difficulty for those interpreting Gramsci to bear in mind both of these registers of 
concern: the formulation of a general theoretical framework, in his words, “für ewig” and the 
discovery of direct political insights into a particular historical or contemporary situation [SPN, p.x]. 
A problem that the editors of the Selections3 frequently contend with in their notes is that it must 
often be surmised from the context of Gramsci’s writings to which historical period an observation is 
intended to apply, or indeed whether it may have multiple applications.4 We can infer that Gramsci 
believes that fruitful experimental work can be achieved through the juxtaposing or inverting of 
contexts in this way. Furthermore, these two registers are not necessarily mutually exclusive, since 
for Gramsci: “all of history bears witness to the present” [SPN, p.267]. 
Gramsci attempts to translate the “science and art of politics” into a “body of practical rules” for 
research and observation [SPN, p.175]. His historico-political analysis emphasises the importance of 
distinguishing and maintaining the correct relation between the elements of the “organic” and the 
                                                          
2
 This historical conjuncture raised specific questions for Gramsci: whether the overthrow of fascism would 
result in its replacement by a new type of bourgeois regime, or a more fundamental social transformation? 
And consequently, whether the overthrow of fascism required external intervention, or whether possibilities 
exist for a counter-hegemonic project to emerge within a fascist State? 
3
 Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith 
4
 e.g. the case of passive revolution: see Gramsci Selections p.107 fn.101. Perry Anderson refers to this type of 
writing as a “‘desituated’ mode of discourse” (Anderson, P “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci” New Left 
Review I/100 (November 1976 – January 1977), p.20). 
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“conjunctural” [SPN, p.178]. Failure to do so, he argues, can lead to twin dangers, of “economism”, 
the over-emphasising of mechanical causes, or of “ideologism”, exaggerating the element of 
voluntarism in a historical situation [SPN, p.178]. 
Whilst averse to making “categorical or absolute” judgements, and preferring to “describe certain 
aspects of a situation”, Gramsci does not retreat from attempting to create generalising abstractions 
to describe reality [SPN, p.275]. The purpose of these is twofold, to evaluate the activity in a 
situation in order to change it, and to give those who have risen above the situation and “modified” 
activity “within their own ranks” the capacity to achieve greater prominence [SPN, p.275]. 
c) Investigating Gramsci’s Theory of Subjectivity 
This chapter will investigate the distinctive nature of the conception of class subjectivity developed 
by Gramsci, focusing particularly on the role played by the intellectuals as the fundamental unit in 
his theory of the construction of political leadership. Examining Gramsci’s conception of the 
“traditional” intellectuals, we will find that Gramsci ultimately undermines their claims to autonomy 
as a social group. Yet, his theorisation of the “traditional” intellectuals produces a comparative 
framework through which Gramsci characterises the specific features of different bourgeois 
hegemonic projects. 
Second, Gramsci’s conception of class subjectivity is tested by the existence of a collective subject 
not self-evidently explicable in terms of class subjectivity, namely the State. We will propose a new 
categorisation of two related modes of analysis of the State employed by Gramsci: a constitutive and 
a holistic mode of analysis. The constitutive mode, exemplified in his analysis of the recruitment of 
the State bureaucracy, illuminates the class basis of the ‘molecular processes’ through which the 
process of State formation takes place [SPN, p.194 p.267]. This mode explains the emergence of the 
apparent autonomy of the State within the framework of a class analysis. On the other hand, the 
holistic mode of analysis relates class and State through a totalising analysis, as seen in Gramsci’s 
analysis of prestige in the relations between State and class. This mode demonstrates the active role 
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that the State plays in creating a class subject. Gramsci’s analysis of the State requires the 
articulation of both of these modes, and an explanation of their interrelationship. 
The class subjectivities of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will be examined comparatively 
through an analysis of their respective hegemonic projects. A relationship will be drawn between 
these projects and Gramsci’s conception of philosophy, particularly his notion of ‘catharsis’, and its 
connection with the development of a subaltern, and specifically proletarian, subjectivity. In his 
discussions of the problem of creating proletarian organic intellectuals, we find that Gramsci’s key 
concern is with the emergence of the proletariat as a subject, as a class-for-itself. 
d) Is there a Theory of Fetishism in Gramsci? 
In this thesis I have followed the close connection between the emergence of the working class as a 
revolutionary subject and the overcoming of, variously, alienation (Marx’s Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts), commodity fetishism (Marx’s Capital), and reification (Lukács’s History 
and Class Consciousness). Tracing the development of this theme further within Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks presents a challenge that is not easily surmounted. 
Recent scholarship, such as Peter Thomas’s The Gramscian Moment, has highlighted the 
sophistication of Gramsci’s understanding of Marxist economics.5 Despite this, the predominantly 
political terrain of Gramsci’s investigations means that he rarely focuses on economic mechanisms, 
and never directly elaborates a theory of commodity fetishism. In the absence of an explicit 
discussion of commodity fetishism or reification in Gramsci’s work, it may however be possible to 
establish whether he has an implicit conception of these concepts. 
In highlighting the unity arising from the “dialectical development of the contradictions between 
man and matter (nature-material forces of production)”, Gramsci discusses value as the “unitary 
centre” of economics, as an ‘alias’ for the “relationship between the worker and the industrial 
productive forces” [SPN, p.402]. Thus he criticises the adherents of “crass vulgar materialism” who 
                                                          
5
 Thomas, P The Gramscian Moment (Chicago: Haymarket, 2009), p.347 
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see “machines in themselves – as constant and technical capital – as producers of value independent 
of the man who runs them” [SPN, p.402]. This appears to demonstrate that Gramsci’s dialectical 
grasp of economics is one that addresses the problem of the machine, here equated by Gramsci with 
capital, as an apparently self-valorising agent.6 Thus he confronts a problematic similar to the 
authentic subjectivity or quasi-subjectivity of capital that Marx solves with the mechanism of 
fetishism. 
Nevertheless, Gramsci’s main concern in The Prison Notebooks is to address the philosophical and 
political levels of this unity between “man and matter” [SPN, p.402]. Therefore the phenomenon of 
commodity fetishism is manifested in Gramsci’s thought not primarily economically, but at the level 
of philosophical praxis and of political organisation. In philosophy he examines the relationship 
between “human will (superstructure) and economic structure”, and in politics between “State 
(centralised will)” and civil society [SPN, p.403]. The absence of a direct focus on economic 
mechanisms may not be a problem for Gramsci, since he argues that the activities of philosophy, 
politics and economics are all implicit in each other. Despite having a “specific language proper to 
each”, he claims that they can be reciprocally translated [SPN, p.403]. 
At the political level, I will argue that the projected forms of practico-critical activity that Gramsci 
associates with a revolutionary political party perform a de-fetishising function in his thought. 
Gramsci denotes the experimental organisational form of this activity, after Niccolo Machiavelli, as 
the ‘Modern Prince’. At the level of philosophy, the proletariat must work out a coherent and unified 
world-view in order to realise its hegemonic project. Philosophy, as conceived by Gramsci, is not the 
isolated preserve of intellectuals, but a collective project that implicitly involves all members of a 
social group. Nevertheless, the primary task of the proletariat is to create its own independent group 
                                                          
6
 Gramsci elaborates the specific attributes of a critical political economy, his distinctive contribution to which 
is a conception of ‘automatism’ as “a group freedom, in opposition to individualistic free will” (Gramsci, A 
Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks ed. and trans. Boothman D (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1995), p.179). A further discussion of Gramsci’s critical political economy can be found in Krätke, M “Antonio 
Gramsci’s Contribution to a Critical Economics” Historical Materialism Vol. 19:3 (2011), pp.63-105. 
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of organic intellectuals who can organise this project. Marxism, as the philosophy of praxis, is 
therefore an on-going attempt to construct this coherent and unified world-view. 
Since it arises from within the world of capitalism, this project confronts the fact that the subaltern 
classes have a world-view that is disjointed and episodic. The social position of the working class is 
characterised by a contradictory consciousness [SPN, p.333]. He argues that the consciousness of the 
worker is ‘composite’, and that the world-view expressed by workers’ collective activity stands in 
direct conflict with general conceptions transmitted through the networks and institutions 
maintaining the ruling group’s hegemony. Thus Gramsci sets the terrain for an ideological struggle 
between the consciousness arising from collective forms of working class struggle, and the 
disintegrating and disorganising effect of the hegemonic apparatus of the ruling group upon the 
subaltern groups. 
Marx’s discussion of alienation in general, and in particular of commodity fetishism in Capital, is 
distinguished by his repeated recourse to analogies drawn with the “misty realm of religion”.7 Here, 
in order to explain the process of penetrating fetishistic appearances, Marx relates to the kind of 
inversions employed by Feuerbach in his analysis of Christianity. Thus the process of inversion 
through which the illusion of religion is brought down to earth is seen as similar to the mechanism 
by which the apparently natural character of capitalism is revealed as being historically specific. 
By contrast, for Gramsci, there is a blurred boundary between religion and modes of acting. 
Collective practices are thus treated as forms of popular religion, as popular tradition. Gramsci is 
concerned with analysing the construction of tradition, and the positive aspect that can be derived 
from this, such as the strength with which Catholicism grips and organises the masses.8 Gramsci’s 
historical analysis of the structural location of “traditional” intellectuals in each society dismantles 
their “esprit de corps”, the particular status or prestige they enjoy, and reveals the class basis of 
                                                          
7
 Marx, K Capital Vol. I (London, Penguin, 1990 [1976]), p.165 
8
 Gramsci frequently paraphrases Marx’s Introduction to his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in which 
Marx says that theory becomes a “material force once it has gripped the masses” (Gramsci Selections, p.377, 
p.404 – Marx, K Early Writings (London: Penguin, 1992 [1975]), p.251). 
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their subjectivity. This gives Gramsci’s comparative framework its particular theoretical strength by 
identifying how the specific features of the formation of political leadership can be characterised in 
different hegemonic projects. 
At the same time, Gramsci is very attentive towards the process by which a worldview becomes 
ossified and separated from its manifestation as a material force. Thus, while an increasingly 
anachronistic worldview continues to dominate the world, this can be overcome through the 
development of the “instinctive feeling of independence” of the subaltern classes. This process 
requires the working out of the contradictory consciousness of workers into a “coherent conception 
of the world” and their organisation as a class subject through the ‘Modern Prince’ [SPN, p.333]. 
Gramsci’s project for the proletariat to realise itself as the hegemonic class shares much with 
Lukács’s desire for the proletariat to become the revolutionary subject of history. Yet whilst the 
theoretical counterpart of Lukács’s concept of reification is his notion of the proletariat as the 
potential ‘identical subject-object’ of history, Gramsci’s hostility to speculative and metaphysical 
thought tends to steer him away from conceptualising the proletariat as an abstract philosophical 
absolute.   
Gramsci’s focus on the immanent development of Marxism as a moment of modern culture means 
that he characterises the “passage” between the “‘spontaneous’ feelings of the masses” and the 
theory of Marxism as a “‘quantitative’ difference of degree” [SPN, p.198-199]. By contrast, Lukács 
emphasises the element of transcendence by conceptualising the “leap” from the empirical 
consciousness of the proletariat to its ascribed/imputed consciousness as “a turning in the direction 
of something qualitatively new”.9 Nevertheless, I will argue that Gramsci’s definition of this passage 
as a process of “catharsis” bears comparison with Lukács’s conception of a “leap” as complementary 
aspects of a dialectical theory of class consciousness [SPN, p.366]. 
                                                          
9
 Lukács, G History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin, 1971), p.250 
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2) Intellectuals, Autonomy and the Problem of ‘Tradition’? 
Gramsci’s ideas regarding the formation of intellectuals are less frequently discussed than his 
concepts of hegemony and passive revolution. However, Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals is central 
to his thought, particularly in regard to the problem of subjectivity. The intellectuals, for Gramsci, 
can be likened in their role to the commodity in Marx’s Capital. For Marx, the commodity is the 
conceptual unit or building block of capitalist society, a society that is based on generalised 
commodity production. Similarly, for Gramsci, the intellectual is the unit in the construction of 
political leadership. To understand Gramsci’s generalised theory of class power, and its application 
to historical case studies, we must clarify the constituent elements at its core. 
a) Organic and ‘Traditional’ Intellectuals 
All humans are intellectuals, as Gramsci points out, but not all people in society have the “function 
of intellectuals” [SPN, p.9]. For Gramsci, each social group10 that “emerges on the original terrain of 
an essential function in the world of economic production” creates organically alongside it, “one or 
more strata of intellectuals” [SPN, p.5].11 These “organic” intellectuals play the role of giving the 
group “homogeneity and an awareness to its own function not only in the economic but also in the 
social and political fields” [SPN, p.5]. Thus Gramsci places a strong emphasis on the intellectuals as a 
constituent element of the construction and organisation of a class as a force or subject. In 
particular, he is interested in the “problem of creating a new stratum of intellectuals”, and the 
                                                          
10
 According to the editors of the Selections, Gramsci employs the term “social group” to avoid the Marxist 
overtones of “class”, although it often has a broader meaning. Class is unambiguously implied by the term 
“fundamental social group” (Gramsci Selections, p.5 fn.1).  
11
 The “organic” intellectuals created alongside a new class are, says Gramsci, “for the most part 
‘specialisations’ of partial aspects of the primitive activity of the new social type which the new class has 
brought into prominence” (Gramsci Selections, p.6). 
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relationship between “intellectual activity” and “muscular-nervous effort” that this entails [SPN, 
p.9].12  
Elsewhere Gramsci argues that his conception of the intellectuals is not simply the commonly 
understood meaning of the term, but the “entire social stratum which exercises an organisational 
function in the wide sense”, whether that be in the “field of production”, of “culture”, or of “political 
administration” [SPN, p.97 fn**]. Thus Gramsci admits that he engages in a “considerable extension 
of the concept of intellectual”, but argues that this is the “only way which enables one to reach a 
concrete approximation of reality” [SPN, p.12].13 
Every new stratum of “organic” intellectuals (up to the present), he says, finds already in existence 
various “categories of intellectuals”14 which seem to represent a “historical continuity 
uninterrupted”, despite the most “radical changes in political and social forms” [SPN, p.7]. In 
Gramsci’s Italy, the most common example of these “traditional” intellectuals were the ecclesiastics, 
who were formerly “organically bound to the landed aristocracy” [SPN, p.7]. Alongside the 
ecclesiastics developed a stratum of administrators, scientists and non-ecclesiastics who were once 
associated with the growing “central power of the monarch … up to absolutism” [SPN, p.7]. These 
“traditional” intellectuals share the characteristic of having played an organic role in a preceding 
form of hegemony. 
The “traditional” intellectuals experience “through an ‘esprit de corps’ their uninterrupted historical 
continuity”, leading them to advance themselves as “autonomous and independent of the dominant 
social group” [SPN, p.7]. Regardless of the veracity, or not, of their “self-assessment”, Gramsci 
                                                          
12
 For Gramsci all human activity entails some degree of specific intellectual activity. It is however muscular-
nervous effort, as an element of general practical activity, which is perpetually changing the world, and which 
becomes the basis of a “new and integral conception of the world” (Gramsci Selections, p.9). 
13
 This is an example of Gramsci operating with both a “common” conception of a concept and simultaneously 
elaborating a critical understanding which stretches this meaning – see also later in this chapter the discussion 
of the State, in its commonly understood and critical forms (arguably corresponding to the distinction between 
narrow/technical and integral State). Peter Ives, after Anne-Showstack Sassoon, argues that this 
transformation, or ‘subversion’, of language is key to Gramsci’s analytic process (Ives, P Language and 
Hegemony in Gramsci (London: Pluto, 2004), p.65). 
14
 The term “category”, argue the editors of the Selections, may refer to “trade or profession” or to a more 
general meaning (Gramsci Selections, p.5 fn.1). 
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argues that this claim has important and wide-ranging “consequences in the ideological and political 
field” [SPN, p.7]. The stance assumed by these intellectuals is an expression of the “social utopia”, 
which he says can be connected to the “whole of idealist philosophy”, of regarding themselves as 
“‘independent’, autonomous, endowed with a character of their own” [SPN, p.7-8]. 
This manifests itself in different ways for the different categories of “traditional” intellectuals. For 
example, the Pope proclaims his link with Christ and the Apostles, but conceals his connection with 
the modern industrialists. On the other hand, Benedetto Croce, the pre-eminent Italian non-
ecclesiastical thinker for Gramsci, feels himself connected with Aristotle and Plato, but is open about 
his relationship with the industrialists [SPN, p.8]. This difference is important, argues Gramsci, for 
understanding the significance of Croce’s philosophy for Italian culture. 
Gramsci tries to establish what the possible “‘maximum’ limits of acceptance of the term 
intellectual” should be [SPN, p.8]. He asks whether there is a “unitary criterion” by which the activity 
of intellectuals can be distinguished “in an essential way” from that of other “social groupings” [SPN, 
p.8]. He concludes that the most common error is to search for this in the “intrinsic nature” of 
intellectual activity, rather than by examining the position of these activities in the complex 
ensemble of the system of social relations [SPN, p.8]. 
The “traditional” intellectuals have an attachment to a historical class formation, but which is 
somehow more concealed or more mediated than with the “organic” intellectuals. Gramsci expends 
significant effort on his study of the problem of the formation of the traditional intellectuals. For 
Gramsci, the distinction between “intellectuals as an organic category of every fundamental social 
group” and “intellectuals as a traditional category” is “the central point of the question” [SPN, p.15]. 
It is from this distinction that “flow a whole series of problems and possible questions for historical 
research” [SPN, p.15]. 
One way of characterising the complexity introduced by Gramsci’s conception of the “traditional” 
intellectuals is that they appear, to themselves and other groups, to be a social group independent 
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of a particular class project. I will argue that Gramsci’s theory of class subjectivity seeks to expose 
this conception of the “intellectuals” as a social category independent of class as a “social utopia” or 
a myth.15 
Whereas the “organic” intellectuals are organically connected to the class alongside which they 
arise, the same is not obviously true for the “traditional” intellectuals. Nevertheless, the 
“traditional” intellectuals are still bound to a class project, even if in a more mediated or complex 
way. The importance of the inter-class aura of the “traditional” intellectuals is that they are the 
strongest form of the above-mentioned myth. 
b) Autonomy and the ‘Traditional’ Intellectuals 
In his note on “The Formation of the Intellectuals”, Gramsci asks whether intellectuals can be 
considered as an “autonomous and independent social group”, or whether each social group has its 
own “particular specialised category of intellectuals” [SPN, p.5]. Gramsci does not ascribe genuine 
autonomy to the intellectuals as a social group, since they are based in the framework of class 
relations, but he acknowledges the complexity of the problem. The source of this complexity and the 
means to investigate it both lie in the “variety of forms assumed to date by the real historical 
process” [SPN, p.5]. 
Gramsci argues that the relationship between the intellectuals and the “world of production” is less 
direct and more “mediated” than it is with the “fundament social groups” [SPN, p.12]. This is 
because their relationship with the world is “mediated” by the “whole fabric of society and by the 
complex of superstructures” [SPN, p.12]. The intellectuals are in fact the “functionaries” of this 
complex of superstructures [SPN, p.12].16 Gramsci suggests that it is technically possible to measure 
the “organic quality” of the intellectual strata, their “degree of connection to the fundamental social 
                                                          
15
 Further comparative investigation of Gramsci’s conceptions of utopia and myth would be a useful exercise. 
For Gramsci, myth appears to denote a positive social content, as in his notion of Machiavelli’s Prince, whereas 
utopia seems to suggest a form detached from its content. 
16
 Gramsci’s investigation of bureaucracy, discussed below, points out that the “problem of functionaries partly 
coincides with that of the intellectuals”, and that the former provides inspiration for solving problems 
regarding the latter (Gramsci Selections, p.186). 
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group” and to grade their functions and the superstructures “from the structure upwards” [SPN, 
p.12]. As an approximation however, he discerns two “major superstructural ‘levels’” corresponding 
the functions of “hegemony” exercised by the dominant group throughout society, and the “direct 
domination” that is “exercised through the State and ‘juridical’ government” [SPN, p.12]. 
The intellectuals therefore play the role of the “dominant group’s ‘deputies’” [SPN, p.12]. They are 
part of the particular division of labour employed by the dominant group to organise social 
hegemony and state domination [SPN, p.13]. This conception comes into conflict however with 
“preconceptions of caste” [SPN, p.12]. Gramsci finds the model of military organisation an apt tool 
to explain the manifestation of these preconceptions in the complex gradations of the strata of 
intellectuals.17 In particular those “officers” of the intellectuals who have risen from the ranks, 
comparable to the NCOs in the army, display the “most blatant” attachment to the “esprit de corps” 
or feeling of solidarity with the rest of the intellectual strata [SPN, p.13 fn.*]. In this respect Gramsci 
discusses the “spirit of caste”, the sense of community which exists amongst scholars and 
particularly leads those of lower grades to follow the higher “university professors and great 
scholars” [SPN, p.104].18 This “spirit of caste” has a social reality acknowledged by Gramsci. By 
explaining the “esprit de corps” of the “traditional” intellectuals, he seeks to dissolve the myth of the 
autonomy of intellectuals from its strongest point. 
Gramsci notes that intellectuals who characterise themselves as independent of class struggle, a 
“crystallised social group…continuing uninterruptedly through history”, connect themselves “with a 
preceding intellectual category by means of a common conceptual nomenclature” [SPN, p.452]. New 
types of society, he argues, create new superstructures and require “‘new’ intellectuals” [SPN, 
p.452]. But if these intellectuals maintain a direct connection with previous “intelligentsia”, they are 
                                                          
17
 Gramsci’s repeated use of military concepts for purposes of analogy is a distinctive feature of his analysis: 
the organisation of social forces as an army, the role played by the NCOs within this (See also Gramsci 
Selections, p.97 fn.**), the war of position/manoeuvre distinction, his analysis of voluntarism and commando 
tactics (Gramsci Selections, p.230), etc. 
18
 In this context we might also consider Croce’s desire to create an “international union of the great 
intellectuals of all nations” (Gramsci Selections, p.270). 
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not in fact new, but a “fossilised left-over” of a “historically superseded” group [SPN, p.453]. The 
situation is complicated, however by the possibility of a new “historical cultural content” 
maintaining an old conceptual form [SPN, p.454].19  
Gramsci accounts for the forms taken by the claims of these intellectuals to independence from the 
class struggle in modern society.20 Gramsci is concerned to dismantle the ideological representation 
of the “traditional” intellectuals as standing for universal values. He argues that “all intellectuals, 
however ‘pure’, are always expressive of certain tendencies” [SPN, p.289]. We will now investigate 
how successfully Gramsci generates the necessary mediations to explain the complex role that this 
stratum plays in society. 
c) Autonomy Reduced? History and Structural Location 
Gramsci analyses the structure of different types of intellectuals. Urban intellectuals are closely 
connected to industry. They mainly articulate the relationship between “entrepreneur and the 
instrumental mass”, whereas the “top” urban intellectuals are associated with the “industrial 
general staff” [SPN, p.14]. There is thus a division between the execution of production plans and 
the autonomous initiative associated with their elaboration. On the other hand, Gramsci argues that 
rural intellectuals tend to be “traditional” intellectuals linked to the “social mass of country people 
and the town (particularly small-town) bourgeoisie” [SPN, p.14]. 
The welding together a particular group’s organic intellectuals and the traditional intellectuals is the 
task of the political party [SPN, p.15]. Thus the function of the political party becomes more 
apparent when a concrete analysis of the organic and traditional intellectuals is developed “in the 
context of different national histories and…the development of the various major social groups 
                                                          
19
 Gramsci’s interest in developing new conceptions of the world consequently transforms language, although 
he contrasts the formal aspect of language and its content: “Identity of terms does not mean identity of 
concepts” (Gramsci Selections, p.456). Thus he distinguishes between a tendency’s “instrumental values” and 
its “transient historical value” (Gramsci Selections, p.453). 
20
 An absence of the necessary nexus of relations between the intellectuals and the element which “feels”, 
which Gramsci calls the “people-nation”, gives rise to the intellectuals becoming a “caste” or “priesthood” 
(Gramsci Selections, p.418). 
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within each nation” [SPN, p.16]. Gramsci analyses the formation of the “traditional” intellectuals in 
each historical epoch, i.e. in the classical world, under feudalism, and in modern society. 
Gramsci compares the relations between “traditional” and organic intellectuals in different national 
formations. He points towards the phenomenon of “cosmopolitanism” amongst Italian intellectuals 
as both “cause and effect” of the state of Italian disintegration from the Roman Empire up until 1870 
[SPN, p.17-18]. France is seen as the paradigm of a “harmonious” development of national energies 
and intellectual categories, whereas England and Germany represent a “suture” between the old 
regime and the capitalist class, albeit in Germany with a specific caste drawn from the old regime 
providing military-bureaucratic personnel [SPN, p.18-19]. Gramsci describes this as “an industrial 
civilisation that develops within a feudal-bureaucratic integument” [SPN, p.23]. Japan also 
represents a society of this type, although with particular features of its own. 
Different class societies are characterised by the relative position of the “traditional” intellectuals in 
each. The purpose of this historical analysis is to exhibit the structural similarity of the position of 
each stratum of “traditional” intellectuals within their respective societies in each epoch, whilst 
accounting for the origin of national variations. Thus Gramsci attempts to reveal the class framework 
upon which the apparent continuity of the “traditional” intellectuals is based. Whilst the continuity 
between the relative structural positions of these strata is real, the “traditional” intellectuals are in 
fact always in a “mediated” relationship with fundamental economic groups that have the only 
authentic claim to autonomy. 
In explaining the structural location of the “traditional” intellectuals in each society, he seeks to 
undermine the particular status or prestige they enjoy in society. Gramsci asks whether historically 
and “realistically” explaining the structural location of the “traditional intellectuals” from a 
“rationalistic” viewpoint is sufficient to undermine their claim to autonomy as a social group. 
Certainly in the case of other myths, Gramsci does not think that a popular superstition can be 
destroyed “merely by being explained” [SPN, p.235]. 
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d) Dissolution and Integration of the ‘Traditional’ 
While the “traditional” intellectuals are a complexity rather than an anomalous group for Gramsci, 
they play a special role in bourgeois thought. Gramsci’s concern is to undermine the influence of the 
“traditional” intellectuals over the national-popular forces which the proletariat is attempting to 
organise and lead. Thus Gramsci critiques the thought of Benedetto Croce, the epitome of a 
“traditional” intellectual, despite not being a clergyman.21 
For Gramsci, the “traditional” intellectuals are a component that needs to be dissolved and re-
incorporated as a constituent of a new historical bloc led by the organic intellectuals of the working 
class. The key task “of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate 
and to conquer “ideologically” the traditional intellectuals” [SPN, p.10]. It is therefore important for 
Gramsci to specify what elements can be absorbed from Croce, as the philosopher of Italy’s passive 
revolution. While the revolutionary party must interact with “traditional” intellectuals in order to 
give leadership to the working class as a whole, it is only the agency of a political party as a cohesive 
unit can channel the activity of the organic intellectuals. 
The category of intellectuals has undergone an “unprecedented expansion” in the modern world 
[SPN, p.13]. The corresponding expansion of education is, says Gramsci, “an index of the importance 
assumed in the modern world by intellectual functions and categories” [SPN, p.10]. He recognises 
both the necessity for defensive organisations provoked by the “mass formation” of “standardised 
individuals”, but also the emancipatory potential of this tendency towards standardisation and 
conformism. Gramsci’s project to analyse the formation of the “traditional” intellectuals is part of 
realising this potential by creating a “new type of intellectual” that can form the basis of an 
education “closely bound to industrial labour” [SPN, p.9]. 
                                                          
21
 Gramsci criticises Croce, as typifying those intellectuals, who regard themselves as “arbiters and mediators 
of real political struggles”, as personifying “catharsis” – a concept we will examine later in this chapter 
(Gramsci Further Selections, p.343 – Henceforth referenced in the text as [FSPN, p.343], i.e. [Further Selections 
from the Prison Notebooks, p.343]). 
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3) The State as Collective Subject: Beyond Class Subjectivity? 
In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci constructs a general theory of class power, the process by which 
classes constitute themselves as subjects through the construction of hegemonic projects. This raises 
the question however, of whether there exist other kinds of collective subject in Gramsci’s 
conceptual framework. We will consider whether his account gives the State the status of a subject. 
For Gramsci, the creation of the State corresponds with the realisation of a hegemonic project. We 
will examine evidence that Gramsci sees the State as a collective subject with an apparent autonomy 
from the hegemonic class. We will ask whether this phenomenon can be accounted for within his 
conception of class subjectivity, in terms of particular classes developing their hegemonic projects. 
In order to carry out this investigation we will postulate two different modes identified in Gramsci’s 
analysis of the State. The first of these we shall call the ‘constitutive’ mode of analysis, and the 
second, the ‘holistic’ mode of analysis. The constitutive mode examines the recruitment of the State 
bureaucracy’s personnel. This constitutive mode preserves Gramsci’s framework of class subjectivity 
by explaining the class basis of the ‘molecular processes’ through which State personnel are formed 
[SPN, p.194 p.267]. 
The second, holistic mode of analysis views the interaction between State and class at a holistic or 
totalising level. Here Gramsci examines the prestige endowed by a State upon the dominant class in 
the creation of a fully operative hegemonic project. This mode demonstrates the active role that the 
State plays in creating a class subject. Gramsci’s study of the phenomenon of ‘State spirit’ is another 
example of this mode of analysis. We will discuss the interrelationship between the constitutive and 
holistic modes of analysis and will attempt to demonstrate that an adequate account of Gramsci’s 
conception of class subjectivity and the State requires the articulation of both.  
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a) Gramsci’s Project and the State 
Whilst Gramsci is opposed to the blanket application of “abstract sociological schemas”, his method 
of study generates complex abstractions derived from the analytical comparison of historical 
phenomena [SPN, p.114].22 In particular, Gramsci believes that the modern French State created by 
the French Revolution provides a paradigmatic case of a bourgeois hegemonic project against which 
he measures other modern European states [SPN, p.114]. Gramsci does not believe that a 
conception of the State “according to the productive functions of the social classes” can be 
mechanically applied to the interpretation of Italian and European history [SPN, p.116]. For the 
capitalist bourgeoisie and modern proletariat, the State is “only conceivable as the concrete form of 
a specific economic world, of a specific system of production”, but this does not mean that the 
“relationship of means to end” takes the form of a “simple schema” [SPN, p.116].  
For Gramsci, the “historical unity of the ruling classes” is “realised in the State” [SPN, p.52]. Whilst 
juridical and political unities are important elements of this “fundamental historical unity”, it in fact 
results from the “organic relations between State or political society and ‘civil society’” [SPN, p.52]. 
In contrast to this, the subaltern groups, defined by their disunity, are presently unable to become a 
“State” [SPN, p.52]. The tendency of the subaltern groups towards unification in their historical 
activity is continually interrupted by the activity of the ruling groups. Although fragmented and 
episodic, Gramsci argues that every trace of this independent initiative of the subaltern groups is of 
“incalculable value for the integral historian” [SPN, p.55]. 
i) The Narrow/Technical and the Integral State 
Some clarification is required in addressing Gramsci’s usage of the concept of the State, due to his 
employment of the term in multiple senses. Gramsci operates on the one hand with a narrow 
conception of the State as a “government technically understood” [SPN, p.267], which appears to 
mean the State solely as a “politico-juridical organisation in the narrow sense” [SPN, p.261]. The 
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 Gramsci tends to oppose “rigid schemata” in favour of “practical criteria of historical and political 
interpretation” (Gramsci Selections, p.217). 
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functions of this “State as policeman”23 are restricted to the “safeguarding of public order and 
respect for the laws” [SPN, p.261]. In this narrow sense, the State is the “governmental-coercive 
apparatus”, constituted of the army, police, judges, and bureaucracy [SPN, p.265] .24 However, it 
should be registered that in “everyday language” the State is often conceived of in this narrow 
sense, and it is “commonly understood as the entire State” [SPN, p.268]. 
On the other hand, there is a broader conception of the State that Gramsci terms the “integral 
State” [SPN, p.267]. This critical conception of the State is more deeply involved in all levels of the 
manifestation of a hegemonic project and the creation of a new culture and a new “conception of 
the world” [SPN, p.265, p.267]. It is difficult, perhaps with good reason, to locate a succinct 
treatment of the integral State in the Prison Notebooks. The concept itself lies at the centre of a 
matrix of interrelated concepts, not least of which is Gramsci’s conception of “civil society”, or the 
“ensemble of organisms most commonly called ‘private’” [SPN, p.12].  Gramsci’s method, we might 
argue, is to attempt to penetrate the “State organism” [SPN, p.210]. The importance of the task is 
emphasised by Gramsci’s recognition that “little understanding of the State means little class 
consciousness”, and that such understanding is mobilised not simply to defend the State, but also to 
attack and to overthrow it [SPN, p.275]. 
In particular, the intellectuals are not necessarily part of the State in the narrow/technical sense, but 
play a role in helping the dominant class to fulfil its hegemonic project, and thus to constitute itself 
as a subject. Thus Croce, although not the leader of a party in the conventional sense, plays a role for 
the Italian State of providing the intellectual General Staff for, what Gramsci terms, the “organic 
party” of the bourgeoisie.25 A consequence of his project of study into the intellectuals, understood 
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 A conception that Gramsci suggests originates with Lassalle (Gramsci Selections, p.262). 
24
 Elsewhere defined by Gramsci as a “coercive apparatus to bring the mass of the people into conformity with 
the specific type of production and the specific economy at a given moment” (Gramsci Selections, p.56 fn.5). 
25
 Gramsci contends that in the modern world, the “exigencies of struggle” have compelled the parties of the 
bourgeoisie to be fragmented. There exists however, an organic party that has a reality for Gramsci more 
fundamental than the “movement of interrelated parties” (Gramsci Selections, p.150).  The intellectual 
General Staff of the “organic” or fundamental party appears to operate as if it was “a directive force standing 
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in its expansive conception, “leads to certain determinations of the concept of State” [SPN, p.56 
fn.5]. Whereas normally conceived as simply the “coercive apparatus”, as we have seen above, the 
operation of the intellectuals in the field of civil society opens up the conception of the State “as an 
equilibrium between political and civil society” [SPN, p.56 fn.5]. 
This critical conception of the State raises the question of “hegemony of a social group over the 
entire national society”, a project carried out through “private organisations, like the Church, the 
trade unions, the schools, etc.” [SPN, p.56 fn.5]. The window on the State provided by the 
theorisation of the function of the intellectuals, helps explain, argues Gramsci, the historical 
weakness of the Italian mediaeval Communes. He defines the Communes as a “syndicalist state”, 
since the dominant economic class failed to create a “category of intellectuals” capable of exercising 
hegemony as well as dictatorship [SPN, p.56 fn.5]. It is the transcendence of the ‘syndicalist’ phase 
to organise hegemony that Gramsci associates with Machiavelli’s advice in The Prince, and with the 
creation of an “integral State” [SPN, p.56 fn.5]. 
Gramsci links the impoverishment of the concept of the State with the decline of “political science 
and the art of politics” and the rise of sociology, and the associated “evolutionary and positivist 
theories” which study society purely by the methods of the natural sciences [SPN, p.243]. Gramsci 
affirms a broad conception of the State, when he rejects the reduction of ‘politics’ to parliamentary 
politics and constitutionalism. The State, he argues, is “the entire complex of practical and 
theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but 
manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” [SPN, p.244]. 
ii) The State as Part of a Hegemonic Project 
Gramsci’s discussion of the State is predicated on his analysis of the various moments or levels in the 
“relation of forces” [SPN, p.180]. He distinguishes three moments in the “relation of forces”: the 
social, the political, and the military [SPN, p.180]. The first moment, the relation of social forces, is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
on its own, above the parties” (Gramsci Selections, p.148). Gramsci also describes Croce as “a kind of lay pope” 
(Gramsci Selections, p.56 fn.5). 
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“refractory reality”, tightly bound to a structure that Gramsci defines as “objective, independent of 
human will”, and one that can be “measured with the systems of the exact or physical sciences” 
[SPN, p.180] .26 The material forces of production provide the basis for the emergence of social 
classes, and the relation of social forces is closely linked to this structure [SPN, p.180]. 
Within the second moment, the relation of political forces, Gramsci elaborates three sub-moments 
of collective political consciousness [SPN, p.181].27  At the highest of these levels, where an analysis 
of the “passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures” is possible (i.e. the 
“universal” rather than the corporate plane), the creation of the hegemony of the fundamental 
social group can be explained [SPN, p.181]. Finally, the relation of military forces plays a decisive role 
in the outcome of conflicts between social forces [SPN, p.185] .28 The development of history is, for 
Gramsci, the continual oscillation between the social and military moments, mediated by the 
political moment [SPN, p.183]. It is all of these elements however which constitute the “concrete 
manifestation of the conjunctural fluctuations of the totality of social relations of force” [SPN, 
p.185]. 
As Gramsci points out, the State can be seen as the “organ of one particular group” and its purpose 
as the creation of “favourable conditions for the latter’s maximum expansion” [SPN, p.182]. On the 
other hand, the development and expansion of this particular group is “conceived of, and 
presented” as being “the motor force of a universal expansion” [SPN, p.182]. Thus Gramsci argues 
that there is a concrete coordination of the dominant group with the interests of the subordinate 
groups. The “life of the State” is therefore understood as a continuous process of “formation and 
                                                          
26
 In this quote, as often elsewhere, Gramsci paraphrases Marx’s Preface to The Critique of Political Economy – 
see also (Gramsci Selections, p.138) for Gramsci’s particular engagement with this passage. 
27
 The three sub-levels of collective political consciousness (and their corresponding social group) can be 
abbreviated as the “economic-corporate” (the professional group), the “politico-juridical” (the wider social 
group, or ‘economic’-class), and the passage from “structure to complex superstructures” (the hegemonic 
class). See Gramsci Selections, p.181. 
28
 The relation of military forces is sub-divided into two aspects, the “technical military” and “politico-military” 
(Gramsci Selections, p.183). 
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superseding of unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane)”, in which the dominant group’s interests 
prevail, but stop short of their “narrowly corporate economic interest” [SPN, p.182]. 
The contradiction underlying the State is that the State both needs to appear as an autonomous 
subject to be an instrument of class domination for the bourgeoisie, and yet so long as this tends to 
be the result, it undermines the claims of those who maintain the notion of the autonomy of the 
State above the class struggle. The situation is complicated in Gramsci’s conception by the fact that 
the formation of a fully operative hegemonic project does appear to project a State with the 
qualities of a subject. 
For Marxists, the bourgeois hegemonic project is crisis-prone due to the internal contradictions in its 
economic foundations. The crises of bourgeois hegemony, such as that which followed the First 
World War, have exposed the strength and depth of that hegemony (“the elements of trench and 
fortress represented by the elements of civil society” [SPN, p.238]). As we have noted, however 
Gramsci is aware of and analyses the variations in the hegemonic projects of the bourgeoisie of 
Western Europe. These variations are in some cases the product of classical bourgeois revolutions 
(e.g. France), in others a product of “passive revolution” (e.g. Italy), whilst others still are constituted 
by a more mixed composition (e.g. Germany, England). 
Although the Italian Risorgimento creates a form of bourgeois hegemony, it is problematic in some 
aspects. In Gramsci’s view, it does not create the fullest form of hegemony, as displayed in the 
paradigm case of the French Revolution. This full hegemony is constituted by the ‘ethico-political’ 
level of hegemony, by the extension of the political relations of force to the highest level of 
collective political consciousness. This type of hegemony creates the most developed structures of 
civil society, whose organic personnel have been created in the process. 
I will argue that, for Gramsci, it appears that when the State is serving a fully operative hegemony, in 
the sense that the hegemonic project engages the subaltern classes at the highest ethico-political 
level, it behaves like a subject in its own right. The Hegelian conception of the State might suggest 
246 
 
that this state is essentially autonomous of class antagonisms, however Gramsci’s class framework 
argues that the State remains a factor in the establishment of full hegemony serving the interests of 
the project of the dominant class. We will now investigate this question of whether these qualities 
constitute the State as an authentic subject, or whether we can in fact account for this quasi-
subjectivity within the class framework of Gramsci’s account. 
b) The State as Autonomous Subject? 
One of the obstacles to making a precise analytic distinction between the hegemonic class as subject 
and the State as subject is Gramsci’s movement beyond a narrow conception of the State: the notion 
that the private forces constituting civil society are the “State itself” [SPN, p.261]. When considering 
whether the State plays the role of a subject, we should make clear whether we are referring to the 
‘integral’ or ‘narrow/technical’ State. Furthermore, the identification between State and 
government, argues Gramsci, is a “representation of the economic-corporate form”, of the 
“confusion between civil society and political society” [SPN, p.262]. As an initial observation, it 
seems that the appearance of the ‘integral’ State as subject corresponds to the case of fully-
operative hegemony, whereas in situations where hegemony is only partially operative the 
possibility of the State as subject is limited to the ‘narrow/technical’ State. 
In historical situations constituting a crisis of the dominant class’s hegemony, the question of the 
role of the State becomes paramount, since attempts to resolve the crisis may revolve around the 
attempts of the dominant group to intervene and regulate class relations. Gramsci is keen to 
emphasise that the State is never neutral. For example, laissez-faire liberalism is also a form of State 
“regulation”, and even when a “weakened State structure” is being re-organised by “illegal private 
action” it is not inert [SPN, p.160, p.232]. In this latter context, he is particularly interested in the 
concept of “Bonapartism” or “Caesarism” [SPN, p.219]. 
Gramsci theorises the state of affairs when two fundamental social groups locked in combat find 
themselves in a position of unstable stalemate that is inclined, if unresolved, towards “reciprocal 
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destruction” [SPN, p.219]. In this case, Gramsci examines the historical phenomenon of “Caesarism” 
in which a third force C intervenes between the two fundamental social groups A and B. Caesarism 
appears to be an example of the State acting as more of an autonomous phenomenon. The question 
is whether this represents Gramsci thinking about the State in non-class terms, or whether it 
represents simply a concrete example of the particular problems faced by classes attempting to 
develop their hegemonic projects. 
Gramsci identifies two conceptions of the State opposed to the notion of “the State as policeman”: 
the “ethical State” and the “interventionist State” [SPN, p.262]. The two are not identical however, 
the former has philosophical and intellectual associations (notably with Hegel), and the latter is 
associated with the economic sphere and national policies of protectionism and/or the reform of 
capitalist excesses [SPN, p.262]. These “diverse tendencies” combine in different ways, and are even 
capable of combining within individuals (intellectuals who claim to be “liberals in the economic field 
and interventionists in the cultural field”) [SPN, p.262]. 
i) Identity of State and Class: The Reflection of Prestige 
In contrast to the common conflation between State and government in the popular consciousness, 
Gramsci suggests that the “identity State/class is not easy to understand” [SPN, p.269]. It is very 
important therefore that the “State/government, conceived as an autonomous force” reflects 
“prestige upon the class upon which it is based” [SPN, p.269]. We can only develop a “realistic 
concept of the State itself” through a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon, which is general, 
he claims, to all types of States [SPN, p.269]. A class “as an economic fact” must establish the 
“intellectual or moral prestige” required for establishing its hegemony and therefore for creating a 
State in the integral sense [SPN, p.269]. 
In discussing the causes of the French revolution, Gramsci makes use of this conception in pointing 
out that the “rupture of the equilibrium of forces” did not occur due to “direct mechanical causes”, 
but in the context of conflicts on a “higher plane than the immediate world of the economy” [SPN, 
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p.184]. These conflicts he argues relate to the realm of class “prestige” that we have discussed 
above. It is only through the transmission of all of these elements through the various levels in the 
relations of force, from the social to the political to the military, that a satisfactory analysis can be 
attempted. 
Gramsci’s analysis of the role of prestige in the relations between class and State belong to the 
holistic mode of his analysis of the State. The purpose of this concrete analysis of the relations of 
force is not abstract or an end-in-itself, but to enable a concrete intervention, or an “initiative of 
will” [SPN, p.185]. An understanding of the State/government as an autonomous force and of the 
role of “prestige” is therefore also important in the understanding of the relationships between 
parties and the classes that they represent. For if a class “as an economic fact” is not capable of 
establishing “intellectual and moral prestige”, and consequently hegemony, it will not itself be 
capable of founding a State [SPN, p.269]. 
ii) ‘State Spirit’ 
In his note on the Elements of Politics, Gramsci discusses the development of the concept contained 
in the expression “State spirit” [SPN, p.146]. The term, as the editors of the Selections point out, is 
derived from Hegel’s Philosophy of History, but was subsequently adopted by Mussolini and the 
fascists [SPN, p.146 fn.31]. Gramsci claims that it has a “quite precise, historically determinate 
meaning”, but he does not clarify exactly what this is [SPN, p.146]. He does suggest however, that 
every movement, which is not an arbitrary expression of individualism, has something similar to a 
“State spirit” [SPN, p.146]. This implies that every movement “presupposes ‘continuity’, either with 
the past, or with tradition, or with the future”, or in other words, “every act is a moment in a 
complex process, which has already begun and will continue” [SPN, p.146].  
The “State spirit” is the responsibility for the process of being in “solidarity with forces which are 
materially “unknown” but which nevertheless feel themselves to be active and operational” [SPN, 
p.146]. Account is taken of these forces, “as if they were physically ‘material’ and present” [SPN, 
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p.146]. This process is in practice bounded by an organic calculation. The awareness of “duration”, 
argues Gramsci, must be “concrete and not abstract”, i.e. it must not “go beyond certain limits” 
[SPN, p.146]. Gramsci is not discussing what he calls the “cult of tradition”, which he suggests is the 
basis for an ideology [SPN, p.147]. Rather Gramsci’s conclusion is that a “State spirit”, in his 
understanding of it, is to be found “in everybody” [SPN, p.147]. He suggests that the “party spirit” is 
the fundamental component of the “State spirit” [SPN, p.147]. 
For Gramsci there is an interaction between the creation of a party, its development into a State, 
and the creation of a new conception of the world. Gramsci refers at points to the party as an 
“embryonic State structure” [SPN, p.226]. He also suggests that all parties are “only the 
nomenclature for a class” [SPN, p.152]. However these parties are not the “mechanical and passive 
expression” of the class, but “react energetically” on them to “develop, solidify and universalise 
them” [SPN, p.227]. Furthermore a conception of the world is not conceived simply as a set of ideas, 
but as a “total and molecular (individual) transformation of ways of thinking and acting” [SPN, 
p.267]. This in turn reacts back upon the State and the party, necessitating a “continual re-
organisation” and the emergence of new and original problems [SPN, p.267]. It seems therefore that 
there is a great deal of fluidity between the various moments in Gramsci’s conception of the nexus 
between State, party and conception of the world. We appear to have identified a number of senses 
in which the State in Gramsci appears as an autonomous subject. This can perhaps only adequately 
be explained in the elaboration of a full critical understanding of the integral State that entails the 
articulation of the moments of State, party and conception of the world. 
We have characterised the mode of analysing the state where the relationship of class and State are 
dealt with at a totalising level as a holistic mode. In examining the prestige reflected on a dominant 
class by the State, we have an example of the State playing an active role in constituting the 
dominant class as a subject. This mode of analysis appears to preserve this active moment. Taken at 
face value, and in conjunction with his analysis of the phenomenon of ‘State spirit’ within 
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movements, Gramsci appears to be making a very Hegelian/idealistic presentation. We will proceed 
now however to investigate a second mode of analysis, the constitutive mode, that attempts to 
explain the emergence of this active moment within a class framework. We will then consider 
whether, taken as a totality, Gramsci develops an account in the Prison Notebooks of these two 
modes that is capable of rendering this active moment compatible with his articulation of a 
conception of class subjectivity. 
c) The State within Class Subjectivity 
As I have argued in the section dealing with the intellectuals, class subjectivity plays a fundamental 
role in Gramsci’s conception of the world. Whilst we have thus far investigated the apparent 
autonomy of the role of the State in Gramsci’s conception, we will now investigate whether his 
account of the State is compatible with the conception of class subjectivity he develops, and 
whether it might represent a certain complexity in the process of the formation of a hegemonic 
project. 
i) ‘Statolatry’ and the State as Absolute 
In the process of identifying and explaining the origins of false attitudes towards the State, Gramsci 
diagnoses the phenomenon of “statolatry” [SPN, p.268]. It refers to an attitude that identifies the 
State with the individuals of a social group. A social group, he argues, must strive to construct a 
“well-articulated civil society” that is the “normal continuation”, the “organic complement” of 
political society, rather than in conflict with it [SPN, p.268]. For the proletariat that has not had the 
bourgeoisie’s opportunity of independent “moral and cultural development” within the previous 
mediaeval society, a period of statolatry is “necessary and opportune” as an “initiation to 
autonomous State life” [SPN, p.268]. But Gramsci warns against the dangers of this statolatry 
becoming “perpetual” [SPN, p.268]. 
Gramsci is concerned not to deny but to explain the strongest manifestations of the State as an 
apparently autonomous subject, and to render them compatible with a class-based analysis. A 
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consequence of his class framework is that Gramsci is able to explain how those intellectuals which 
are not “firmly anchored” to a “strong economic group” tend to present the State as a “rational 
absolute” or as “something in itself” in order to abstractly rationalise their own “historical existence 
and dignity” [SPN, p.117]. It is this motive which underlies, he suggests, the modern philosophical 
current of idealism, is connected with the “mode of formation of the modern States of continental 
Europe”, and is also essential for understanding the concepts of “passive revolution” and 
“revolution/restoration” [SPN, p.117]. 
ii) Bureaucracy and the Constitution of State Power 
Gramsci makes a detailed study of the historical formation of bureaucracy and its significance for the 
form of the State. For Gramsci, classes produce parties, and parties “form the personnel of State and 
government, the leaders of civil and political society” [SPN, p.227]. Whilst this does not exhaust the 
relationship between classes and the State, it can be seen that one mode in which Gramsci 
addresses the construction of state power is by analysing the personnel of which its institutions are 
constituted. Functionaries, in this sense, are like intellectuals in that they are the building blocks of 
the narrow/technical state apparatus. Thus Gramsci takes very seriously his study of the 
phenomenon of bureaucracy. 
The historical development of “political and economic forms” increasingly produces a “new type of 
functionary” [SPN, p.185]. Gramsci describes these personnel trained for civil and military 
bureaucratic work as “career” functionaries [SPN, p.186]. The process of their formation has a 
primary importance for the development of the form of the State. This is because each form of 
society and State has a system of selection and a method of training its own particular type of 
functionaries. Gramsci argues that, similarly as with the case of the intellectuals (with which the 
problem partly coincides), the processes by which these systems have evolved historically must be 
reconstructed [SPN, p.186]. 
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In certain periods, Gramsci says, social classes become “detached from their traditional parties” 
[SPN, p.210]. He is particularly interested in periods of “organic crisis”, whose content is the “crisis of 
the ruling class’s hegemony” [SPN, p.210]. To analyse parties in these situations he distinguishes 
between three distinct elements: the “mass membership”, the “bureaucracy” and the “General 
Staff” [SPN, p.211]. The bureaucracy, he argues, is capable of becoming a “dangerously hidebound 
and conservative” force [SPN, p.211]. If the bureaucracy constitutes itself as a “compact body” and 
“feels itself independent of the mass of members”, a party can become anachronistic and void of 
social content [SPN, p.211]. 
A party’s ability to influence a situation at historically vital moments is dependent on its capacity to 
react against a tendency to become “mummified and anachronistic” [SPN, p.211].29 We might ask 
whether or not Gramsci provides the conceptual apparatus in his account with which to explain the 
origins of this tendency in the structure of society. If not, we might suggest there is an absence of 
explanatory power to critique this tendency towards bureaucratic ossification, even if its symptoms 
have been powerfully identified. We will attempt to examine this apparent aporia later in this 
chapter. Rather Gramsci describes a very concrete process by which various intermediate strata, or 
class fractions, are conditioned to play a role in the formation and functioning of the State [SPN, 
p.212].30 
Gramsci’s conception of Caesarism adopts what we have called a mode of constitutive analysis of 
the State. It gives a description of the strata which provide the bulk of the bureaucratic element of 
the State’s civil and military apparatus [SPN, p.212]. We could argue that the apparent autonomy of 
the State demonstrated in the case of Caesarism can be explained through this constitutive analysis 
to be the product of molecular processes that are grounded in a class framework. Caesarism is in this 
                                                          
29
 We will further discuss the implications of this tendency towards ‘mummification’ in the next section of this 
chapter (Gramsci Selections, p.211). 
30
 Of particular interest in this respect is his repeated analogy to the NCOs in the army, and the distinction 
between immediately directive functions and overall organisational planning (Gramsci Selections, p.13). 
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view a tool deployed by Gramsci to address particular complex situations in the struggle between 
class forces. 
This constitutive analysis is complicated by the fact that the stratum in modern Europe for whom the 
bureaucratic career is very important, historically conditioned by the relations between “industrial 
strength” and “agrarian reform”, is the rural petit-bourgeoisie [SPN, p.212]. In the constitution of the 
State however, this stratum does not represent its own interests, but the interests of the 
bourgeoisie as a whole. Gramsci explains this through the distinction between the bureaucracy’s 
directive “command” function, and the overall organisational and “ordering” role played by the 
‘General Staff’ of the bourgeoisie [SPN, p.213-214]. 
iii) The Modern State and the Disintegration of the Bourgeoisie 
The bourgeois revolutions brought about a transformation in the function of the State, consisting 
particularly in what Gramsci calls the “will to conform”, or the “ethicity of the law and of the State” 
[SPN, p.260]. In contrast to previous dominant groups, the bourgeoisie is not conceived as a “closed 
caste”, but tends to construct an “organic passage” from other groups into its own, both 
“‘technically’ and ideologically” [SPN, p.260]. Since the bourgeoisie presents itself as an “organism in 
continuous movement”, capable of assimilating the whole of society, the State, argues Gramsci, 
takes on the function of an “educator” [SPN, p.260].  
More recently however, this process has halted, and the State is again conceived as “pure force”, as 
the bourgeoisie becomes “saturated”, and begins to “disintegrate”, not absorbing but losing 
elements [SPN, p.260]. In the modern period, the traditional intellectuals, argues Gramsci, have 
given the “most extensive and perfect consciousness of the modern State”, but are now detaching 
themselves from the dominant social group “marking and ratifying the crisis of the State in its 
decisive form” [SPN, p.270]. There is a tendency, he notes, of conservative and reactionary forces to 
be reduced to an economic-corporate stage, whilst the “progressive and innovatory groupings”, due 
to their nascent state, have not yet advanced beyond this stage either [SPN, p.270]. 
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d) Two Modes of Analysis 
We have suggested that two modes of analysis can be distinguished in Gramsci’s analysis of State 
power. The first is what we call a constitutive analysis. This examines the molecular processes 
through which the formation of the personnel of the State and shows how they are based in a class 
framework. In particular, the constitutive mode includes Gramsci’s investigation of the phenomenon 
of bureaucracy. The second mode, more difficult to describe, attempts to deal with the relations 
between State and class at a more holistic and totalising level. This mode attempts to analyse the 
active role played by the State in the constitution of the dominant class’s hegemonic project through 
the phenomenon of class prestige and the notion of ‘State spirit’. 
I will argue that a one-sided presentation of Gramsci’s thought that emphasised only one of these 
modes would be open to challenge. The holistic mode of analysis alone might simply assert the 
active role of the State in the constitution of a hegemonic class subject and thus be seen as 
teleological. On the other hand, a constitutive analysis divorced from its holistic counterpart, might 
be accused of reducing collective subjectivity to an aggregate of individual molecular processes. I 
suggest that the dichotomy that we have tried to examine in this section, that the State both 
appears to exhibit the qualities of an autonomous subject within Gramsci’s investigations and that it 
is also conceived of as being contained within or compatible with his conception of class subjectivity, 
is only explicable if we fully articulate both of these moments of analysis. 
I will argue that Gramsci’s method leads us to consider the two modes as having a dialectical 
interrelationship. However, it should be registered that other explanations could be asserted. For 
example, a functional explanation, such as that advanced by G. A. Cohen, might also present a 
possibility for considering the relationship between these two modes.31 From this perspective the 
active role played by the State in constituting the dominant class’s hegemonic project might simply 
be considered as its expected function in the relationship between class and State. Does this 
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 Cohen, G A Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford: OUP, 1978), p.233 
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explanation have sufficient explanatory power to avoid the teleological trap outlined above, but also 
to explain the interconnection between these two modes? 
We referred above to a potential aporia in Gramsci’s framework. Let us now develop this further. 
We might ask whether a distinctive feature of Gramsci’s analysis is that a “collective will” is always 
embodied in a person, or group of persons. A consequence of this might be an absence of the ability 
to theorise non-personal, or perhaps non-human, social domination. For example, would it make 
sense within Gramsci’s conception to ask whether the authentic subjectivity underlying the apparent 
autonomy the State was in fact capital rather than the class subjectivity of the bourgeoisie? 
This might be related to the relative absence of any felt need by Gramsci to explicitly engage with 
Marx’s conception of the fetishism of commodities, or, in terms of consciousness, to develop a 
theory of reification along the lines of Lukács.32 On the other hand, we might ask whether the 
problem of bureaucracy is a lens through which Gramsci is able to develop concrete insights into the 
organisational form of a party capable of resisting the effects of what Lukács would describe as the 
bureaucratic ossification associated with reification. It should be noted however that Gramsci does 
not elaborate a ‘universal’ framework for this process. 
Gramsci’s investigation of the State certainly poses a critical challenge to commonplace conceptions 
of the State, but also the further challenge of establishing, from his experimental mode of study, the 
limits of the critical concept which Gramsci is attempting to advance. The extent to which his 
concept of the integral State may exhibit a necessary elasticity is perhaps evidence that Gramsci is in 
the process of attempting to carry out the task of expanding the formula of the “United Front”,33 not 
simply theoretically, but by a “reconnaissance of the terrain and identification of the elements of 
trench and fortress represented by the elements of civil society” [SPN, p.238]. 
                                                          
32
 In its place, in Gramsci, we find a more highly developed theorisation of the roles of myth and utopia in 
contrast to other Marxist writers. Gramsci takes on Sorel’s conception of the myth as enclosing “the strongest 
inclinations of a people, of a party, or of a class” (Gramsci Selections, p.126 fn.4). 
33




4) Comparing Class Subjectivities: Bourgeois and Proletarian 
Hegemony 
Having examined the question of the intellectuals in Gramsci’s thought and the question of the State 
as a collective subject, we will now investigate the internal differentiations in his conception of class 
subjectivity. We will examine the differences between bourgeois and proletarian subjectivity by 
comparing the formation of a hegemonic project in each case. First we will look at the distinctive 
features of the bourgeoisie as a subject, and the variations that appear in different bourgeois 
hegemonic projects, before contrasting the prospective features of a future proletarian hegemonic 
project. Finally we will examine whether there is a contradiction between Gramsci’s notion of the 
proletarian hegemonic project as creating a new State (as a feature of all hegemonic projects), and 
the classical Marxist conception of the withering away of the State. 
a) The Bourgeois Hegemonic Project: the formation of the bourgeoisie as a 
subject  
Let us examine the features that make the bourgeoisie distinctive as a subject. In Gramsci’s account, 
the bourgeoisie’s hegemonic project is constituted by a variety of institutions that represent a 
division of labour: the integral State, made up of both the narrow/technical State, the police, the 
army and the bureaucracy, and the institutions of civil society, the Church, the education system, 
trade unions and other civil institutions. We might say therefore that the unity of the dominant class 
is not represented by a single transparent consciousness, due to the differentiated and 
institutionalised form of its class power. 
The bourgeoisie is distinct from the proletariat in its ability to develop its hegemonic project within 
feudal society. It is even able to realise its hegemonic project in numerous forms, many of which 
involve the incorporation of sections of the previous dominant class, rather than their complete 
destruction or neutralisation. In particular, Gramsci notes that the “suture” that takes place between 
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bourgeoisie and the feudal aristocracy [SPN, p.18]. This is manifested in the development of 
industrialism within a “feudal-bureaucratic integument” in the cases of the English, German and 
Japanese bourgeoisie [SPN, p.23].  For Gramsci, this type of accommodation with the bourgeoisie 
would be impossible for the proletariat in its hegemonic project, as evidenced by his fundamental 
hostility to reformism.34 
Gramsci’s study of hegemony is comparable to a historical “laboratory” in which he attempts to 
categorise the different types of bourgeois hegemonic projects [SPN, p.335]. We find that, for 
Gramsci, two main types of bourgeois hegemony can be distinguished corresponding to, or as the 
products of, the different transitions from the feudal order: classical bourgeois revolution and 
“passive revolution”, or “revolution/restoration” [SPN, p.109]. Gramsci analyses the modern Italian 
State and the failure of the Risorgimento to produce anything resembling the Jacobin-type 
movement of the French Revolution [SPN, p.80]. This demonstrates the weakness of the partially-
operative hegemony resulting from the process of ‘passive revolution’ in contrast to the strength of 
a fully-operative bourgeois hegemony produced by a classical bourgeois revolution. 
Furthermore, a full bourgeois revolution gives rise to the aforementioned complex structures of the 
integral State that provide a certain stability against the tempests of social conflict produced by 
social crises. It is these reserves of strength that enabled the bourgeois States of Western Europe to 
weather the crises following the First World War. Another aspect of this strength is in the creation of 
a stratum of organic intellectuals of the bourgeoisie. This stratum, Gramsci observes, is not 
possessed by the Italian bourgeoisie during the Risorgimento.35 The critical difference in these two 
cases appears to be the presence of the Jacobins, and “Jacobinism”, a crucial concept for Gramsci 
[SPN, p.77]. In the French Revolution the Jacobins represent not only their immediate needs, but the 
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 Gramsci’s methodological hostility to any kind of reformism is illustrated by his remarks on the degenerated 
dialectical method that tends to “enervate the antithesis”, by dismantling it into a “long series of moments” 
(Gramsci Further Selections, p. 377). From this point of view, the conception of “revolution-restoration” is 
reduced to its second term, in which the social organism is in need of “continually patching up”, since it is 
“unable to keep itself healthy” (Gramsci Further Selections, p. 377). 
35
 As we have seen, it is Croce, as a private figure, who later comes to play this ideologically integrating role for 
the Italian bourgeoisie. 
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“revolutionary movement as a whole”, and are able to unite a bloc of national-popular forces, a 
composite class-subject, in order to create a modern bourgeois State [SPN, p.79]. 
Although Gramsci is somewhat ambiguous about the status of the subjectivity involved in the type of 
hegemony resulting from a ‘passive revolution’, it is not the case that such a process is without an 
element of subjectivity. Gramsci’s detailed studies of the complex relationships of political 
leadership in the Risorgimento between Cavour and the Moderate Party, the State of Piedmont, and 
international forces, over the Action Party of Mazzini and Garibaldi illustrate this [SPN, p.55-90]. The 
process of transformation in the case of ‘passive revolution’ does not involve a revolutionary subject 
of the national-popular type organised by the Jacobins, but it does involve a subjectivity that is able 
to control a gradual process of change. In this sense ‘passive revolution’ can be conceived as a 
displacement of revolutionary pressures, a “revolution without a revolution” [SPN, p.59]. The 
prolonged process by which this political leadership was maintained through the “gradual but 
continuous absorption” of the “active elements” produced by allied, or even antagonistic groups, is 
described by Gramsci as “transformism” [SPN, p.58].  
b) Proletarian Hegemony and the Modern Prince 
Gramsci’s concern with the development of a subaltern hegemonic project led by the proletariat is a 
theme that runs throughout the Prison Notebooks. This manifests itself explicitly in his pre-
occupation with the development of a stratum of organic intellectuals of the proletariat. It also 
raises the question as to what extent the conceptual apparatus developed by Gramsci in his 
investigation of bourgeois hegemonic projects can be adapted or transformed to provide insights 
into the development of a subaltern, and ultimately proletarian, counter-hegemony. 
In contrast to the stronger and weaker forms of hegemony that may be identified amongst the 
bourgeoisie, Gramsci does not refer to a partially-operative hegemony being realised by the 
proletariat. In contrast, Gramsci tends to allude to the proletarian hegemonic project in terms of a 
“totalitarian” endeavour, although we should note that the term has very different connotations for 
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Gramsci than for contemporary political theorists [SPN, p.335]. For Gramsci, suggest the editors of 
the Selections, its meaning should be understood as “simultaneously ‘unified’ and ‘all-absorbing’” 
[SPN, p.335 fn.20]. 
The subaltern classes are however, by their nature, “not unified and cannot unite until they are able 
to become a ‘State’” [SPN, p.52]. The history of their movements is “intertwined with that of civil 
society” [SPN, p.52]. It is also “necessarily fragmented and episodic” [SPN, p.54]. Many of the 
features of a subaltern class project are touched upon in Gramsci’s analysis of the term “subversive”, 
which refers to a “negative rather than a positive class position” [SPN, p.272]. Since the lower classes 
have historically been on the defensive, he argues, their self-awareness is achieved “via a series of 
negations, via their consciousness of the identity and class limits of their enemy” [SPN, p.273]. 
Gramsci argues however that this process has not yet reached the “surface” of society, at least not 
on the national level [SPN, p.273].36 
If the proletariat is to fully realise its hegemonic project it is necessary for it to create a form of 
hegemony that obliterates the “division of labour” both between and within social groups, and 
therefore the division between worker and intellectual [SPN, p.144]. This is not so easily achieved 
since the progress of the mass, and not simply “small intellectual groups”, requires the creation of 
an “intellectual-moral bloc”, in order to raise the cultural level of all to a “higher conception of life” 
[SPN, p.332]. To explain this project, Gramsci introduces the conception of “contradictory 
consciousness” [SPN, p.333]. 
The “active man-in-the-mass”, according to Gramsci, has “two theoretical consciousnesses (or one 
contradictory consciousness)” [SPN, p.333]. The first is “implicit in his activity” and “in reality unites 
him with all his fellow-workers in the practical transformation of the real world” [SPN, p.333]. The 
second is a “superficially explicit or verbal” consciousness that the worker has “inherited from the 
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 It is important to note that Gramsci’s concept of ‘subversive’ does not necessarily refer to the proletariat, 
but often to the morti di fame, constituted of two general types: rural day-labourers and petit-bourgeois 
intellectuals (Gramsci Selections, p.273). 
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past” or “uncritically absorbed” [SPN, p.333]. Thus this “man-in-the-mass” takes on the conception 
of the world of the dominant class, but in a complex way that continues to express another 
conception that is implicit in the activity of workers [SPN, p.333]. 
The initial stage of the development of the consciousness of being part of a hegemonic force is 
found in an “instinctive feeling of independence”, which must be developed into a “coherent 
conception of the world” [SPN, p.333]. In Gramsci’s conception, the intellectuals play a crucial role in 
this process, since there can be “no organisation without intellectuals, that is without organisers and 
leaders” [SPN, p.334]. Their function is not to import a conception of the world to the proletariat 
from outside, but to explain the working class’s own conception of the world to itself, to “make 
critical” an “already existing activity” [SPN, p.331]. The “crucible”37 where this unification of theory 
and practice takes place is the party, which are the “elaborators of new integral and totalitarian 
intelligentsias” [SPN, p.335]. 
Whilst Gramsci sees the proletariat at the centre of the process of socialist revolution, it is certainly 
not a ‘pure’ class subject. Gramsci postulates the necessity of an alliance between the proletariat 
and other anti-capitalist forces. This gives rise to a complex process in which institutionalisation and 
the formation of a hegemonic project go hand-in-hand. An important question for Gramsci is how a 
“movement” becomes a party. He identifies the necessary moments of this process, the creation of a 
centre of formation or irradiation, the organising of formal democracy and of a permanently active 
consent, and finally the gigantic aggregation of minute “molecular” processes standardising the 
masses that establish a party’s influence and “gives birth to a collective will” [SPN, p.191-194]. 
An important issue in Gramsci’s understanding of subjectivity is the question of the primacy of 
politics. In this regard, Machiavelli is a figure of great significance for Gramsci, both for himself and 
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 Interestingly Lukács also refers to the party as a crucible of this sort in History and Class Consciousness. 
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in regards to the interpretation of Machiavelli by subsequent thinkers.38 Machiavelli’s “implicit 
assertion” in his way of posing problems, argues Gramsci, is that “politics is an autonomous activity, 
with its own principles and laws distinct from those of morality and religion” [SPN, p.134]. This raises 
the question of the location of politics in a “systematic (coherent and logical) conception of the 
world”, within the philosophy of praxis [SPN, p.136]. 
For Gramsci, Machiavelli is the prototype of the modern political thinker, who constructs all 
questions of theory in terms of concrete political content. Gramsci talks about Machiavelli’s Prince as 
a living work. It is neither simply utopia nor “scholarly treatise”, but the fusion of political ideology 
and science in the “dramatic form” of a “myth” [SPN, p.125]. The “doctrinal, rational element” of 
this myth, the symbol of the “collective will”, is embodied in the person of the condottiere, or the 
leader of a mercenary army [SPN, p.125]. It is the “exemplification of the Sorelian myth”, the 
“creation of a concrete phantasy” that “acts on a dispersed and shattered people to arouse and 
organise its collective will” [SPN, p.126]. 
In the creation of the proletarian hegemonic project, the wider process of institution-building has at 
its core the creation of a new type of party, which Gramsci imagines as a modern version of 
Machiavelli’s Prince. He asks what the Prince would be if translated into modern political language, 
either the leader of a government or State, or a political leader that aims to “conquer a State” [SPN, 
p.252]. The protagonist of The Modern Prince, he says, cannot be an “individual hero” but only a 
political party [SPN, p.147].39 Whilst immediate historico-political actions can be incarnated 
mythically by a concrete individual, such an individual cannot provide the “long-term and organic 
character” necessary for the creation of “new national and social structures” [SPN, p.129]. 
                                                          
38
 Gramsci’s relationship to Croce and others (e.g. Sorel, Bergson) is often played out on the terrain of the 
interpretation of Machiavelli (e.g. “the Jacobins were realists of the Machiavelli stamp and not abstract 
dreamers”, see Gramsci Selections, p.78). 
39
 The form taken by Gramsci’s notes suggests that he imagined working them into a future published 
monograph entitled The Modern Prince (Gramsci Selections, p.130, p.132). 
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It is in the political party that the “first germs” of a collective will “tending to become universal and 
total” gather [SPN, p.129]. This modern prince, or “myth-prince” as he calls it, is a “complex element 
of society in which a collective will, which has already been recognised and has to some extent 
asserted itself in action, begins to take concrete form” [SPN, p.129]. The modern prince creates the 
“terrain” for the development of a “national-popular collective will” towards the “realisation of a 
superior, total form of modern civilisation” [SPN, p.133].The modern prince is both the “organiser” 
and the “active, operative expression” of this national-popular will [SPN, p.133]. 
In contrast to Sorel, whose conception of a myth is “non-constructive”, Gramsci argues that 
“destruction and negation” of existing moral and juridical relations cannot exist without an “implicit 
construction and affirmation” of a practice, as “party programme” [SPN, p.129]. The modern 
collective will is for Gramsci, “an operative awareness of historical necessity, as protagonist of a real 
and effective historical drama” [SPN, p.130]. The aim of the new Prince is to found a “new type of 
State”, and it has been created “rationally and historically”40 for this end [SPN, p.147]. 
c) Fetishism and the Party 
As we remarked earlier in this chapter, Gramsci regards one of the most important questions 
concerning political parties as their tendency to become “mummified and anachronistic” [SPN, 
p.211]. Gramsci’s study of the historical development of political parties takes note of the class 
differentiation in the ability of social forces to adapt to new tasks, epochs and the evolution of the 
overall relations of force [SPN, p.211]. The process of reorientation and reorganisation has different 
“rhythms” for different strata of the population [SPN, p.210]. The greater cadre resources of the 
ruling class than the subordinate classes give them the ability to reabsorb power after a “crisis of 
authority” [SPN, p.210]. 
                                                          
40
 It is important to note the close connection between the notions of rationality and historicity in Gramsci’s 
conception, and the distinctive meanings they have for him (Gramsci Selections, p.346). Their interchangeable 




In Gramsci’s critique of the misuses of the term “organic centralism”, the Selections provide us with 
interesting material from his Notes on Machiavelli [SPN, p.187 fn.83]. Here Gramsci investigates the 
fetishism that typically takes place in collective organisms, even those of ‘voluntary’ character (i.e. 
parties and trade unions). For Gramsci, a collective organism is made up of a collection of “single 
individuals” who “actively accept” a “particular hierarchy and leadership” [SPN, p.187 fn.83]. If these 
individuals experience this organism as something “external”, Gramsci argues, it in fact no longer 
exists, but has become a “phantasm of the mind, a fetish” [SPN, p.187 fn.83]. 
There is, he suggests, a widespread tendency towards regarding the relationship between individual 
and organism in a fetishistic way, as a “dualism” [SPN, p.187 fn.83]. Expecting the organism to act 
independently of their own activity, individual do not recognise the connection between their 
attitude and the inoperative organism. Further there exists both a widespread and common-sense 
“deterministic and mechanical conception of history” and an experience among individuals that the 
organism does in fact act despite their non-intervention [SPN, p.187 fn.83]. This leads each 
individual, says Gramsci, to project a “phantasmagorical being, the abstraction of the collective 
organism, a kind of autonomous divinity”, which has neither a “concrete brain”, nor “specific human 
legs”, but nevertheless thinks and moves for itself [SPN, p.187 fn.83]. 
Although certain modern ideologies, such as idealism, seek to re-educate individuals about their 
identity with the State, Gramsci argues that these are merely “verbal and verbalistic” [SPN, p.187 
fn.83]. Similarly the formula of “organic centralism”, employed by Amadeo Bordiga in relation to 
individual communist parties and the Comintern, might fall within the ambit of Gramsci’s criticism 
here, although his category of “organic centralism” seems to extend even beyond this to the “French 
Revolution and the Third Republic” [SPN, p.187 fn.83]. 
To what extent is Gramsci demonstrating a conception of fetishism linked to the structure of 
capitalist society? It certainly seems that Gramsci demonstrates an awareness of the phenomena 
theorised by Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism, however we might suggest that his 
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framework of analysis leads him to ask very different questions than Lukács, whose general 
theoretical conception would lead him to analyse this phenomenon within the context of his theory 
of reification. We will investigate the relationship between Gramsci and Lukács further in the next 
section. 
d) The Construction or the Withering Away of the State? 
For Gramsci, the realisation of the proletarian hegemonic project is coincident with the construction 
of a new type of State. If we take this hegemonic project as Gramsci’s presentation of the 
communist project, we must examine whether this implies that Gramsci’s conception of communism 
abandons the classical Marxist conception of the withering away of the State, or whether they are in 
fact two formulations of the same process. I will argue that the latter appears to be the case, but will 
ask whether this is either problematic or a reflection of a necessary ambiguity in the philosophy of 
praxis. 
i) Construction of a new State: Regulated Society  
Let us first examine the concept of a “regulated society” that Gramsci introduces to explain the type 
of society created by communism, after the realisation of the proletarian hegemonic project and the 
creation of a new type of State. He uses the term, it is suggested by the editors of the Selections, as a 
short-hand for the type of society described by Engel’s in the final lines of Socialism Utopian and 
Scientific, where he refers to anarchy in social production being replaced by “systematic, definite 
organisation” [SPN, p.257 fn.59].  Gramsci suggests that Marx, in “producing an original and integral 
conception of the world”, has initiated an epoch that will last until “the disappearance of political 
society and the coming of a regulated society” [SPN, p.382]. 
Gramsci also disambiguates the concept of a “regulated society” from its use by the fascists. He 
combats the claims of fascist theorists of the corporate economy that the fascist state had already 
abolished the anarchy of liberal capitalism [SPN, p.257]. Gramsci attempts to undermine these 
claims, and to show that it is characteristic of the “middle classes and petty intellectuals”, to confuse 
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the “regulated society” with the “class-State” [SPN, p.258]. For Gramsci, it was a virtue of utopian 
thinkers to understand that the class-State could never be the regulated society [SPN, p.257]. 
ii) The Withering away of the State? 
In contrasting Marxism with the “non-dialectical statalist” ideas of Ferdinand Lassalle, Gramsci 
argues that the “doctrine of the State as regulated society” will have to pass from a stage in which 
the State is equal to ‘government’ to one in which it is “identified with ‘civil society’” [SPN, p.263]. In 
other words, the new State’s goal should be its own disappearance, or the “re-absorption of political 
society into civil society” [SPN, p.253]. This can only be achieved following a phase in which the State 
as a coercive organisation safeguards “the development of the continually proliferating elements of 
regulated society” [SPN, p.263]. Only with the progressive reduction of the necessity of this State’s 
authoritarian and coercive intervention is it “tendentially capable of withering away and of being 
subsumed into regulated society” [SPN, p.263]. 
The significance of this framework is the concrete nature of Gramsci’s analysis of the post-capitalist 
establishment of a regulated society, and consequently an investigation into what the organisational 
implications of the ‘withering away of the State’ might be. For Gramsci, it is the creation of an “era 
of organic liberty”, which requires both the reorganisation of the “real relations between men” and 
the “world of the economy or of production” [SPN, p.263]. 
The possible pitfalls of his analysis we might suggest are the dangers inherent in appropriating a 
conception of ‘civil society’ that must be qualitatively transformed from the content that it 
possesses in the bourgeois hegemonic project. For example, Gramsci discusses the will to create a 
new culture in which the self-government of the individual in civil society would become the 
“organic complement” to political society, the narrow/technical State [SPN, p.268]. 
The editors of the Selections suggest that Gramsci has a somewhat different interpretation of Marx’s 
concepts of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom than Marx does himself [SPN, p.367 
fn.59]. They argue that Gramsci’s conception of the philosophy of a future communist society is 
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similar to idealism, of a “free movement of thought” unencumbered by “tendentious ideology” or 
the need to take the contradictions of material production as its basis [SPN, p.367 fn.59]. As we will 
argue later, Gramsci undoubtedly has his own distinctive way of presenting the problem. 
In particular, we could cite Gramsci’s suggestion that the philosophy of praxis might itself be 
superseded if the disappearance of the historical contradictions were to take place [SPN, p.405]. 
Indeed he suggests that the “conception of necessity” may then be superseded by the “conception 
of freedom” [SPN, p.382]. This is not to say that Gramsci does not take very seriously the concepts of 
regularity and necessity, as evidenced by his study of these concepts [SPN, p.410-414]. In this 
respect Gramsci’s estimation of the philosophical importance of David Ricardo for the philosophy of 
praxis is relevant [SPN, p.412]. 
iii) Coincident conceptions? 
The Hegelian conception of the ‘ethical State’, one that appears to be essentially autonomous of 
class antagonisms, belongs to an era in which the development of the bourgeoisie seemed limitless, 
and its “ethicity or universality could be asserted” [SPN, p.258-9]. But Gramsci argues that only the 
proletariat, the social group that “poses the end of the State and its own end” as its aim, can create 
an authentically “ethical State” [SPN, p.259]. This is one which “tends to put an end to the internal 
divisions of the ruled”, and to create a “technically and morally unitary social organism” [SPN, 
p.259]. 
I would argue that rather than abandoning the classical Marxist conception of the withering away of 
the State, Gramsci conceives the notion of the realisation of the proletarian hegemonic project, as 
creating a new type of State, to be coincident with this classical conception. This may appear 
paradoxical, and perhaps it is, but such a paradox could be said to exist in reality, and is one that can 
only be worked out in the future praxis of proletarian revolution. If this appears to impose a 
necessary ambiguity on the theorisation of the philosophy of praxis, this may have been recognised 
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by Gramsci more generally in his acknowledgement of the importance of utopias41 or “abstract 
rationalism” in the initial phase of formation of new collective will [SPN, p.195]. Gramsci also notes 
Rosa Luxemburg’s observation that it is impossible to treat certain question regarding the 
philosophy of praxis until they have become “actual for the course of history in general or that of a 
given social grouping” [SPN, p.404]. It is the crisis of the hegemonic project of the current ruling class 
that presents an opportunity in which a counter-hegemonic project by the proletariat at the head of 
the subaltern classes might be formulated.  
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 Since a utopia has a political value, and, for Gramsci, “every politics is implicitly a philosophy” it may also 
have a philosophical value (Gramsci Selections, p.405). 
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5) Philosophy, Catharsis, and the Proletariat 
We will now examine Gramsci’s distinctive conception of philosophy as a collective project and its 
relationship to the proletariat and the process of revolution. As we will see, for Gramsci, a concrete 
analysis of the diffusion of conceptions of the world reveals not simply a clash of “pure” rational, 
logically coherent conceptions, but the political (and social) struggle of concrete social groups, 
involving an interrelationship  between the masses and the experts or authorities. Gramsci argues 
that the question “what is man?” is the principal question asked by philosophy [SPN, p.351]. He 
suggests that the distinguishing feature of the philosophy of praxis is to have demonstrated that 
there is “no abstract ‘human nature’”, but rather that human nature is the “totality of historically 
determined social relations” [SPN, p.133].  
We will investigate whether the success of Gramsci’s philosophical project is dependent on 
elaborating a renewed Marxist conception of the dialectic, mediated by his settling of accounts with 
Croce and others. Subsequently we will explore Gramsci’s conception of ‘catharsis’, and evaluate its 
possible similarities with the Lukács’s conception of the passage from empirical to ascribed or 
imputed class consciousness. 
a) Philosophy, Religion and the Proletariat 
Philosophy is “intellectual order”, according to Gramsci [SPN, p.325]. It is distinct from both religion 
and common sense, with the former being a fragmented element of the latter [SPN, p.325]. 
However the philosophy of praxis finds itself with a position similar to the “antithesis of the 
Catholic”, with a schism between the “simple” and the intellectuals [SPN, p.332]. Unlike Catholicism 
however, argues Gramsci, it does not restrict the activity of the intellectuals to prevent a 
catastrophic split, but rather attempts to lead the masses to a higher conception of life through the 
construction of an “intellectual-moral bloc” [SPN, p.332-333]. 
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Whilst philosophy is often counter-posed to religion, Gramsci suggests that for the “masses as such”, 
philosophy can only be experienced “as a faith” [SPN, p.339]. Gramsci’s interest lies in the “process 
of diffusion” by which old conceptions are replaced by new in the life of the popular masses. This 
process is far more complex than the simple clash of rival conceptions in their “pure”, “rational and 
logically coherent” form [SPN, p.338]. At work in this case are political and “in the last analysis” 
social factors, including the elements of authority and of organisation [SPN, p.339]. 
From an analysis of the difficulties of the Church in preventing ruptures with the “community of the 
faithful”, Gramsci argues that “specific necessities” can be deduced for “any cultural movement” 
that seeks to replace “common sense and old conceptions of the world in general” [SPN, p.340]. This 
includes the necessity of the repetition of arguments as a means of working on the “popular 
mentality”, but also the creation of a personality for this “amorphous mass element”, through the 
production of “élites of intellectuals of a new type” [SPN, p.340]. 
These new élites, arising from, but maintaining contact with the masses, have the potential to 
modify the “ideological panorama” of the age, says Gramsci [SPN, p.340]. They also produce within 
themselves a “hierarchy of authority and intellectual competence”, culminating in the creation of 
“great individual philosopher[s]” [SPN, p.340]. Gramsci’s very hierarchical conception of organisation 
is a striking aspect of his conception of subjectivity. This is particularly evident in his claim that it is 
much “easier to form an army than to form generals” [SPN, p.153].42 
We have already touched upon these issues in our discussion of Gramsci’s conception of the organic 
and “traditional” intellectuals. Gramsci contrasts the “flexibility of movement” of the “individual 
brain” with the “modes of thought of a collective thinker” [SPN, p.340].43 The “real critical test” of 
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 It is important for Gramsci that the destruction of political armies leaves “as its heritage a ferment from 
which it may be recreated” (Gramsci Selections, p.153). 
43
 It would be worth considering Gramsci’s notion of the “collective thinker” alongside Marx’s notion of the 
development of the “collective worker” Gramsci Selections, p.341 and Marx K Capital, Vol. I (London: Penguin, 
1990 [1976]), p.468). 
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the “rationality and historicity”44 of modes of thinking is the adhesion or non-adhesion of the masses 
to an ideology [SPN, p.341]. Thus philosophical activity is not solely about the “individual” 
elaboration of coherent concepts, but primarily about the “cultural battle to transform the popular 
‘mentality’”, and thus to make philosophical innovations “concretely–i.e. historically and socially–
universal” [SPN, p.348]. 
b) Gramsci’s Dialectic 
Underlying Gramsci’s ability to give an adequate account of the issues we have highlighted in other 
sections of this chapter, e.g. the State, the Intellectuals, is an ability to mediate between different 
modes of his analysis that we have identified as constitutive and holistic. The theoretical apparatus 
that makes this possible is his conception of the dialectical method. For Gramsci, the philosophy of 
praxis is, in a sense, “a reform and a development of Hegelianism” [SPN, p.404]. On the other hand, 
it is also based on the methodological innovations of David Ricardo [SPN, p.401]. Gramsci’s 
interpretation of the dialectic is mediated through the studies of Antonio Labriola and reacts to the 
currents of Croce, Gentile, Sorel and Bergson [SPN, p.389].45 Gramsci’s attempt at a renewal of the 
conception of Marxist “orthodoxy” is a familiar theme from our study of Lukács [SPN, p.462].  
The problem of how we are to understand the dialectic is posed, says Gramsci, in Marx’s Poverty of 
Philosophy [SPN, p.109, p.416].46 Central to his understanding is a “new concept of immanence” that 
has been transformed from the speculative form of its origins [SPN, p.400]. For Gramsci, all 
ideological systems are both “perishable” and simultaneously have a “historical validity” [SPN, 
p.138]. Whilst Gramsci often takes up and uses Crocean concepts, he very radically departs from 
Croce’s conception of “politics/passion” [SPN, p.138]. Croce’s conception excludes the possibility of 
an “organised and permanent passion” [SPN, p.138]. Although the “party in action” is not identical 
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 As we have seen above, for Gramsci (in contrast to Lukács) the terms rationality and historicity often appear 
in close connection with each other. 
45
 Labriola was, for Gramsci, “the only man who has attempted to build up the philosophy of practice 
scientifically” Gramsci Selections, p.387). 
46
 The Poverty of Philosophy also has a central place in Lukács’s understanding of Marx’s development. 
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to the party existing previously, Gramsci argues that they may be considered the same organism 
[SPN, p.139]. 
Although Gramsci identifies the importance of Croce’s dialectical philosophy in the theorisation of 
the ethico-political moment, and therefore as a bourgeois reflection of one element of Lenin’s 
conception of the State, he identifies a very clear distinction between the Crocean dialectic and his 
own, that of the philosophy of praxis. For Croce’s dialectic is a “degenerate and mutilated form of 
Hegelianism”, which has a “blind fear of Jacobin movements, of any active intervention by the great 
popular masses as a factor of social progress” [FSPN, p.341]. 
The philosophical error committed by Croce, arising from “practical origin”, is related to Gramsci’s 
conception of the role of the antithesis in the dialectic. Counter to Croce, in a dialectical movement 
it is not possible to “mechanically” predict whether a thesis will be “preserved” in the synthesis 
emerging from the process of “supersession” [FSPN, p.342]. In real history, argues Gramsci, “the 
antithesis tends to destroy the thesis”, and what elements of the thesis might be preserved in the 
synthesis cannot be foretold. Or in other words, one is not “able to ‘award’ points in advance 
according to Queensberry Rules” [FSPN, p.342]. 
For Gramsci, whereas other philosophies are non-organic, since they “aim at reconciling opposing 
and contradictory interest”, the philosophy of praxis eschews a peaceful reconciliation since it is in 
fact the “very theory of these contradictions” [FSPN, p.395]. Rather than being an instrument of 
government, it is the expression of the subaltern classes who have an interest in avoiding all 
deceptions, even self-deceptions. The philosophy of praxis is therefore not “formally” dialectical like 
the “speculative and conceptual” dialectic in Croce, since it sees the dialectic in “historical becoming 
itself” [FSPN, p.396]. 
c) Catharsis, Freedom and Class Consciousness 
In a note on the Problems of Philosophy and History, Gramsci appropriates the term “catharsis”, in 
what Geoffrey Nowell Smith, the editor of the note, suggests is a “highly original use…to indicate 
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(roughly speaking) the acquisition of revolutionary consciousness” [SPN, p.366 fn.58]. Although 
often overlooked, Gramsci makes some startling claims about this concept that merit further 
attention. Indeed despite occurring only eight times in the Prison Notebooks, Peter Thomas argues 
that it is “one of the central terms of Gramsci’s political theory”.47 We will now briefly examine the 
term, Gramsci’s use of it, and finally make a comparison with the questions of the realms of freedom 
and necessity and of Lukács’s conception of the ‘leap’ from empirical to imputed/ascribed class 
consciousness. 
In the Oxford English Dictionary, catharsis, in this sense, refers to the “purification of the emotions 
by vicarious experience”, with particular reference to its origin in Aristotle’s Poetics.48 From the 
outset this might seem like a somewhat passive and spectatorial terminology to adopt.49 Gramsci 
employs the term to “indicate the passage from the purely economic (or egoistic-passional) to the 
ethico-political moment”, or more concretely to indicate the “superior elaboration of the structure 
into superstructure in the minds of men” [SPN, p.366]. This explanation employs Crocean 
terminology, in demonstrating the movement from “particular” economic-corporate to “universal” 
hegemonic moments. Nowell Smith argues however, that the Crocean system is subverted by the 
central role of Gramsci’s conception of politics in his thought [SPN, p.366 fn.58].50 
In addition, Gramsci argues that the term “catharsis” also means the “passage from ‘objective to 
subjective’ and from ‘necessity to freedom’” [SPN, p.367]. This might be interpreted as suggesting 
that the process of catharsis gives thought a free movement released from its basis in the 
“contradictions engendered in the world of production” [SPN, p.367 fn.59]. Marx makes clear in 
Capital that the “true realm of freedom” can only blossom with “the realm of necessity as its basis” 
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 Thomas argues that the term derives from Gramsci’s engagement with “Croce’s aesthetics” and a “novel 
reading of the tenth Canto of Dante’s Inferno” – Thomas, P The Gramscian Moment (Chicago: Haymarket, 
2009), p.294. 
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 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition – s.v. “catharsis” 
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 This may concur with Gramsci’s observation that the role played by the masses in the initial phases of a 
movement is largely by demonstrating “loyalty and discipline” as their ‘active’ contribution (Gramsci 
Selections, p.334). 
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[Capital, III, p.959]. Although his observations are somewhat opaque, Gramsci does not explicitly 
contradict Marx’s conception. 
Rather Gramsci suggests that “catharsis” is a process in which structure “ceases to be an external 
force” that crushes, assimilates and makes humanity passive [SPN, p.367]. On the contrary, this 
process transforms structure into a “means of freedom”, an “instrument to create a new ethico-
political form”, and a “source of new initiatives” [SPN, p.367]. The culmination of Gramsci’s 
argument is that establishing the ‘cathartic’ moment is the “starting point for all the philosophy of 
praxis”, and that the “cathartic process coincides with the chain of syntheses which have resulted 
from the evolution of the dialectic” [SPN, p.367]. 
Gramsci is keenly aware of the potential misuses and distortions of the Hegelian dialectic in general 
and therefore in particular of the notion of ‘catharsis’. He notes that amongst the intellectuals, e.g. 
Croce, who conceive themselves as “arbiters and mediators of real political struggles”, there is a 
tendency to see themselves as “personifying” this ‘catharsis’, and to deem themselves capable of 
manipulating the synthesis of the dialectical process “in a speculative fashion in their mind,” [FSPN, 
p. 343]. Gramsci is interested in establishing, in opposition to this speculative act, the cathartic 
moment in the dialectic of the real historical process. 
d) Gramsci and Lukács 
We will now compare Gramsci’s conception of catharsis with Lukács’s understanding of the ‘leap’ 
between the empirical and ascribed/imputed consciousness of the proletariat. Lukács’s 
understanding is often understood as representing the speculative and intellectual catharsis that 
Gramsci criticises above. We might ask however, whether Lukács’s conception understood in more 
sophisticated terms is actually compatible with the authentic ‘cathartic moment’ in the Gramscian 
sense, as a starting point for a transition to the philosophy of praxis, rather than its messianic 
realisation in a lightning flash. If this were true, these two concepts of the ‘leap’ and the ‘cathartic 
moment’ would represent a point of convergence between these two distinctive conceptions of 
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Marxism. Nevertheless we might say that Gramsci gives the more concrete account of the 
acquisition of class consciousness in his appropriation from Sorel of the conception of the spirit of 
“cleavage” and its transformation with a reconstructive element that is historically exemplified in 
the modern Prince [SPN, p.52, p.126 fn.4]. 
In terms of a concrete engagement between the two thinkers, Gramsci is conscious of “Professor 
Lukács” and comments on the necessity of studying his position on the philosophy of praxis [SPN, 
p.448].51 However Gramsci’s only theoretical commentary, in the Selections, consists of some 
speculation regarding Lukács’s position on the possibility of speaking of a dialectic for the history of 
man and not of nature, upon which Gramsci equivocates [SPN, p.448]. Gramsci is aware that Lukács, 
like him, is critical of the “baroque theories” of Bukharin’s Popular Manual, but suggests that 
Lukács’s reaction against this may have led him towards idealism [SPN, p.448]. But, as the editors of 
the Selections point out, it is unclear if these comments are based on a reading of any substantive 
works by Lukács, or merely on the accounts of Lukács’s critics.52 
It is useful however to consider the possible complementarity of the Lukácsian and Gramscian 
frameworks as a whole. We can already observe from our studies thus far the substantial differences 
that exist in the focuses of their investigations. The most evident difference is Lukács’s central 
concern with the concept of reification and his critique of capitalist rationalisation. Although Gramsci 
is clearly aware of Max Weber’s writings,53 Lukács’s attempts in History and Class Consciousness to 
systematically integrate Weber’s categories of rationalisation into Marxism marks his work as 
distinctive. It would perhaps be fruitful to investigate what benefits this might have for Gramsci’s 
more concrete framework of analysis in the Prison Notebooks. 
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 Gramsci spent “several months in Vienna in 1924 when History and Class Consciousness was being widely 
discussed” (Jay, M Marxism and Totality (Berkeley: University of California, 1984), p.158). 
52
 e.g. Abram Deborin (Gramsci Selections, p.448 fn.94). 
53
 Gramsci refers to Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Gramsci Selections, p.338) and to 
his critique of bureaucracy (Gramsci Selections, p.228). 
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According to Martin Jay, since Gramsci did not have a “firm belief in the existence of a meta-subject 
which objectified itself in the world”, his writings did not focus on the process of reified 
objectification.54 In other words, Gramsci’s political thought is not concerned to posit the proletariat 
as an equivalent to Lukács’s identical subject-object of history. Gramsci was in fact hostile to 
anything identified as an idealisation of action, of the type that he identified and criticised in the 
thought of Giovanni Gentile. On the other hand, Jay suggests that we do find in Gramsci, counter to 
an initial positing of a meta-subject capable of creating the totality, an “intersubjective totalisation 
which is to be completed in the future” entailing the “achievement of a linguistically unified 
community with shared meanings”.55 This leaves open the question of what in fact constitutes the 
grounding element of this totalisation, although we can perhaps agree with Jay that it is “no less 
cultural than it is economic”.56 
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a) Gramsci and Marx 
In this chapter we have set out to study various issues in Gramsci’s thought: the intellectuals, the 
question of the State, bourgeois and proletarian hegemony, and his conception of philosophy. We 
have found that the investigation of each of these leads itself by numerous paths onto the terrain of 
the others. Thus the determination of an adequate account of each is reliant on an account of the 
whole. More specifically, each of Gramsci’s concepts is reliant on a set of related concepts for its 
concrete determination. In this character of his thought, we might argue that Gramsci is preserving 
an “orthodoxy” with respect to the method developed by Marx in Capital [SPN, p.462]. 
In contrast to the painstakingly ordered presentation of Marx’s Capital (albeit not completed in his 
lifetime), Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks come to us as a set of notes that are famously labyrinthine and 
fragmented. This makes the effort of establishing the full determination of Gramsci’s concepts no 
small task. Regarding its fragmentary nature, the Prison Notebooks may be a reminder of similar 
difficulties we encountered in the interpretation of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
in a previous chapter. 
We might conjecture that the difficulties of ordering Gramsci’s work are not solely due to his 
condition of incarceration during its writing, although this is clearly a factor, but also with the 
difficulty of structuring and presenting material elaborating a Marxist analysis of class consciousness 
and the complex superstructures of capitalist society.57 In addition, Gramsci’s engagement with 
Marx’s Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and the development of its 
themes is a recurring motif within the Prison Notebooks. Whilst many of the questions we have 
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 Although, as we have attempted to convey, this does not detract from Gramsci’s sharp understanding of 
Marxist economic theory and his account of the structure of capitalist society: e.g. as demonstrated by his 
understanding of economic laws as tendency, appreciation of the methodological innovations of David 
Ricardo, etc. (Gramsci Selections, p.400). This argument is developed by Thomas in The Gramscian Moment 
(Thomas The Gramscian Moment, p.347). 
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raised provoke further avenues of investigation, we have discovered that Gramsci presents us with a 
distinctive conception of subjectivity. We will attempt to summarise briefly our findings. 
b) Gramsci’s Conception of Subjectivity 
Gramsci’s conception of subjectivity is distinctive in its concrete account of the constitution of class 
subjects through an analysis of their hegemonic projects. In elaborating the various aspects of class 
power, the comparative nature of Gramsci’s analysis also marks him out as distinctive. Whilst we 
have differentiated Gramsci from the version of the Lukácsian problematic that seeks to establish a 
philosophical unity of subject and object, we have argued that the concept of totality enters into 
Gramsci’s framework via other channels, particularly in the possibility of a ‘cathartic’ moment that 
becomes the starting point of the philosophy of praxis. 
We have argued that the intellectuals are a fundamental and molecular building block in Gramsci’s 
general theory of class power. We have analysed the complexities that the “traditional” intellectuals 
introduce into his conception of class subjectivity, and which he incorporates through a historical 
analysis that dismantles their “esprit de corps” and caste-status to reveal the class basis of their 
subjectivity. By examining the critical broadening of the common-sense definition of the 
intellectuals, and other concepts, we have also highlighted a crucial methodological aspect of 
Gramsci’s thought: the key role played by the production of new conceptions in Gramsci’s political 
(and philosophical) project, and the corresponding attention given to both the form and content of 
language. 
In considering whether Gramsci’s account of the State is compatible with his conception of class 
subjectivity, we have identified two distinct modes of analysis: holistic and constitutive. We have 
defined the constitutive analysis as that exemplified in his study of the formation of the State 
bureaucracy. In our assessment, this mode allows the apparent autonomy of the State to be 
reconsidered within the framework of the molecular processes through which the State recruits its 
personnel, which are themselves grounded in class. On the other hand, we have also argued that 
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Gramsci conducts his analysis through a second mode. This holistic mode considers the relations 
between class and State at a totalising level. When considered from the holistic mode, we have 
noted the active role played by the State in the constitution of the dominant class’s hegemonic 
project. We have advanced the argument that Gramsci considers the relationship between these 
modes as a dialectical one, although it has been registered that other explanations could be 
asserted, e.g. a functional analysis. 
Finally we considered Gramsci’s distinctive conception of philosophy as a collective project, and his 
understanding of the dialectic in contrast to that of Croce. In particular we examined Gramsci’s 
conception of ‘catharsis’ and the possibility emerging from this concept of making a comparative 
analysis of the differing ways in which the concept of totality enters into the theories of subjectivity 
of both Gramsci and Lukács. In summary, we have found that Gramsci’s conception of subjectivity is 
a testament to his commitment to analysing, in the modern context, Marx’s conception of “ideas 
becoming a material force” [SPN, p.333 fn.16]. 
  
Conclusion 
1) Marxism as the Philosophy of Praxis 
By tracing the development of conceptions of subjectivity through a selection of key texts in the 
classical Marxist tradition, this thesis has identified a theme relating the creation of a revolutionary 
subject to the overcoming of obstacles to working class subjectivity. These obstacles are expressed 
in various forms: alienated labour (Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts), commodity 
fetishism (Marx’s Capital), and the phenomenon of reification (Lukács’s History and Class 
Consciousness). I have argued that Gramsci’s project to construct a proletarian hegemonic project 
and its corresponding world-view also expresses a de-fetishising function. Although Gramsci 
conceives the processes upon which this function is performed very differently to Lukács, both seek 
to formulate the essential core of Marxism as a philosophy of praxis. 
a) Walter Benjamin and Contemporary Debates in Subjectivity 
Through the works of Marx, Lukács and Gramsci, I have addressed the problem of revolutionary 
subjectivity as a question of political subjectivity, approaching the notion of the subjectivity of labour 
and the proletariat as a potential collective political agent. Thus I have focused on the political 
aspect in contrast to broader explorations of the notion of subjectivity undertaken by other thinkers. 
There are however many links between the political aspect studied here and these more general 
investigations. Michael Löwy has for example indicated the formative influence of Lukács’s History 
and Class Consciousness on the work of Walter Benjamin.1 
In common with Lukács and Gramsci, Benjamin’s theory of revolution, expressed in his Theses on the 
Philosophy of History, is one that counters the deterministic notions of progress associated primarily 
                                                          
1
 Löwy, M Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s ‘On the Concept of History’ (London: Verso, 2005), p.8 
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with the dominant Marxism of the Second International.2 Benjamin sought to unify messianic and 
revolutionary thought by conceptualising revolution as the blowing open of the continuum of 
“homogenous empty time”, an oblivion filled with data into which the oppressed past disappears.3 
By rejecting conventional notions of progress, Benjamin’s Theses have in turn exerted a strong 
influence on subsequent Marxist and non-Marxist conceptions of subjectivity. 
Indeed, in recent years the problem of subjectivity has been addressed in new ways by the radical 
philosophers Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou.4 Their conception of revolutionary subjectivity can be 
understood in simple terms as a rupture from the normal routines of material existence. This theme, 
addressed so vividly by Benjamin, illuminates one aspect of the continuity between the concerns of 
Lukács and Gramsci and these contemporary thinkers. 
Whilst Žižek tends to express his insights through the psychoanalytical framework of Jacques Lacan, 
these concerns are closely intertwined with his engagement with Marxism. For Žižek, the project of 
Leninist re-invention that was necessitated by the collapse of progressivism in 1914 must be 
repeated today due to the “stale, existing (post)ideological coordinates”.5 In simple terms, Žižek’s 
notion of revolutionary subjectivity can be conceived as a reaction to certain extreme circumstances. 
Counter to the political assertion of post-modernism that “nothing really happens”, Žižek steers us 
towards Badiou’s notion of the Event and his affirmation that “miracles do happen”.6 Badiou’s 
reference to miracles is reminiscent of Benjamin’s messianic notion of the sudden emergence of 
“now-time”, in which history becomes available to humanity.7 Benjamin draws an explicit link 
between the possibility of such a “tiger’s leap into the past” and Marx’s conception of revolution. 
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 Gramsci’s critical remarks on progress as a “democratic ideology” and its historical origins can be found in 
The Prison Notebooks (Gramsci, A Selections from the Prison Notebooks ed. and trans. Hoare, Q and Nowell-
Smith, G (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p.357 – Henceforth referenced in the text as [SPN, p.357], i.e. 
[Selections from the Prison Notebooks, page 357]). 
3
 Löwy Fire Alarm, p.94 
4
 Badiou, A Being and Event (London: Continuum, 2005) and Žižek, S The Ticklish Subject: the Absent Centre of 
Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999) 
5
 Žižek, Slavoj “A Plea for Leninist Intolerance” Critical Inquiry 28:2 (Winter 2002), p.553 
6
 Žižek The Ticklish Subject, p.135 
7
 Löwy Fire Alarm, p.86 
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b) Normality and Crisis 
The adoption of a stance that breaks with normality is closely associated in classical Marxist thought 
with the notion of a revolutionary crisis. Indeed the thinkers studied in this thesis all have a 
conception of the increasing tendency of capitalist society to move into crisis. For Gramsci, a crisis 
consists, “precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born” [SPN, p.276]. In a 
period that he describes as an “organic crisis”, the masses are capable of re-organising “like lightning 
in comparison with periods of calm” [SPN, p.211]. Lukács’s conception of class consciousness gives a 
theoretical basis to this capacity of the proletariat to advance by “leaps” [HCC, p.249].8 
Lukács attempts to use his theory of reification to demonstrate that the structure of a crisis is not 
qualitatively different to that of the “daily life of bourgeois society”, but is rather the peak of its 
intensity [HCC, p.101]. The influence of the tragic conception of bourgeois culture leads Lukács to 
emphasise the inherently crisis-ridden structure of capitalist society, and the necessity of an 
absolute break with it. Lukács seeks to give a philosophical basis to the privileged position of the 
proletariat in providing an escape route from this situation. 
Gramsci’s thought appropriates from Georges Sorel the conception of the spirit of “cleavage” in 
order to articulate the necessary break with capitalist society, but transforms it with a reconstructive 
element that is historically exemplified in the ‘Modern Prince’ [SPN, p.52, p.126 fn.4]. Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony investigates the capacities of developed capitalist societies to avert crises 
through the elaboration of the stabilising institutional apparatuses of civil society. Nevertheless for 
Marx, Lukács and Gramsci, the tendency towards crisis inherent in the capitalist economic system 
provides the opportunity for the conscious intervention of the working class. 
                                                          
8
 Lukács, G History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin, 1971), p.249 – Henceforth referenced in the text 
as [HCC, p.249], i.e. [History and Class Consciousness, p.249]. 
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2) Labour and the Proletariat 
a) Characteristics of the Marxist Conception of Subjectivity 
I contend that the defining characteristic of the conception of subjectivity that emerges from the 
writings of Marx, Lukács and Gramsci is that of the working class as the potential subject of the 
revolutionary transformation of capitalist society. The prime axis of this conception is the connection 
in this body of work between the notion of labour as a subject and that of the proletariat as a class 
subject. Whilst this does not preclude the classical Marxist tradition from acknowledging the agency 
of other actors in capitalist society, it is fundamental to this framework that a unique feature of the 
proletariat is its potential to be the subject of social revolution. 
The centrality of labour for the Marxist conception of subjectivity can be identified from Marx’s 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts onwards. At this early stage, many of the issues associated 
with the way in which the proletariat can constitute itself concretely as a class subject are 
necessarily somewhat theoretically underdeveloped. These questions are increasingly posed in 
theory and practice by the struggles over the length of the working day, the Paris Commune, and, for 
Lukács and Gramsci, by the revolutionary struggles of the early 20th century. However, the 
alienation of labour, one of the central theoretical issues for the Marxist conception of subjectivity, 
is already outlined in the Manuscripts. 
The theme of alienation is a pre-occupation explicitly or implicitly throughout much of this thesis.9 In 
each of the works that I have studied the process of the disruption of the potential subjectivity of 
labour and the creation of an alien power over and against it takes different forms. The process of 
the proletariat becoming a class-for-itself or of the realisation of a proletarian hegemonic project 
both, either explicitly or implicitly, involve a conception of the possibility of the positive overcoming 
of these obstacles. Whilst it is clear that the conceptual framework of Marx’s investigation in Capital 
                                                          
9
 For a recent close investigation of this theme see Sayers, S Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
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is very different to the register he adopts in the Manuscripts, I have argued that Marx maintains a 
commitment to the potential revolutionary subjectivity of the proletariat. 
This theme is closely linked with the concern of the classical Marxist tradition, from its origins in 
Marx’s Manuscripts, with the problem of the apparent subjectivity of private property under the 
modern system of production. There is continuity with this theme in the emphasis that Marx places 
in Capital on the scientific investigation of the laws of capitalist development, and his analysis of 
capital as a “self-moving substance”, the subject of its own process.10 
I have tried to show that the analysis of Capital advanced by Moishe Postone runs counter to the 
classical Marxist tradition by displacing the role of the proletariat and the notion of labour as 
subject. Despite his concern with the notion of ‘abstract labour’, Postone presents labour one-
sidedly as the object of Marx’s critique in Capital. Whilst I found some substance to the claims by 
Michael Lebowitz that Marx treats workers as objects within the labour process in Capital, I argued 
that Marx continues to conceive the proletariat as the potential revolutionary subject. Postone’s 
critique does demonstrate however the difficulties involved in attempting to adequately formulate 
both a theory of the determinate forms of social mediation and a class-based analysis of capitalism. 
b) Social Relations and Class Consciousness 
Marx’s Capital is closely concerned with the social relations of production that are embodied in the 
individual through a process of personification. These social relations of production allow classical 
Marxism to investigate the connection between the structure of society and the forms of 
consciousness that arise from it. I argued that Marx’s notion of the person as a living incarnation of 
social relations must include the dimension of lived experience. At the same time, Marx is 
committed in Capital to making a concrete analysis of working class struggle and its influence on the 
functioning of the laws of capitalist production. In this context, I examined his exposition of the 
interaction between the working class movement and the factory inspectors, like Leonard Horner. 
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 Marx, K Capital Vol. I (London: Penguin, 1990 [1976]), p.256 
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It would be possible to investigate further the relationship between Marx’s conception of class 
struggle in the chapter on the Working Day and his analysis of large-scale industry. Or, in other 
words, to question how the further development of the processes detailed in Marx’s writings on 
large-scale industry affect our understanding of the proletariat as a subject and the processes 
described in the sections on the class struggle over the working day. It is a contradiction that the 
Factory Acts, which seek to protect the conditions of workers' lives, tend to increase the speed at 
which the development of large-scale industry reduces workers to the level of objects within the 
labour process. An analysis of this problem could have important consequences for our 
understanding of the relationship between the workplace and wider society and make an important 
contribution to the transformation of these social relations. 
c) The Proletariat as ‘Universal Class’ 
In the Reification essay of Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness, I identified a potential 
separation between Lukács’s conception of the proletariat as the solution to the philosophical 
problem of the antinomies of bourgeois thought, and the understanding of the proletariat as the 
empirically-existing working class. A comparable distinction can be located in the writings of Alain 
Badiou, who distinguishes on this basis between the proletariat as a revolutionary subject and the 
empirically-existing working class.11 
In his book The Resources of Critique, Alex Callinicos contends that three contemporary thinkers, 
Badiou, Žižek and the political theorist Stathis Kouvelakis all oppose the notion of the proletariat as a 
universal class to the sociological working class.12 Callinicos argues that the lesson of Marx’s polemic 
in texts such as The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte is that the apparent autonomy of the 
political sphere must have an “anchorage in social reality”.13 
                                                          
11
 Callinicos , Alex The Resources of Critique (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p.93 
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 Callinicos The Resources of Critique, p.118 
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 Callinicos The Resources of Critique, p.118 
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Lukács’s conception of the proletariat as the ‘identical subject-object’ of history builds on Marx’s 
notion that the proletariat is the potential ‘universal class’. In his 1843 Introduction, Marx argues 
that the proletariat is “a sphere which has a universal character because of its universal suffering”, 
since it elevates “to a principle for society what society has already made a principle for the 
proletariat”.14 In his commentary on Lukács’s Tailism and the Dialectic, Žižek examines the dialectical 
logic of affirming the proletariat as the “universal class”.15 Žižek argues that the claim that the 
proletariat is the ‘universal class’ is equivalent to claiming that it is “radically dislocated … with 
relation to the social body”.16 The danger of this dislocation is that it risks scrambling the co-
ordinates of, what Callinicos calls, ‘the class map of modern society’ beyond recognition.17 
Whilst Žižek does not dispute the potential misuses of the notion of proletariat as the ‘identical 
subject-object’ of history, he contends that it has a continuing significance.18 For Žižek, Lukács’s 
revolutionary subject does not force an objective situation. Rather a genuine political intervention 
has the effect of “reshuffling … the global matrix”.19 I claim that the messianic conception of the 
‘leap’ can be mitigated if an interaction between consciousness and its objects is seen to continually 
change the basis of the relationship between empirical and imputed consciousness. Thus Lukács’s 
argument that a “sudden dislocation” is possible in a moment of crisis is crucial to the possibility of 
revolutionary subjectivity [HCC, p.101]. 
Žižek draws our attention to the Lukácsian concept of Augenblick, ‘the blink of an eye’, which is that 
moment in which “there is an opening for an act to intervene in a situation”.20 This concept is very 
close, he argues, to Badiou’s central concept of the Event, “an intervention that cannot be 
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 Marx, Karl Early Writings (London: Penguin, 1992), p.256 
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 Žižek, Slavoj “Georg Lukács as the philosopher of Leninism” in Lukács, Georg Tailism and the Dialectic 
(London: Verso, 2000), p.161 
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 Žižek “Georg Lukács as the philosopher of Leninism”, p.163 
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formulated in terms of its pre-existing ‘objective conditions’”.21 Žižek suggests that this aspect of 
Lukács’s thought shows him in an unexpectedly ‘Gramscian’ light. 
To explain this comment, Žižek characterises a distinction between the thought of Lukács and Louis 
Althusser. He contends that each articulates “a crucial problematic excluded from the opponent’s 
horizon”.22 For Lukács, this is the “historical act”, and for Althusser the notion of the Ideological 
State Apparatuses as the “material existence of ideology”.23 Although he acknowledges that no 
straightforward synthesis of their frameworks is possible, Žižek suggestively comments that 
Gramsci’s work might help us to move beyond this impasse. 
I have sought to investigate whether the challenges to Lukács’s framework, his account of the 
proletariat becoming an ‘identical subject-object’, might be overcome with the benefit of insights 
derived from Gramsci’s conception of contradictory consciousness and his distinctively concrete 
account of the formation of class subjectivity. This raises the question of whether the implicit 
understanding of fetishism that I argue can be found in Gramsci’s thought and its explicit but 
particular theorisation in Lukács’s theory of reification can be rendered compatible. 
3) Lukács and Gramsci 
a) The Formation of Class Consciousness 
There is a close connection for both Lukács and Gramsci between the formation of class 
consciousness and the process by which the working class becomes a subject. Defining the 
separation between proletarian class consciousness and bourgeois class consciousness is a central 
concern for thinkers such as Lukács. Marxist theory is confronted by the problem of overcoming the 
domination of bourgeois ideology in capitalist society, which Lukács formulates as the gap between 
the empirical consciousness of the proletariat and its ascribed or imputed consciousness. Lukács’s 
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conception of subjectivity focuses on theorising the principle by which the proletariat can create a 
revolutionary break with the current society, whilst Gramsci emphasises that it must construct this 
project with tools and ideas drawn from within it.  
For both Lukács and Gramsci, this process is a collective project in which organisation and political 
leadership mediate between theory and practice. They conceive philosophy as a practico-critical 
activity in which knowledge plays an active role in social reality. Thus Gramsci returns again and 
again to Marx’s concern with the processes by which the “fanatical granite compactness” of 
“popular beliefs” attains the energy of “material forces” [SPN, p.404]. 
Since class consciousness plays an active role in the transformation of social relations, this 
necessitates the exploration of the factors by which it is mediated. This mediation takes place at all 
levels, the economic, political, and cultural, and it involves the social institutions of the state, 
political parties, education, trade unions, etc. I have argued that the classical Marxist tradition 
attempts to generate these determinate forms of social mediation from a class-based analysis of 
exploitation. The most sophisticated expression of this method remains Marx’s great work Capital. 
I identified Lukács’s notion of the ‘leap’ from empirical to ascribed/imputed consciousness and 
Gramsci’s conception of ‘catharsis’ as a point of departure for studying the complementarity of their 
frameworks. Peter Thomas argues that for Gramsci ‘catharsis’ plays a central role in his 
understanding of the philosophy of praxis.24 The editors of the Prison Notebooks suggest that 
‘catharsis’ can be roughly understood as the “acquisition of revolutionary consciousness”.25 Whilst 
Lukács emphasises the qualitative element of transcendence, Gramsci highlights the immanent, 
‘quantitative’ difference between popular conceptions and Marxist theory. I contend that each 
articulates a necessary element for a dialectical conception of revolutionary subjectivity.  
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b) Immanence and Transcendence 
Lukács’s theory of reification seeks to provide a principle or cutting edge by which a distinction can 
be drawn between the proletarian and bourgeois standpoints. For Lukács, the proletariat is capable 
of penetrating the reified forms of consciousness generated by the commodity-form as a universal 
structuring principle under capitalism. Through its privileged social position, the proletariat is able to 
generate the mediating links necessary to delve beneath immediate appearances to an ‘authentic’ 
reality. A proletarian standpoint capable of penetrating reification provides the possibility of a sharp 
break with a doomed bourgeois culture. 
By contrast, Gramsci is hostile to any solutions to philosophical problems that appear to be 
metaphysical or transcendental, which he sees as reinforcing a mechanical and determinist 
conception of the world. Gramsci characterises the twin problems facing Marxism as a philosophy of 
praxis: on the one hand, it arises as a moment of modern culture both influenced and influencing it, 
and on the other, it must create a new culture that is independent and original [SPN, p.388]. This 
requires a development of social relations arising from a revolutionary crisis, and a corresponding 
period of crisis in the cultural field, that he denotes as Sturm und Drang [SPN, p.388]. 
Gramsci’s comparative method analyses the respective hegemonic projects of the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat. His philosophical emphasis on immanence is opposed to any speculative basis by 
which to distinguish between them [SPN, p.402]. The historicisation of ‘truth’ that Gramsci ascribes 
to the philosophy of praxis leaves him open to accusations of relativism. He acknowledges that for 
Marxism this makes it difficult to motivate revolutionary political action without necessitating a 
relapse into dogmatism [SPN, p.406-7].26 
I would argue that the resistance of Gramsci’s framework to accusations of relativism arises from his 
conception of the different elements of this relationship of unity between man and matter: 
economics, philosophy and politics. Gramsci’s image as a non-economistic thinker has been 
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contested by recent scholarship.27 His rejection of the notion that “every fluctuation of politics and 
ideology” can be read off as an “immediate expression of the structure”, does not imply his rejection 
of mediated importance of the economy [SPN, p.407]. Although Gramsci does not establish a general 
principle relating the generation of mediation to the economic position of the proletariat, his theory 
finds an anchorage in value as the unitary centre of economics [SPN, p.402]. 
He maintains that there is a mutual translatability between the scientific concepts appropriate to 
these levels [SPN, p.403]. I have argued therefore that the de-reifying function in Gramsci’s thought 
is expressed simultaneously at the levels of philosophy and politics: in the de-mummifying of 
popular culture by philosophy [SPN, p.417], and the de-fetishising function of the revolutionary 
party, the Modern Prince. 
Lukács makes a high-stakes gamble by seeking to dissolve all reified phenomena into mediated 
processes, placing a heavy philosophical burden on the potential of the proletariat to become the 
‘identical subject-object’ of history. The chapter on Lukács identified the difficulties of synthesising 
his conception of a philosophical absolute or ‘universal’ subject with the empirically-existing working 
class. This raises the question of how the capacity of the proletariat to generate mediations in 
consciousness concretely relates to the process of class struggle. One answer is to turn to Gramsci’s 
conception of class subjectivity, which is marked out as distinctive by the concrete account that he 
gives of the constitution of class subjects through an analysis of their hegemonic projects. 
Lukács does attempt to mediate between his philosophical and empirical notions of the working 
class by addressing the organisational problems of a revolutionary party in the later essays in History 
and Class Consciousness. However, Lukács’s theory of the relationship between the revolutionary 
party and the working class tends to focus on matters of form rather than content. This content-less 
aspect may support suggestions that Lukács’s conception of the party shares some similarities with 
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Badiou’s conception of the void.28 There is a potential link between what Lukács calls the problem of 
genesis, and Badiou’s concern with the process by which genuine novelty enters the world. 
For Lukács, the problem of genesis, of the creation of new content in history, can only be solved by 
the proletariat. This leaves him open to the accusation that the proletariat is the sole subject in 
history, even prior to capitalism. Žižek rejects this characterisation of Lukács by arguing that it is 
necessary to distinguish between the different historical shapes of the “dialectical tension and 
interdependence between necessity and contingency”.29 
Lukács’s conception of subjectivity emphasises the transcendence of the proletariat as a transparent 
acquisition of self-consciousness. Although he recognises gradations in class-consciousness, there is 
a certain absence of content in the analysis of these intermediate stages. On the other hand, for 
Gramsci the concrete forms of institutionalisation associated with the development of a hegemonic 
project mitigate against speculative excesses. 
Lukács explicitly places the category of totality at the centre of his understanding of the dialectic. It is 
for him the “bearer of the principle of revolution in science”.30 In Gramsci’s case the notion of 
totality enters into his framework via other channels: his emphasis on the ‘organic’, his valorisation 
of the ‘totalitarian’ in certain contexts, his conception of historical unity, and a philosophical 
commitment to the ‘immanent’. 
Gramsci was particularly hostile to anything that he deemed to be an idealisation of action, or to the 
positing of a meta-subject capable of creating the totality. However, Martin Jay argues that the 
important role played by language in Gramsci’s conception of the formation of consciousness belies 
a totalising project in which a future “linguistically unified community with shared meanings” might 
be achieved.31 
                                                          
28
 I am grateful to Anindya Bhattacharyya for suggesting this insight. 
29
 Žižek “Georg Lukács as the philosopher of Leninism”, p.171 
30
 Lukács History and Class Consciousness, p.27 
31
 Jay, M Marxism and Totality (Berkeley: University of California, 1984), p.159 
291 
 
Gramsci’s critical project is therefore reflected in language, constantly working on and re-working 
common sense conceptions to develop critical notions. The contradictory consciousness of the 
proletariat displays a composite nature. Ideas appropriate to working class self-activity can and must 
co-exist with conceptions transmitted through the dominant hegemonic project [SPN, p.324]. This 
necessitates a certain fragmentation inherent in the construction of a proletarian hegemonic 
project, and the closely related creation of a unified world-view. 
In this sense, Gramsci’s counter-position of the ‘commonly understood’ meaning of the State and his 
own expansive conception of the integral State is one of the pivotal questions of his project. Class 
subjectivity is realised for Gramsci through the construction of the hegemony of the State. Rather 
than the creation of a transparent collective subject, it is a complex institutionalisation that involves 
the various aspects of civil and political society. 
This differentiated conception of the institutionalisation of subjectivity appears to be in tension with 
the explanatory unity of Lukács’s conception of reification. However, these tensions seem to arise 
from the theorisation of sharpening contradictions that exist in reality, and these thinkers’ attempts 
to grapple with the intensifying fragmentation of proletarian subjectivity under capitalism. This leads 
me to believe that I have identified aspects of the Gramscian and Lukácsian frameworks that 
indicate useful points of departure for pursuing a Marxist conception of subjectivity. 
4) The Subjectivity of Labour in the Twenty-First Century? 
Can the notion of the subjectivity of labour and of the proletariat, central for the classical Marxist 
tradition, endure in contemporary debates about subjectivity? Žižek attempts to reclaim subjectivity 
from the post-modern critique by reasserting the “spectre of the Cartesian subject”.32 He rejects the 
prioritisation of “cultural recognition over socioeconomic struggle” that is characteristic of certain 
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tendencies of post-modern political thought, such as ‘identity politics’.33 However, Žižek’s counter-
proposal for a “leftist, anti-capitalist political project” is less transparent than his critique.34 His re-
engagement with Hegel and defence of the ‘authenticity’ of Leninist politics,35 leads him to argue for 
a “radical repoliticization of the economy”.36 This notion raises interesting questions, but I would 
argue that Žižek draws up short of establishing the role played by the proletariat and labour as a 
potential revolutionary subject in this project. It appears that there is still much potential for 
clarifying the relationship between post-Marxist accounts of subjectivity and the framework that 
arises from the key works of the classical Marxist tradition. 
In posing the proletariat as the potential revolutionary subject, the classical Marxist tradition, 
particularly its Lukácsian formulation, is necessarily exposed to accusations of re-creating a Hegelian 
absolute subject. I contend that this tradition, self-consciously critical of Hegel from its inception, 
rejects the false ‘catharsis’ that such a solution represents. At the same time, I argue that, for 
classical Marxism, the forms of subjectivity that arise from the proletariat have an intimate 
connection with the process of totalisation. The various exponents of this tradition, as I have shown 
with Lukács and Gramsci, develop very different ways of formulating the relationship between the 
proletariat and the process of totalisation. 
The intervening historical period has seen the intensification of the processes of capitalist reification 
that gave rise to Lukács’s formulation of the philosophical basis of the proletariat as the subject of 
social revolution. The limitations of Lukács’s conception have been drawn out in this thesis. Whilst 
the problems of positing the proletariat as a meta-subject capable of generating the totality have 
been demonstrated, the fusion of a Lukácsian framework with other types of de-fetishisation 
implicitly found in the Gramscian project remains undeveloped. An account would be required that 
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critically assesses the particular strengths of Lukács’s and Gramsci’s approaches and synthesises 
both in a unified framework. 
An impoverished version of ‘traditional’ Marxism has often been the intellectual sparring partner for 
trends of thought that lead away from conceptions of totality, towards the dissolution of the subject 
into flows of meaning and towards the constitution of reality through language. I claim that the 
reading of the classical Marxist tradition developed in this thesis possesses the theoretical tools to 
analyse language as social mediation.37 For Gramsci, the problem of the development of the 
autonomy of the subaltern classes is closely connected to his analysis of language. He contends that 
conceptions of the world must be transformed through a practico-critical process. Here it could be 
argued that there is an underexplored path returning from the linguistic dissolution of the subject 
back to the concern with the construction of a proletarian hegemonic project, characteristic of the 
classical Marxist tradition.38 
5) A Tradition Obscured 
The classical Marxist tradition presented here – Marx’s thought and its renewal by Lukács and 
Gramsci – predates both the rise of Stalinism and the later revolutionary movements of the 
twentieth century. However, the legacy of Stalinism accompanies all returns to Marx’s writings in 
the twenty-first century. For this reason – just as Lukács and Gramsci sought to re-establish the spirit 
of Marx’s thought – it must again be creatively renewed in the light of these experiences. However, 
it could be argued that the majority of attempts to do so have jettisoned the core content of this 
tradition. 
The works studied within this project can be located as pre-cursors to entire trends of thought. 
Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness is a foundational text for the critical theory of Frankfurt 
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School thinkers and those whom they influenced in turn. Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks were 
selectively adopted by the Italian Communist Party after the Second World War, and later used to 
justify the strategy of Eurocommunism. Specific readings of Gramsci’s concepts have been deployed 
in various fields: by the practitioners of cultural studies, and more recently by a neo-Gramscian trend 
within International Relations theory. 
The texts studied in this thesis can be considered as theoretical points of origin for the thought of 
many post-structuralists and post-Marxists. Thus a chain of mediations has been extended from the 
present back to Marx, but often resulting in an obscuration of aspects of the original work. By re-
examining key texts in the classical Marxist tradition this thesis has sought to construct a defensible 
conception of the solution advanced by Marx and his successors to the problem of subjectivity. It is 
part of an on-going project that aims to test the explanatory power of this tradition in the debates of 
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